Money is a cultural construction, leukemia is not. In which category does phenomenal consciousness fit? The issue is clarified by a distinction between what cultural phenomena causally influence and what culture constitutes. Culture affects phenomenal consciousness but it is ridiculous to suppose that culture constitutes it, even in part.

What is it that produces laughter? Or a smile, since, in fact, the verb γελάω has both meanings? Because for someone to laughs or to smile, it requires to be in the company of others, and involved in a certain situation which somehow sparks in us that kind of reaction. This note will provide a sketch for a research on the various situations in which characters laugh or smile in the Platonic dialogues. There is a ridiculous situation that emerges in (...) a discussion, when the interlocutors speak by themselves without taking into account what the other says ; another ridiculous situation emerges involuntarily from an intervention or remark from one of the interlocutors ; another more subjective one emerges from certain behaviors in particular situations. Moreover, there are interesting indications about the very nature of the ridiculous and the proper way to use it in comedy or in the interactions between people. (shrink)

Ridicule can be used in order to create concurrence as well as to en-hance antagonism. This paper deals with ridicule that is used by a critic when he is responding to a standpoint or to a reason advanced in support of a standpoint. Ridicule profits from humor’s good repu-tation, and correctly so, even when it is used in argumentative contexts. However, ridicule can be harmful to a discussion. This paper will deal with ridicule from the (...) perspective of strategic maneuvering between the individual rhetorical objec-tive of effecting persuasion and the shared dialectical objective of resolving the dispute on its merits. In what ways can ridicule be used in strategic maneuvering and under what conditions are these uses dialectically sound? (shrink)

Drawing on the Second Discourse and the Social Contract and Notes from Underground and “The Dream of a Ridiculous Man,” this essay examines the striking similarities and fundamental differences between Dostoevskij’s and Rousseau’s treatment of the problem of individual vs. society and their notions of ideal social relations. The essay investigates Rousseau’s attempt to absorb morality into politics and “to concretize” Diderot’s universal moral man into citizen. It also suggests that Dostoevskij takes Rousseau’s attempt at concretization a step further by (...) exposing humanist conceptions of man and society in general as fiction and creating a model of ideal society that absorbs morality, not into politics (as does Rousseau’s model), but into the sanctity of the Word. (shrink)

This paper aims to discuss ridicule in Plato. Often neglected in modern accounts of emotions, ridicule is in fact considered a pathos by Plato and extensively deployed in his dialogues. I will analyse ridicule from a descriptive, a normative, and a “practical” perspective, paying attention to how Plato understands its basic functioning, how he thinks that it should be regulated, and how he uses it in his dialogues. More generally, this paper will be an opportunity to explore (...) some issues related to the “pathe of the dialogue”, by which I mean both the emotions that are staged through the characters of Platonic fiction and the emotions which Plato aimed to elicit in his audience. (shrink)

In the first argumentative section of Book 1, Lucretius establishes the existence of matter and void , and in the second identifies matter as the atoms and defines their properties . In the third section, following Epicurean tradition, he attempts to refute a representative selection of Presocratic philosophers – Heraclitus , Empedocles and Anaxagoras – whose explanations of basic matter are potential rivals to the atomist theory which he has just outlined. The climax to this section is reached in Lucretius' (...) triumphant personal claim to be an original poet and health-bringing purveyor of truth . His foregoing criticism of the Presocratics as writers and thinkers is deeply coloured by the values he openly professes here. The introductory passages to each philosopher, in particular, are highly revealing of Lucretius' personal inclinations as a poet and exhibit a virtuoso command of several styles and techniques. (shrink)

