In his Complaint of Peace, the great sixteenth-century humanist Erasmus allows "Peace" to talk. Peace speaks as a plaintiff, protesting her shabby treatment at the hands of humankind and our ever-ready inclination to launch wars. Against this lure of warfare, Erasmus pits the higher task of peace-building, which can only succeed through the cultivation of justice and respect for all human life. First articulated in 1517, the complaint of peace has echoed through subsequent centuries and down to our age--an age (...) convulsed by world wars, holocausts, and ethnic cleansings. Distinguished political scientist Fred Dallmayr traces this complaint from the writings of Erasmus through the evolution of the "law of nations" to recent and contemporary co-plaintiffs in the West. He also highlights the role of non-Western thinkers and teachings in giving voice to "Peace." In addition to Erasmus, Dallmayr engages major thinkers such as Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius, Immanuel Kant, Hannah Arendt, Martin Heidegger, Mahatma Ghandi, the Dalai Lama, John Rawls, and Martha Nussbaum. This timely book urgently pleads for greater attentiveness to peace's complaint as an antidote to the prevailing culture of violence and the escalating danger of nuclear catastrophe. Dallmayr offers not only a compelling historical narrative, but powerful ethical and religious arguments vindicating the primacy of peace over violence and war. (shrink)

In an age marked by profound rifts and tensions on both political and philosophical levels, a fundamental debate affecting virtually the whole of Western intellectual culture is currently taking place. In one camp are those who would defend traditional metaphysics and its ties to the rise of modernity; in the other camp, those who reject the possibility of foundational thought and argue for the emergence of a postmodern order. Can we still defend the notion of critical reason? How should we (...) grasp the significance of the embeddedness of language and thought in specific historical contexts? Can we rationally defend the possibility of human freedom? In this book, Fred Dallmayr goes beyond conventional discussion of these issues by tracing them back to their origins. Drawing on his unrivaled knowledge of Continental philosophy, he explores the underlying connections between the phenomenologists of the Freiburg School and the critical theorists of the Frankfurt School, thus steering a course toward a "critical ontology" that bridges reason and the world. This book will be essential reading for sociologists, philosophers, and political theorists. (shrink)

This book is a protest against some geopolitical agendas that are pushing the world toward a major global war and possibly toward a nuclear apocalypse. As an antidote, Fred Dallmayr issues a call to people everywhere to oppose this rush to destruction and to restore the "wholeness of humanity" through the quest for just peace.

ArgumentIn the decade between 1983 and 1993, Herbert Mehrtens in West Berlin and I in East Berlin communicated closely about our parallel work on mathematics under the National Socialist (NS) regime. For a short period (1988–89), we worked on a joint book on this topic. We agreed that the book should be based primarily on empirical historical material, using a theoretical approach largely guided by Mehrtens’ work on social systems in mathematics (Mehrtens1981, 1987a). However, parallel work for his habilitation thesis (...) on modernity in mathematics increasingly captivated Mehrtens’ interests. This, together with ongoing resistance among older mathematicians and the insecurities of our individual careers during times of considerable political change, particularly in East Germany, led to the failure of our joint project.This paper aims at reconstructing—mostly by drawing on correspondence—parts of the dialogue between Mehrtens and me at the time. Our dialogue was influenced by our different upbringing and socialization in the two parts of Germany, and by different, though complementary, views about the combination of empirical and theoretical approaches to the historiography of mathematics.In the epilogue, I describe how my later work in the decades from the 1990s on the history of mathematics profited much from Mehrtens’ early theoretical and empirical work but was less influenced by his book on modernity. That later work of mine was, however, mostly done at a time when Mehrtens had largely left the field and considered himself increasingly as a “cultural scientist” (Kulturwissenschaftler). (shrink)

When considering the question, “Is it just for a [genetic] screening program to give people all the information they want?” it is first necessary to understand how the information is being presente...

If polygenic risk scores for traits are to be provided to parents before—as opposed to after—a child is born, these scores will provide the very first units of information upon which parents will b...

In this note, we review paradoxes like Russell’s, the Liar, and Curry’s in the context of intuitionistic logic. One may observe that one cannot blame the underlying logic for the paradoxes, but has to take into account the particular concept formations. For proof-theoretic semantics, however, this comes with the challenge to block some forms of direct axiomatizations of the Liar. A proper answer to this challenge might be given by Schroeder-Heister’s definitional freedom.

This paper embeds the core part of Discourse Representation Theory in the classical theory of types plus a few simple axioms that allow the theory to express key facts about variables and assignments on the object level of the logic. It is shown how the embedding can be used to combine core analyses of natural language phenomena in Discourse Representation Theory with analyses that can be obtained in Montague Semantics.

