The vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR) adaptation is an ideal model for investigating how the neurosteroid 17 beta-estradiol (E2) contributes to the modification of behavior by regulating synaptic activities. We hypothesized that E2 impacts VOR adaptation by affecting cerebellar synaptic plasticity at the parallel fiber–Purkinje cell (PF) synapse. To verify this hypothesis, we investigated the acute effect of blocking E2 synthesis on gain increases and decreases in adaptation of the VOR in male rats using an oral dose (2.5 mg/kg) of the aromatase (...) inhibitor letrozole. We also assessed the effect of letrozole on synaptic plasticity at the PF synapse in vitro, using cerebellar slices from male rats. We found that letrozole acutely impaired both gain increases and decreases adaptation of the VOR without altering basal ocular-motor performance. Moreover, letrozole prevented long-term potentiation at the PF synapse (PF-LTP) without affecting long-term depression (PF-LTD). Thus, in male rats neurosteroid E2 has a relevant impact on VOR adaptation and affects exclusively PF-LTP. These findings suggest that E2 might regulate changes in VOR adaptation by acting locally on cerebellar and extra-cerebellar synaptic plasticity sites. (shrink)

Neurosteroid 17 beta-estradiol (E2) is a steroid synthesized de novo in the nervous system that might influence neuronal activity and behavior. Nevertheless, the impact of E2 on the functioning of those neural systems in which it is slightly synthesized is less questioned. The vestibulo-ocular reflex (VOR) adaptation, may provide an ideal arena for investigating this issue. Indeed, E2 modulates cerebellar parallel fiber-Purkinje cell synaptic plasticity that underlies encoding of VOR adaptation. Moreover, aromatase expression in the cerebellum of adult rodents is (...) maintained at very low levels and localized to Purkinje cells. The significance of age-related maintenance of low levels of aromatase expression in the cerebellum on behavior, however, has yet to be explored. Our aim in this study was to determine whether E2 synthesis exerts an effective and persistent modulation of VOR adaptation in adult male rats. To answer this question, we investigated the acute effect of blocking E2 synthesis on gain increases and decreases in VOR adaptation using an oral dose (2.5 mg/kg) of the aromatase inhibitor Letrozole in peri-pubertal and post-pubertal male rats. We found that Letrozole acutely impaired gain increases and decreases in VOR adaptation without altering basal ocular-motor performance and that these effects were similar in peri-pubertal and post-pubertal rats. Thus, in adult male rats neurosteroid E2 effectively modulates VOR adaptation in both of the periods studied. These findings imply that the adult cerebellum uses E2 synthesis for modulating motor memory formation and suggest that low and extremely localized E2 production may play a role in adaptive phenomena. (shrink)

A critical survey of the main philosophical theories about events and event talk, organized in three main sections: (i) Events and Other Categories (Events vs. Objects; Events vs. Facts; Events vs. Properties; Events vs. Times); (ii) Types of Events (Activities, Accomplishments, Achievements, and States; Static and Dynamic Events; Actions and Bodily Movements; Mental and Physical Events; Negative Events); (iii) Existence, Identity, and Indeterminacy.

The aim of this book is to provide a fresh, wider, and more compelling account of democracy than the one we usually find in conventional contemporary political theory. Telling the story of democracy as a broad societal project rather than as merely a political regime, Frega delivers an account more in tune with our everyday experience and ordinary intuitions, bringing back into political theory the notion that democracy denotes first and foremost a form of society, and only secondarily a specific (...) political regime. The theoretical shift accomplished is major. Claiming that such a view of democracy is capable of replacing the mainstream categories of justice, freedom and non-domination in their hegemonic function of all-encompassing political concepts, Frega then argues for democracy as the broader normative framework within which to rethink the meaning and forms of associated living in all spheres of personal, social, economic, and political life. Drawing on diverse traditions of American pragmatism and critical theory, as well as tackling political issues which are at the core of contemporary theoretical debates, this book invites a rethinking of political theory to one more concerned with the political circumstances of social life, rather than remaining confined in the narrowly circumscribed space of a theory of government. (shrink)

A brief introduction to the main philosophical problems and theories about the nature of holes and such-like nothingnesses.

