Defences of Williamson’s Anti-Luminosity Argument (ALA) that employ doxastic propagation principles—i.e., rules by which cases of beliefs and/or dispositions to believe are inferred from other such cases—risk running into sorites. Since these principles are explainable by an ineffective capacity to phenomenally discriminate between two adjacent cases, luminist rejections of the ALA can halt sorites by denying doxastic propagation, thereby reaffirming these discriminative capacities as appropriately effective. One potent method of resisting the luminist involves recharacterizing discriminative capacities in terms of a (...) distinction between beliefs and their underlying dispositions to reinstate the plausibility of doxastic propagation. To this effect, I propose a novel coarse-grained approach favouring the ALA that leverages a modal analysis of the belief/ disposition distinction. This motivates a sharp threshold between belief and absent belief that neither succumbs to sorites nor begs the question against the luminist. The upshot of this approach is substantial: by conferring a dialectical advantage to the anti-luminist, the luminist is held to highly problematic positions, regarding the trivialisation of safety and the relationship between beliefs and dispositions, if they deny the coarse-grained approach at many of its components. (shrink)

Modal epistemologies that rely on a fallibilism about modal claims have been gaining traction over the years. This paper critically discusses the accounts of Kung (2009, 2010, 2016) and Dohrn (2018, 2019, 2020b) and argues that they are invariably susceptible to being read as entailing claims of epistemic possibility. Both Kung and Dohrn seek to ground modal intuitions on non‐modal ones, and primarily appeal to the modalizing capacity of imagination to aid in the discovery of modal truths. However, insofar as (...) inference from non‐modal imagination to modal truths remains fallible, then no non‐ad hocdistinction can be made between substantiation of fallible metaphysically modal claims and infallible epistemically modal ones. This is because, barring an agent's infallible knowledge of modal truths, how these truths are argued for must attend the agent's imperfect epistemic access thereof, therefore entailing claims of modality consistent with her epistemic state—that is, claims of epistemic possibility. If modal epistemologies in general non‐modally ground their modal assertions in this fallible fashion, then they seem inevitably interpretable in terms of epistemic possibility as opposed to some non‐epistemic reading of metaphysical possibility. (shrink)

Minimal adversariality consists in the opposition of contradictory conclusions in argumentation, and its usual metaphorical expression as a game between combating arguers has seen it be criticized from a number of perspectives: the language used, whether cooperation best attains the argumentative telos of epistemic betterment, and the ideal nature of the metaphor itself. This paper explores primarily the idealization of deductive argumentation, which is problematic due to its attenuated applicability to a dialectic involving premises and justificatory biases that are left (...) hidden and unelucidated. To clarify the issue and offer up a solution, we consider minimal adversariality as an involuntary state of affairs before relating this interpretation to a link between rational persuasion and the attainment of epistemic betterment. Through this we see how the idealizing tendencies of minimal adversariality can be reduced even in argumentation involving premises whose justifications for any arguer are inaccessible to any other arguer. (shrink)

Page 1. Economics and Philosophy, 26 291--320 Copyright C Cambridge University Press doi: 10.1017 / S0266267110000386 TWO KINDS OF WE-REASONING RAUL HAKLI, KAARLO MILLER AND RAIMO TUOMELA University of Helsinki.

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions of an agent fit to be held morally responsible, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. We employ Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility to argue that even if robots were to have all the capacities required of moral agency, their history would deprive them from autonomy in a responsibility-undermining way. (...) We will also study whether humans and technological artifacts like robots can form hybrid collective agents that could be morally responsible for their actions and give an argument against such a possibility. (shrink)

I argue that from a very weak recombination principle and plausible assumptions about the nature of parthood and location it follows that it's possible that the mereological structure of the material world and that of spacetime fail to correspond to one another in very radical ways. I defend, moreover, that rejecting the possibility of such failures of correspondence leaves us with a choice of equally radical alternatives. I also discuss a few ways in which their possibility is relevant to various (...) debates in metaphysics. (shrink)

