There is much more said in the Critique of Pure Reason about the relationship between God and purposiveness than what is found in Kant's analysis of the physico-theological argument. The ‘Wise Author of Nature’ is central to his analysis of regulative principles in the ‘Appendix to the Transcendental Dialectic’ and also appears in the ‘Canon’, first with regards to the Highest Good and then again in relation to our theoretical use of purposiveness. This paper will begin with a (...) brief discussion of the physico-theological argument before moving on to the Appendix and the Canon. Finally, it will consider some changes to the role of the Wise Author in the Critique of Judgement. (shrink)

In his Kant on Laws, Eric Watkins presents an account of reason on which the principles of specification and continuity are regulative instructions to search for different kinds of the unconditioned. I suggest that we correct Watkins’ account in two ways. First, we need to complete Watkins’ claim to the plurality of the unconditioned: reason aims for three kinds of the unconditioned, associated with the lowest, next and highest concepts. Second, we need to look beyond reason’s search for (...) the unconditioned in order to properly understand the nature of the aim of reason. I argue that we construe reason’s aim as the systematic unity of cognition considered as a whole or, in Kant’s teleological terms, as the realization of an ‘idea’, or a ‘purposive unity’. (shrink)

It is an essential part of Kant's conception of regulative principles and ideas that those principles and ideas are in a certain sense indeterminate. The relevant sense of indeterminacy is cashed out in a section in the Antinomies where Kant says that the regress of conditions of experience forms not a “regressus in infinitum” but a “regressus in indefinitum.” The mathematics that Kant appears to rely on in making this distinction turns out to be problematic, as Jonathan (...) Bennett showed long ago. But I suggest that despite this, there is another mathematically legitimate way to make Kant's point, one enunciated by, among others, Michael Dummett. This reading is corroborated, I suggest, by Kant's conception of reason as a radically open-ended endeavor. -/- . (shrink)

The antinomy of teleological judgment has increasingly been understood as a conflict between regulative principles. But it is not clear why regulative principles can be in conflict at all, since Kant otherwise takes the realization that two conflicting principles are regulative to be sufficient to resolve an antinomy. I argue that in Kant’s view regulative principles do not conflict with one another only if they are reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. Given (...) that the principles of this antinomy do conflict, they must not be reducible to reason’s interest in systematicity. I argue that teleology is thus not reducible to reason’s interest because it is fundamentally unlawful. I then use this irreducibility to account for Kant’s appeal to the supersensible in this context. (shrink)

In recent multicultural conflicts, such as the Danish Muhammad cartoons affair and the religious controversy about having a gay pride parade in the holy city of Jerusalem, religious minority members have argued that certain acts should be prohibited because they offend their religious and cultural feelings. According to the orthodox view in current liberal thought, however, there should be no legal protection from mere insult to feelings and sensibilities, as related to sacred religious and cultural values as they may be. (...) In this article I challenge this view. I argue that certain offensive acts ought to be legally regulated and propose a normative principle for their regulation, which is consistent with neutral liberalism. I argue that some claims of offence to feelings boil down to a struggle for equality in the public sphere between competing cultural identities. I conceptualize such claims as claims that purport to protect people’s right in the integrity of their cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable cultural identity principle, according to which the more vulnerable the social and civic status of one’s cultural identity is, the stronger her claim is from integrity of cultural identity. I argue that this principle avoids the problems of legal moralism and the subjectivity in evaluating painful feelings. (shrink)

It is rather intriguing that we will often try to persuade people of what we find beautiful, even though we do not believe that they may subsequently base their judgement of taste on our testimony. Typically, we think that the experience of beauty is such that we cannot leave it to others to be had. Moreover, we are often aware of the contingency of our own judgements’ foundation in our own experience. Nevertheless, we do think that certain aesthetic, evaluative conceptions (...) do relate to specific experiences in a non-trivial way, especially that of aesthetic excellence. Now certain analytical aestheticians ascribe truth values to aesthetic judgements of various kinds. Such ascription would evidently have a bearing on the problem of aesthetic experience’s relevance for evaluation, as we may in the end be better off neglecting the experiential altogether in virtue of treating aesthetic values in objectivist ways, as natural properties, or as reducible to such properties, descriptions of which will then indeed be true or false.1 However, I think that it is too early yet to bury subjectivism. So let us instead defend it and try to get a better grasp on its suppositions. In this we may profit from ideas advanced by David Wiggins, who neither denies the role played by objective properties, nor neglects the subjective import. According to him, aesthetic values are somehow kinds of relations, which are established by an elaborate process of criticism and refinement of perceptions of, and feelings toward specific natural properties.2 The argument in this paper suggests that the analysis of a paradigmatic pair regarding ‘aesthetic excellence’ provides us with inter-. (shrink)

