The basic understanding which underlies scientific evidence - ideas such as the structure of experiments, causality, repeatability, validity and reliability- is not straightforward. But these ideas are needed to judge evidence in school science, in physics or chemistry or biology or psychology, in undergraduate science, and in understanding everyday issues to do with science. It is essential to be able to be critical of scientific evidence. The authors clearly set out the principles of investigation so that the reader will be (...) confident in questioning the experts, making an informed choice or arriving at in informed opinion. The book is intended for a wide range of readers including those who want to: } collect their own evidence } be able to question and judge a wide range of science-based issues that we come across in the press or other media in everyday life } teach others how to understand evidence. This book has been developed from the authors' work with first year undergraduates in a combined science course and in primary teacher training for science specialists. It is suitable for students training as primary science specialists, and also for 'A' level and first-year undergraduates in science and science-related subjects. (shrink)

Gott denken: Diese Aufgabe zielt in die Mitte der Philosophie – und eben dieser Aufgabe widmet sich dieses Buch: einem Kompendium der europäischen Religionsphilosophie und ihrer wichtigsten Fragestellungen unter historischen wie systematischen Aspekten. Am Beginn des Bandes findet sich der hier erstmals veröffentlichte Habilitationsvortrag des bedeutenden deutschen Religionsphilosophen Richard Schaeffler – dem dieses Buch gewidmet ist – über Anselm von Canterbury und seinen Widersacher Gaunilo von Marmoutiers. Schaeffler geht der Frage nach, die vor und nach Anselm der Philosophie (...) keine Ruhe gelassen hat: Können wir in unserem Denken zu einer Vergewisserung des Daseins Gottes finden? Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich das Ringen mit dieser Ungewissheit, ob und wie im Denken eine Vergewisserung Gottes möglich ist, durch die Geschichte der europäischen Philosophie. Eben das ist die Leitfrage auch dieses Buches: Welche Bedeutung hat Gott für unser Denken und in unserem Denken? Ist das möglich: zu denken, ohne Gott zu denken? Der InhaltDie Kontroverse zwischen Anselm von Canterbury und Gaunilo von Marmoutiers: zur Frage nach der Vertretbarkeit des Daseins Gottes im Denken • Geschichtliche Bezüge • Gott erkennen und erfahren? • Gott: effabile et ineffabile – sagbar und doch unsagbar • Zur programmatischen Idee einer rationalen Theologie • Etsi Deus daretur – aut non daretur Die HerausgeberChristoph Böhr ist Professor für Philosophie an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz ist Professorin em. für Religionsphilosophie an der TU Dresden sowie Vorstand des Europäischen Instituts für Philosophie und Religion an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. (shrink)

In einer Zeit intensiver Begegnung der Kulturen und Religionen ist die Frage unausweichlich: Wie müssen Religionen sich selber verstehen, um zu einem solchen Dialog fähig zu sein? Perry Schmidt-Leukel antwortet auf diese Frage: Um dialogfähig zu sein oder zu werden, müssen die Religionen auf jeden „exklusiven" Wahrheitsanspruch verzichten, aber auch den „inklusivistischen" Anspruch preisgeben, dass alles, was in anderen Religionen wahr und gut ist, in ihrer eigenen Botschaft bereits „inkludiert" sei. Der vorliegenden Artikel bestreitet sowohl die Möglichkeit als auch die (...) Notwendigkeit eines verstandenen „Pluralismus". Als Alternative dazu entwirft er eine Theorie des „Lernens auch noch im Widerspruch" und zeigt, dass ein solches Lernen dem Gespräch der Religionen besser dient als der von Schmidt-Leukel vorgeschlagene Verzicht auf alle „exklusivistischen" und „inklusivistischen" Wahrheitsansprüche. (shrink)

Meister Eckhart hat in seinen Predigten einen von philosophischer Weite und mystischer Innerlichkeit geprägten christlichen Glauben dargelegt und entfaltet. Über die Jahrhunderte hinweg haben seine Überlegungen vielen Menschen bei ihrer Suche nach Gott und einem offenen Welt- und Menschenbild lebendige Impulse und hilfreiche Wegweisungen vermittelt. Die Predigten sind eine unerschöpfliche Quelle geistig religiöser Einsichten, Anregungen und Ermutigungen und ziehen den Leser immer neu in ihren Bann."-- Back cover.

