This study focuses on the concept of people developed by Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe in the context of radical theories of democracy and populism. People is defined as a subjectivity established as a contingency in the conflictual environment of politics. The construction of the people is a condition of the existence of populist politics as a form of subject that enables the division of politics and social into two camps in the form of friend/enemy and (...) the formation of antagonisms. The article seeks to answer the question of how to create a political order in Laclau and Mouffe's conception of the people in a pluralistic society, in order to cleanse politics from antagonistic (struggle between enemies) relations and transform it into agonistic (struggle between adversaries) relations, despite the danger of eliminating each other through a friend-enemy relationship. In this study, it will be discussed whether the antagonism that constitutes the foundation of politics and society is indestructible and whether it is a subject figure in which the people is organized as a counter-hegemonic subject against certain kinds of antagonisms and whether those who are partners can come together agonistically. (shrink)

The article examines the compatibility of agonistic democracy and populism as well as their relationship to the idea of constitutionalism. The first part shows that Chantal Mouffe’s recent attempts to reconcile her normative approach of an agonistic pluralism with a populist style of politics are not fully convincing. Although there are undeniable commonalities between an agonistic and a populist understanding of politics – the appreciation of conflict, the rejection of moralistic and juridical modes of conflict resolution etc. (...) – the populist mode of the construction of the people (and the denunciation of political opponents as enemies of the people) risks impeding the transformation of antagonistic into agonistic modes of political contest. The tensions between agonism and populism are especially evident in matters of constitutionalism. This topic is examined in the second part of the article, which provides some ideas for reducing the normative and institutional blind spots of contemporary theories of agonistic democracy. It focuses on elementary principles for an agonistic concept of democratic constitutionalism that differs from the populist view of the relationship between politics and law, especially in respect of its interpretation of the concept of ‘resistibility’ of legal norms. (shrink)

This paper mobilises the psychoanalytic concepts of desire and enjoyment to better understand how processes of education aimed at extending and defending democratic life might respond to and engage with populist politics. I approach this task by engaging with a particular vector of Mouffe and Laclau’s political philosophy, moving from a critique of liberal democracy’s rationalist pretensions to their insistence that left populism and its passionate construction of a ‘people’ is the central task facing radical politics. This attention (...) to the libidinal basis of political identification locates them in a community of Left Lacanian thinkers who reframe the problems of democratic politics in terms of desire and enjoyment rather than miseducation or its lack. Whilst this position might suggest a binary choice between different analytical frames, I inquire into what insights are generated by theorising left populism as an ‘education of desire’. The paper is organised into four main parts: the opening discussion clarifies my understanding of education by engaging with the literature on educational agonism. The second section lays the groundwork for a critique of the way in which education is fetishized, in different ways, by liberals and radicals as a panacea for populist politics. The third section reframes democratic crisis as an enjoyment problem in order to better grasp the relationship between the liberal democratic disavowal of its own irrationality and the structure of right-wing populist enjoyment. The fourth section applies these insights to develop a critical analysis of what is at stake when we explicitly consider the left populist construction of a ‘people’ as an educational task. I conclude by drawing together and summarising the main features and considerations of left populism understood as an education of desire. (shrink)

Philosophy & Social Criticism, Volume 48, Issue 7, Page 992-1013, September 2022. This article examines the connection between populism and post-foundationalism in the context of contemporary debates about populism as a strategy for the Left. I argue that there is something “populist” about every constitutional order, including liberal democratic ones. I argue so drawing on Chantal Mouffe’s theories of hegemony, agonistic democracy, and left populism. Populism is the quintessential form of post-foundational politics because, rightly understood, populism constructs the object (...) it claims to represent, namely the people. As such, it expresses the fact that, because there is no ultimate foundation, politics consists in the construction of contingent foundations. I develop this argument through readings of Jan-Werner Müller and Chantal Mouffe, showing the differences between their respective post-foundational approaches. I show that Müller cannot uphold the distinction between populism and democracy in the way he seeks to do, but I also argue that this does not mean that we must jettison all normativity, only that it requires that we rethink normativity in hegemonic terms. (shrink)

Rise of populist politics in the 21s century calls scholars and politicians alike to reflect upon the question of how politics and democracy have been understood. Drawing on the theory of hegemony, this article establishes a distinction between democracy and ‘demography’ as a key line of conceptualization in politics. It highlights a central misunderstanding at the core of the demonization of populism: For radical democratic theory, ‘the people’ is not a demographic, socio-economic, or historically sedimented category tied to (...) some characteristics, but a performative process of ‘being’ and ‘becoming’ ‘the people’ as a self-consciously enacted polity. This statement challenges the taken-for-granted status of subjectivities of political struggle and links this approach to other contemporary discussions of politics, democracy, and populism. After discussing how anti, neo and post-foundational theoretical accounts on populism reveal a dimension of politics and representation, this article emphasizes action and performativity over static categories and models characteristic of political realism and political system approaches. (shrink)

This article begins with a theoretical tension. Radical democracy, in the joint work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, can be understood as a joint articulation of a post-foundational ontology of contingency and a politics of autonomy of ‘democratic struggles’ within a hegemonic bloc as loci of antagonisms in their own right, while Laclau’s theory of populism marks a shift from the autonomy of struggles to the representative function of the empty signifier as a constitutive dimension. This tension between (...) a horizontal logic of autonomy and a vertical logic of representation comes to the fore not least in the manifold attempts to combine radical-democratic and populist practices in the wake of the ‘movements of the squares.’ This argument is illustrated empirically in the cases of two party projects situating themselves in contexts of social protest—‘Social Movement’ in Ukraine and Podemos in Spain—both of which seek to combine a left-populist discursive strategy with some form of radical-democratic politics of autonomy, either by supporting local alliances independent from the party or by integrating trade union representatives into the organizational center, which in turn finds expression in a representative logic. (shrink)