Phenomenology of Civilization explores the philosophy of Edmund Husserl and R.G. Collingwood, two of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. Husserl founded phenomenology, which has had a direct effect on contemporary philosophy, and Collingwood, though less formally known, is still one of the most commonly read twentieth century philosophers. Maurice Eisenstein examines their work in relation to recent philosophy, particularly focusing on existentialism, Heideggerian phenomenology, and postmodernism. He brings these two philosophers together because they were contemporaries of each (...) other, addressed the same audience, and, therefore, had similar issues to influence them. This discussion of Husserl and Collingwood's work moves beyond Husserl's phenomenology, and Collingwood's typical association with Hegel or Kant, to a new understanding of their ideas through an association with each other in regard to contemporary philosophy and political theory. Eisenstein's discoveries place Husserl and Collingwood into the main Western liberal political tradition with Dewey and James, rather than the more radical critique of that tradition with Sartre and Heidegger. (shrink)

This article is devoted to some of the dominant positions in the philosophy of mathematics, in Descartes and in Leibniz, and to their consequences drawn by these authors in mathematical analysis. I shall treat of Descartes’ epistemological conceptions of analysis and of the primacy of order, both of which are excellently exposited in the _Rules for the direction of the mind_ and of various mathematical devices which he developed later, from the time of the _Cogitationes privatae_ until the _Géométrie_.

The principle of subsidiarity can be an effective tool for adjusting economic systems and establishing the social rule-of-law concept in public organisation. In considering the usability of the principle of subsidiarity, the following aspects thereof are discussed: the role in the development of the European social model; employment in determining limits for the powers of the public and private sectors; the application in the market and planned economy systems; and the social justice function in the development of a social welfare (...) state. The principle of subsidiarity as an instrument for individuals’ interests, balancing and adjusting in the regulation of economic systems, helps to establish the relative sizes of public policy and the market, as subsidiarity can help ensure a more equitable distribution of public goods while guaranteeing the maintenance of the creative potency of operators and minimal satisfaction of vital needs of individuals unable to contribute to the production of goods. It amounts to a constitutional measure determining the balance of productive and protective state, thus ensuring the stability of the state organisation. In the concept of a social rule-of-law state, subsidiarity draws clear limits to the state’s powers, institutionally bringing together efforts of all members of the community to achieve welfare in the state. (shrink)

Ethical principles play an important part not only in the promulgation of regulations but also in their application, i.e., enforcement and adjudication. While traditional ethical principles – promotion of welfare, freedom, and fairness – play an important role in both elements of regulation, some other kinds of ethical principles are significant as well. Principles governing the structure of decision processes should shape the structure and actions of agencies; principles of wise application should govern the work (...) of those whose responsibility it is to apply regulatory language to particular situations. These points are demonstrated by investigating a case study: federal regulations designed to protect children involved in scientific research applied to a placebo study of the effects of recombinant human growth hormone on children of extremely short stature. Keywords: ethics, interpretation, regulation, research CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Moral philosophy has long been dominated by the aim of understanding morality and the virtues in terms of principles. However, the underlying assumption that this is the best approach has received almost no defence, and has been attacked by particularists, who argue that the traditional link between morality and principles is little more than an unwarranted prejudice. In Principled Ethics, Michael Ridge and Sean McKeever meet the particularist challenge head-on, and defend a distinctive view they call "generalism as (...) a regulative ideal.". (shrink)

