R.I.G Hughes offers the first detailed and accessible analysis of the Hilbert-space models used in quantum theory and explains why they are so successful.

Group size is a function of relative neocortical volume in nonhuman primates. Extrapolation from this regression equation yields a predicted group size for modern humans very similar to that of certain hunter-gatherer and traditional horticulturalist societies. Groups of similar size are also found in other large-scale forms of contemporary and historical society. Among primates, the cohesion of groups is maintained by social grooming; the time devoted to social grooming is linearly related to group size among the Old World monkeys and (...) apes. To maintain the stability of the large groups characteristic of humans by grooming alone would place intolerable demands on time budgets. It is suggested that (1) the evolution of large groups in the human lineage depended on the development of a more efficient method for time-sharing the processes of social bonding and that (2) language uniquely fulfills this requirement. Data on the size of conversational and other small interacting groups of humans are in line with the predictions for the relative efficiency of conversation compared to grooming as a bonding process. Analysis of a sample of human conversations shows that about 60% of time is spent gossiping about relationships and personal experiences. It is suggested that language evolved to allow individuals to learn about the behavioural characteristics of other group members more rapidly than is possible by direct observation alone. (shrink)

R.I.G. Hughes presents a series of eight philosophical essays on the theoretical practices of physics. The first two essays examine these practices as they appear in physicists' treatises (e.g. Newton's Principia and Opticks ) and journal articles (by Einstein, Bohm and Pines, Aharonov and Bohm). By treating these publications as texts, Hughes casts the philosopher of science in the role of critic. This premise guides the following 6 essays which deal with various concerns of philosophy of physics such as laws, (...) disunities, models and representation, computer simulation, explanation, and the discourse of physics. (shrink)

Science and religion have been described as the “two dominant forces in our culture”. As such, the relation between them has been a matter of intense debate, having profound implications for deeper understanding of our place in the universe. One position naturally associated with scientists of a materialistic outlook is that science and religion are contradictory, incompatible worldviews; however, a great deal of recent literature criticises this “conflict thesis” as simple-minded, essentially ignorant of the nature of religion and its philosophical (...) and theological underpinnings. In this first part of a two-part article, I set out the wide-ranging background required for a proper understanding of the debate as a preliminary for the second part, in which Ian Barbour ’s influential four-fold typology of science-religion relations is critically assessed, leading to the conclusion that the conflict model is not to be so easily dismissed. (shrink)

It is shown that a formula of modal propositional logic has precisely the same models as a sentence of the first-order language of a single dyadic predicate iff its class of models is closed under ultraproducts. as a corollary, any modal formula definable by a set of first-order conditions is always definable by a single such condition. these results are then used to show that the formula (lmp 'validates' mlp) is not first-order definable.

Data on the number of adults that an individual contacts at least once a month in a set of British populations yield estimates of network sizes that correspond closely to those of the typical “sympathy group” size in humans. Men and women do not differ in their total network size, but women have more females and more kin in their networks than men do. Kin account for a significantly higher proportion of network members than would be expected by chance. The (...) number of kin in the network increases in proportion to the size of the family; as a result, people from large families have proportionately fewer non-kin in their networks, suggesting that there is either a time constraint or a cognitive constraint on network size. A small inner clique of the network functions as a support group from whom an individual is particularly likely to seek advice or assistance in time of need. Kin do not account for a significantly higher proportion of the support clique than they do for the wider network of regular social contacts for either men or women, but each sex exhibits a strong preference for members of their own sex. (shrink)

In the preceding Part 1 of this two-part paper, I set out the background necessary for an understanding of the current status of the debate surrounding the relationship between science and religion. In this second part, I will outline Ian Barbour’s influential four-fold typology of the possible relations, compare it with other similar taxonomies, and justify its choice as the basis for further detailed discussion. Arguments are then given for and against each of Barbour’s four models: conflict, independence, integration and (...) dialogue. In contradiction of the recent trend to dismiss the conflict model as overly “simplistic”, I conclude that it is the clear front-runner. Critical examination reveals that theology (the academic face of religion) typically proceeds by first affirming belief in God and then seeking rationalisations that protect this belief against contrary evidence. As this is the very antithesis of scientific endeavour, the two disciplines are in unavoidable and irreconcilable conflict. (shrink)

This volume of recent writings, some previously unpublished, follows the sequence of a typical intermediate or upper-level logic course and allows teachers to enrich their presentations of formal methods and results with readings on corresponding questions in philosophical logic.