Various sources in the literature claim that the deduction theorem does not hold for normal modal or epistemic logic, whereas others present versions of the deduction theorem for several normal modal systems. It is shown here that the apparent problem arises from an objectionable notion of derivability from assumptions in an axiomatic system. When a traditional Hilbert-type system of axiomatic logic is generalized into a system for derivations from assumptions, the necessitation rule has to be modified in a way that (...) restricts its use to cases in which the premiss does not depend on assumptions. This restriction is entirely analogous to the restriction of the rule of universal generalization of first-order logic. A necessitation rule with this restriction permits a proof of the deduction theorem in its usual formulation. Other suggestions presented in the literature to deal with the problem are reviewed, and the present solution is argued to be preferable to the other alternatives. A contraction-and cut-free sequent calculus equivalent to the Hubert system for basic modal logic shows the standard failure argument untenable by proving the underivability of DA from A. (shrink)

Endorsing the idea of group knowledge seems to entail the possibility of group belief as well, because it is usually held that knowledge entails belief. It is here studied whether it would be possible to grant that groups can have knowledge without being committed to the controversial view that groups can have beliefs. The answer is positive on the assumption that knowledge can be based on acceptance as well as belief. The distinction between belief and acceptance can be seen as (...) a refinement of the ordinary language concept of belief, and it may be useful in understanding the nature of epistemic justification and classifying various types of epistemic subjects. (shrink)

I give shape to a neglected debate in metaphysics, the debate over the ontological priority between individuality and collectivity. I distinguish the debate from more familiar ones in the recent literature and articulate what I call ontological collectivism, the view that collectivity is prior to individuality. I defend the in-principle intelligibility of the view from forceful general objections and argue that not only is it coherent but also of significant interest to the literature: it allows for overlooked alternatives on a (...) variety of central discussions. (shrink)

One of the key problems the field of Machine Consciousness is currently facing is the need to accurately assess the potential level of consciousness that an artificial agent might develop. This paper presents a novel artificial consciousness scale designed to provide a pragmatic and intuitive reference in the evaluation of MC implementations. The version of ConsScale described in this work provides a comprehensive evaluation mechanism which enables the estimation of the potential degree of consciousness of most of the existing artificial (...) implementations. This scale offers both well defined levels of artificial consciousness and a method to calculate an orientative numerical score . A set of architectural and cognitive criteria is considered for each level of the scale. This permits the definition of a cognitive framework in which MC implementations can be ranked according to their potential capability to reproduce functional synergies associated with consciousness. The probability of the implementations having any phenomenal states related to the assessed functional synergy is not specifically addressed in this paper; nevertheless, it could be thoughtfully discussed elsewhere. (shrink)

Epistemic justification of non-summative group beliefs is studied in this paper. Such group beliefs are understood to be voluntary acceptances, the justification of which differs from that of involuntary beliefs. It is argued that whereas epistemic evaluation of involuntary beliefs can be seen not to require reasons, justification of voluntary acceptance of a proposition as true requires that the agent, a group or an individual, can provide reasons for the accepted view. This basic idea is studied in relation to theories (...) of dialectical justification in which justification is taken to require ability to justify. Since the reasons offered can in principle always be challenged, there is no ultimate end to the dialectical chain of justification. This makes justification of acceptance, and thus group belief, social and, in a way, contextual, but this does not seem to entail strong forms of epistemic relativism. (shrink)

As a new type of epistemic logics, the logics of knowing how capture the high-level epistemic reasoning about the knowledge of various plans to achieve certain goals. Existing work on these logics focuses on axiomatizations; this paper makes the first study of their model theoretical properties. It does so by introducing suitable notions of bisimulation for a family of five knowing how logics based on different notions of plans. As an application, we study and compare the expressive power of these (...) logics. (shrink)

Purpose: To determine the relative value that patients place on consent for procedures in the emergency department (ED) and to define a set of procedures that fall in the realm of implied consent. Methods: A questionnaire was administered to a convenience sample 134 of 174 patients who were seen in the ED of a Midwestern teaching hospital. The questionnaire asked how much time they believed was necessary to give consent for various procedures. Procedures ranged from simple (venipuncture) to complex (procedural (...) sedation). Results: Participants valued a simple blood draw at a low mean of 1.02 minutes of extra time and a lumbar puncture at a high mean of 7.78 minutes. Of all participants 52% and 48% noted a time-value of ?0? time on blood draw and intravenous line starts, respectively, indicating that they desire no additional consent for these procedures. Conclusion: Defining a set of ED procedures covered under implied consent will be difficult because many patients value formal consent for even the simplest procedure. (shrink)

"Husserl's work include lengthy treatment of universals, categories, meanings, numbers, manifolds, etc. from an ontological perspective. Here, however, we shall concentrate almost exclusively on the Logical Investigations, which contain in a clear form the ontological ideas which provided the terminological and theoretical basis both for much of the detailed phenomenological description and for many of the metaphysical theses presented in Husserl's later works.