Nach einer kritischen Sichtung der methodischen Ansatze, von denen aus Religionsphilosophie getrieben werden kann, entscheidet sich der Verfasser fur die Methode der Religionsphanomenologie (1. Kapitel). Diese liest an der Weise, wie die Religion sich selbst darstellt, die besondere Struktur des religiosen Aktes und seine Beziehung auf die in diesen Akten intendierten Gegenstande ab. Deutlichster Ausdruck der besonderen Eigenart der religiosen Akte ist die religiose Sprache (2. Kapitel). Doch lassen sich die dort zum Ausdruck kommenden Strukturen auch an religiosen Handlungen, vor (...) allem an denen des Kultus, wiederfinden (3. Kapitel). Dabei sind die besonderen Formen religiosen Anschauens, Denkens und Handelns nicht einfach angeboren, sondern werden in religiosen Uberlieferungsgemeinschaften erlernt und kultiviert (4. Kapitel). Unter denjenigen Wirklichkeiten, auf die religiose Akte sich beziehen und die nur diesen Akten "originar gegeben" sind, haben Gott bzw. die Gotter herausragende Bedeutung. An der Weise, wie Gott bzw. die Gotter zum Gegenstand religioser Verehrung, aber auch philosophischer Argumentation werden, lasst sich die Eigenart der spezifischen religiosen Verhaltnisbestimmung von religiosen Akten und religiosen Gegenstanden deutlich machen - auch und gerade im Unterschied zur profan-philosophischen Auffassung (5. Kapitel). (shrink)

Das Spannungsfeld "Glaube und Vernunft" ist eine Kernfrage sowohl christlicher als auch muslimischer Theologie. Bereits in den Offenbarungsschriften selbst wird ansatzweise die Frage diskutiert, inwieweit die Vernunft eine eigenstandige Quelle der Gotteserkenntnis und eine kritische Instanz fur die Prufung der Glaubenswahrheiten ist. Beide Weltreligionen rezipieren von ihren Anfangen Werke und Gedanken der griechischen Philosophie. Umstritten bleibt die Reichweite der Vernunft in Glaubensfragen, besonders bei Themen wie Freiheit und Gehorsam, Allmacht Gottes und Wahrheitsanspruche anderer Religionen. In den gegenwartigen, weltanschaulich pluralen Diskursen (...) sowie im interreligiosen Gesprach eroffnet die Annahme der Vernunftigkeit der Offenbarung eine grundlegende Moglichkeit zur Verstandigung. (shrink)

Physicist J. Richard Gott uses the Copernican principle that “we are not special” to make predictions about the future lifetime of the human race, based on how long the human race has been in existence so far. We show that the predictions which can be derived from Gott’s argument are less strong than one might be inclined to believe, that Gott’s argument illegitimately assumes that the human race will not last forever, that certain versions of (...) class='Hi'>Gott’s argument are incompatible with Bayesian conditionalization, and that Gott’s argument is self-refuting. -/- *****Note: For Bradley Monton's up-to-date thoughts on Gott's argument, see his _Philosophical Quarterly_ paper co-authored with Brian Kierland, "How To Predict Future Duration from Present Age".*****. (shrink)