In recent decades, Claude Lefort has become a recurring reference point for mainstream authors hostile to populism. This article delves into the paradoxical character of Lefort’s own ‘populism’ to challenge these anti-populist approaches. It explores Lefort’s nuanced stance in which, despite his explicit rejection of populism, he nevertheless embraced social division and the empowerment of the people against the grandees. The analysis is divided into three parts. First, it presents Lefort’s objections to populism, echoed by scholars such as Marilena (...) Chaui, Andrew Arato, Nadia Urbinati, Pierre Rosanvallon and Stefan Rummens, who often associate populism with Carl Schmitt’s political theology. The second part highlights latent ‘populist’ elements in Lefort’s work, as examined through his study of Machiavelli and his reflections on a wild democracy. The third part critically assesses the supposed rupture between Lefort and populist thinkers such as Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe, identifying moments of consistent theoretical alignment and even shared political engagement rather than stark disagreement. The conclusion challenges the prevailing narrative by positing a sophisticated theory of populism in Lefort’s work. It emphasises the inclusive and emancipatory aspects of appeals to the ‘people’ without overlooking potentially undemocratic expressions. Ultimately, the article argues for a nuanced understanding of populism from Lefort’s work, emphasising the need for a delicate balance in navigating between populism’s democratic and tyrannical manifestations. (shrink)

Alexis de Tocqueville once wrote that "the people reign over the American political world like God over the universe," unwittingly casting democracy as the political instantiation of the death of God. According to Jeffrey W. Robbins, Tocqueville's assessment remains an apt observation of modern democratic power, which does not rest with a sovereign authority but operates as a diffuse social force. By linking radical democratic theory to a contemporary fascination with political theology, Robbins envisions the modern experience of (...) democracy as a social, cultural, and political force transforming the nature of sovereign power and political authority. Robbins joins his work with Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri's radical conception of "network power," as well as Sheldon Wolin's notion of "fugitive democracy," to fashion a political theology that captures modern democracy's social and cultural torment. This approach has profound implications not only for the nature of contemporary religious belief and practice but also for the reconceptualization of the proper relationship between religion and politics. Challenging the modern, liberal, and secular assumption of a neutral public space, Robbins conceives of a postsecular politics for contemporary society that inextricably links religion to the political. While effectively recasting the tradition of radical theology as a political theology, this book also develops a comprehensive critique of the political theology bequeathed by Carl Schmitt. It marks an original and visionary achievement by the scholar the _Journal of the American Academy of Religion_ hailed "one of the best commentators on religion and postmodernism.". (shrink)

The difficulty with democracy is always how to define the demos—the people. Can we think of democracy in a different way? My starting point is to ask what it would mean to take kratos (power) rather than demos as the starting point of the thinking of democracy. I will argue that this is consistent with Solon’s first democratic constitution and that it leads to a thinking of democracy in terms of agonism. Maybe such a conception of agonistic democracy (...) will allow us to conceptualize as well as actualize a political space not predetermined by the “fickle multitude” that can be manipulated and is pray to the forces of populism. (shrink)

This paper considers what concept of accommodation is necessary to identify and address discrimination, disadvantages and disparities in such a way that the plurality of religious people with their beliefs, values and practices may be justly accommodated in healthcare. It evaluates threats to the possibility of such accommodation pertaining by considering what beliefs and practices might increase the risk of unjust discrimination against and disadvantage for religious people, whether as individuals or as groups; and the risk of disparities (...) between the care provided to religious people. The claim is that there is an important cluster of risks that are political in kind and emergent within philosophical bioethics. While not amounting (yet) to a trend, they are sufficiently threatening to a just civic life for patients and healthcare staff as to warrant scrutiny. After an Introductory Section 1, Section 2 evaluates a criticism of ‘accommodation’ and the apparently additional health-related requirements that those of religious faith demand, when compared with other people. It does so by comparing Lori Beaman's idea of agonism with that of a distinct and somewhat complementary approach in Jonathan Chaplin's political philosophy, before examining the role of established religion in setting the conditions for the accommodation of religion and belief in healthcare. Section 3 examines risks to such accommodation by engaging critically with three health-related instantiations of political philosophy that differ radically from both Beaman and Chaplin. A concluding Section 4 focusses on appropriate modes of communicating about religious and other beliefs in healthcare. (shrink)

In this article, I develop a critique of Chantal Mouffe’s leftist populism and its construction of ‘the people’ against an opposed ‘them’, from a perspective informed by the thought of Didier Eribon. I draw on both his public interventions and his theoretical work, employing his concepts of return, society as verdict, and his two principles of critical thinking to question the desirability of crafting ‘the people’ in the first place. I contend that Eribon’s critique renders Mouffe’s proposal problematic (...) on three accounts. First, her approach is too politically volatile; its instability leaves it devoid of a critical analysis of the differences between concrete social positions, struggles, and subjectivities within ‘the people’. Consequently, the political becomes merely a function of the social. Yet, the social and its determining power remain mostly unaddressed by her framework. Second, its simplistic opposition of an overly generalised ‘the people’ against ‘the oligarchy’ is susceptible to right-wing populist appropriations. Third, for a shot at hegemony and a general appeal, it eclipses plurality and dissensus within ‘the people’. In contrast, Eribon encourages a connection between the social and the political by suggesting that a self-critical analysis be mutually intertwined with social analysis. Instead of merely mobilising affects, they must be critically interrogated. Instead of summoning ‘the people’, a return to their respective genesis must be attempted. Unless both principles of critical thinking, the insights of return, and societal verdicts are deployed to come to terms with the social determinisms at hand, the ‘people’s’ mobilisation against an opposed ‘them’ risks sacrificing pluralism and equality alike and neglecting the criteria of the desirability of specific changes in favour of a “whatever it costs” attempt at hegemony. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship between popular sovereignty, populism, and deliberative democracy. My main thesis is that populisms resurrect the polemical dimension of popular sovereignty by turning “the people” against the “powerbloc” or the “elite”, and that it is crucial thatthis terrain not be ceded to authoritarian distortions of this basic contestatory grammar. Furthermore, I contend that populist forms of politics are compatible with a procedural and deliberative conception of democracy. Ifirst engage with the assumption that populism and a (...) procedural model of democracy are incompatible, demonstrating that this assumption relies on a conservative bias which tiesthe exercising of communicative power to a “duty of civility”. I then engage with radical-democratic reconstructions of the procedural notion of popular sovereignty which emphasize the unleashing and diversification of peoplehood in communication circuits and the mutual permeability of constitutional politics, parliamentary legislation, and the public sphere. Thirdly, I conclude that populisms are an essential part of communicative power in modern democracies and part of its dialectical structure. (shrink)