This volume offers eleven philosophical investigations into our future relations with social robots--robots that are specially designed to engage and connect with human beings. The contributors present cutting edge research that examines whether, and on which terms, robots can become members of human societies. Can our relations to robots be said to be "social"? Can robots enter into normative relationships with human beings? How will human social relations change when we interact with robots at work and at home? The authors (...) of this volume explore these questions from the perspective of philosophy, cognitive science, psychology, and robotics. The first three chapters offer a taxonomy for the classification of simulated social interactions, investigate whether human social interactions with robots can be genuine, and discuss the significance of social relations for the formation of human individuality. Subsequent chapters clarify whether robots could be said to actually follow social norms, whether they could live up to the social meaning of care in caregiving professions, and how we will need to program robots so that they can negotiate the conventions of human social space and collaborate with humans. Can we perform joint actions with robots, where both sides need to honour commitments, and how will such new commitments and practices change our regional cultures? The authors connect research in social robotics and empirical studies in Human-Robot Interaction to recent debates in social ontology, social cognition, as well as ethics and philosophy of technology. -/- The book is a response to the challenge that social robotics presents for our traditional conceptions of social interaction, which presuppose such essential capacities as consciousness, intentionality, agency, and normative understanding. The authors develop insightful answers along new interdisciplinary pathways in "robophilosophy," a new research area that will help us to shape the "robot revolution," the distinctive technological change of the beginning 21st century. (shrink)

A proof-theoretical treatment of collectively accepted group beliefs is presented through a multi-agent sequent system for an axiomatization of the logic of acceptance. The system is based on a labelled sequent calculus for propositional multi-agent epistemic logic with labels that correspond to possible worlds and a notation for internalized accessibility relations between worlds. The system is contraction- and cut-free. Extensions of the basic system are considered, in particular with rules that allow the possibility of operative members or legislators. Completeness with (...) respect to the underlying Kripke semantics follows from a general direct and uniform argument for labelled sequent calculi extended with mathematical rules for frame properties. As an example of the use of the calculus we present an analysis of the discursive dilemma. (shrink)

We study whether robots can satisfy the conditions for agents fit to be held responsible in a normative sense, with a focus on autonomy and self-control. An analogy between robots and human groups enables us to modify arguments concerning collective responsibility for studying questions of robot responsibility. On the basis of Alfred R. Mele’s history-sensitive account of autonomy and responsibility it can be argued that even if robots were to have all the capacities usually required of moral agency, their history (...) as products of engineering would undermine their autonomy and thus responsibility. (shrink)

Raúl Arrabales, Int. J. Mach. Conscious., 06, 1 (2014). DOI: 10.1142/S1793843014400010.

Reseña de ‘Pólemos y Stásis. Vestigios y bordes trágicos de lo bélico y lo político’, realizada por Raúl Villarroel Soto, Dr. en Filosofía, Decano de la Facultad de Filosofía, Universidad de Chile. Juan Pablo Arancibia Pólemos y Stásis. Vestigios y bordes trágicos de lo bélico y lo político La Cebra y Palinodia 2023 Santiago 394 páginas ISBN: 9789878956176.

This contribution offers reflections about Chilean Cybersyn, 50 years ago. In recent years, Cybersyn, has received significant attention. It was the brainchild of Stafford Beer, who conceived it to support the transformation of the Chilean economy from its bureaucratic history to hopefully create a vibrant and modern society, driven by cybernetic tools. These aspects have received much attention in recent times; however, in this contribution, I want to discuss how working in Cybersyn influenced my work after the coup of 1973. (...) Perhaps, for me, its major influence was in the management of complexity, through what I refer here as variety engineering and through the Viable System Model VSM as a paradigm to the management of relationships with implications to enterprises, society and the economy. After the 1973 coup major interest was in technological aspects of Cybersyn such as real-time management and its contribution to decision support and executive information systems. In the late 70s I was personally influenced by information management, but by the early 1980s my work moved towards methodological aspects of how to use the VSM. By 1989 I had created the VIPLAN method. Key questions I attempted to answer were, how to model the complexity of enterprises and their interactions with environmental agents. Later on, in the 1990s and 2000s, the main direction of my work was epistemological, ontological and methodological towards second-order cybernetics and relationships. Only in recent decades the political transformations proposed by Cybersyn have captured the imagination of many commentators. The confluence of social and cultural changes with information technology, data models, artificial intelligence, algorithms and several additional technological developments have challenged the excesses of capitalism, particularly after the banking crisis of 2008–2009. The purpose in this paper is discussing this evolution in the light of those early days in Chile. (shrink)