Gott denken: Diese Aufgabe zielt in die Mitte der Philosophie – und eben dieser Aufgabe widmet sich dieses Buch: einem Kompendium der europäischen Religionsphilosophie und ihrer wichtigsten Fragestellungen unter historischen wie systematischen Aspekten. Am Beginn des Bandes findet sich der hier erstmals veröffentlichte Habilitationsvortrag des bedeutenden deutschen Religionsphilosophen Richard Schaeffler – dem dieses Buch gewidmet ist – über Anselm von Canterbury und seinen Widersacher Gaunilo von Marmoutiers. Schaeffler geht der Frage nach, die vor und nach Anselm der Philosophie (...) keine Ruhe gelassen hat: Können wir in unserem Denken zu einer Vergewisserung des Daseins Gottes finden? Wie ein roter Faden zieht sich das Ringen mit dieser Ungewissheit, ob und wie im Denken eine Vergewisserung Gottes möglich ist, durch die Geschichte der europäischen Philosophie. Eben das ist die Leitfrage auch dieses Buches: Welche Bedeutung hat Gott für unser Denken und in unserem Denken? Ist das möglich: zu denken, ohne Gott zu denken? Der InhaltDie Kontroverse zwischen Anselm von Canterbury und Gaunilo von Marmoutiers: zur Frage nach der Vertretbarkeit des Daseins Gottes im Denken • Geschichtliche Bezüge • Gott erkennen und erfahren? • Gott: effabile et ineffabile – sagbar und doch unsagbar • Zur programmatischen Idee einer rationalen Theologie • Etsi Deus daretur – aut non daretur Die HerausgeberChristoph Böhr ist Professor für Philosophie an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. Hanna-Barbara Gerl-Falkovitz ist Professorin em. für Religionsphilosophie an der TU Dresden sowie Vorstand des Europäischen Instituts für Philosophie und Religion an der Hochschule Heiligenkreuz/Wien. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Gott—Mensch—Natur: Der Personenbegriff in der philosophischen Anthropologie Heinrichs von Gent by Julian E. JoachimMartin PickavéJulian E. Joachim. Gott—Mensch—Natur: Der Personenbegriff in der philosophischen Anthropologie Heinrichs von Gent. Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters, Neue Folge, 86. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2020. Pp. 558. Paperback, €78.00.In recent years, there has been a noticeable uptick in studies exploring medieval conceptions of personhood. One line of approach (...) taken by scholars of medieval philosophy has been to investigate the emergence of the idea of subjectivity in medieval philosophical and theological texts and to work from there toward a broader picture of medieval accounts of personhood. Alain de Libera’s as-of-yet incomplete series of books under the title Archéologie du sujet (the first volume appeared in 2007 for Vrin) exemplifies this approach. Others, such as Dominik Perler in Eine Person sein: Philosophische Debatten im Spätmittelalter (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2020), take their starting point from some uncontroversial aspects and dimensions of personhood (rationality, reflexivity, and moral agency) and pursue the various debates that ensued around these among medieval philosophers and theologians. Very few interpreters today start with what medieval authors themselves have to say about persona. This is unsurprising, given the theological context in which the term persona is discussed, and it is not clear at first sight how discussions about the persons of the Trinity can teach us anything about what medieval authors thought about human persons. The book by Joachim is an exception to this trend. The author takes his lead from the Trinitarian context and aims to move from there to a wider understanding of what Henry of Ghent (d. 1293), the most important scholastic thinker in the generation after Thomas Aquinas, thinks a person is.Apart from an extensive introduction (9–52) in which the author justifies his approach, the book consists of four very long chapters. The first chapter (53–169) does not deal with Henry of Ghent at all. Rather, it is devoted to the prominent and influential definitions of what a person is that we can find in Boethius’s treatise Contra Eutychen et Nestorium (person as “individual substance of a rational nature” [naturae rationabilis individua substantia]) and Richard of St. Victor’s De Trinitate (person as “incommunicable existence of an intellectual nature” [naturae intellectualis incommunicabilis existentia]). The author spends a considerable amount of space explaining how Boethius and Richard arrived at their respective definitions and how their definitions ought to be understood, and concludes with some remarks on the differences between the two accounts. In the rest of the book, the author turns to Henry of Ghent. Because Joachim holds that there are three thematic areas in Henry of Ghent that are closely connected to the notion of a person, he devotes chapters 2 through 4 to each one of those areas. Chapter 2 (170–308) deals mostly with individuation and individuality, chapter 3 with the eternity of the world and creation (309–428), and chapter 4 is organized around discussions about freedom of the will (429–505). [End Page 504]Joachim’s decision to start chapter 2 by focusing on the connection between personhood and individuality is fully justified, as Henry himself draws this connection in question 1 of article 53 of his Summa quaestionum ordinariarum. Article 53 is the closest we get to a dedicated treatment of personhood in Henry’s oeuvre, although this article is, as usual, part of a longer discussion of the Trinity. Furthermore, Joachim explores individuation and individuality in two respects: first, he is interested in pursuing what is meant by the very notion of an individual; second, he explores what, for Henry, counts as the principle or cause of individuation. A lot of ground gets covered in these pages, as the author delves into various aspects of Henry’s ontology. Although it is not always easy to follow the main line of argument, Joachim provides a lot of helpful material for understanding the various moves Henry makes in Summa, article 53. He frequently contrasts Henry’s positions with those of Thomas Aquinas, which both helps in terms of clarity and provides useful... (shrink)