El sarcasmo que se manifiesta hacia los representantes de las profesiones intelectuales es un fenómeno patente en los períodos 'abbasí y buyí. Aunque los eruditos de la gramática árabe fueran clásica el blanco especial de tales burlas en la literatura de ese período, también se encuentran en las fuentes muchas anécdotas e historietas en las que se hace burla de otros estudios y actividades intelectuales y religiosas, así como de los que las ejercen. La lista incluye disciplinas tales como el (...) estudio del hadíth, varias ramas del fiqh, etc. En este artículo se analiza el contenido irónico de los chistes y versos y se identifica el elemento común en la mayoría de estos textos en el hecho de que se hace burla, casi siempre, del esnobismo de los doctos demasiado pedantes y solemnes, contra los cuales "triunfa" lo alegre, sensato y realista. En conclusión, se ofrece una interpretación de estos chistes y alusiones en los textos literarios en el contexto de los enormes cambios sociales del período 'abbasí: parece razonable suponer que se refleja aquí un nuevo tipo de cultura literaria, urbana, altamente civilizada y frívola, para lo cual no bastaba ya con imitar modelos de expresión, vida y cultura anteriores y más solemnes, sino que buscaba manifestarse con mayor libertad tanto en la literatura como en otros ámbitos de la vida cultural. Todo este cambio cultural, empero, parece haber sucedido dentro de la clase educada y élite, de forma que no se debe suponer que estos textos representen la voz de las clases bajas en la literatura. (shrink)

This chapter focuses on one of the common fallacies in Western philosophy, appeal to ridicule. An appeal to ridicule is closely related to an ad hominem argument because both attack the person. There is a similarity between an appeal to ridicule and an appeal to emotion in that both attempt to bypass rational assessment of a point of view and elicit an emotional reaction from the audience. An appeal to ridicule may be an attempt to elicit (...) humor at another's expense, or it may be an attempt to elicit enmity, playing on the fears and prejudices of the group. The difference between a reductio ad absurdum and an appeal to ridicule is that the former uses good evidence while the latter does not. Perhaps the best way to avoid this fallacy is to cultivate an attitude of respect for other points of view. (shrink)

According to Reid, opinions that contradict the principles of common sense are not only false but also absurd. Nature has given us an emotion that reveals the absurdity of an opinion: the emotion of ridicule. An appeal to ridicule in philosophical arguments may easily be discounted as a logical fallacy in the same manner as an appeal to the common consent of people. This essay traces the origins of Reid's defense of ridicule in the works of Addison, (...) Hutcheson, Shaftesbury and Campbell. Reid rejected a non-epistemic view of the sense of ridicule. According to Reid, ridicule includes both a feeling and a particular act of judgment based on the principles of common sense. (shrink)

The Callicles colloquy of Plato’s Gorgias features both examination and ridicule. Insofar as Socrates’ examination of Callicles proceeds via the elenchus, the presence of ridicule requires explanation. This essay seeks to provide that explanation by placing the effort to ridicule within the effort to examine; that is, the judgment/pronouncement that something/ someone is worthy of ridicule is a proper part of the elenchic examination. Standard accounts of the Socratic elenchus do not include this component. Hence, the (...) argument of this essay suggests a need to revise the standard account of the elenchus, at least as it relates to the use of that method within the Gorgias. Insofar as a revised account of the elenchus has implications for our understanding of Socratic moral psychology, the argument of this essay also suggests a need to reconsider the moral psychological framework within which Socrates operates in the Gorgias. (shrink)

Abstract: In the Philebus, Socrates constructs a dialectical argument in which he purports to explain to Protarchus why the pleasure that spectators feel when watching comedy is a mixture of pleasure and pain. To do this he brings in phthonos (malice or envy) as his prime example (47d-50e). I examine the argument and claim that Socrates implicitly challenges Protarchus’ beliefs about himself as moderate and self-knowing. I discuss two reasons to think that more is at stake in the argument than (...) the mixed pleasure and pain of comic malice. (shrink)

Readers of Plautus’ Poenulus are struck by the generally ‘sympathetic’ portrayal of the title character Hanno, a portrayal somewhat surprising to us since the play was produced shortly after the Second Punic War.1 Contrary to what we might expect, Hanno the Carthaginian is neither villain nor scapegoat, and he even exhibits the Roman virtue of pietas.2 However, Hanno's portrayal is not wholly positive, for Plautus delineates his character principally by endowing him with the negative stereotypes of Punic physiognomy, dress, speech, (...) and behaviour familiar to his Roman audience.3 Hanno's Punic ethnicity is not merely an incidental matter of fact, as it is with his relative Agorastocles, but an essential part of his characterization that serves to isolate him from all the other characters of the palliata. While some of Hanno's vices—deceit, licentiousness, and effeminacy—are not exclusive to Carthaginians and are shared by other Greek characters in the palliata, there is one vice peculiar to Hanno. In this paper I argue that Plautus ridicules Hanno through arecurrent insinuation of incest. The insinuation of incest has not, to my knowledge, been noted previously, but our text does imply it in three conspicuous places. (shrink)

In contemporary thought, as in the long eighteenth century, the politics of ridicule is split between those who see it as fundamentally uncivil and those who advocate for its emancipatory potential...