The death of Montaigne is described in some important documents such as the correspondence between Pierre de Brach, Justus Lipsius and Marie de Gournay, as well as in another letter written by Pasquier. What these «lettres du deuil» do is to reconstruct the philosophical meaning of death, using an entire universe of symbols to represent it. Previously, Montaigne had himself been the only person to witness La Boétie's death, of which he had deconstructed the abstract, merely speculative image in order (...) to emphasize its human dimension. (shrink)

Introduction -- Inquiry as the logic of practical reasoning -- From reasoning to judgment -- Expressive inquiry -- The public sphere -- Pragmatism, pluralism, and the fact of relativism -- A pragmatic theory of objectivity -- Why justification matters? -- Pragmatism as an epistemology of practice.

In a recent piece, Jon Bebb (2023) has argued that we have no reason to believe, contrary to what is often assumed, that ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and a normative sense. I argue that his case rests on two false premisses, and that we have very good reasons to believe that ‘normal’ is, in fact, ambiguous in this way. As part of my argument, I will go on to suggest that if ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and (...) a normative sense, that is because of the deep but seldom recognised connection between regularities and rules. This suggestion, if correct, will in turn help us elucidate three familiar thoughts about normality. (shrink)

The present article delineates how the Roman and Christian dispositif of the person has increasingly brought about a neat division between persons and things. This has had devastating effects for both. On the one hand, things are reduced not only to servile objects but also to disposable commodities. On the other, the process of derealization of things is paralleled by that of depersonalization of persons; different typologies of persons emerge, historically reproduced by the distinction between real persons and those that (...) are declared non-persons, almost-persons, temporary persons or anti-persons. It is, however, possible to develop a new anti-hierarchical conception of things and persons by focusing on the human body and by taking into account the findings of anthropology as well as the works of philosophers such as Spinoza, Simondon and Latour. (shrink)

Decision theorists have attempted to accommodate several violations of decision theory’s axiomatic requirements by modifying how agents’ choice options are individuated and formally represented. In recent years, prominent authors have worried that these modifications threaten to trivialize decision theory, make the theory unfalsifiable, impose overdemanding requirements on decision theorists, and hamper decision theory’s internal coherence. In this paper, I draw on leading descriptive and normative works in contemporary decision theory to address these prominent concerns. In doing so, I articulate and (...) assess several different criteria for individuating and formally representing agents’ choice options. (shrink)

This paper provides a philosophical assessment of leading theory-based, evidence-based and coherentist approaches to the definition and the measurement of well-being. It then builds on this assessment to articulate a reformed division of labor for the science of well-being and argues that this reformed division of labor can improve on the proffered approaches by combining the most plausible tenets of theory-based approaches with the most plausible tenets of coherentist approaches. This result does not per se exclude the possibility that theory-based (...) and coherentist approaches may be independently improved or amended in the years to come. Still, together with the challenges that affect these approaches, it strengthens the case for combining the most plausible tenets of those approaches. (shrink)

As the worlds of economics, politics, culture, and communications face a growing wave of globalization that will likely continue, ethical challenges for journalists have also gone global. I propose a clear division between ethics codes for media owners, the public, and professional journalists and present a set of considerations and specific rules applicable only to the last group. In this article I advocate a universal code of journalistic ethics but point out problems and warn against dangers that have made the (...) application of such codes difficult in the past. A universal code should consider the voluntary nature of such an endeavor, the cultural and economic differences in various journalistic traditions, and the problem of producing solutions acceptable to all involved. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to address the “Grounding Grounding Problem,” that is, the question as to what, if anything, grounds facts about grounding. I aim to show that, if a seemingly plausible principle of modal recombination between fundamental facts and the principle customarily called “Entailment” are assumed, it is possible to prove not only that grounding facts featuring fundamental, contingent grounds are derivative but also that either they are partially grounded in the grounds they feature or they are (...) “abysses”. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to advance our understanding of the normative grammar of the concept of democracy by distinguishing two levels at which a political concept may play a normative function, a...