Das Buch legt in geschichtlicher Reihenfolge dar, wie sich herausragende Denker des Abendlandes Gott geistig und geistlich angenähert haben und wer für sie Gott im Wesentlichen war. So war für die antiken Philosophen Platon und Plotin das Göttliche vor allem das Gute, Schöne oder Eine. Als christliche Denker suchten dann im Früh- und Hochmittelalter Augustinus, Richard von St. Viktor und Thomas von Aquin auf je eigene Weise die Dreieinheit Gottes zu erklären. Am Beginn der Neuzeit endete die (...) lebenslange Suche des Nikolaus von Kues nach dem angemessensten Gottesbegriff schliesslich beim "Können selbst." In der Neuzeit erfuhr Teresa von Avila Gott als das Innerste ihrer Seele, während ihr Ordensbruder Johannes vom Kreuz Gott als lebendige Liebesflamme erlebte. In seinen "Meditationen" bestimmte Descartes Gott als das vollkommenste Wesen. Wiederum dem dreieinen Gott näherte sich Hegel mit seiner spekulativen Lehre vom Reich des Vaters, des Sohnes und des Geistes. Für Hans Urs von Balthasar war im 20. Jh. das stellvertretende Leiden des Gottessohnes für uns Menschen von entscheidender Bedeutung. Im selben Zeitraum verstand Karl Rahner Gott primär als das heilige Geheimnis. Anhand eines Hauptwerkes oder mehrerer Werke wird jeweils der Weg oder ein Weg dieser Denker zu Gott nachgezeichnet. Ausserdem werden mithilfe neuerer angelsächsischer Diskussionen einige Eigenschaften Gottes erörtert: sein Schöpfertum sowie seine Allmacht, Allwissenheit und Ewigkeit.-- Back cover. (shrink)

Dieser Sammelband hat zum Ziel, moderne atheistische Richtungen kritisch und wissenschaftlich zu betrachten. Mit diesen modernen atheistischen Richtungen ist vor allem der in Oxford unterrichtende Biologe und Religionskritiker Richard Dawkins verknüpft, bekennender Gegner von Kreationismus, Intelligent Design und Theologie, der schon 1976 mit der Veröffentlichung seines Buches "Der Gotteswahn" in der breiten Öffentlichkeit auf sich aufmerksam machte. Auch in jüngerer Vergangenheit, und zwar im Jahr 2006, war Dawkins mit seinem Buch (Dawkins 2006) an einem erneuten Aufflammen einer vor allem (...) in den USA geführten Diskussion rund um die Vereinbarkeit oder Unvereinbarkeit von theologischen und evolutionstheoretischen Ansätzen beteiligt. Beim Durchblättern dieses Buches wird spätestens beim Entdecken des vierten Kapitels, das den provokanten Titel "Warum es mit ziemlicher Sicherheit keinen Gott gibt" trägt, klar, dass Dawkins damit keine Brücke zwischen Evolutionsbiologie und Schöpfungstheologie schlagen möchte. Auch Dawkins selbst hält dieses Kapitel für das wichtigste seines Buches: "This chapter has contained the central argument of my book" (cf. Dawkins 2006, p. 187). -/- Dies ist Grund genug, uns dieses Kapitel aus Dawkins' Buch näher anzusehen. Schließlich verbindet Dawkins damit hohe Ansprüche: "If the argument of this chapter is accepted, the factual premise of religion - the God Hypothesis - is untenable. God almost certainly does not exist. This is the main conclusion of the book so far" (cf. Dawkins 2006, p.189). Sein Argument, im englischen Original "main argument" (hier: "Hauptargument") genannt, verdient also genauere Betrachtung und soll in diesem Artikel wissenschaftstheoretisch beleuchtet werden. (shrink)

The physicist Richard Gott defends the Copernican principle, which claims that when we have no information about our position along a given dimension among a group of observers, we should consider ourselves to be randomly located among those observers in respect to that dimension. First, I apply Copernican reasoning to the distribution of evil in the universe. I then contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life strengthens four important versions of the argument from evil. I remain neutral regarding (...) whether this result is a reductio of these arguments from evil or the statement of a genuine evidential relationship. (shrink)

Der Vorsokratiker Xenophanes von Kolophon aus dem 6. vorchristlichen Jahrhundert gilt als der Begründer eines philosophischen Monotheismus, der unabhängig vom Monotheismus der hebräischen Bibel aus dem Denken entstand. Aber war Xenophanes wirklich Monotheist? Diese Frage soll im Folgenden beantwortet werden. Dazu ist aber vorab der Begriff des ‚Monotheismus‘zu klären.