La razón fundamental por la que, según cierto modelo historiográfico el Parménides platónico constituye un diálogo de crisis en el desarrollo del pensamiento de Platón, es la supuesta presencia en él de una crítica de la Teoría de las Ideas del período medio –Fedón, Banquete, República. La insuficiencia de esa teoría consistiría en una concepción de las Ideas como unidades absolutamente simples y completamente aisladas que les impediría cumplir la función para la cual habrían sido concebidas. Esa función solo podría (...) ser cumplida por una nueva concepción relacional de las Ideas que estaría sugerida en el Parménides y desarrollada en el Sofista. Así pues, por contraste con la que yo llamaría una estrategia del silencio, quisiera 1) insistir en que la noción de koinōnía es fundamental e imprescindible para el proyecto de la República, pues su tema central, la noción de justicia, es impensable sin la noción de koinōnía entre las Ideas; y 2) hacer notar el uso de esa noción de justicia en el Parménides, precisamente en conexión con la cuestión de la interrelación eidética y la concepción de la Idea como un todo “que ha surgido como un uno a partir de todos las partes – ἐξ ἁπάντων ἓν τέλειον γεγονός”. (shrink)

La aceptación de la identidad de la Idea del Bien con lo Uno no necesariamente implica, como recentemente ha sostenido Gerson (2019), que Platón y Plotino comparten esa identificación en los mismos términos. Para insistir en esta diferencia me apoyo en un argumento gnoseológico. Si bien ambos filósofos sostienen la posibilidad de acceder a una presencia en el principio y para describirla recurren a una metáfora erótica, para Platón esa presencia implica la realización plena del Nous en la aprehensión noética (...) del Bien y la generación de episteme, mientras que para Plotino implica el recogimiento no solo de la intelección, sino del deseo mismo de inteligir para acceder a una presencia superior a la episteme. Consecuentemente, Platón concibe al Bien/Uno como Idea – como Idea de Ideas - y cúspide del ser y lo inteligible, mientras que Plotino lo concibe como aneideon, amorfon y apeiron, y, por ende, como radicalmente transcendente al ser y al pensar. (shrink)

Table of Formal and Descriptivists Ontologists (PDF - from Bernard Bolzano to present time) Ontologists of the 19th and 20th Centuries (a selection of critical judgments about some of the greatest philosophers of the recent past) Living Ontologists (a list of authors with an interest in ontology, with synthetic bibliographies).

En este trabajo centrado en la Ética se resaltará la dimensión de alteridad de la esencia del ser humano y, por lo tanto, en el caso de Spinoza, de la noción de deseo. A partir de esta alteridad constitutiva, el modo dicotómico de pensar lo social y lo individual es reconsiderado mediante un deseo que, sin dejar de ser singular, es y persevera en relación con los demás. Con el fin de no reducir la noción de deseo a una de (...) sus expresiones, se distinguirá entre las diversas formas del deseo, en particular el anhelo, y el deseo-cupiditas. Asimismo se perfilará la noción de un deseo de razón en contraste con las figuras de la impotencia. Las vías abiertas conducen a la valoración de un pensador que nos legó una noción de deseo que implica simultáneamente afirmación y codependencia, insertándolo en debates éticos, políticos y psicológicos actuales. (shrink)

The progress in the machine consciousness research field has to be assessed in terms of the features demonstrated by the new models and implementations currently being designed. In this paper, we focus on the functional aspects of consciousness and propose the application of a revision of ConsScale — a biologically inspired scale for measuring cognitive development in artificial agents — in order to assess the cognitive capabilities of machine consciousness implementations. We argue that the progress in the implementation of consciousness (...) in artificial agents can be assessed by looking at how key cognitive abilities associated to consciousness are integrated within artificial systems. Specifically, we characterize ConsScale as a partially ordered set and propose a particular dependency hierarchy for cognitive skills. Associated to that hierarchy a graphical representation of the cognitive profile of an artificial agent is presented as a helpful analytic tool. The proposed evaluation schema is discussed and applied to a number of significant machine consciousness models and implementations. Finally, the possibility of generating qualia and phenomenological states in machines is discussed in the context of the proposed analysis. (shrink)