According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’, if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what (...) may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most ‘joint-carving’ plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, ‘unrestricted’ plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over ‘super-pluralities’ of entities. (shrink)

This paper provides a fresh examination of John Dewey’s social philosophy in the light of new evidence made available by the recent discovery of the original manuscript Dewey wrote in preparation of the Lectures on Social and Political Philosophy delivered in China and published here for the first time. The paper reconstructs Dewey’s ambivalent relationship with social philosophy throughout his long career and focuses upon his attempt between 1919 and 1923 to develop his own’s social philosophy. It proceeds to examine (...) the contribution of the Chinese Lectures in Social and Political Philosophy to Dewey’s project in social philosophy and shows that our understanding of Dewey’s social philosophy was severely hampered by the unavailability of the original text. It concludes by assessing the critical potential of Dewey’s social philosophy. (shrink)

The classical Glivenko theorem asserts that a propositional formula admits a classical proof if and only if its double negation admits an intuitionistic proof. By a natural expansion of the BCK-logic with negation we understand an algebraizable logic whose language is an expansion of the language of BCK-logic with negation by a family of connectives implicitly defined by equations and compatible with BCK-congruences. Many of the logics in the current literature are natural expansions of BCK-logic with negation. The validity of (...) the analogous of Glivenko theorem in these logics is equivalent to the validity of a simple one-variable formula in the language of BCK-logic with negation. (shrink)

Ordinary reasoning about space—we argue—is first and foremost reasoning about things or events located in space. Accordingly, any theory concerned with the construction of a general model of our spatial competence must be grounded on a general account of the sort of entities that may enter into the scope of the theory. Moreover, on the methodological side the emphasis on spatial entities (as opposed to purely geometrical items such as points or regions) calls for a reexamination of the conceptual categories (...) required for this task. Building on material presented in an earlier paper, in this work we offer some examples of what this amounts to, of the difficulties involved, and of the main directions along which spatial theories should be developed so as to combine formal sophistication with some affinity with common sense. (shrink)

This Handbook presents the state of the art overview of current research on anticipation studies. It develops anticipation from both the theoretical and applied points of view. Via this comprehensive overview of the research on anticipation, this Handbook makes clear that anticipation is a serious topic of research that can and should be connected to Futures Studies research, perspectives and orientation. The Handbook uses the anticipatory viewpoint as a unifying framework able both to stop the progressive fragmentation of the human (...) and social sciences and begin a process aimed at progressively closer integration, mutual knowledge and dialogue among the human and social sciences. It sets the agenda for the field, helps futures studies to come of age, and contributes to changing the orientation of the human and social sciences from their dominant past-orientation to a new future-orientation. The Handbook presents research from a variety of fields such as: Biology, ecology, psychology, social sciences, humanities, engineering, and computer science. The editorial board consists of scholars from various sciences, such as futurists, sociologists, economists, statisticians, computer scientists, designers and game builders. (shrink)

I argue that the growing-block theory of time and truthmaker maximalism jointly entail that some truthmakers undergo mereological change as time passes. Central to my argument is a grounding-based account of what I call the “purely incremental” nature of the growing-block theory of time. As I will show, the argument presented in this paper suggests that growing-block theorists endorsing truthmaker maximalism have reasons to take composition to be restricted and the “block” of reality to literally grow as time goes by.

Logics based on weak Kleene algebra (WKA) and related structures have been recently proposed as a tool for reasoning about flaws in computer programs. The key element of this proposal is the presence, in WKA and related structures, of a non-classical truth-value that is “contaminating” in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula ϕ, any complex formula in which ϕ appears is assigned that value as well. Under such interpretations, the contaminating states represent occurrences of a (...) flaw. However, since different programs and machines can interact with (or be nested into) one another, we need to account for different kind of errors, and this calls for an evaluation of systems with multiple contaminating values. In this paper, we make steps toward these evaluation systems by considering two logics, HYB1 and HYB2, whose semantic interpretations account for two contaminating values beside classical values 0 and 1. In particular, we provide two main formal contributions. First, we give a characterization of their relations of (multiple-conclusion) logical consequence—that is, necessary and sufficient conditions for a set Δ of formulas to logically follow from a set Γ of formulas in HYB1 or HYB2 . Second, we provide sound and complete sequent calculi for the two logics. (shrink)

This paper explores the epistemological impact of the idea of post-secularism on the concept of public reason. It does so by examining a strand of the Rawls-Habermas debate on the role of religious beliefs within public reason. The paper identifies a difficulty in the liberal solution that depends upon the unwillingness to challenge the proviso-like conception of public reason and contends that this difficulty is overcome neither by Habermas’ “institutional” version of proviso nor by Cristina Lafont’s version of “mutual accountability” (...) proviso. Once acknowledged this blind spot in the theory of public reason, the paper proceeds to show that a pragmatist-based conception of public reason can overcome this shortcoming as it grants to religious beliefs a role that does not compromise the liberal ethics of citizenship while at the same time does not frustrate the communitarian and religious call for a less restrictive conception of the public sphere. The conclusion this paper brings home is that a proviso-free public reason is necessary for tackling the theoretical challenge of defending liberalism in a post-secular society. (shrink)