Bei der Renaissance der philosophischen Auseinandersetzung mit Fragen über Gott spielte der Oxforder Philosoph Richard Swinburne eine wesentliche Rolle. Er kann als der bedeutendste zeitgenössische Vertreter der natürlichen Theologie gelten. Natürliche Theologie ist das Unternehmen, philosophisch zu untersuchen, ob es einen Gott gibt und wie er beschaffen ist. Dies ›philosophisch‹ und nicht theologisch zu untersuchen, heißt, direkte Offenbarung dabei nicht als Erkenntnisquelle zu verwenden.

Summary This paper deals with the structure of the so-called c-inductive arguments in Richard Swinburne’s book The Existence of God and attempts to criticize their central concepts and assumptions. One of these concepts is simplicity: it is argued that Swinburne’s concept of simplicity is not unambiguous and that there is no reason to assume a positive correspondence between simplicity and probability. Furthermore, the theistic hypothesis cannot be said to be simple in any sense relevant to Swinburne. The second important (...) concept is explanatory power. It is argued that the method of determining a theory’s probability by means of its explanatory power cannot be applied to the case of theism. Finally, polytheism is considered and it is argued that according to his own principles Swinburne has actually no sufficient reason to prefer monotheism. (shrink)

J. Richard Gott III (1993) has used the “Copernican principle” to derive a probability density function for the total longevity of any phenomenon, based solely on the phenomenon’s past longevity. John Leslie (1996) and others have used an apparently similar probabilistic argument, the “Doomsday Argument,” to claim that conventional predictions of longevity must be adjusted, based on Bayes’ Theorem, in favor of shorter longevities. Here I show that Gott’s arguments are flawed and contradictory, but that one of (...) his conclusions—his delta t formula—is mathematically equivalent to Laplace’s famous (and notorious) ‘rule of succession’; moreover, Gott’s delta t formula is a plausible worst-case (if one favors greater longevity) bound in some contexts. On the other hand, the Doomsday Argument is fallacious: the argument’s Bayesian formalism is stated in terms of total duration, but all attempted real-life applications of the argument—with one exception, an application by Gott 1994—actually plug in prior probabilities for future duration; moreover, the Self-Sampling Assumption, an essential premise of the Doomsday Argument, is contradicted by the prior information in all known real-life cases. But rejecting the Doomsday Argument does not entail rejecting the possibility of learning about the future from the past. Applying the work of Bruce M. Hill (1968, 1988, 1993) and Frank P.A. Coolen (1998, 2006) in the field of non-parametric predictive inference, I propose and defend an alternative methodology for quantifying how past longevity of any phenomenon does provide evidence for future longevity. In so doing, I identify an objective standard by which to choose among counting time intervals, counting population, or counting any other measure of past longevity in predicting future longevity. This methodology forms the basis of a calculus of induction. (shrink)

The physicist J. Richard Gott has given an argument which, if good, allows one to make accurate predictions for the future longevity of a process, based solely on its present age. We show that there are problems with some of the details of Gott's argument, but we defend the core thesis: in many circumstances, the greater the present age of a process, the more likely a longer future duration.

Copernican reasoning involves considering ourselves, in the absence of other information, to be randomly selected members of a reference class. Consider the reference class intelligent observers. If there are extraterrestrial intelligences (ETIs), taking ourselves to be randomly selected intelligent observers leads to the conclusion that it is likely the Earth has a larger population size than the typical planet inhabited by intelligent life, for the same reason that a randomly selected human is likely to come from a more populous country. (...) The astrophysicist Fergus Simpson contends that this reasoning supports the claims that the typical planet inhabited by ETIs is smaller than Earth (radius about 5,000km; cf. Earth's radius = 6,371km) and that the typical ETI is significantly larger than us about 314kg, the size of an adult male grizzly bear). Simpson's applications of Copernican reasoning are novel and exciting. They should be of interest to philosophers concerned with Richard Gott's delta t argument, the N=1 problem in astrobiology, limited principles of indifference, and probabilistic epistemology in general. While we agree with Simpson about the qualitative direction of his conclusions, we take issue with his presentation of precise quantitative results because his methods (1) display bias, (2) ignore other variables contributing to population size, (3) commit an equivocation, and (4) conceal their dependence on arbitrary assumptions. (shrink)