This paper examines the emergence of a new approach to stratigraphic complexity, first in geology and then, following its creative appropriation, in paleobiology. The approach was associated with a set of models that together transformed stratigraphic geology in the decades following 1970. These included the influential models of depositional sequences developed by Peter Vail and others at Exxon. Transposed into paleobiology, they gave researchers new resources for studying the incompleteness of the fossil record and for removing biases imposed by the (...) processes of sedimentary accumulation. In addition, they helped reconfigure the cultural landscape of paleobiology, consolidating a growing emphasis on fieldwork and eroding the barrier that had been erected in the 1970s between “paleontology” and “paleobiology.” This paper traces these developments, paying special attention to the simulation models of stratigraphic paleobiologist Steven Holland. It also considers how the integration of sequence and event stratigraphy and paleobiology has begun to influence long-running discussions of incompleteness and bias in the fossil record. (shrink)

In Uncivil Mirth, Ross Carroll skilfully draws our attention to the Enlightenment debate in Britain on the “politics of ridicule” that questions the virtue or effectiveness of, broadly, laughing, j...

We tend to take the phenomenon of humour for granted, seeing it for the most part as something innately and fundamentally human. However we might go even further than this, and say that the phenomenon of humour is perceived as an essential part of what makes us human. In this respect, philosophers and theorists as wide apart as Aristotle and the French, feminist Julia Kristeva (1980; also see Goldberg, 1999a) have regarded a baby's ability to laugh as one of the (...) earliest signs of the separation of 'self' from 'other', a reciprocal process deemed to be crucial to the formation of a separate identity. However, although the general importance of humour might be agreed amongst researchers, what theoretical position one takes will have a profound effect on how one approaches and analyses humour. In much psychological research the focus tends to be on how humour works, i.e., syntax, semantic categories, sex differences, personality types, etc., and one finds a frustrating neglect of what is actually meant by the term 'humour' in terms of history and emergences. Consequently, an important question tends to go unchallenged: Is humour some unproblematic innate human ability, or, a socially defined concept that has changed and mutated alongside our understanding of what is means to be person ? In an attempt to grapple with this question, the following genealogical account is less concerned with fathoming out how humour works than with relating it to notions of human subjectivity, or how theories of humor have informed and reflected social constructs of what it means to be a 'subject'. (shrink)

Betr. u.a. Sebastian Brants "Narrenschiff.".

In one of the closing paragraphs of Treatise Book 1, Hume provocatively concludes: ‘Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous’ . Unlike the first clause, the meaning of the second clause is far from obvious. I claim that errors in philosophy are ‘only ridiculous’ for Hume in the sense that – unlike errors in religion – they fail to disturb us psychologically or in practical life. The interesting question, however, is why they fail to (...) disturb us. I suggest that it is their critical role in resolving the psychological instability brought on by philosophical reflection that makes errors in philosophy quite helpful to us and necessary for re-stabilising ourselves. In recognising a positive role for philosophical errors, my account challenges the standard interpretation of Hume's claim according to which ‘ridiculous’ philosophical errors play the merely negative role of being innocuous or safely dismissed. (shrink)

This chapter explicates a distinctive argument that Avicenna offers for the existence of nature as a causal power in bodies. In doing that, the author shows the argument has two main targets: the Aristotelian tradition on the hand, who thought that the existence of nature, as an intrinsic principle of movement, was self-evident, and the Ash ͑arite occasionalist theological tradition on the other, who were anti-realists about all creaturely efficacious power, locating all efficacy instead in an extrinsic transcendent agent. The (...) argument draws on two key premises: a regularity of events thesis and a version of the principle of sufficient reason. Based on these two premises, Avicenna offers a response to the issue in a way that attempts to preserve something from both traditions. For it allows, with the Ash ͑aris, the causal involvement of a transcendent being in the production of some effect or range of effects from some body; and yet still maintains, against them and with the Aristotelians, that the effect must occur in virtue of some property of that body, where the property in question makes a real causal contribution to the effect’s occurrence. This amounts to a properly Avicennian account. (shrink)