Drawing from Marx’s 18 th Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte and the work of Carl Schmitt, this article proposes a framework that critically diagnoses the plebiscitary, executive-centered conception of democratic representation as a species of political theology. I reconstruct Marx’s comments on plebiscitarianism in The 18 th Brumaire through his earlier critique of political theology in ‘On the Jewish Question’, in order to contrast two modes of representation. The first, ‘ theological’ representation, is a symbolic incarnation of the unity of the (...) people in the person of the executive. The second, ‘ agonistic’ representation, develops only in the legislative assembly as a forum for translating social antagonisms and divisions into political ones. Turning from Marx to the writings of Carl Schmitt on plebiscitarianism, and to more recent analyses of populism, I show how these logics of political-theological versus antagonistic representation can function in different political contexts than the one Marx diagnosed. In conclusion, I argue that plebiscitarian democracy is neither an innocuous feature of institutions, nor a decisionist democratic alternative to liberal parliamentarism. Rather, it is a contemporary expression of political theology, premised upon depoliticization and the exclusion of social antagonisms from the sphere of democratic representation. (shrink)

This article explores the possibility of a notion of left-wing populism that is conceptually opposed to the identitarian logic of embodiment that characterises right-populist interpellations of ‘th...

John Dewey envisioned the "American experiment" of democracy as a moral and ethical ideal, lived out in personal habits and "in our daily walk and conversation."1 More than mere external political forms or institutional arrangements, Deweyan democracy is a "personal way of life."2 Democratic political organizing is typically captured in campaigns focused on single issues, but broad-based community organizing is more closely aligned to Deweyan radical democracy as an ethical way of life. This kind of organizing is "relational organizing" (...) that, as Mark Warren says, brings people "together first to discuss the needs of their community and to find a common ground for action."3 BBCO is first and foremost about... (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis that democratic populism and the commons can and should complement each other in counter-hegemonic interventions promoting egalitarian and ecological democracy in our times. After elucidating its key terms, the article makes, first, a theoretical case for the combination of egalitarian, inclusionary populism and the commons by debunking arguments which highlight the conflicts between them and by explaining the political significance of their conjugation. Subsequently, discussion builds an empirical argument for the real possibility and the democratic (...) promises of such a convergence by considering three ways in which populist politics and the commons merge and recompose each other in contemporary social movements, from the Spanish 15M and new municipalism to Occupy and other collective contestation in the Americas over the last two decades. These cases will illustrate how late social activism has effectively blended populist mobilization with the spirit of the commons, engendering a hybrid figure of ‘common populism’ that fosters grassroots processes of democratization. (shrink)

This book completes the project, begun in Nietzsche’s Immoralism: Politics as First Philosophy, of critically reconstructing a Nietzschean left politics. Nietzsche's incompatibilist ideal of amor fati requires reconceiving legitimacy as the breeding of a people whose material conditions enable it to affirm its social order. Justice is founded in a future, higher type’s right to exist against present individuals who internalize the contradictions of past societies. In opposition to Nietzsche’s self-undermining aristocratism, this right can only be realized through a (...) universal promotion of the pluralistic unity of the manifold soul, secured by an equally manifold form of democracy. Against the covert aristocratism of liberal proceduralism, authentic democracy produces a true people grounded in shared, concrete happiness, requiring a comprehensive egalitarianism maintained by a permanent socialist state and achievable only through a populist, coalitional politics across identities that radically transforms the material conditions of our shared social life. (shrink)

Increases in popular xenophobia and racism in a society may (partly) have meso-level reasons. The presence of a xenophobic Radical Right Populist (RRP) party may cause increases in racism and xenophobia because (a) it has an influence on other political actors; and (b) because it has an influence on people's frame of thought. I will identify and discuss various mechanisms that will be put against two empirical cases, France and Sweden. Both have witnessed the emergence of RRP parties (...) during the 1980s and 1990s, respectively. However, although they pursued similar xenophobic programmes and used similar anti-immigration frames, only the emergence of the Front National resulted in a dramatic increase in manifest, politicized xenophobia, whereas the emergence of New Democracy had no such effect. Some important factors behind these diverging effects will be elaborated and discussed in this article. (shrink)

The word “populism” commonly elicits images of hordes of angry townspeople with pitchforks and torches. That is the classic picture of “the mob,” bolstered by countless movie and television productions, and it is clearly based on such historical events as the English civil wars, the sans-culottes’ terror, the Bolshevik revolution, and the recent genocides in Rwanda and Burundi. Many of the leaders involved in fostering such horrors are seen as radical democrats whose successors today should also be feared. In (...) this paper, I argue that any mob takeovers of the feared sort are actually antithetical to radical democracy. This is because an authentically democratic regime, even of the most extreme type, is necessarily inconsistent with “mobocracy” or any sort of “tyranny of the majority” given its essential procedural aspects. It is argued, in fact, that leaders of legitimately democratic movements have generally been quite vapid because of the fallibilistic, plebiscitary proceduralism inherent in any authentic attempt to require government policy to reflect the “general will.” And this vapidity is argued to inhere regardless of the extent of rhetorical powers of the advocate or advocacy. (shrink)

Chantal Mouffe has played an active role in promoting the ‘discursive hegemonic’ politics of left populism, not least in her two most recent books, For a Left Populism and Towards a Green Democratic Revolution: Left Populism and the Power of Affects. Taking these books together, this review article shows how these interventions build on Mouffe's earlier work on ‘the political’ and her vision of ‘radical democracy’ based on an ‘agonistic pluralism’. It argues that we find in Mouffe's latest (...) work some of the salient problems of her overall project. The article focuses on two such problems: Mouffe's notion of antagonism (and its cognate, agonism); and the question of collective action. (shrink)