A review article: In their book Principled Ethics: Generalism as a Regulative Ideal McKeever and Ridge address arguments in the debate between moral particularism and moral generalism. The first part of the book presents a systematic discussion of moral particularism, especially a critical evaluation of arguments in its favour. In the second part authors defend a version of generalism which they label generalism as a regulative ideal. The heart of the debate between particularism and generalism is the question (...) of acceptability of a principled approach to morality – the question whether universal, exceptionless moral principles govern morality. Recognizing the need for a systematic justification of true moral principles and their role in morality, McKeever and Ridge defend such a generalist approach to morality, without committing themselves to any special normative structure or to any specific principles. They offer an impressive and persuasive set of arguments for their position, based on the starting presupposition of moral knowledge in particular cases – this presupposition being the common ground in the debate between generalism and particularism. The book is a defense of generalism and moral principles in their various characteristics – form their functioning as moral standards to their role in guiding our decisions and behaviour, serving as a basis for moral progress, avoiding the danger of special pleading. (shrink)

In this article for a symposium on Joseph Raz's Morality of Freedom, I argue, contrary to Raz, that there is a sound case for the regulation of diminishing principles by strictly egalitarian principles.

Since the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were adopted by the UN Human Rights Council in 2011, they have diffused into policy frameworks, laws, and regulations across the globe. This special issue seeks to advance the interdisciplinary field of human rights research by examining key elements of the emerging transnational regime for the regulation of business and human rights. In seven original contributions, scholars from political science, law, accounting, and philosophy critically reflect on the theoretical foundations (...) of the UNGPs, they analyze the effectiveness of implementation mechanisms and current regulatory practice, and they advance proposals for the future development of the business and human rights regime. In this introduction, we prepare the ground for these analyses, proceeding in three steps. Firstly, we argue that the adoption of the UNGPs has triggered a norm cascade which requires a distinctive, empirically oriented research agenda focusing on the scope, governance, and effectiveness of corporate human rights accountability norms and instruments. Secondly, we explain how the articles in this special issue contribute to that research agenda by addressing these themes. Thirdly, we provide an overview of the individual contributions and point out avenues for future research. (shrink)

Eugene Wigner's several general discussions of symmetry and invariance principles are among the canonical texts of contemporary philosophy of physics. Wigner spoke from a position of authority, having pioneered for recognition of the importance of symmetry principles from nuclear to molecular physics. But perhaps recent commentators have not sufficiently stressed that Wigner always took care to situate the notion of invariance principles with respect to two others, initial conditions and laws of nature. Wigner's first such general consideration (...) of invariance principles, an address presented at Einstein's 70th birthday celebration, held in Princeton on 19 March 1949, began by laying out just this distinction, and in a way that seems to suggest that the three notions arise through abstraction in an analysis of the general problem of cognition in the natural sciences: The world is very complicated and it is clearly impossible for the human mind to understand it completely. Man has therefore devised an artifice which permits the complicated nature of the world to be blamed on something which is called accidental and thus permits him to abstract a domain in which simple laws can be found. The complications are called initial conditions; the domain of regularities, laws of nature. the underlying abstraction is probably one of the most fruitful the human mind has made. It has made the natural sciences possible. (shrink)

Theories of business ethics or corporate responsibility tend to focus on justifying obligations that go above and beyond what is required by law. This article examines the curious fact that most business ethics scholars use concepts, principles, and normative methods for identifying and justifying these beyond-compliance obligations that are very different from the ones that are used to set the levels of regulations themselves. Its modest proposal—a plea for a research agenda, really—is that we could reduce this normative asymmetry (...) by borrowing from the normative framework of “regulation” to identify and justify an important range of beyond-compliance obligations. In short, we might think of “self-regulation” as a language and a normative framework with some distinct advantages over other frameworks like stakeholder theory, corporate social responsibility, corporate citizenship, and the like. These other frameworks have been under attack in the business ethics literature of late, primarily for their vagueness and their disappointing inability to distinguish clearly between genuine beyond-compliance moral obligations, on the one hand, and charitable acts that are laudable but not morally obligatory, on the other. (shrink)

In his important recent book, Aaron James has defended a principle ? Collective Due Care ? for determining when a form of economic integration is morally objectionable because it causes unjustified harm (including unemployment, wage suppression and diminished working conditions). This essay argues that Collective Due Care would yield implausible judgements about trade practices and would be too indeterminate to play the practical role for which it is intended.