Exploring how a Freudian-Lacanian approach to psychoanalysis intersects with social and cultural theory, Lacan, Jouissance and the Social Sciences demonstrates the significance of subjectivity as a concept for the study of leadership, social psychology, culture, and political theory. Raul Moncayo examines Lacan's notion of surplus jouissance in relation to four types of socio-economic value: Productive Value, Exchange Value, Surplus Value and Profit. Also drawing on the work of Slavoj Žižek, Moncayo contends that surplus production cannot be reduced to alienated (...) labor, but rather includes various levels of jouissance-value. In this way, the jouissance that drives capitalization and organization can be theorized as constructive rather than destructive, and encompass satisfaction and prosperity rather than individual suffering. This volume will be of great interest to psychoanalysts both in practice and in training, and to academics and scholars of psychoanalytic studies, Lacanian studies, and the social sciences. (shrink)

Este artículo busca responder si es posible planificar y reflexionar sobre contenidos transversales en educación, sin una aproximación transdisciplinaria sobre la complejidad de lo real, en un contexto de mutación planetaria. Todos los esfuerzos, dice el autor, parten del mismo diagnóstico: los distintos niveles educativos se encuentran obsoletos, se requiere una mirada transdisciplinar, y los docentes no tienen una epistemología acorde. El artículo analiza los estados de avance y las distinciones entre multidisciplinariedad, interdisciplinariedad y transdisciplinariedad.

Nietzsche identificó la filosofía como _arte de la transfiguración _en la edición de _La gaya ciencia_ de 1887. Esta expresión tiene un fuerte vínculo con la última obra de Rafael Sanzio, _La trasfigurazione_, comentada en _El nacimiento de la tragedia_, en donde el arte es considerado como transfigurador. Tanto la filosofía como el arte se relacionan con el acto de transfigurar y ambas deben ponerse en relación con la vida; la cual ha de ser transfigurada por el amor.

Este artículo tiene por objeto explicar cuándo en el estado de necesidad la distinción entre un mal mayor o menor responde al universo ético consecuencialista y desde qué consideraciones no lo haría; segundo, explicar por qué es posible desde el principio del doble efecto la ponderación de la vida humana, aceptando la objetivización de sus parámetros según los efectos de una acción. Por ello, a continuación trataremos en la primera sección el concepto de mal en clave consecuencialista y, posteriormente, moral (...) absolutista. Se trata de un análisis sobre la materia que reconoce, en la segunda sección, la importancia de la existencia de estos universos en la ponderación de males. Luego, contrastaremos nuestros razonamientos con las soluciones que, para casos semejantes, se proponen desde el doble efecto para algunas situaciones de estado de necesidad. Finalmente, en la tercera sección, entregaremos los criterios de una política criminal para distinguir y no encubrir exigencias deónticas en el estado de necesidad. (shrink)

Considerando que el transhumanismo es una particular deriva de la reflexión contemporánea, que sostiene la idea de que el actual estado de la humanidad no es el definitivo sino uno simplemente transitorio, que puede y debe ser intervenido tecnocientíficamente en procura de su mejoramiento, en este artículo se examinan las implicancias bioéticas y biopolíticas de tal presupuesto. Se atiende para ello a las complejas y dilemáticas circunstancias derivadas de la perspectiva transhumana, que están vinculadas con la probable trasgresión de los (...) derechos de las personas presentes o futuras y el eventual control absoluto de la vida como el que algunos de sus detractores afirman que inevitablemente se generaría a partir de semejante tipo de intervenciones biotecnológicas. Se intentará indagar críticamente en el ideario del transhumanismo tomando como referencia para el análisis la articulación indisoluble que en la modernidad se ha establecido entre el desarrollo de las tecnologías y aquella racionalidad política que sustenta las estrategias de la gubernamentalidad neoliberal. Se espera plantear con ello una inquietud y un conjunto de interrogantes respecto de los riesgos asociados a los modos hasta hora insospechados de producción, administración y control biopolítico de la subjetividad que podrían estar ligados inadvertidamente a la idea transhumanista. (shrink)