This paper sets out to think the relationship between horizontality and verticality from the perspective of post-foundational discourse theory, taking as a starting point the diachronic development from Laclau’s and Mouffe’s joint work on radical democracy to Laclau’s theory of populism. The argument here is that the shift in conceptual terrain from the autonomy of ‘democratic struggles’ to the representative function of ‘empty’ popular signifiers points to deeper shifts and slippages – especially around the category of antagonism – as (...) well as a more general tension between a horizontal politics of autonomy and a vertical politics of representation, for which radical democracy and populism respectively take on a paradigmatic character. While horizontality is predicated on the autonomous multiplicity and ‘multiplication of antagonisms’, verticality entails the simplification and concentration of antagonism around central representative signifiers. The question thus becomes how antagonism is organized, or – drawing on Nonhoff’s concept of contrariety – to what extent the contrarieties defining the constituent parts of an equivalential chain are more multiple or more concentrated. This is followed by empirical considerations on how horizontality and verticality are organizationally mediated within current political projects, including a distinction between movement parties and Volksparteien neuen Typs (‘people’s parties of a new type’). (shrink)

The past two decades have witnessed a resurgence of populist politics across the globe. The early 21st century saw the pink tide of left wing populism in Latin America, the Southern European populisms that rejected the politics of austerity after 2013, and the right wing populisms that now dominate not only European but global polities. Although each instance of populist politics is distinct, all share an appeal to the people, to the true people, who both oppose and are (...) dominated by the political elite. The nature of this elite also varies – in some cases it is predatory capital; in other cases it is the multicultural left; in yet others the anonymous bureaucrats in Brussels undermining national sovereignty. This special issue of RECERCA poses one question: how does populism relate to democracy? Is it democracy’s other face? (shrink)

In this introductory essay, we outline the relationship between political dissensus and radical democracy, focusing especially on how such a politics might inform the study of business ethics. This politics is located historically in the failure of liberal democracy to live up to its promise, as well as the deleterious response to that from reactionary populism, strong-man authoritarianism, and exploitative capitalism. In the context of these political vicissitudes, we turn to radical democracy as a form of contestation that (...) offers hope in an affirmative, inclusive and sustainable alternative. On this basis we introduce the papers in the special issue as a collective exploration of the ethics and politics of radical democracy as manifesting in dissensus and the subversion of corporate and elite power by alternative democratic practices and realities. (shrink)

Post-foundational politics and democracy -- Agonism and democracy -- A typology of agonistic democracy -- Agonistic democracy and the question of institutions -- Agonistic democracy and the limits of popular participation -- Populism, representation, and the popular will -- Political liberalism, contingency and agonistic pluralism -- Liberalism, agonism, and democracy.

The article aims to investigate the problematic relationship between populism and democracy by comparing the conceptions of ‘the people’ and popular sovereignty which they presuppose. In the first two sections, the populist and the democratic ‘peoples’ are reconstructed, and the unbridgeable gap dividing them is highlighted. The discussion of the democratic people requires a concise analysis of the main contemporary democratic frameworks, including deliberative democracy, ‘neo-Roman’ republicanism, agonistic democracy. The article works out the implications of the incompatibility (...) between the two ‘sovereign peoples’ identified, and concludes that such an incompatibility undercuts the kinship of populism and democracy. While populism is often said to intertwine with democracy in some way, the article argues that it significantly departs from democratic theory and practice, and belongs to a distinct conceptual space. It cannot be made to overlap with ‘illiberal democracy’, a ‘democratic myth’, a crude electoral majoritarianism, nor does it amount to hiding undemocratic policies into properly democratic justifications. The boundary dividing populism and democracy, therefore, starts unfolding at the level of the conception of the people. While democratic theory invariably assumes a people intended as simultaneously heterogeneous and united, populism conceives of the people as a moral whole, internally undifferentiated, whose homogeneity and intrinsic righteousness preclude the task of specifying what popular sovereignty ultimately means. Such specification, on the other hand, is inescapable for any democrat assuming the people as a composite unity. The last section addresses four possible objections to the argument, variously formulated by Ernesto Laclau and by scholars approaching populism from a post-Laclauian or discursive-performative perspective. (shrink)