Act Utilitarianism has traditionally been regarded as the view that you should always perform the action that will bring about the greatest possible excess of happiness over unhappiness or, if there is no such alternative, the least possible excess of unhappiness over happiness.1 Following Rawls, I shall call this the classical principle. An alternative which Rawls calls the average principle is the view that you should always do the thing that will bring about the highest possible average happiness level. Rawls, (...) Rescher and Broad2 regard the average principle as superior to the classical principle, and there are considerable grounds for supposing that Mill accepted the average principle.3 Smart favours the classical position but confesses that if someone doesn't feel the same way, he doesn't know how to argue with him.4. (shrink)

I shall argue here that the reason supererogatory acts are not obligatory is that they require too much personal sacrifice, and that in order for an act to be supererogatory, it must have a kind of result that you would have an obligation to bring about if you could do so with no personal sacrifice. I further argue that traditional utilitarianism should be modified so as not to treat supererogatory acts as obligatory.

The urgency of the research topic is that the attempt, through the prism of higher education in Ukraine, is to outline the factors and opportunities for forming a positive image of a modern teacher as the basis for the competitiveness of a higher educational institution. The purpose of the article is: rethinking the teacher’s image in conditions of growing demands and increasing competitiveness among higher education institutions. The objectives of the study are to summarize the data of the investigated problem (...) and to develop a model for the development of theoretical aspects of forming a teacher’s positive image in the context of the growth of the status of the university, and an analysis of the interdependence of the teacher’s image and his professional competence, practical skills, and the ability to associate theory with practice. The research methodology is general scientific and special-disciplinary methods of scientific research. In particular, the methods of theoretical generalization, analogy and abstraction are used to clarify the conditions, specifics and realities of the modern educational process, in particular – in higher educational institutions; deduction and induction, analysis and synthesis – to identify systemic problems of Ukrainian universities the needs satisfaction of educational services users; the synthesis of progressive ideas on designing ways to enhance the teacher’s positive image in the context of the growth of the status of higher education institutions. Also, special-disciplinary methods of scientific research are used: comparison, systematization and grouping – to generalize the model of development of theoretical aspects of creating of a positive image of the teacher in the context of the formation of the image of the university; analytical – in the analysis of the interdependence of the teacher's image and his professional competence, practical skills and ability to associate theory with practice, etc. The result of the study is a theoretical understanding of the teacher’s image in the context of the formation of the competitiveness of a higher educational institution. The result of the analysis is the constant, systematic improvement of their own professional competencies. And only under this condition, the teacher will be able to rely on the authority and respect among students and colleagues. It is noted that the current state of higher education dictates the necessity of finding new ways of solving problems of increasing the efficiency of not only training, preparation of a specialist in the labor market, but also the efficiency of the activity of a higher educational establishment in conditions of autonomy. Conclusion. The positive image of the teacher, and in general the educational institution, will increase the authority of the professions and specialties of higher education. And philosophy itself should assume responsibility for the formation of the future teacher, since since ancient times, philosophy has been, is and will be the reason for the comprehension of wisdom. The image of a modern teacher largely depends on his professional competence in practical skills and the ability to instruct students to study the theory in close relationship with practice. After all, knowledge becomes effective only in the applied aspect, in particular, when applying the principle of “theory-practice-theory". (shrink)

Probability kinematics is the theory of how subjective probabilities change with time, in response to certain constraints . Rules are classified by the imposed constraints for which the rules prescribe a procedure for updating one's opinion. The first is simple conditionalization , and the second Jeffrey conditionalization . It is demonstrated by a symmetry argument that these rules are the unique admissible rules for those constraints, and moreover, that any probability kinematic rule must be equivalent to a conditionalization preceded by (...) a determination of the values x i to be given to the members of such a partition. Next two rival rules which can go beyond such conditionalization are described. INFOMIN and MTP . Their properties are investigated and compared. (shrink)

In 1962 appeared one of the classic articles in Anglo-Saxon manuscript studies, the publication of two eleventh-century fragments of leaves of Old English found in the binding of a seventeenth-century printed book in the library of the University of Kansas, Lawrence. The fragment that more nearly concerns the present article now carries the shelf mark Pryce MS C2:1 in the Kenneth Spencer Research Library . It is a large part of a single leaf from The Legend of the Holy Cross (...) before Christ, an edifying work known in full only in a twelfth-century copy, Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS Bodley 343, fols. 14v–20v . Working from a photograph the great paleographer and codicologist N. R. Ker attributed the hand of the Kansas fragment to the scribe who also wrote the texts of two bits of the same work found in the library of Matthew Parker, archbishop of Canterbury , at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, now MS 557 . He concluded, no doubt rightly, that all three are part of one manuscript. (shrink)

I argue that, while Finlay et al, are correct to suggest that there are developmental regularities (or constraints) acting on brain component evolution, they are incorrect to infer from this that a developmental explanation necessarily implies that structural changes preceded functional use. Developmental and functional (adaptationist) explanations are complementary, not alternatives.

