At the beginning of the 16 th century, Transylvania had been an officially Catholic land belonging to the Kingdom of Hungary and led by an elite consisting of three nations, the Hungarian nobles (increasingly referred to as the Hungarian nation), the Saxons and the Szeklers. However, the general population, deprived of any political power, consisted of Orthodox Romanians. In other words, in Transylvania the Latin West met the Byzantine Orient. The old Hungary fell apart between 1526 and 1541, its central (...) regions taken by the Ottoman Empire, the west and the north by the Habsburgs, while the eastern part, Transylvania, became an autonomous principality under Ottoman suzerainty. At the same time, various Protestant trends made their presence felt among the leading nations, eventually crystallizing in the form of Lutheranism, Calvinism, and Unitarianism. In the space of three decades (1540–1570) these rival denominations gained legal status and joined Catholicism as the official religions of the country. Catholicism became a marginal denomination, deprived of assets and of its hierarchy. Under Protestant pressure, the Orthodox Romanians were still kept away from power. The last three decades of the century saw some attempts at Counterreformation and at a Catholic Reformation, at a time when the principality was once again led by a Catholic dynasty. In this context, new Catholic cultural (educational) models, supported by the Jesuits, were implemented in the existing Protestant and Orthodox context, in an often desperate attempt to reverse or at least balance the situation. In this respect, the Jesuit College of Cluj (today Cluj-Napoca, Romania), established in 1581, remains a most memorable episode, whose consequences can still be seen today. By resorting to education and learning, the college was meant to influence and alter the surrounding Protestant and Orthodox world. In fact, it became an interesting facet of the multicultural, multiethnic and multiconfessional character of Transylvania, a miniature Europe inhabited by Latin, Germanic, Finno-Ugrian, Slavic peoples etc., by Byzantines, Catholics and Protestants, by rightful citizens and “tolerated” inhabitants, by masters and servants, by privileged categories and by groups merely “allowed to exist”. The troubled events of those years have left us with a model of cohabitation based on both cooperation and rivalry that truly deserves consideration. (shrink)