This paper considers the radical democratic theory of Chantal Mouffe and Ernesto Laclau with reference to the recent rise of Right-wing populism. I argue that even as Mouffe and Laclau develop a critical political ontology that regards democracy as an end in itself, they simultaneously exclude certain elements of the demos. In other words, they appeal to formal categories but decide the political content in advance, disqualifying Right-wing movements and discourses without justification. This ambivalence between form and content reveals (...) the limits of Mouffe and Laclau’s brand of radical democracy for understanding and critiquing the present political conjuncture. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Radical Democracy:John Dewey and Angela Y. Davis on Pluralism and PrisonsAmanda Dubrulein 2013, the multiculturalism act marked its 25th anniversary; at the same time, the Office of the Correctional Investigator (OCI) was celebrating its 40th anniversary (Elizabeth qtd. in Eng 2–3) The OCI was created in response to the prison riot in Kingston Penitentiary that occurred in 1971. Yet, 40 years after, prisons in Canada still face "overcrowding, (...) the shortage of professional staff, programming cuts, the confinement in the institution of a number of people who did not require maximum security confinement, too much time spent in cells, a lack of adequate channels to deal with complaints" (Elizabeth qtd. in Eng 3). The "Annual Report on the Operation of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act 2019–20" (subtitled "Building a Better Canada Through Diversity") lists four principal objectives of the Canadian Multiculturalism Act: "the retaining and fostering of identity …, overcoming barriers to participation …, promoting exchanges, and language acquisition" (Canadian Heritage 10; emphasis added). One can then see that there is a marked disconnect between the ideals of plurality and participation that Canada supposedly rests on and the practices of the systems it maintains.Drawing on John Dewey's conception of democracy and Angela Davis's critique of the prison industrial complex, I aim to show that a state cannot truly be pluralistic or participatory while continuing to engage in carceral practices. To do so, I will first explicate Dewey's conception of democracy,1 then I will lay out the contemporary problems surrounding incarceration in Canada, and, finally, I will end with a discussion of abolition as a constructive practice.Discussions of democracy often center on the mechanisms of voting. We have formed the habit of believing that democracies will carry on as long as citizens perform rote political duties (Dewey, "Creative Democracy" 225). Yet, as Dewey saw and as we continue to see, a healthy democracy cannot [End Page 40] be maintained through rote action alone. Instead, it requires "conscious and resolute effort" because democracy is not a mere political system ("Creative Democracy" 224). Instead, as Dewey phrases it, it is a "way of life" and therefore has moral implications. A democracy cannot flourish where there is no community (Dewey, "Creative Democracy" 225). This is accomplished through dialogue and debate with others and the recognition of the transactional nature of associated living. The purpose of a state is to supply the "right conditions" so that every person can lead their life and flourish in their own capacity (Dewey, "Creative Democracy" 227).The public is composed of individuals who act and associate with each other; every individual is "subject to all kinds of social influences which determine what they can think of, plan and choose" (Dewey, The Public 115). Yet when people come together and discuss their wants and needs, new ideas are tested, and new beliefs are formed. This creates an unsettling of current modes and processes of political action (Dewey, The Public 103).2 Thus, Dewey argues that one of the main tasks required for maintaining (and reclaiming) democracy is the constant "discovering [of] means by which a scattered, mobile, and manifold public may so recognize itself as to define and express its interests" (The Public 174). For this to occur, the creation and recognition of community is central. For Dewey, community is not merely "physical and organic" (though it often is this), it is also "moral … emotional, [and] intellectual" (The Public 177–78). For the individual, who becomes a part of this association, democracy involves the responsibility of sharing with others the "capacity in forming and directing the activities of the groups to which one belongs and in participating according to the need in the values which the group sustains" (Dewey, The Public 175). For the group, democracy "demands liberation of the potentialities of [its] members" to flourish "in harmony with the interests and goods which are common" (Dewey, The Public 175). The flourishing of the group can only come about when we, as individuals, recognize the worth and potential of those around us and our capacity, when combined to direct the community, as a community.Thus, critique plays an important role in democracies: we... (shrink)

While the word “democracy” has proliferated in social and political discourse in recent decades, I suggest that the liberal democracy of the past, connected as it is (especially in the West) to the market economy, is insufficient for the challenges facing the contemporary Latin American context. I assess and criticize democratic ideas in order to suggest that the way forward is radical democracy based on socio-economic and political justice. These, however, have to be articulated at a variety of levels, (...) from that of local and indigenous peoples to that of national and international relations. (shrink)

In this heterodox reading of Thomas Jefferson, Dean Caivano proposes a theory of democracy conceived through a politics of all. Democracy from this standpoint does not entail liberal consensus-building but rejects hierarchical forms of authority, supplanted by ongoing political resistance by "the people" to obtain freedom and equality.

Radical democrats highlight dramatic moments of political action, which disrupt everyday habits of perception that sustain unequal social relations. In doing so, however, we sometimes neglect how social conditions—such as precarious employment, social dislocation, and everyday exposure to violence—undermine political agency or might be contested in uneventful ways. Despite their differences, two thinkers who have significantly influenced radical democratic theory (Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière) have been similarly criticized for contributing to such a socially weightless picture of politics. (...) However, attending to how they are each preoccupied by the social conditions of inequality and loneliness enables us to recognize two distinct aspects of democratic politics–emancipation and civility. Cultivating an interpretive flexibility to shift between these aspects of politics might enable radical democrats to more clearly picture how struggles for appearance are limited and shaped by the social conditions within which they are enacted. (shrink)

Within the author’s long-term project of updating John Rawls’s paradigm of “political liberalism” to a historical context different from the original one, this paper focuses on how political liberalism can help us understand populism and help liberal democracy survive the populist upsurge. In the first section, political liberalism is argued to be of help in directing our attention to three constitutive aspects of all sorts of populism: the conflation of “the people” with the electorate and the electorate with the (...) nation, the attribution of constituent power to the electorate, and a penchant for so-called “justified intolerance.” In the second section, enfeebled democracies and postliberal democracies are discussed as two distinctly dangerous outcomes of populist contagion. Finally, in the third section the containment of populism is argued to require targeting the socioeconomic factors undergirding the populist upsurge and the jettisoni... (shrink)

The vertiginous rise of right-wing populism, especially in its “nationalist, xenophobic and conservative form”, and some “racist, anti-Semitic, homophobic and sexist” drifts associated with this phenomenon – whether real or perceived as such – make the mainstream media play a double role. On the one hand, the mainstream media reflect the struggle for political hegemony between different vested interests; on the other hand, they engage in the fight against right-wing populism blasting both right-wing populist candidates and their voters or supporters. (...) Many mainstream journalists ask citizens to realize a “sanitary cordon”, a “wall” or a “republican front” to block far-right populism and preserve liberal democracy. Moreover, they urge people to be wary of all attempts to “dediabolize” or “normalize” some tokens of right-wing populism. The main idea of this article is that right-wing populism is more harmless than is generally believed and, if excessive, negative media coverage doesn’t baffle but feed it. Populism is essentially a latent side effect of liberal democracy. Populism rises and becomes obtrusive only if a significant part of society perceives a regime of illiberal majoritarianism instead of one of liberal democracy. Right-wing populists are chiefly frustrated “ci-devants” who feel dispossessed of their past, identity, properties, qualities, privileges or titles. Inasmuch as the causes of collective frustration are many and varied (e.g. the real or just perceived corruption of the elites, the “system”, the deep state, the relocation of jobs, immigration, national sovereignty, national identity, communitarianism, radical Islamism, the status of some traditional institutions, some chapters of official history, etc.), there will always be right-wing populists, whether they are self-declared or covert. By adopting David G. Hackett’s thesis that the media are “agents of hegemony”, we applied the critical analysis of discourse to a set of 346 media articles in order to reveal the discursive sources of power, domination, inequality and partiality. The articles appeared in The New York Times and Le Monde during the period 2016-2017, at the time when the presidential elections took place in the United States and France. The articles were selected according to the occurrence of the keywords “Donald Trump” – “populism” and “Marine Le Pen” – “populisme” within the titles. The analysis of these articles reveals a divisive discursive structure that correspond to a real political cleavage in society. It is true that populism presents a “Manichean outlook”, in which there are only friends and foes” and no compromise is possible. It is also true that mainstream media reinforce this Manichean perspective on society and make populists feel marginalized and politically disempowered. The mainstream media may appease right-wing populism if they treat its followers as legitimate and equal political actors. For this, they have to give up the narrative structures that underscore insurmountable divergences and irreconcilable interests. In a liberal democracy, mass media should chiefly play the role of mediator. They may not aim to defeat or re-educate certain categories of citizens just because they advocate “wrong” political solutions. (shrink)