The recent explosion in the discovery of exoplanets and our incipient ability to detect atmospheric biomarkers recommend reflection on the conceptual implications of discovering – or not discovering – extrasolar life. I contend that evidence for intelligent extraterrestrial life is evidence against the existence of God, because if there are intelligent extraterrestrials, there are likely to be evils in the universe even greater than those found on Earth. My reasoning is based on Richard Gott's Copernican Principle, which holds (...) that in the absence of information to the contrary, we should take ourselves to be typical observers. (shrink)

This chapter explores the concept of time itself, as physicists understand it. Einstein's special theory of relativity requires worldlines of physical objects to be timelike; the field equations of his general theory of relativity predict that massive bodies such as stars and black holes distort space‐time and bend worldlines. Suppose space‐time becomes so distorted that some worldlines form closed loops. If one tried to follow such a closed timelike curve (or CTC) exactly, all the way around, one would bump into (...) ones former selves and get pushed aside. But by following part of a CTC, we could return to the past and participate in events there. According to a recent calculation by J. Richard Gott of Princeton, a cosmic string passing rapidly by another would generate CTCs. The chapter concludes that if time travel is impossible, then the reason has yet to be discovered. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji presents a unique discussion of the development of moral conscience over a period of 2500 years, from the playwrights of the fifth century BCE to the present. He addresses key topics including the original meaning and continuing nature of conscience, the ideas of freedom of religion and conscience with climaxes in the early Christian centuries and the seventeenth, the disputes on absolution or 'terrorisation' of conscience, dilemmas of conscience, and moral double-bind, the reliability of conscience if it (...) is shaped by local custom, and modern opposition to the idea of conscience and its role in legislation. (shrink)

Richard Sorabji, a noted philosopher in his own right, here offers a new edition of his 1972 translation of "De Memoria" here with commentary, summaries, and three essays comparing Aristotle's accounts of memory and recollection. For this edition, Sorabji has also provided a substantial new introduction taking into account scholarly debates over the intervening thirty years, particularly those over the role of mental images in the imagination. "Sorabji has produced a first-class book on an important topic. All Aristotelians, and (...) anyone with an interest in any aspect of memory, will be in his debt."--Jonathan Barnes, "Isis ""Anyone concerned with Aristotle's psychology, theory of mind, or rhetoric, anyone interested in mnemonic systems, and anyone trying to work out for himself a theory of memory, should read Aristotle's treatise "On Memory," with the comments by Richard Sorabji."--"International Studies in Philosophy" "Sorabji's book is a sample of care, intelligence, and subtlety that the Anglo-Saxon philosophers do not hesitate to invest in such enterprises.... The notes seem to leave no detail, no textual difficulty unilluminated."--"Revue de Metaphysique et de Morale ". (shrink)

In this paper, I describe how artifacts and autobiographical memory are integrated into new systemic wholes, allowing us to remember our personal past in a more reliable and detailed manner. After discussing some empirical work on lifelogging technology, I elaborate on the dimension of autobiographical dependency, which is the degree to which we depend on an object to be able to remember a personal experience. When this dependency is strong, we integrate information in the embodied brain and in an object (...) to reconstruct an autobiographical memory. In such cases, autobiographical memory is extended or distributed. (shrink)

The concept of self-control is incorporated in a theory of individual intertemporal choice by modeling the individual as an organization. The individual at a point in time is assumed to be both a farsighted planner and a myopic doer. The resulting conflict is seen to be fundamentally similar to the agency conflict between the owners and managers of a firm. Both individuals and firms use the same techniques to mitigate the problems which the conflicts create. This paper stresses the implications (...) of this agency model and discusses as applications the effect of pensions on saving, saving and the timing of income flows, and individual discount rates. (shrink)

BackgroundDuring the arrival of the COVID-19 pandemic, various professional ethical guidance was issued to (and for) health and social care professionals in England and Wales. Guidance can help to inform and support such professionals and their patients, clients and service users, but a plethora of guidance risked information overload, confusion, and inconsistency. MethodsDuring the early months of the pandemic, we undertook a rapid review, asking: what are the principles adopted by professional ethical guidance in England and Wales for dealing with (...) COVID-19? We undertook thematic content analysis of the 29 documents that met our inclusion criteria.ResultsThe 29 documents captured 13 overlapping principles: respect, fairness, minimising harm, reciprocity, proportionality, flexibility, working together, inclusiveness, communication, transparency, reasonableness, responsibility, and accountability.ConclusionsWe intend this attempt to collate and outline the prominent principles to be helpful, particularly, for healthcare practice during the COVID-19 pandemic and, hopefully, for future pandemic planning. We also offer some reflections on the guidance and the principles therein. After describing the principles, we reflect on some of the similarities and differences in the guidance, and the challenges associated not only with the specific guidance reviewed, but also with the nature and import of “professional ethical guidance”. (shrink)

