Examines the dialogues from Plato's early and middle periods and illustrates the similarities and differences between Plators"s concept of craft knowledge and ...

Acts of martyrdom have been found in nearly all major religions. Though considered by devotees to be perhaps the greatest expression of faith, martyrdom is also one of the most difficult concepts for modern observers of religion to understand. Cormack seeks to foster a greater understanding of these acts by explaining how martyrdom has historically been viewed in the major religions. She provides the first cross-cultural examination of this fascinating aspect of religious life.

In the opening sections of this paper, we defined ambiguity in terms of distinct sentences (for a single sentence-string) with, in particular, distinct sets of truth conditions for the corresponding negative sentence-string. Lexical vagueness was defined as equivalent to disjunction, for under conditions of the negation of a sentence-string containing such an expression, all the relevant more specific interpretations of the string had also to be negated. Yet in the case of mixed quantification sentences, the strengthened, more specific, interpretations of (...) some such positive string are not all of them necessarily implied to be false if the corresponding negative sentence-string is asserted. On the contrary, as we saw in section 6, a negative sentence-string can be used to deny one of the more specific interpretations of the corresponding positive string without also denying other weaker interpretations of that same string. One might therefore argue that the only empirical evidence availble for assessing quantified sentences suggests clearly that these sentence-strings are ambiguous. Indeed logicians, many of whom restrict their attention to propositions, MUST recognise logical ambiguity at this point. For the contextualisation of the negative sentences in section 6 showed that it was possible to assert the falsity of some proposition P expressed by the sentence S while asserting a further proposition which was compatible with the truth of S. However the corresponding conclusion that such sentence-strings are sententially ambiguous is not a necessary conclusion for the linguist: for the alternative account of postulating a single semantic representation plus a set of semantic procedures is also compatible with the negation evidence. Moreover we have seen independent reasons for thinking that if sentential ambiguity is assumed to be in one-to-one correspondence with what we should now call logical ambiguity, a considerable body of generalisations is lost. For the maximal ambiguity account, it should be recalled, is committed to assigning at least thirteen distinct propositions and hence thirteen distinct sentence outputs for every sentence-string containing no more than two quantifiers, for three out of the four interpretations originally outlined in this paper can be understood with each numeral taken either in an ’exactly’ sense or in an ’at least’ sense. Moreover there is no explanation of why just these interpretations are available-they are merely an arbitrary list, no more connected than are the two interpretations of John saw her duck, with no reason to predict that the ambiguity would carry over from language to language. If then it is granted that an ambiguity account fails to capture appropriate generalisations, only two alternative accounts of mixed quantification sentence-strings remain viable-an analysis proposing an initial co-ordinate logical form like the logical form III, which is the strongest form compatible with each of the propositional interpretations of sentence-string Two examiners marked six scripts, and the radically weak form in which only existential quantification (both over sets and over members of those sets) is invoked. Since there are strong arguments to suggest that the procedures which both analyses require are semantic, there seems no reason not to adopt the radical vagueness account, with its considerably greater simplicity. (shrink)

Måske er netop Grundtvigs forståelse af det evige en nødvendig inspiration til at se sider af kristendommen, som vi ellers fortrænger. For om nogen formulerede han både sammenhængen og det uoverstigelige svælg mellem ”nu” og ”engang”, det dennesidige og det evige - og så den modsætning, der går ned gennem det menneskelige liv mellem lys og mørke, liv og død, frelse og fortabelse. Det modsætningsfyldte i kristendommen, dens paradoks, var for Grundtvig at se gået tabt i rationalismens kritiske syn på (...) Bibelen og i romantikkens harmonitænkning Spørgsmålet er så, om det dristige og håndgribelige i Grundtvigs tale om det evige kan gøres gældende i en folkekirkelighed, hvor den teologiske refleksion over eskatologien er gledet i baggrunden. Er Grundtvigs kraftige billedverden, kampen mellem lys og mørke, fylde og meningsløshed, frelse og fortabelse, liv og død blevet uforståelig? Og kan vi igen gøre denne billedverden nærværende og meningsfyldt? (shrink)

This book argues that we can only understand transformations of nature studies in the Scientific Revolution if we take seriously the interaction between practitioners and scholars. These are not in opposition, however. Theory and practice are end points on a continuum, with some participants interested only in the practical, others only in the theoretical, and most in the murky intellectual and material world in between. It is this borderland where influence, appropriation, and collaboration have the potential to lead to new (...) methods, new subjects of enquiry, and new social structures of natural philosophy and science. The case for connection between theory and practice can be most persuasively drawn in the area of mathematics, which is the focus of this book. Practical mathematics was a growing field in early modern Europe and these essays are organised into three parts which contribute to the debate about the role of mathematical practice in the Scientific Revolution. First, they demonstrate the variability of the identity of practical mathematicians, and of the practices involved in their activities in early modern Europe. Second, readers are invited to consider what practical mathematics looked like and that although practical mathematical knowledge was transmitted and circulated in a wide variety of ways, participants were able to recognize them all as practical mathematics. Third, the authors show how differences and nuances in practical mathematics typically depended on the different contexts in which it was practiced: social, cultural, political, and economic particularities matter. Historians of science, especially those interested in the Scientific Revolution period and the history of mathematics will find this book and its ground-breaking approach of particular interest. (shrink)