In the context of the Union of Greater Romania, a problem specific to the development of the Romanian society and of the re-united national state was the regulation of the status or the varied religious cults. It is well known that under the Older Romanian Kingdom, the Orthodoxy was a state religion. The other cults – Lutheran, Catholic, Mosaic, and Moslem – represented small numbers of believers and had not been regulated under the law; they were tolerated. Following the Union (...) of 1918, the Romanian State came to accommodate not just one, but several denominations. Consequently, it had to clarify its relations with the cults in the Romanian provinces of Bucovina, Basarabia, Banat, and Transylvania. These cults which had not existed in the Older Kingdom functioned according to the legislative systems they had belonged to before 1918. Thus came the necessity of establishing the unitary status for the minority cults, which, given the diversity of their religious doctrines, rituals and interests, posed new problems to be settled for the government policy. This also should be the focus of the debates surrounding the forthcoming law of the cults in Romania. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Romanian Cultural and Political IdentityDonald R. KelleyThe Journal of the History of Ideas, in collaboration with other institutions, including the Universities of Bucharest and Budapest and the Soros Foundation, recently sponsored the second in a series of international conferences being planned on topics in current intellectual history. (The first, “Interrogating Tradition,” was held at Rutgers University, 13–16 November 1997.) The Romanian conference, which was held in the Elisabeta Palace (...) in Bucharest (27–31 May 1998), was devoted to “Culture and the Politics of National Identity in Modern Romania.” Over forty scholars, mainly from Romania but some also from the U.S., France, Germany, and Hungary, gathered to discuss a variety of questions about Romanian society, past, present, and speculative future; and they were joined by at least as many visitors, especially students, from the local area and beyond.Topics discussed included politics, language, economics, historiography, religion, education, philosophy, ideologies, intelligentsia, particular intellectuals, minorities, and women (though not Gypsies or gays). Under this riot of rubrics a wide range of questions were posed in interdisciplinary fashion, with frequent, sometimes impassioned interventions. What is—was, might have been, can be—Romania? Who is a Romanian (and who not)? What is Romania’s relation to the West and the East? (And what are the “West” and the “East”?) To modernity, to modernism, to modernization? What is—has been, should be—the function of intellectuals, of political and cultural elites, in understanding the Romanian past and in setting a course for the future? What, more generally, is the role of history in answering such questions? Or is history perhaps (as Karl Krause remarked of psychoanalysis) the disease for which it claims to be the cure?Keith Hitchens’s keynote address suggested that rehashing old essentialist debates might not be productive at millennium’s end, but the conference itself could not avoid some excursions down the paths of memory and myth. For historians, Western historians anyway, Romania seems to have too many pasts. Located at the juncture of four previous empires, Romania is a mosaic, or perhaps a pandemonium, of ethnic, religious, economic, and ideological groups that can only imagine, or invent, a nationality. Geographically (and in many ways culturally) remote from the West, Romania for a long time (as Sorin Antohi remarked) lacked both a public sphere and a civil society; and suffering “a Counter-Reformation without a Reformation” (Alexandru Dutu’s phrase), it has not enjoyed a tradition of religious or ethnic toleration. Nor have either the Germans or the Jews (as Glass said) found their own unity within the changing borders of the modern Romanian state. Not until the nineteenth century did Romania develop, out of its Boyar background (as Siupiur argued), an intellectual elite that could create a modern national history and help turn “peasants into Romanians” (Antohi’s phrase); and even then this elite seemed more attracted to conservative [End Page 735] (Herder, Savigny, Burke) than to liberal views of autochthonism. Many features of Western modernity, such as Newtonian science, reached Romania late, and indeed there was a retrograde movement against liberalism under the aegis by orthodox religion. In any case this intelligentsia has been as fragmented and multiform as the Romanian past itself. True, some Romanian scholars like to posit a mainstream tradition, “excesses aside,” as one speaker put it—but how, asked another, can historians put “excesses” aside from the devastating perspective of this century?Political and cultural self-examination was the dominant theme of this conference. Nationality, said Pippidi, depends on three factors, viz., name, language, religion, and territory. The Romanian name dates from the tenth century, indicating a separation of the Roman from the Greek tradition in Wallachia; and from the seventeenth century the idea of a mainly Roman provenance was given privilege. As a language, “Romanian” was spoken in the late Middle Ages, but the first written document is dated 1521. The principal religion in Romania was and is Greek orthodox, although there are also Roman Catholic, Jewish, Islamic, and German Protestant communities, as well as the Uniate church created in the eighteenth century. As for the territory, this has been a matter of change, conflict, and confusion throughout the tragic course... (shrink)

This article presents the development of elementary schools supported by the Orthodox Church in Transylvania between 1868 and 1921. Until 1918, Transylvania belonged to Hungary. In 1918, it was united with the Kingdom of Romania. As Hungary was a particularly complex state in ethnic and confessional terms before 1918, the school system developed under the coordination and financing of the churches. The government intended to gradually replace them with schools run by communities or state. It was not until the end (...) of the 19th century that radical measures were taken. The situation was fully resolved just after the unification of Transylvania with Romania when Romanian Orthodox denominational schools were nationalised and transformed into state schools. Contribution: Although summary works on the history of education in Romania or various research on the history of schools at the local level have appeared in Romanian, the impact of governmental and legislative decisions in Hungary on Orthodox confessional education in Transylvania has not been analysed. In German, the historian Joachim von Puttkamer has dealt with this perspective but especially concerning the schools in the Slovak areas of Greater Hungary. This PhD thesis of the author, P Brusanowski, was the first approach in this direction regarding the Romanians in Transylvania. The article presents for the first time in English a short analysis of the relationship of the Orthodox Church authorities in Transylvania to the educational policy decisions of the central authorities in Budapest. The parallel use of the reports of the Ministry of Education to the Hungarian Parliament, and the reports of the school councils of the executive body of the Romanian Orthodox Church in Transylvania to the ecclesiastical legislative forum, is an important part of this article. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to provide a Christian interpretation to the concept of tolerance. The idea of tolerance is strongly related to the religion revealed by Jesus Christ. Moreover, Christianity is a religion that opens through love, thus tolerant.Religious tolerance in our era should be examined, as it is pointed out in the article, strarting from a reconsideration of the term of "Christian Church". The consensus over these matters would generate a genuine ecclesiastic co- citizenship and place the (...) human person within the completeness of an anthropos liturgos. (shrink)