I try to show that there is much sap (synthetic a priori) knowledge although one may not find many, or even any, sap true statements in most natural languages. Reasons are given for the difficulty of expressing sap truths in natural languages, but it is argued that these are not necessary features of language as such. There are, then, sap true statements in some possible languages.Admission of the sap gives one a way of distinguishing logical from metaphysical possiblity. Something is (...) metaphysically impossible just in case it is a sap truth that it is impossible. I argue that the realm of logically possible entities is vastly larger than the realm of metaphysically possible entities.My.defence of the sap begins with a partial defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction. In particular, I attack the intentionality circle argument,Quine's indeterminacy thesis and some applications of the Kripke/Putnam theory of meaning for natural kind terms. Without being a conclusive defence of the analytic/synthetic distinction, this section makes the defence of the sap more secure. Arguments are then mounted in direct defence of the sap by showing that the purported reduction of sap truths to analytic truths is mistaken. Examples are adduced to show that, even where expressions of natural language fail, one can stipulate usage in ways that allow expression of sap truths. I then consider and reply to various objections, giving an example of the sort of meaning theory which illegitimately legislates the analyticity of any purported sap true statement. (shrink)

Quite rightly, philosophers of physics examine the theories of physics, theories like Quantum Mechanics, Quantum Field Theory, the Special and General Theories of Relativity, and Statistical Mechanics. Far fewer, however, examine how these theories are put to use; that is to say, little attention is paid to the practices of theoretical physicists. In the early 1950s David Bohm and David Pines published a sequence of four papers, collectively entitled, ‘A Collective Description of Electron Interaction.’ This essay uses that quartet as (...) a case study in theoretical practice. In Part One of the essay, each of the Bohm-Pines papers is summarized, and within each summary an overview is given, framing a more detailed account. In Part Two theoretical practice is broken into six elements: (a) the use of models, (b) the use of theory, (c) modes of description and narrative, (d) the use of approximations, (e) experiment and theory, (f) the varied steps employed in a deduction. The last element is the largest, drawing as it does from the earlier ones. Part Three enlarges on the concept of ‘theoretical practice,’ and briefly outlines the subsequent theoretical advances which rendered the practices of Bohm and Pines obsolete, if still respected. (shrink)

In my target article, I argued (1) that the relationship between neocortical size and group size in primates implies that there is a cognitive limit on the size of human groups, and (2) that time constraints forced the evolution of language as a more efficient means of bonding the large groups that humans evolved. The doubts about these claims raised by these additional commentaries largely reflect misinterpretation of my original claims.

Clark & Thornton take issue with my claim that parity is not a generalisation problem, and that nothing can be inferred about back-propagation in particular, or learning in general, from failures of parity generalisation. They advance arguments to support their contention that generalisation is a relevant issue. In this continuing commentary, I examine generalisation more closely in order to refute these arguments. Different learning algorithms will have different patterns of failure: back-propagation has no special status in this respect. This is (...) not to deny that a particular algorithm might fortuitously happen to produce the “intended” function in an parity-generalisation task. (shrink)

While the evidence that cetaceans exhibit behaviours that are every bit as cultural as those recognised in chimpanzees is unequivocal, I argue that it is unlikely that either taxon has the social cognitive mechanisms required to underpin the more advanced forms of culture characteristic of humans (namely those that depend on shared meaning).

There can be no doubt that we do know one another. We know that others exist and we know a good deal about others. The question is how we know others. To say that others do not exist would be to assert a solipsism—a theory which no serious philosopher has ever maintained. Solipsism is absurd. Not because it is self-contradictory, for there is nothing self-contradictory in the notion that I alone exist having the experiences and thoughts which I do have (...) and that apart from me nothing and no one else exists. It is absurd simply because others do exist and I know this; because, that is to say, it contradicts the known evidence. This is the sole—but the adequate—ground for concluding solipsism to be absurd. Any discussion of this present problem, therefore, must begin with, the recognition of the fact that knowledge of others occurs. (shrink)

John Searle attempts to show through a consideration of promising that at least some ‘ought’ statements can be derived from ‘is’ statements. He thinks that you can determine on purely factual grounds that a person has made a promise, and that it follows logically from the statement that a person has made a promise that he has at least a prima facie obligation to do the thing he promised to do. I agree with but not with.