Homology is the similarity between organisms due to common ancestry. Introduced by Richard Owen in 1843 in a paper entitled “Lectures on comparative anatomy and physiology of the invertebrate animals”, the concept of homology predates Darwin's “Origin of Species” and has been very influential throughout the history of evolutionary biology. Although homology is the central concept of all comparative biology and provides a logical basis for it, the definition of the term and the criteria of its application remain controversial. Here, (...) I will discuss homology in the context of the hierarchy of biological organization. I will provide insights gained from an exemplary case study in evolutionary developmental biology that indicates the uncoupling of homology at different levels of biological organization. I argue that continuity and hierarchy are separate but equally important issues of homology. BioEssays 30:653–658, 2008. © 2008 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Let N be a transitive model of ZFC such that ωN ⊂ N and P(R) ⊂ N. Assume that both V and N satisfy "the core model K exists." Then KN is an iterate of K. i.e., there exists an iteration tree J on K such that J has successor length and $\mathit{M}_{\infty}^{\mathit{J}}=K^{N}$. Moreover, if there exists an elementary embedding π: V → N then the iteration map associated to the main branch of J equals π ↾ K. (This answers (...) a question of W. H. Woodin, M. Gitik, and others.) The hypothesis that P(R) ⊂ N is not needed if there does not exist a transitive model of ZFC with infinitely many Woodin cardinals. (shrink)

Given the many marvelous things animals can do and moreover the success we have in employing the intentional stance towards animals, it seems to be almost unthinkable to say that animals could not act at all. Nonetheless, this is exactly what I argue for. I claim that strictly speaking there is no animal action, only behaviour. I defend this claim in three steps. Firstly, I recapitulate some of the weighty grounds that speak in favour of animal agency. Secondly, I explain (...) why I still doubt that animals act. The argument is that the account of agency that I take to be the most attractive one entails that animals can't act. Since this account of agency is non-standard, I spend the bulk of the paper with providing a sketch of what, according to it, actions are. Finally, I explain why it is still so natural and promising to regard animals as agents, although in fact they aren't. As one might put it: of course they act, only strictly speaking they don't. (shrink)

Currently, two frameworks of causal reasoning compete: Whereas dependency theories focus on dependencies between causes and effects, dispositional theories model causation as an interaction between agents and patients endowed with intrinsic dispositions. One important finding providing a bridge between these two frameworks is that failures of causes to generate their effects tend to be differentially attributed to agents and patients regardless of their location on either the cause or the effect side. To model different types of error attribution, we augmented (...) a causal Bayes net model with separate error sources for causes and effects. In several experiments, we tested this new model using the size of Markov violations as the empirical indicator of differential assumptions about the sources of error. As predicted by the model, the size of Markov violations was influenced by the location of the agents and was moderated by the causal structure and the type of causal variables. (shrink)

It is shown in this paper that a classical way of speaking about the past can be rejected when quantum systems without superselection rules are considered. To show this, use is made of a formal quantum language. The noncontextuality of quantum measurements is a presupposition of the quantum language. In addition, it is shown that introspective measurements, in contrast to the claims of Albert et al., do not violate the noncontextuality, and hence the result of rejecting the classical way of (...) speaking remains still applicable to introspective measurements. (shrink)

For ordinals α beginning a Σ1 gap in equation image, where equation image is closed under number quantification, we give an inner model-theoretic proof that every thin equation image equivalence relation is equation image in a real parameter from the hypothesis equation image.

Do we sometimes know what will happen in the future? There are two intuitively plausible answers. The prognostic thesis says that we frequently know what will happen, the agnostic thesis says that we never do. Examining the question in the light of different conditions of knowledge supports the prognostic thesis. Yet there is still room for the agnostic intuition, as an expression of oUf necessarily suboptimal epistemic situation with respect to the future, but also of our freedom, in principle, to (...) shape the world as we like to. (shrink)

The present paper investigates the power of proper forcings to change the shape of the universe, in a certain well-defined respect. It turns out that the ranking among large cardinals can be used as a measure for that power. However, in order to establish the final result I had to isolate a new large cardinal concept, which I dubbed “remarkability.” Let us approach the exact formulation of the problem—and of its solution—at a slow pace.Breathtaking developments in the mid 1980s found (...) one of its culminations in the theorem, due to Martin, Steel, and Woodin, that the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals with a measurable cardinal above them all implies that AD, the axiom of determinacy, holds in the least inner model containing all the reals, L. One of the nice things about AD is that the theory ZF + AD + V = L appears as a choiceless “completion” of ZF in that any interesting question seems to find an at least attractive answer in that theory. Beyond that, AD is very canonical as may be illustrated as follows.Let us say that L is absolute for set-sized forcings if for all posets P ∈ V, for all formulae ϕ, and for all ∈ ℝ do we have thatwhere is a name for the set of reals in the extension. (shrink)