In Romania, the Baptist denomination includes, according to the 2002 census, about 130,000 believers, subsequent to the Pentecostal denomination. Areas having a large number of followers are Banat and some parts of Transylvania; besides these, there can be added large urban areas such as Bucharest, Timişoara, Constanţa, Cluj-Napoca, Oradea, and Arad. In terms of ethnicity, Romanians represent the majority, followed by the Hungarians (Hungarian Baptist Convention). One of the smallest minorities in Romania, that is the Czechs, also provides a (...) number of believers, in the village of Sfînta Elena (Coronini Township, Caraş-Severin County) being the only Czech Baptist community in our country. Here, besides Catholics, a Baptist community is to be found, twice as small and of fairly recent origin. In the following, we intend to outline its image, based on field observations and interviews carried out between 2005-2010 (All of these have been materialised in our book, Istorie şi memorie în comunităţile cehilor din Clisura Dunării). We paid a particular interest in the neo-Protestant group, in order to identify means of building the image of another group with a different faith, considering the double minority, ethnic and religious status. Also, we tried to capture the ratio of forces between two different faith groups that were facing the same economic and social problems, problems that have caused the depopulation of villages, by massive migration of people to the Czech Republic. (shrink)

To discuss what was the attitude of the Romanian society towards the increasing economic, social and political role of the Jews throughout history is one of the aims of this paper. Serban Papacostea, the outstanding specialist in mediaeval history, makes use of the syntagm “hostile tolerance”, which specified the general attitude towards the Jews of the Orthodox mediaeval world of Byzantine origin. Tolerance - defined the unlimited opportunity for Jews to be accepted, settle, move and act freely within the Romanian (...) principalities, all the way to the status of possessing properties in Moldavia and Wallachia. There were, however, mixed feelings of hostility manifest at three distinct levels: mental, juridical and political. As for the mentalities, both popular and high brow education as well as prejudices held the Jews guilty for the death of Christ. Even if physically the Jewish presence in Romania has become symbolical, the history of the Jews, the traditions of the Jewish culture and spirituality, the imprint of the Jewish contribution on the emergence and development of the Romanian society will remain the perennial values of a historiography aspiring to fulfill its duty, forever preserved in the conscience of generations to come. (shrink)

The vision of cooperation between the Catholic Church and the state authorities was firmly established in the consciousness of the Polish society in the interwar period. In the collective memory there is no recollection of sharp disputes between the Church and the political and social activists about the scope of recognition of Catholic principles as the basis for lawmaking. Before 1926, the government officials were not directly involved in the disputes. This changed after the May Coup, which is discussed in (...) the text. The source basis is constituted exclusively by documents produced by the state and Church offices and institutions regarding the presence of religious education and teaching in schools. Of particular cognitive value are the state documents and drafts of legal documents, memoranda of the Polish Episcopate and correspondence between state authorities and the School Committee of the Polish Episcopate and the ordinary bishops of individual dioceses. Programs published by educators and education officials associated with the ruling politicians are also an important element for learning about the views of state officials on the place of religion in the Polish school system. Apart from propaganda works written by communist educators, there is virtually no literature on these issues. Consequently, this text is a source dissertation. Thus, according to a principle accepted in the humanities, it uses the methods of analysis and synthesis. Even a cursory review of the documentation on state-church relations in matters of education and upbringing reveals the change in their character after the May Coup. Without destroying the legal order adopted in Poland, those in power and the officials subordinate to them, through a series of minor changes, tried to subordinate the Church to the state, hoping that it would become a tool for building a new citizen — the subject of the state. The sharpness of the sharpness of disputes was particularly evident in the matters of teaching and education during the 1932 school reform and the enactment of the new constitution in 1935. (shrink)

After the unification process of 1918, in the former Hungarian State schools Romanian language was introduced as a teaching language. Consequently, the Hungarian as a teaching language was solely pre- served in the vocational schools. The governments showed little understanding toward the minorities’ vocational schools, aiming rather at the unification of the scholar system. The Roman Catholic Church sustained and administrated hundreds of elementary and secondary schools, many of them having a multi-secular history. Based on the documents from the (...) churches’ archives, this study presents the efforts of the Roman Catholic Church to preserve and maintain all these schools. (shrink)