The Bible recounts that in Eden, Adam gives names to all the animals. But those names are not only representations of the animals’ nature, rather they shape and constitute it. The naming by Adam contains in itself the divide between the human and non-human. Then, there is the Fall: Adam falls and forgets Being. Though he may still remember the names he gave to the animals in Eden, he is no longer sure about their meaning. Adam will have to try (...) to remember his own intentions. Through this effort he can also become aware of how he thinks, who he is, and what was the natural order he knew before the Fall. Medieval bestiaries tell us this story. Bestiaries are works of word play populated by animal figures. They depend on back-and-forth anthropomorphization, or circular metaphor. Animal figures are portrayed as both a mirror of human nature and a window on it. Bestiaries served as means for the moral education of human beings and, at the same time, a way to criticize the current state of humanity, including political and ethical habits. Within the moral irony of medieval bestiaries we can find the origin of the invented nature that modernity will try, subsequently, to insert into natural rights discourse through the teleological oxymoron of their naturalized and naturalizing counter-factuality. I will propose a historical-semiotic journey through the ironic representations of the human-beasts from the ancient world to contemporaneity. The proposal resulting from this cultural excursion is that the words included in the many national and international Rights declarations operate much like the names Adam gave to the animals and still more as they were re-read in medieval bestiaries, both textual and musical. So, can the words of Rights still serve as musical scores, open to an infinite play of re-signification? If we were able to overcome the modern culture/nature and human being/animal dualisms, we could cast, today as in the past, a zoological gaze on human rights by means of contemporary bestiaries and, in this way, perhaps find the gist of rights’ names and our ever regained and ever lost again humanity. (shrink)

The critical studies on Dostoevsky’s ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ have never diverged to a very great extent from the two interpretative lines developed many years ago by Mikhail Bakhtin and Nikolai Berdyaev, which concern, on the one hand, the Menippean satirical structure of this short story and, on the other, its general motif of ‘utopia vs. anti-utopia.’ Although these two views are unquestionably enlightening, mainly because they reflect Dostoevsky’s poetics from the 1870s, they still do not seem to (...) have fully considered the central problem the ridiculous man raises throughout his monologue. This problem concerns the main character’s fundamental quest for truth. This article offers a reading of Dostoevsky’s story, with a new interpretation of it that does not exclude but, in fact, extends Bakhtin’s and Berdyaev’s views. While the purpose of the Menippean satire is, as Bakhtin suggested, to test an idea, in ‘The Dream of a Ridiculous Man’ Dostoevsky examines three different ideas of ‘truth’ each of which correspond to the protagonist’s various stages of awareness that occur in the three main parts of the narrative: before, during, and after the dream. These ideas are: a nihilistic solipsism of a higher consciousness; the natural perfection of a pantheistic universe; and the primacy of life over thought. The result of this analysis leads to the philosophical problem of ‘difference,’ understood as a ‘transcendent difference’ à la Fichte, which offers a new insight into Dostoevsky’s ‘higher realism.’. (shrink)

Le mosche del capitale [The Flies of Capital] is Volponi’s last novel, and it is inspired by autobiographical events, which are depicted at a historical level. The end of a progressist industrial paradigm entails the end of social conflicts (i.e., the end of the working class) and the passage from manufactured capital to financial capital. The pervasiveness reached by capital is criticized through some formal choices that ridicule the language of power and the subjugation of the managers to it. (...) The main objective of this paper is to show how Volponi depicts a double breakdown: on the one hand, and in dramatic forms, the breakdown of the working class; on the other hand, and in comic forms, the breakdown of industry. (shrink)

Frege ridiculed the formalist conception of mathematics by saying that the formalists confused the unimportant thing, the sign, with the important, the meaning. Surely, one wishes to say, mathematics does not treat of dashes on a bit of paper. Frege’s idea could be expressed thus: the propositions of mathematics, if they were just complexes of dashes, would be dead and utterly uninteresting, whereas they obviously have a kind of life. And the same, of course, could be said of any proposition: (...) Without a sense, or without the thought, a proposition would be an utterly dead and trivial thing. And further it seems clear that no adding of inorganic signs can make the proposition live. And the conclusion which one draws from this is that what must be added to the dead signs in order to make a live proposition is something immaterial, with properties different from all mere signs. But if we had to name anything which is the life of the sign, we should have to say that it was its use. (Blue Book, p. (shrink)