If payoffs are tickets for binary lotteries, which involve only two money prizes, then rationality requires expected value maximization in tickets. This payoff scheme was increasingly used to induce risk neutrality in experiments. The experiment presented here involved lottery choice and evaluation tasks. One subject group was paid in binary lottery tickets, another directly in money. Significantly greater deviations from risk neutral behavior are observed with binary lottery payoffs. This discrepancy increases when subjects have easy access to the alternatives' expected (...) values and mean absolute deviations. Behavioral regularities are observed at least as often as with direct money payoffs. (shrink)

This paper develops a semantics for a fragment of English that is based on the idea of `impossible possible worlds'. This idea has earlier been formulated by authors such as Montague, Cresswell, Hintikka, and Rantala, but the present set-up shows how it can be formalized in a completely unproblematic logic---the ordinary classical theory of types. The theory is put to use in an account of propositional attitudes that is `hyperfine-grained', i.e. that does not suffer from the well-known problems involved with (...) replacing expressions by logical equivalents. (shrink)

Force, Fate, and Freedom serves as an introduction to historical sociology, as well as a critical analysis of the belief in economic and political progress through social knowledge. Reinhard Bendix offers a development of the historicist approach to social change first championed by Max Weber, and presents an overview of the foundations of political authority in Japan, Russia, Germany, France, and England.

In a recent paper we have defined an analytic tableau calculus PL_16 for a functionally complete extension of Shramko and Wansing's logic based on the trilattice SIXTEEN_3. This calculus makes it possible to define syntactic entailment relations that capture central semantic relations of the logic---such as the relations |=_t, |=_f, and |=_i that each correspond to a lattice order in SIXTEEN_3; and |=, the intersection of |=_t and |=_f,. -/- It turns out that our method of characterising these semantic relations---as (...) intersections of auxiliary relations that can be captured with the help of a single calculus---lends itself well to proving interpolation. All entailment relations just mentioned have the interpolation property, not only when they are defined with respect to a functionally complete language, but also in a range of cases where less expressive languages are considered. For example, we will show that |=, when restricted to L_{tf}, the language originally considered by Shramko and Wansing, enjoys interpolation. This answers a question that was recently posed by M. Takano. (shrink)

We give a survey on truth theories for applicative theories. It comprises Frege structures, universes for Frege structures, and a theory of supervaluation. We present the proof-theoretic results for these theories and show their syntactical expressive power. In particular, we present as a novelty a syntactical interpretation of ID1 in a applicative truth theory based on supervaluation.

Measurement instruments assessing multiple emotions during epistemic activities are largely lacking. We describe the construction and validation of the Epistemically-Related Emotion Scales, which measure surprise, curiosity, enjoyment, confusion, anxiety, frustration, and boredom occurring during epistemic cognitive activities. The instrument was tested in a multinational study of emotions during learning from conflicting texts. The findings document the reliability, internal validity, and external validity of the instrument. A seven-factor model best fit the data, suggesting that epistemically-related emotions should be conceptualised in terms (...) of discrete emotion categories, and the scales showed metric invariance across the North American and German samples. Furthermore, emotion scores changed over time as a function of conflicting task information and related significantly to perceived task value and use of cognitive and metacognitive learning strategies. (shrink)

A logic is called higher order if it allows for quantification over higher order objects, such as functions of individuals, relations between individuals, functions of functions, relations between functions, etc. Higher order logic began with Frege, was formalized in Russell [46] and Whitehead and Russell [52] early in the previous century, and received its canonical formulation in Church [14].1 While classical type theory has since long been overshadowed by set theory as a foundation of mathematics, recent decades have shown remarkable (...) comebacks in the fields of mechanized reasoning (see, e.g., Benzm¨. (shrink)

This book provides readers with in-depth insights into Corporate Social Responsibility and sustainability strategies, as well as their impacts on product and process innovation, business models and social innovation around the globe. It explains how resource issues, climate change, the impacts of pollution and economic activities, and emerging social challenges inevitably lead to changes in the business environment, cost structure and competitive advantage. Further, it highlights how these changes influence the process of innovation, and how companies can gain an edge (...) by integrating stakeholder groups in their innovation process, and by considering sustainability and the needs of society at large. The book reflects the immense strides made in recent years in the discussion about the relationship between business and society, and demonstrates the increasing impact on innovation management. (shrink)

It is known that C. G. J. Jacobi wrote his first two letters to E. E. Kummer in the year 1834. Thanks to a find in the archive of the Mittag-Leffler Institute there is now the missing link , Kummer’s reply letter to Jacobi’s first letter. This letter seems to be the earliest one from Kummer still in existence (at least to a mathematician). Kummer tells in his letter about his situation as a teacher in Liegnitz, gives further a version (...) of his later paper on the summation of slowly convergent series and discusses Euler’s summation formula in connection with the practice of its use in numerical calculations. The article contains the complete texts of the three letters (up to those parts in Kummer’s letter identically contained in his published article) together with a commentary on their contents. (shrink)

Recent publications (Henrich, Seeberg) claim that Kant has been profoundly influenced by contemporary publications on juridical deductions. I try to show, that this cannot be right. The introductory note of the “Transcendental Deduction” (Critique of Pure Reason A 84) poses two questions: “quid facti?” and “quid juris?”. The first is answered by the demonstration of the possibility of relations between pure concepts and pure intuition und sensations, the second by the implicit refutation of David Hume. Kant and his interpreters sustain (...) the possibility of using juridical concepts, that are neither related to real juridical facts nor are only metaphers, but have a special philosophical signification. But what should that be? (shrink)