The paper explores the events that preceded the conclusion of the Concordat between the Holy See and Romania (1927) and its effects. Both the Vatican and the Romanian Monarchy aimed at concluding a Concordat: the first, because the document was expected to provide a legal frame for the life of the Catholic Church, and the second, because such document contributed to its international visibility. Early talks, during the reign of Prince Al. I. Cuza and King Carol I, were eventually unsuccessful. (...) Discussions were resumed after the end of World War I. The Concordat was drafted essentially by the representatives of the Greek Catholic Church, without the consultation of the Latin bishops of Transylvania. The finalization and the ratification of the document were delayed, partly because of the objections of the Orthodox Church, and partly due to the disagreement regarding the fate of the Latin dioceses of Transylvania and the Patrimonium Sacrum. The Concordat was highly contested by the Latin bishops of Transylvania as it produced serious changes and difficulties. It stipulated the merger of the dioceses of Oradea and Satu Mare and caused severe problems concerning the management of Latin Catholic funds, previously administered by the Roman Catholic Status. The Concordat also affected the functioning of the confessional schools. (shrink)

The existence of Catholic communities in Moldavia has raised questions not for the Orthodox population from neighbourhood but mostly for the Hungarian and Romanian history researchers. The term „csangos” was first used in 1783 by Petru Zold, a priest, in order to describe these communities and the term remained as such in the Hungarian historyography (and in the last decade it has also been borrowed by the Romanian historyography) but is not accepted and used by the majority of people belong- (...) ing to the community. The present case-study dedicated to the villages situated near Roman attempts to answer some ques- tions related to the origin and evolution of these communities without the intention of an exhaustive study. (shrink)

The study discusses the paradox of the failure of the Romanian Church United with Rome, Greek-Catholic (RCUR) to assert itself after 1990, in the context of a revival of the life of all other religious communities. The significant decrease in the number of Greek-Catholic believers and the difficulties in exercising their rights are germane to the limits of democracy in Romania. No other vulnerable communities, neither immigrants, gays, Roma,nor Jehovah's Witnesses, have been denied, all this time, the protection of the (...) Romanian state, as Greek-Catholics have been. The systematic denial of the rights of the Romanian Church United with Rome (Greek-Catholic) is explained by the feature which distinguishes RCUR faithful from the members of other vulnerable communities: their organisation is perceived by the Romanian Orthodox Church (ROC) as an adversary. The Romanian Orthodox Church constantly proclaimed the illegitimacy of the RCUR in the first half of the twentieth century, and participated in its dissolution when the opportunity arose in 1948. It holds today the same explicit goal. The societal circumstances, specific to anarchic democracy, allow a major player like the ROC to impose its policy of undermining the RCUR. In accordance with Bruce Bueno de Mesquita and Alastair Smith's concept, the material and symbolic competition between the RCUR and the ROC is interpreted as an example of "bad behavior as good politics". The ROC strategy finds an optimal framework for maximizing gain in the circumstances of the Romanian anarchic democracy. (shrink)

The very founding of the town Neuwied-am-Rhein was closely linked to policies and practices of religious toleration. It was the hope and intent of Count Friedrich of Wied (1618-1698) that a town, well planned and advantageously located, would bring economic relief and eventually prosperity to his small land, which had suffered particularly in the last years of the Thirty Years’ War. From the outset he saw that the best means of attracting residents would be to guarantee as large a degree (...) of religious freedom as possible.The Treaty of Westphalia provided a viable legal framework within which Protestants, adherents to the Augsburg Confession be they Lutherans or Reformed, and Roman Catholics could exercise their religion within the German Empire. The treaty basically defined three types of religious practice: the exercitium religionis publicum, which gave the members of the minority religion in any territorial unit full freedom to worship openly; the exercitium privatum, restricting the worship of the congregation to specific places; and finally the devotio domestica, which allowed the “individual exercise of religion by the common subject, practiced by him alone, without further ecclesiastical ceremony,... within the walls of his own living quarters.” The treaty further offered the beneficium emigrandi, and specified the conditions under which forced or voluntary emigration was to take place. (shrink)