The question of rationality and of its role in human agency has been at the core of pragmatist concerns since the beginning of this movement. While Peirce framed the horizon of a new understanding of human reason through the idea of inquiry as aiming at belief-fixation and James stressed the individualistic drives that move individuals to action, it is in Dewey’s writing that we find the deepest understanding of the naturalistic and normative traits of rationality considered as the qualifying attribute (...) of human agency. Recent developments in moral and political philosophy as well as in general pragmatist scholarship have shown a renewal of interest in the role of human reason in agency, both with respect to control of conduct (decisions about how to act) and with respect to normative attitudes (considerations of what is good and right). In this article I will examine some features of Dewey’s epistemology which are particularly promising for the elaboration of a theory of practical rationality based on pragmatist sources. In particular, I will focus on Dewey’s notion of “judgment of practice” in order to frame a distinctively Deweyan approach to practical rationality. In order to point out the specificity of Dewey’s epistemological framework, I will refer to it as an “epistemology of practice”i. The aim of this article is to clarify the epistemological meaning of the concepts of articulation and transformation, that Dewey places at the heart of his theory of inquiry. Part of my argument consists in showing that through these notions Dewey aimed at broadening the conception of rationality, bringing it beyond the reach of the standard notions of analysis and synthesis and of induction, deduction, and abduction. Once the specificity of Dewey’s conception of rationality will have been demonstrated, I will proceed to show some of its implications in the explanation of the rationality of human agency with reference to practical reasoning and value assessment. I will then conclude the article by drawing some implications of Dewey’s theory of judgment for a broader epistemology based upon the acknowledgment of the primacy of practice. (shrink)

Argle claimed that holes supervene on their material hosts, and that every truth about holes boils down to a truth about perforated things. This may well be right, assuming holes are perforations. But we still need an explicit theory of holes to do justice to the ordinary way of counting holes--or so says Cargle.

This paper aims to develop a new understanding of normativity based upon the priority of the ordinary. By relying upon diverse sociological and philosophical traditions, the paper seeks to emphasize the ordinary tacit assumptions which provide the basic structure of our experience of the world and its normative features. The general argument is that, whereas sociological traditions of social interactionism shed new light upon the “empirical fact of normativity”, ordinary language philosophy and pragmatism offer a theoretical account of normativity which (...) is consistent with the picture of normativity which emerges out of these empirical descriptions. The paper synthesizes the main achievements of these traditions into a unified account of normativity. (shrink)

The year 1968 is universally considered a watershed in history, as the world was experiencing an accelerated growth of anti-establishment protests that would have long-lasting impacts on the cultural, social, and political spheres of human life. On September 26, amid social and political unrest across the globe, 62 physicists gathered in Geneva to found the European Physical Society. Among these were the official representatives of the national physical societies of 18 countries in both Eastern and Western Europe, who signed the (...) constitution in spite of the political divides of the Cold War. According to the main proponent of the society, Italian physicist Gilberto Bernardini, the success of the initiative was the realization of a dream: the institutional formation of a single community of European physicists, a representation of a culturally unified Europe that he described as a “single highly civilized nation.” The analysis of as yet unexplored archival materials of Bernardini and other protagonists in the establishment of the society has enabled an investigation of the historical development of science diplomacy in two interconnected ways: first, by elucidating how the actors involved, especially those in Western Europe, interpreted their role as diplomats amid particularly turbulent reconfigurations of international political relations; second, by interpreting the attempt to institutionalize transnational scientific networks with the establishment of a non-governmental organization as a tool to influence world political affairs. It will first be shown that the political ideal of a culturally unified Europe was deeply intertwined with the socio-professional interests of a specific community, mostly involved with CERN. I will argue that, in the process of establishing the society, the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Warsaw Pact armed forces led many of the Western physicists involved in this process to reframe the role of the European Physical Society as a tool to diffuse liberal-democratic values and to support political dissidents in Eastern Europe. (shrink)