The text considers points of view of theoreticians of the radical pluralism : Connolly, Mouffe and Tully with regard to the status and the nature of concepts in the political discourse, as well as the consequences of these conceptual presumptions to understanding democracy. The three authors emphasize the essential contestability of political concepts, the paradox of liberal democracy and the need to revise standard rational consensus theories of democracy. Also, the three authors take over the specific interpretation of Vittgenstein (...) to the direction of political theory the centre of which consists of everyday contingent practices of politics as well as dissent about their assessment. The text analyzes the extent to which this reading is compatible to Wittgenstein's position. The author defends the opinion that the essential contestability does not imply agonism and denial of the significance of rules and tries to indicate to the points of illegitimate transition from antiessentialism to unconsensus rules. Also, the text underlines the flaws of dissent conception of democracy and social integration. U tekstu se razmatraju stanovista Konolija, Mufove i Tjulija u pogledu statusa i prirode pojmova u politickom diskursu, kao i posledice ovih konceptualnih pretpostavki na shvatanje demokratije. Sva tri autora isticu esencijalnu spornost politickih pojmova, paradoksalnosti liberalne demokratije i neophodnost revidiranja standardnih racionalno-konsenzusnih teorija demokratije. Takodje, sva tri autora preuzimaju specificno tumacenje Vitgenstajna u pravcu politicke teorije u cijem su sredistu svakodnevne kontingentne prakse politike, kao i disenzus oko njihovog razumevanja i vrednovanja. Autor brani stav da esencijalna spornost pojmova ne podrazumeva agonizam i negiranje znacaja pravila i pokusava da ukaze na tacke nelegitimog prelaza od antiesencijalizma ka nekonsenzusnosti pravila. Takodje, u tekstu se ukazuje na nedostatke radikalne-disenzusne koncepcije demokratije i drustvene integracije. (shrink)

This article is concerned with the antagonistic character of democratic politics, specifically in relation to the neo-republican conceptualisation of politics, as outlined by Philip Pettit. I take up a problem not addressed in the neo-republican scholarship, namely, the broader dispute over the practice of contestation and the scope of its reach in relation to the activity of politics. This article proceeds through an examination of what I call Pettit’s method of political theory in order to approach sideways the concept of (...) ‘contestation’ as a marker for a sublimated antagonistic dimension of neo-republican politics. Drawing on the work of Rancière and the insights of post-Nietzschean critical theory (Derrida, Laclau and Arendt), I examine the relationship between populism, democratic contestation and non-domination in neo-republican discourse. As such, this article exerts pressure on Pettit’s privileging of a status concept of freedom as the supreme political ideal of republican politics. This article explores the political possibilities opened up through a re-politicisation of non-domination, and the radical potential that resides in a politics that does not foreclose on democracy, understood in terms of popular power and not popular control. (shrink)

Jan-Werner Müller’s analysis of ‘authoritarian populism’ represents a highly limited approach to the issue that is typical of many mainstream approaches within populism studies and liberal-democratic constitutional theory. Through a critique of Müller, the article develops an account of the historical emergence of authoritarian populism as a ‘long counter-revolution of the radical right’ against the values and institutions of the social-democratic welfare state. Focussing on the USA and UK, the article shows how, rather than being a novel phenomenon emerging (...) from the fringes in the 1980s and 1990s, authoritarian populism emerges from the middle of the twentieth century as a highly successful form of hegemonic struggle over the Republican and Conservative parties and over American and British societies. The political success of a highly contradictory ideological framework of the radical right has helped to largely normalise a language, rhetoric and imaginary of authoritarian populism and place it at the centre of contemporary politics and culture. By largely ignoring such a development, and the highly contingent nature of North Atlantic ‘democracy’, theorists and commentators like Müller fail to grasp the depth of the current authoritarian populist threat and offer only liberal-democratic mythology in response to the ranting and chanting of ‘fake news’. (shrink)

In light of the recent revival of the debate on radical democracy, this paper seeks to show how a critical reappropriation of Chantal Mouffe’s theory of agonistic politics can explain the structure of a conflict-based understanding of democratic orders. In explicit convergence with Mouffe, I argue that a radical democratic project by no means needs to abandon—as many absolute democracy and multitude theorists claim—the modern political paradigm. I also show, diverging from her account, that Mouffe’s defence of (...) a radical democratic project based on pluralism and agonism would have been better served by a critical reception of Arendt’s thinking rather than that of Schmitt. The relevance of this alternative strategy—so I will argue—lies in the fact that it delivers an apt design for a politico-legal order which permits true and proper conflicts, on the one hand, while simultaneously allowing that they be dealt with democratically, on the other. (shrink)

This article uncovers an internal tension within theories of agonistic democracy. On the one hand, as radical pluralists, agonistic democrats want to institute a ‘symmetrical’ political scene where different identities can struggle on an equally legitimate basis. On the other hand, they often normatively prioritize the struggles of oppressed groups against domination. In response, this article proposes to collapse any strict distinction between pluralism and social relations of domination. The result is a move from agonistic to (...) insurgent democracy, where insurgent struggles against domination give the central impetus to any democracy. To do so, it turns to the writings of Étienne Balibar, who argues that most, if not all, symmetrical political conflict is built on asymmetrical forms of domination or oppression. This leads us to develop an account of democratic conflict that is incessantly asymmetrical. Finally, this article suggests an alternative way of rescuing the political principle of pluralism cherished by agonistic democrats. Balibar’s writings on the ‘ideology of the dominated’ show that every insurgent struggle expresses itself ideologically, which harbours the risk of obscuring other forms of domination. Therefore, democracy is not only kept alive by insurgent movements, it requires that the latter democratize themselves by maintaining a permanent openness to alternative calls against domination or oppression. (shrink)