ABSTRACTOne prestudy based on a corpus analysis and four experiments in which participants had to invent novel names for persons or objects investigated how the valence of a face or an object affects the phonological characteristics of the respective novel name. Based on the articulatory feedback hypothesis, we predicted that /i:/ is included more frequently in fictional names for faces or objects with a positive valence than for those with a negative valence. For /o:/, the pattern should reverse. An analysis (...) of the Berlin Affective Word List – Reloaded yielded a higher number of occurrences of /o:/ in German words with negative valence than in words with positive valence; with /i:/ the situation is less clear. In Experiments 1 and 2, participants named persons showing a positive or a negative facial expression. Names for smiling persons included more /i:/s and fewer /o:/s than names for persons with a negative facial expression. In Experiments 3 and 4, participant... (shrink)

This chapter provides an account of the Kantian theory of value, showing how a plurality of incommensurable values, namely the fundamentally heterogeneous values of morality and prudence, can be integrated into a complete ordering by appealing to the conditionality of the value of happiness, which allows us to explain how the claims of prudence can be silenced by the claims of morality, thereby solving the Sidgwickian problem of the dualism of practical reason. Moreover, it establishes that the Kantian understanding of (...) silencing is the only way of rendering dualism coherent, given that the question as to what one ought to do, considering all the normative demands to which one is subject, requires either that these demands be commensurable, which presupposes monism, or that these demands never conflict, which can only be ensured in principle by means of conditional value structures. (shrink)

Objectives Medical futility at the end of life is a growing challenge to medicine. The goals of the authors were to elucidate how clinicians define futility, when they perceive life-sustaining treatment (LST) to be futile, how they communicate this situation and why LST is sometimes continued despite being recognised as futile. Methods The authors reviewed ethics case consultation protocols and conducted semi-structured interviews with 18 physicians and 11 nurses from adult intensive and palliative care units at a tertiary hospital in (...) Germany. The transcripts were subjected to qualitative content analysis. Results Futility was identified in the majority of case consultations. Interviewees associated futility with the failure to achieve goals of care that offer a benefit to the patient's quality of life and are proportionate to the risks, harms and costs. Prototypic examples mentioned are situations of irreversible dependence on LST, advanced metastatic malignancies and extensive brain injury. Participants agreed that futility should be assessed by physicians after consultation with the care team. Intensivists favoured an indirect and stepwise disclosure of the prognosis. Palliative care clinicians focused on a candid and empathetic information strategy. The reasons for continuing futile LST are primarily emotional, such as guilt, grief, fear of legal consequences and concerns about the family's reaction. Other obstacles are organisational routines, insufficient legal and palliative knowledge and treatment requests by patients or families. Conclusion Managing futility could be improved by communication training, knowledge transfer, organisational improvements and emotional and ethical support systems. The authors propose an algorithm for end-of-life decision making focusing on goals of treatment. (shrink)

The widely agreed view that actions are events faces the problem of how to describe the “branches” in so-called action trees, i.e. actions which are done by doing other actions. Moreover, the view is also inconsistent with the existence of two familiar species of agency: omitting something and letting things happen. In this article, an alternative conception of action is proposed which takes letting happen as the paradigm of agency. Agency should be construed as an explanatory relation between agents and (...) things happening in the world. This relational view of agency can accommodate for all kinds of agency: doing, letting happen, omitting, prohibiting. And it also provides a satisfactory account of the ontological basis of action trees. We should at first say that to do something is to originate or to bring into existence, i.e., really, to cause, some not yet existing state either of ourselves or of someone else, or, again, of some body. (shrink)

In his target article, Daryl Pullman explores and explains the divergent developments of the frequency of medical assistance in dying (MAID) in Canada and California in the US (Pullman 2023). One o...

ABSTRACTThis paper addresses the problem of opaque sweetening and argues that one should use stochastic dominance in comparing lotteries even when dealing with incomplete orderings that allow for non-comparable outcomes.

We show that simple perceptual competences can emerge from an internal simulation of action effects and are thus grounded in behavior. A simulated agent learns to distinguish between dead ends and corridors without the necessity to represent these concepts in the sensory domain. Initially, the agent is only endowed with a simple value system and the means to extract low‐level features from an image. In the interaction with the environment, it acquires a visuo‐tactile forward model that allows the agent to (...) predict how the visual input is changing under its movements, and whether movements will lead to a collision. From short‐term predictions based on the forward model, the agent learns an inverse model. The inverse model in turn produces suggestions about which actions should be simulated in long‐term predictions, and long‐term predictions eventually give rise to the perceptual ability. (shrink)