There is... something both intellectually and socially unresponsive in the appeal to self-evidence upon controverted issues. Over the last two decades philosophers have focused increasingly on the role of society and practices in shaping practical normativity.3 Contemporary moral and political philosophy remains fundamentally committed to individualistic and causal approaches to normativity, but a contrary trend has taken root—at least since Wittgenstein’s insights regarding the role of context, practices, and uses—with increasing appeals made to the “social” and to “practice” in reaction (...) to the over-individualistic and idealistic trends characterizing mainstream philosophy, especially in the.. (shrink)

In this paper I offer a first account of a practice-based conception of normativity for the political domain. This standpoint is used to relocate the most sophisticated normative practices of justification and critique within an experience-based framework, that of the human being as a “normative creature.” I begin by discussing the two major paradigms in political theory, showing that their neglect of this broad framework of normativity is a serious drawback. I then proceed to articulate the central elements of a (...) practicebased account of normativity: the notions of normative practices and normative orders, and an account of the rationality potential of normativity as practice. (shrink)

Comprendre la nature de la pensée, redéfinir notre compréhension de la connaissance et de sa place dans la vie des individus et des sociétés, tel est le projet de John Dewey.

Il saggio focalizza quattro significati fondamentali del concetto di seconda natura in Hegel e ne ricostruisce i legami, i nessi interni, le implicazioni per la comprensione dell’intera Geistesphilosophie. Attraverso il concetto di seconda natura, infatti, è possibile evidenziare la connessione tra spirito soggettivo e spirito oggettivo e mostrare che le sfere dello spirito non sono prive di unificazione e provengono da una radice comune. Al termine del saggio emerge che il concetto di seconda natura ha inoltre uno statuto ambivalente: da (...) un lato, esso rende possibile l’idealizzazione della natura e l’innalzamento alla dimensione dello spirito, dall’altro implica una naturalizzazione dello spirito ossia la sua autonegazione. (shrink)

Riassunto : Il presente articolo intende lumeggiare l’esito tanto fecondo quanto problematico a cui conduce l’originale opera laskiana di risemantizzazione del concetto di soggettività. Al centro di tale opera si staglia la progressiva elaborazione di ciò che il filosofo rubrica, al termine del suo Denkweg, sotto il titolo di soggetto ricettivo. Con tale concetto, a cui è intimamente legato quello di “dedizione”, Lask individua in una mera ricettività intuitiva il momento sorgivo e originario di ogni processo cognitivo; il solo momento (...) che rende possibile un accesso diretto all’oggetto trascendente. Ma come si realizza questo accesso? Qual è lo statuto di ciò che il filosofo nomina “dedizione”? L’insufficiente risposta a tali quesiti conduce il pensiero laskiano ad un esito aporetico, ossia alla riduzione della dedizione a momento ideale e alla conseguente riattivazione, in ambito conoscitivo, dell’inaggirabile distanza tra soggetto e oggetto. Ma, se in tale aporia è riconosciuto il limite del modello della conoscenza elaborato da Lask nel suo sistema maturo, non è comunque possibile occultare il decisivo contributo offerto dalla sua riflessione al problema gnoseologico: il superamento del coscienzialismo attraverso l’elaborazione di un soggetto concreto-ricettivo e, accanto a esso, di un peculiare realismo. Parole chiave : Emil Lask; Soggettività; Ricettività; Coscienza; Concreto/astratto Emil Lask. Subjectivity and Receptiveness: This paper intends to illuminate the problematic outcome of Lask’s redefinition of the concept of subjectivity. The main result of this operation is the elaboration of the notion of receptive subject. With this concept, strictly linked to the notion of Hingabe, Lask identifies the original element of every cognitive process in simple intuitive receptivity. Intuitive receptivity alone provides direct access to the transcendent object. But how is this access possible? What is the relation between the receptive-intuitive element of knowledge and predicative activity? What is the status of Hingabe? The insufficient answers to these questions lead the Lask’s thought to an aporetic outcome, namely, the reduction of Hingabe to an exclusively abstract and ideal receptivity, and consequently to the reactivation, in the theory of knowledge, of the distance between subject and object. However, while this distance marks the limit of the model of knowledge developed by Lask, the main contribuition of his thought remains valid: the overcoming of trascendental subjectivism through the elaboration of a concrete-receptive subject and of an original form of realism. Keywords : Emil Lask; Subjectivity; Receptivity; Consciousness; Concreteness/Abstractness. (shrink)

A leading Italian philosopher develops an original perspective on the crisis of contemporary politics.