Political realism points out that politics is to create and sustain a legitimate order in a context of persistent disagreement, with the possible surge of conflicts, and where political power inevitably uses coercion. Political realists contend that modus vivendi is a contingent political arrangement at the level of the political constitution that allows diverse groups of people to coexist peacefully. Proposals of modus vivendi do not say enough about how to manage disagreements and conflicts. In this paper, I argue (...) that proposals of agonistic democracy supply this lack. I contend that agonistic democracy proposals share the premises of political realism and contribute to the sustainment of a liberal modus vivendi. (shrink)

This article is a critical analysis of the most important assumptions of Chantal Mouffe’s political philosophy, along with its original categories such as agonism, radical democracy and hegemony. The sources of her concept are indicated and certain difficulties that the author falls into are distinguished. The thread that is considered central to this philosophy, with the most profound practical consequences, is an attempt to demonstrate the futility of a liberal doctrine that values consensus and deliberation and proclaims an apology (...) for individualism and rationalism. Mouffe’s diagnosis strikes at the most important liberal values with the intention of discrediting them although she tries to creatively adopt others, such as pluralism. She proposes a new paradigm, much fairer than existing ones, because it does not negate the conflictive nature of politics. Does an agonist dispute and radical democracy really have a chance to undermine liberal axiology? Are we dealing with a breakthrough in thinking about politics? (shrink)

Current radical democratic politics is characterized by new participatory spaces for citizens’ engagement, which aim at facilitating the democratic ideals of freedom and equality. These spaces are, however, situated in the context of deep societal inequalities. Modes of discrimination are carried over into participatory interaction. The democratic subject is judged by its physically embodied appearance, which replicates external hierarchies and impedes the freedom of self-expression. To tackle this problem, this article seeks to identify ways to increase the freedom of (...) the subject to explore its multiple self. Understanding the self as inherently fugitive, the article investigates participatory, deliberative and agonistic concepts of self-transformation. As all of them appear limited, it introduces a transformative perspective in democratic thought. Enriching the transformative perspective with queer and gender theory, the article generates the concept of a politics of becoming, which, through radical democratic practices of disidentification, advances the freedom of the subject to change. (shrink)

Can democracy be at once radical and Islamic? In this paper I argue that it can. My argument is based on a comparison and contrast of certain aspects in the social-political thought of two contemporary authors: Axel Honneth who defends a particular conception of radical democracy, and Rached al-Ghannouchi who defends a particular conception of the Islamic state. I begin with Honneth’s early articulation of his model of radical democracy as reflexive cooperation, which he presents as an (...) alternative that reconciles Arendtian republicanism and Habermasian proceduralism while avoiding their weaknesses. I also refer to his more mature conception of democracy by way of highlighting his understanding of democracy as a process of constituting civil society. This is significant for the purposes of this paper since it forms the most important link between Honneth’s radical democracy and Ghannouchi’s Islamic model of political rule. I then introduce Ghannouchi’s theoretical account of the Islamic state with a focus on his conception of shura (consultation) in order to bring to the fore both the similarities and dissimilarities with Honneth’s theory of democracy. By this point I will have identified Islamic resources for a conception of democracy that, like Honneth’s democracy as reflexive cooperation, shares with proceduralism an instrumental view of democratic procedures, and with republicanism a strong connection between the pre-political social level and politics. Next, I ask whether this conception of radical Islamic democracy can square its dual commitment to pluralism and Islamic unity. Again, I draw on Ghannouchi’s thought to respond to the challenge, doing so in a way that brings out the agonistic dimension in radical Islamic democracy. I conclude by making explicit how radical Islamic democracy carves out a conceptual space in which proceduralist, republican and agonistic features are combined. (shrink)

The relationship between ecology and democracy has a complex history and an uncertain future. Ecological crises threaten all forms of life on earth, and democracy too is endangered, as popular discontent, elite malfeasance, and unresponsive institutions herald crisis if not collapse. It is clear that our present political concepts and institutions are inadequate for meeting the challenges of living in right relation with the more-than-human world and, moreover, that these inadequacies are themselves symptoms of a failing political-cultural story and a (...) lack of concrete practices of ecological renewal, a story that does not recognize that there is no "people" without the earth and that power is not held by humans alone but in common with the natural world--intensifying weather events effected by climate change are only the most obvious example. Earthborn Democracy upends conventional accounts, which view democracy as a modern invention, by probing deep histories of egalitarian political organization beyond the ancient Athenian efforts so feared by the American founders in the premodern Americas, Mesopotamia, and many other egalitarian cultures. Unlike the constitutional democracies in nation-states, which are in service to economic directives, the political practices and stories excavated in the book illustrate the interdependence necessary to inspire and orient the work of ecological and democratic renewal. Responses to climate catastrophe call for an understanding of how unconscious desire can be a resource for collective democratic action. Developing an embodied account of the unconscious in which a desire for pleasure is central, the authors examine the knowledge and living traditions of Indigenous communities; the incorporation of "pleasure activism" into contemporary social movements and antiracist struggles; and practices of cooperation-cross-species affinity and relational grassroots political organizing around the world. The resonances across these examples trace the possibility for renewal of individual and collective selves through the work of ecological attunement and restoration. Building from re-envisioned democratic histories and this radical rereading of the collective unconscious, they show how contemporary political experiments and practices might cultivate and channel desires for autochthonous-earthborn-democracy, as the Athenian mythos names it. (shrink)