The accurate measurement of the level of consciousness of a creature remains a major scientific challenge, nevertheless a number of new accounts that attempt to address this problem have been proposed recently. In this paper we analyze the principles of these new measures of consciousness along with other classical approaches focusing on their applicability to Machine Consciousness (MC). Furthermore, we propose a set of requirements of what we think a suitable measure for MC should be, discussing the associated theoretical and (...) practical issues. Using the proposed requirements as a framework for the design of an integrative measure of consciousness, we explore the possibility of designing such a measure in the context of current state of the art in consciousness studies. (shrink)

In philosophical action theory there is a wide agreement that intentions, often understood in terms of plans, play a major role in the deliberation of rational agents. Planning accounts of rational agency challenge game- and decision-theoretical accounts in that they allow for rationality of actions that do not necessarily maximize expected utility but instead aim at satisfying long-term goals. Another challenge for game-theoretical understanding of rational agency has recently been put forth by the theory of team reasoning in which the (...) agents select their actions by doing their parts in the collective action that is best for the group. Both planning and team reasoning can be seen as instances of a similar type of reasoning in which actions are selected on the basis of an evaluation of a larger unit than an individual’s momentary act. In recent theories of collective agency, both planning and team reasoning have been defended against orthodox game theory, but, interestingly, by different authors: Raimo Tuomela has defended team reasoning in his theory of group agency, but he ignores temporally extended planning in this context. Michael Bratman has extended his theory of planning to the case of shared agency, but he does not seem to see a role for team reasoning in understanding shared intentional activities. In this paper, we argue that both accounts suffer from this one-sidedness. We aim to combine the main insights of Tuomela’s we-mode approach and Bratman’s planning approach into a fruitful synthesis that we think is necessary for understanding the nature of group agency. (shrink)

En el presente trabajo de investigación se busca examinar la recepción de la obra foucaultiana en dos pensadores paraguayos, Benjamin Arditi y Gilberto Giménez. Para tal propósito se realiza un análisis de las problemáticas socioculturales e históricas que motivaron el acercamiento al pensador francés, como también, los usos de ciertas categorías para una ampliación reflexiva en las disciplinas de ambos autores, partiendo de textos publicados en la última parte del siglo XX.

Stagirite's important disciples should also be mentioned. Other philosophers belonging to the Peripatetic school were: Aristoxenus, Dikaiarchos, Phanias, Straton, Duris, Chamaeleon, Lycon, Hieronymus, Ariston, Critolaus, Phormio, Sotion, Hermippus, Satyrus and others. Straton even succeeded Theophrastus as director of the Lyceum but his name and those of the other Peripatetics of Aristotle's old school should not be considered in a history of logic as they were mainly concerned with history and the natural sciences.

Durante las últimas décadas, ha resurgido la polémica sobre la existencia de la “Filosofía en México”. Además del universalismo y el particularismo, hay una cuestión que aparece reiteradamente en esta polémica: la de la la distinción entre “Filosofía en México” y “Filosofía Mexicana”. Sin embargo, no todos la significan de la misma manera. Así, para Aureliano Ortega, ha existido una “Filosofía Mexicana” en términos de una filosofía dispersa; para Mauricio Beuchot, ha habido y puede seguir habiendo una “Filosofía Mexicana”, en (...) el sentido de un Universalismo analógico (en el esfuerzo de replantear el universalismo concreto de Hegel); Guillermo Hurtado, por su parte, propone hablar de una meta filosofía práctica, para abordar la cuestión; y, por último, Carlos Pereda sugiere que, para hablar de “Filosofía Mexicana”, en buenos términos, es necesario cambiar un vicio, el del entusiasmo nacionalista, por una virtud, el del nacionalismo responsable. (shrink)

Las así llamadas Humanidades Públicas exploran hoy aquello que la educación cívica llamó educación liberal. El desarrollo tecnológico requiere de la imaginación y el juicio que las artes cultivan, pero a menudo olvida que la capacidad crítico-creativa es la fuerza que nos humaniza. La teoría de la imagen de Walter Benjamin señala una vía de pensar y escribir que estimula la simultaneidad y lo constelacional en detrimento de la continuidad, creando un lector distraído, alguien “distraído de la distracción por la (...) distracción” (Eliot). (shrink)