Suppose there are two people having a moral disagreement about, say, abortion. They argue in a familiar way about whether fetuses have rights, whether a woman’s right to autonomy over her body overrides the fetus’s welfare, and so on. But then suppose one of the people says “Oh, it’s all just a matter of opinion; there’s no objective fact about whether fetuses have rights. When we say that something is morally forbidden, all we’re really doing is expressing our disapproval of (...) it.” The other person protests: “No!—that’s totally wrong. Of course there are objective moral truths.” And suppose their dispute now settles on this new matter of whether there are objective moral facts, and the debate continues. They’ve now stopped discussing abortion, and are discussing the nature of any moral debate about abortion; they’ve stopped doing ethics, and started doing metaethics. If wondering about what one morally ought to do is to engage in ethical thought, then wondering about what one is doing when one wonders about what one morally ought to do is to engage in metaethical thought. When we make public moral judgments are we stating facts, or are we just expressing our opinions? And if there are moral facts, then what kind of fact are they? Can moral judgments be true or false? Can moral judgments be justified, and if so how? These kinds of questions are the domain of metaethics. (I’m not saying that there is a crisp and principled line to be drawn between meta-ethics and regular ethical discourse; but it is, if nothing else, a pedagogically useful division of labor.). (shrink)

New models of data governance for health data are a focus of growing interest in an era of challenge to the social licence. In this article, we reflect on what the data trust model, which is founded on principles of participatory governance, can learn from experiences of involving and engagement of members of the public and participants in the governance of large-scale biobanks. We distinguish between upstream and ongoing governance models, showing how they require careful design and operation if they (...) are to deliver on aspirations for deliberation and participation. Drawing on this learning, we identify a set of considerations important to future design for data trusts as they seek to ensure just, proportionate and fair governance. These considerations relate to the timing of involvement of participants, patterns of inclusion and exclusion, and responsiveness to stakeholder involvement and engagement. We emphasise that the evolution of governance models for data should be matched by a commitment to evaluation. (shrink)

Four prominent views of the nature and methods of clinical ethics (especially in consultation forums) are reviewed; each is then submitted to a criticism intended to show both weaknesses and strengths. It is argued that clinical ethics needs to be responsive to the specific complexities of clinical situations. For this, the need for an expanded notion of practical reason within unique situations is emphasized, one whose aim is to facilitate decision-making on the part of those directly responsible for them and (...) consonant with their own respective moral frameworks and conceptions of what is most worthwhile. Keywords: Casuistry, clinical ethics, consultation, decision-making, dialogue, facilitator, practical reason, relationships CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

The article explains a rule-Utilitarian normative thesis about when actions are morally excused; that an act otherwise morally objectionable in some way is excused if a moral system, The acceptance of which in the agent's society would be utility-Maximizing, Would not condemn it. What is meant by a "moral system condemning" an action is explained. The parallel between this moral thesis and the benthamite theory of criminal justice is developed. It is argued that this rule-Utilitarian thesis implies that an action (...) is morally excused (not blameworthy) if it does not manifest a defective trait of character. (shrink)

The political passages in Polanyi’s Personal Knowledge are an integral part of his arguments against ‘objectivism’ and/or a post-critical, personalist, fiduciary and fallibilist philosophy. This paper elaboratesthe social and political implications of Polanyi’s emphasis upon acceptance of one’s situation and the exercise in it of a sense of responsibility to transcendent ideals, as against attempts to start with a clean slate, to overcome all imperfections and to find some simple rule for political policy. Prescriptive duties and rights, and mutual trust (...) and solidarity, are the bases of politics, anti responsible action must start with them. But much of modern politics expresses a Gnostic impatience of our created and finite existence which results in arbitrary commitment to some radical and destructive ideology. (shrink)

This book brings recent developments in Anglo-American philosophy into engagement with dominant currents in contemporary European social theory in order to articulate a pragmatic account of moral criticism. Presented in a lively and accessible style that avoids technical jargon, Morality and Social Criticism argues that the objectivity of moral discourse can be preserved without recourse to the overweening philosophical ambitions of the Enlightenment.