We show that the following conjecture about the universe V of all sets is wrong: for all set-theoretical (i.e., first order) schemata true in V there is a transitive set "reflecting" in such a way that the second order statement corresponding to is true in . More generally, we indicate the ontological commitments of any theory that exploits reflection principles in order to yield large cardinals. The disappointing conclusion will be that our only apparently good arguments for the existence of (...) large cardinals have bad presuppositions. (shrink)

In this paper, the results of an empirical analysis of a set of 416 descriptive case studies published by corporate members of the UN Global Compact are presented. Although these cases cannot be viewed as representative of the Compact itself or of corporate social responsibility (CSR) and development in general, they can illustrate which kinds of projects are deemed appropriate as best practice examples among Compact members, and therefore indicate the direction, in which predominantly voluntary and business‐led CSR might at (...) best be evolving. To help contextualize the analysis, the paper starts with a brief overview of recent academic work on the strengths and limitations of CSR in the light of international development, followed by the empirical analysis of Compact case studies. The results raise doubts regarding the general suitability of contemporary CSR initiatives to tackle some of the most pressing developmental challenges. Instead, only certain topics are commonly addressed, while a number of issues such as anti‐corruption measures or labour rights are underrepresented in the case study sample. Regarding the target regions of the best practice examples, the majority is reported on activities based in OECD countries and a small number of emerging markets such as South Africa, India or China, while neglecting other regions such as sub‐Saharan Africa (excluding South Africa). From a European Union policy perspective, these results indicate that there is a role to play for the state in order to create a better fit between CSR agendas and the actual developmental needs in the South. (shrink)

Graphical AbstractCarrying out research means being innovative, which requires novelty. Novelty is an important source of scientific breakthroughs and has great technological impact. Research institutions stand to benefit from fostering innovation. Here, we outline what academic institutions can do to help their scientists become more innovative.

The conference in a nutshell: philosophy in times of crises returned to a crisis in philosophy. The pandemic throws us back on our feet and makes us rethink the question raised at the Davos Disputation between Martin Heidegger and Ernst Cassirer in 1929: “What is a human being?” While both had agreed that the initial question was the crucial question to tackle, neither of them could put forth a solution to the question given that their own thought paths proved to (...) have led them into a dead end and to the necessity to turn in a new direction in order to overcome a philosophical crisis. So, in 2020, why not move beyond the scope of this German–German disputation in Davos, and even beyond the horizon of Europe to look for new pathways of thought? (shrink)

We show that weakly compact cardinals are the smallest large cardinals k where k+ < k+ is impossible provided 0# does not exist. We also show that if k+Kc < k+ for some k being weakly compact , then there is a transitive set M with M ⊨ ZFC + “there is a strong cardinal”.

Resemblance Nominalism About Perfect Naturalness is the view that perfect naturalness of classes is best defined by a conceptual primitive of resemblance between particulars. The adequacy of RNPN is defended by outlining nominalism as the strictly anti-constitutive view that the particulars’ being the fundamental ways they are is not constituted by anything further, supplying a doubly plural contrastive and graded resemblance predicate that allows for a definition of perfect naturalness on an actualist basis, and proving a representation and a uniqueness (...) theorem on the basis of a formal constraint on resemblance called “the Principle”, thereby revealing that bodies of nominalist resemblance facts are guaranteed to behave as if they were grounded in patterns of universals distributed over particulars. (shrink)

It is shown in ZF that if $\delta are such that δ and δ + are either both weakly compact or singular cardinals and Ω is large enough for putting the core model apparatus into action then there is an inner model with a Woodin cardinal.

Inhalt Einfuhrung - Staat im Wandel. Rudiger Voigt zum 65. Geburtstag I. Konzeptualisierung und Systematisierung von Staatswandel Ralf Walkenhaus: Entwicklungslinien moderner Staatlichkeit.

Inductive Metaphysics combines an anti-aprioristic emphasis on an empirical and scientific basis for metaphysics with an insistence on a specifically philosophical abductive theory-building. Since the latter specifically philosophical work is not empirical itself, it may in a liberal sense be called apriori. This paper highlights this apriori dimension within IM by a case study on Structuralism, the view that fundamental reality consists of a network of relations, which a number of philosophers consider to be suggested by modern physics. Focussing on (...) Dasgupta’s algebraic Generalism, the author argues that Structuralism suffers from a severe entailment problem, because the relations-spanning apparatus must stand for metaphysically fundamental forms. Schaffer’s contention that there are no entailment problems is rejected. Advocates of IM are well advised to take seriously their own insistence on metaphysical abduction and not to one-sidedly emphasise the empirical input: the elaboration of exact metaphysical theories and the apriori evaluation of their inherent tenability is a constituent of IM no less important than the consideration of scientific input. More traditional ways of metaphysical reasoning inevitably survive as an essential dimension within IM. (shrink)