This article probes the advisability of regulating U.S. food and drug safety according to the precautionary principle. To do so, a precautionary regulatory regime is formulated on the basis of the beliefs that motivate most proponents of this initiative. That hypothetical regime is critically analyzed on the basis of an actual instantiation of a similarly stylized initiative. It will be argued that the precautionary principle entails regulatory constraints that are apt to violate basis tenets of political legitimacy. The modifications that (...) would change this finding would also change precautionary regulation to the point that it would be indistinguishable from orthodox safety protocols. It is concluded on the basis of its impoverished content that the precautionary principle should not be taken seriously as a formal approach to the regulation of U.S. food and drug safety. (shrink)

The paper considers the legal tools that have been developed in German pharmaceutical regulation as a result of the precautionary attitude inaugurated by the Contergan decision. These tools are the notion of “well-founded suspicion”, which attenuates the requirements for safety intervention by relaxing the requirement of a proved causal connection between danger and source, and the introduction of the reversal of proof burden in liability norms. The paper focuses on the first and proposes seeing the precautionary principle as an instance (...) of the requirement that one should maximise expected utility. In order to maximise expected utility certain probabilities are required and it is argued that objective Bayesianism offers the most plausible means to determine the optimal decision in cases where evidence supports diverging choices. (shrink)

Following the recent condemnation of the National Health Service charging regulations by medical colleges and the UK Faculty of Public Health, we demonstrate that through enactment of this policy, the medical profession is betraying its core ethical principles. Through dissection of the policy using Beauchamp and Childress’ framework, a disrespect for autonomy becomes evident in the operationalisation of the charging regulations, just as a disregard for confidentiality was apparent in the data sharing Memorandum of Understanding. Negative consequences of the (...) regulations are documented to highlight their importance for clinical decision makers under the principles of beneficence and non-maleficence. Exploration of the principle of justice illuminates the core differentiation between the border-bound duties of the State and borderless duties of the clinician, exposing a fundamental tension. (shrink)

Law is often linked to ethics and morality. Regulations of genetically modified organisms ensue from a discussion on how well the law is composed to accommodate ethical considerations. The precautionary principle and biotechnology have undeniable moral connotations. Besides, the principle has socio-economic implications. The application of the precautionary principle in plant breeding should be legally justified on the basis of the best available evidence. On the other hand, scientific information cannot provide all the necessary information on which a risk management (...) decision should be based. This article addresses the issue of gap between science, ethics, and socio-economic considerations related to the cultivation and authorisation of GM crops. (shrink)

Introduction -- The serenity of the wise man -- The seventh day of history -- The guarantor-state -- Biosecurity -- Conclusion -- Appendix -- Index.

Those involved in end-of-life decision making must take into account both legal and ethical issues. This book starts with a critical reflection of ethical principles including ideas such as moral status, the value of life, acts and omissions, harm, autonomy, dignity and paternalism. It then explores the practical difficulties of regulating end-of-life decisions, focusing on patients, healthcare professionals, the wider community and issues surrounding 'slippery slope' arguments. By evaluating the available empirical evidence, the author identifies preferred ways to regulate (...) decisions and minimise abuses at the end of life, and outlines an ethical theory which can provide practical guidance for those engaged in end-of-life decisions"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

The increasing costs of healthcare delivery led to different political and administrative approaches trying to preserve the core values of the welfare state. This approach has well documented weaknesses namely with regard to healthcare rationing. The objective of this paper is to evaluate if independent healthcare regulation is an important tool with regard to the construction of fair processes for setting limits to healthcare. Methodologically the authors depart from Norman Daniels’ and James Sabin’s theory of accountability for reasonableness and try (...) to determine if new regulatory models—namely independent agencies—perform better with regard to the public disclosure of the reasons and rationales of healthcare rationing. In publicly financed healthcare systems independent regulation is an important tool to assure fair and reasonable procedures of prioritising services. In accordance with the principle of public accountability, independent regulatory agencies are particularly well suited to assure publicity of the decision-making processes, relevance of the rationale involved and particularly mechanisms for challenge and dispute resolution regarding limit setting decisions. It follows that independent healthcare regulation could be regarded not only as an instrument for performance improvement but also as a tool of social justice. The authors conclude by stating that accountability for reasonableness should be regarded as a landmark of any healthcare reform. And therefore regulators have the social task of assuring that the rationales for limit-setting decisions are clearly accessible to the public. (shrink)