이 논문의 목적은 21세기에 등장한 ‘탈진실’ 시대의 정치가 어떻게 민주주의 사회에서 구축될 수 있었는지 정치철학적 입장에서 밝히는 것이다. 이를 위해 첫째, 적용 가능한 민주주의 모델을 정치철학적 견지에서 점검한다. 둘째, 탈진실화와 연관성이 깊은 모델로서 샹탈 무페의 논쟁적 민주주의를 점검한다. 셋째, 논쟁적 민주주의 모델이 강조하는 헤게모니 투쟁이 탈진실화와 갖는 친화력을 보여주는 정치현상으로서 21세기 포퓰리즘을 살펴본다. 넷째, 우리사회에서 일어나고 있는 탈진실화의 이데올로기적 요소로서 ‘분단모순’과 ‘신자유주의’를 분석한다. 이를 바탕으로 우리사회에서 ‘탈진실’ 정치가 구축되는 과정에서, 특히 이데올로기가 동원의 정치와 연관하여 어떤 영향을 미쳤는지 밝힌다. 마지막으로 탈진실의 (...) 시대에 무페의 논쟁적 민주주의 모델이 지닌 정치철학적 의미를 평가한다. (shrink)

Political conflict in our society is inevitable, and the results are often far from negative. How then should we deal with the intractable differences arising from complex modern culture? Developing her groundbreaking political philosophy of agnostics--the search for a radical and plural democracy--Chantal Mouffe examines international relations, strategies for radical politics, the future of Europe and the politics of artistic practices. She shows that in many circumstances where no alternatives seem possible, agonistics offers a new road map for (...) change. Engaging with cosmopolitanism, post-operaism, and theories of multiple modernities she argues in favor of a multipolar world with a real cultural and political pluralism. -- Publisher's website. (shrink)

Constitutional reform has been an important means to push populist authoritarian agendas in Hungary, Poland, Turkey and Venezuela. The embrace of constitutional means and rhetoric in pursuit of these agendas has led to the growing recognition of ‘populist constitutionalism’ as a contemporary political phenomenon. In all four examples mentioned above, democracy, popular sovereignty and direct plebiscitary appeal to the people is the rhetorical and justificatory framework for constitutional reform. This, I worry, gives democracy a bad name and reinforces the (...) widespread suspicion that citizens should not be directly involved in constitutional reform as popular participation can lead to dangerous majoritarianism and is easily manipulated by elite actors seeking to weaken constitutional checks and balances. But the problem, I argue, is not inherent in citizen’s participation in constitutional reform. In contrast to populist constitutionalism, I develop an idea of deliberative constitutionalism in which citizens can participate in constitution-making and reform without hijacking constitutionalism for majoritarian, nationalist or anti-pluralist ends. Deliberative constitutionalism as I understand it has four features: a Habermasian co-originality thesis that articulates the interdependence of democracy and liberalism mediated by a conception of discourse; a proceduralized idea of popular sovereignty that reduces the tension between appeal to the people and respect for pluralism; the centrality of the public sphere over the voting booth as the cradle of democracy; institutional innovations intended to include citizens in constitutional reform (including through referendums) but avoid majoritarian and populist pathologies. (shrink)

Many scholars in the area of citizenship education take deliberative approaches to democracy, especially as put forward by John Rawls, as their point of departure. From there, they explore how students’ capacity for political and/or moral reasoning can be fostered. Recent work by political theorist Chantal Mouffe, however, questions some of the central tenets of deliberative conceptions of democracy. In the paper I first explain the central differences between Mouffe’s and Rawls’s conceptions of democracy and politics. To this end I (...) take Eamonn Callan’s Creating Citizens as an example of Rawlsian political education and focus on the role of conflict and disagreement in his account. I then address three areas in which political education would need to change if it were to accept Mouffe’s critiques of deliberative approaches to democracy and her proposal for an agonistic public sphere. The first area is the education of political emotions; the second is fostering an understanding of the difference between the moral and the political; the third is developing an awareness of the historical and contemporary political projects of the “left” and “right.” I propose that a radical democratic citizenship education would be an education of political adversaries. (shrink)

The classic pejorative designation of populism currently coexists with its recent vindication. From certain left-wing political and intellectual circles, the revival of this category is part of a strategy aimed at bringing together unsatisfied demands in an emancipatory key. In line with Ernesto Laclau's theory, one of the paradigmatic examples of this tendency is Chantal Mouffe's left-populist proposal. Different critical approaches object that, in the eagerness to deepen and to radicalise democracy, these impulses often challenge its limits and flirt with (...) political logics that could completely blur them. Thus, the feasibility of this emancipatory strategy seems to be tied to the ever-problematic compatibility between populism and democracy, especially to its possible normative and institutional modulations. This article will argue that the populist conception projected by Mouffe is relatively autonomous from Laclau's, and that, unlike Laclau's, it has its own prospects of agonism and civicrepublicanism that can make room for the institutional dimension and the normativity constitutive of the liberal democratic order. (shrink)

While education for democracy has been heavily influenced by the deliberative perspective on democracy, a recent turn towards an agonistic perspective on democracy places a great deal of faith in the role of political emotion and conflict. Educational scholars have mostly interpreted agonism in relation to the emotional and conflictual experiences that occur within school. Some scholars draw general pedagogical insights from this perspective, while others use it to propose conflictual approaches to classroom discussions. Overestimating, however, the extent to (...) which experiences of agonism within school applies to politically experienced agonisms beyond the school, is problematic. Such overestimations undermine the core political insights of agonistic theory, concerning the democratic potential of radical collective movements. Agonistic theory acknowledges the psychological need among disgruntled citizens for radical alternatives enabling them to oppose and rearticulate the established power dynamics in society. The purpose of agonistic democracy is to enable rearticulations of hegemony through the institutions of representative democracy, rather than as opposed to them. Important for this paper, however, is the argument that such rearticulations depend on the rhetorical force of collective movements. Emphasizing that we cannot assume the presence of such movements in everyday school life, the paper revisits the following question: What are the didactical implications of an agonistic perspective on democracy? The democratic potential of collective movements is not easily captured through experiences within the pedagogical context alone, but proposals are made as to how this potential can be grasped in other ways. (shrink)