I suggest that the social justice issues raised by Internet regulation can be exposed and examined by using a methodology adapted from that described by John Rawls in 'A Theory of Justice'. Rawls' theory uses the hypothetical scenario of people deliberating about the justice of social institutions from the 'original position' as a method of removing bias in decision-making about justice. The original position imposes a 'veil of ignorance' that hides the particular circumstances of individuals from them so that they (...) will not be influenced by self-interest. I adapt Rawls' methodology by introducing an abstract description of information technology to those deliberating about justice from within the original position. This abstract description focuses on computing devices that users can use to access information and information networks that information devices use to communicate. The abstractness of this description prevents the particular characteristics of the Internet and the computing devices in use from influencing the decisions about the just use and regulation of information technology and networks. From this abstract position, the principles of justice that the participants accept for the rest of society will also apply to the computing devices people use to communicate, and to Internet regulation. (shrink)

Kant's doctrine of the radical evil in human nature invites at least two serious worries: first, it is unclear how Kant could establish the claim that all human beings adopt an evil maxim; second, this claim seems to conflict with central features of Kant's doctrine of freedom. I argue, via criticisms of various charitable interpretations, that these problems are indeed insuperable if we read Kant as trying to establish that all human beings are evil as a matter of fact. I (...) then develop an alternative reading that avoids these problems. On my reading, Kant transforms the complaint that humans are evil into a prescriptive regulative principle. Although we cannot know whether all human beings really are evil, we ought to presuppose “inextirpable” human evil in the context of moral “ascetic”, the practical field that answers to the duty of moral self-perfection and that aims at the development of virtue. (shrink)

The term ‘responsible AI’ has been coined to denote AI that is fair and non-biased, transparent and explainable, secure and safe, privacy-proof, accountable, and to the benefit of mankind. Since 2016, a great many organizations have pledged allegiance to such principles. Amongst them are 24 AI companies that did so by posting a commitment of the kind on their website and/or by joining the ‘Partnership on AI’. By means of a comprehensive web search, two questions are addressed by this (...) study: Did the signatory companies actually try to implement these principles in practice, and if so, how? What are their views on the role of other societal actors in steering AI towards the stated principles? It is concluded that some three of the largest amongst them have carried out valuable steps towards implementation, in particular by developing and open sourcing new software tools. To them, charges of mere ‘ethics washing’ do not apply. Moreover, some 10 companies from both the USA and Europe have publicly endorsed the position that apart from self-regulation, AI is in urgent need of governmental regulation. They mostly advocate focussing regulation on high-risk applications of AI, a policy which to them represents the sensible middle course between laissez-faire on the one hand and outright bans on technologies on the other. The future shaping of standards, ethical codes, and laws as a result of these regulatory efforts remains, of course, to be determined. (shrink)

The free energy principle (FEP) portends to provide a unifying principle for the biological and cognitive sciences. It states that for a system to maintain non-equilibrium steady-state with its environment it must minimise its (information-theoretic) free energy. Under the FEP, to minimise free energy is equivalent to engaging in approximate Bayesian inference. According to the FEP, therefore, inference is at the explanatory base of biology and cognition. In this paper, we discuss a specific challenge to this inferential formulation of adaptive (...) self-organisation. We call it the universal ethology challenge: it states that the FEP cannot unify biology and cognition, for life itself (or adaptive self-organisation) does not require inferential routines to select adaptive solutions to environmental pressures (as mandated by the FEP). We show that it is possible to overcome the universal ethology challenge by providing a cautious and exploratory treatment of inference under the FEP. We conclude that there are good reasons for thinking that the FEP can unify biology and cognition under the notion of approximate Bayesian inference, even if further challenges must be addressed to properly draw such a conclusion. (shrink)

The social licence to operate concept is little developed in the academic literature so far. Deployment of the term was made by the United National Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights and the UN ‘Protect, Respect and Remedy’ Framework, which apply SLO as an argument for responsible business conduct, connecting to social expectations and bridging to public regulation. This UN guidance has had a significant bearing on how public regulators seek to influence business conduct beyond Human Rights to (...) broader Corporate Social Responsibility concerns. Drawing on examples of such public regulatory governance, this article explores and explains developments towards a juridification of CSR entailing efforts by public regulators to reach beyond jurisdictional and territorial limitations of conventional public law to address adverse effects of transnational economic activity. Through analysis of an expansion of law into the normative framing of what constitutes responsible business conduct, we demonstrate a process of juridification entailing a legal framing of social expectations of companies, a proliferation of law into the field of business ethics, and an increased regulation by law of social actors or processes. (shrink)