Hospital chaplaincy, in its exposure to clients, colleagues, and care-takers from different faith backgrounds, can be understood in either generic or catholic terms. The first understanding, often merely implicit in denominationalist approaches, assumes that some “Absolute” can be prayerfully invoked through the medium of diverse rituals, confessions, and symbols. This position combines the advantage of unprejudiced acceptance of other creeds and traditions with the disadvantage of lacking resources for discriminating among the spiritualities that may be operative within those other creeds (...) and traditions. Catholicism, in linking true spirituality with the one true church as the mystical body of the Tri-une God, secures such a criterion but fails to satisfy the tolerance-of-acknowledgement in the secular sense, which is canonical in contemporary ecumenism. The Orthodox understanding of Catholicism is portrayed as imposing a non-judgemental humility and repentance which provides a solution to that spiritual-human dilemma of inter-faith cooperation in the hospital. (shrink)

Since M. Weber and E. Troeltsch, much has been published on real or perceived differences between Catholic and Protestant countries concerning ethical matters, especially in a context of rising capitalism supposedly promoted by Calvinism. Yet, large scale sociological studies were lacking. Even now, when such studies are possible, they treat opinions and seldom behavior; many studies show that there can be serious differences between these two groups. This article analyzes possible agreements and differences in opinions concerning ethics using the results (...) of the 1990 value study carried out by the “European Values Study” Foundation. We limit ourselves here to ten Western European countries.Some references are made to Switzerland where an EVS type survey was taken in 1988-89, as well as to some Northern European countries that are nearly exclusively Lutheran. The EVS has stimulated similar studies in Bulgaria, Rumania, and Greece. When the data from this last country become available, a comparison with the ethical attitudes of the Orthodox world will also be possible. Even now we note great differences between Rumania and Bulgaria, which indicates that the ‘Orthodox Religion’ factor cannot be the only explanation. The EVS study asked the respondents about their church religious affiliation; the answers to this question were used as the distinguishing criterium. It is of course an over simplification to refer to the Catholics and the Protestants. The Irish and the Portuguese differ greatly in their respective histories. Anglican, Lutheran and Reformed Protestants are equally difficult to categorize under one heading.6 Nevertheless, we will have to be content with rough generalizations.Yet, at some time, the large number of interviews offer sufficient material to indicate certain differences between Protestants and Catholics. Of course, the question remains whether the observed differences are to be attributed mainly to the differing religious affiliations or to the differences in the long background histories and in the socio-economic contexts of the countries. The whole study shows that the sociocultural background is a more important explicative variable for elucidating the differences than age is, however determinative this latter may be. (shrink)

One of the theological disagreements in Christianity is the legitimacy of infant baptism. It was not discussed in the early period of Christianity. Nevertheless, it is one of the problems that have been debated especially since the post-reform period. Debates about infant baptism create differences in Christianity. Churches accepting infant baptism, espe¬cially the Catholic Church, acknowledge it as a tradition that has been practiced for thou¬sands of years. According to them, children were baptized by Jesus and the Church Fathers kept (...) doing this ritual. However, most of the Protestant Churches, like Anabaptists, criticize infant baptism as it does not happen based on free will. They claim that such people should get baptized again. According to them, Jesus did not baptize infants and the biblical texts, which are shown as a source of infant baptism, indicate that either Jesus blessed babies or baptized adults. Therefore, theological debates about infant baptism have continued in Christianity. The article discusses the historical process of infant baptism and the arguments presented by different groups about this discussion. The main framework of the article is the discussions between groups about biblical texts and religious identification, especially the post-reform period. Infant baptism is an important issue because it includes modern discussions about differences among churches, Bible interpretation, will, and mind. Since there is no specific study on infant baptism in our country, we can say that the article will contribute to the studies of the history of religions.Summary: The sacrament is one of the controversial topics among Christian churches. It has been discussed structure of the sacraments as well as the legitimacy of these practices throughout the history. Infant baptism is another example over legitimacy debate about the sacraments. Infant baptism is a key topic because it involves fundamental doctrines like salvation, faith, and original sin and conflicts among churches.This study addresses the historical process of infant baptism and the arguments presented by different groups regarding the debates of its legitimacy. It aims to shed light on one of the current debates of various groups in the post-reform period, especially among the Protestants. Initially, we discuss the value of baptism in Christian theology, then the histori¬cal process of infant baptism, and finally the arguments of groups that accept and do not accept infant baptism. Although there are various studies about baptism in our country, there is no specific study assessing infant baptism. Therefore, we think that this paper will augment the existing literature in the field.Baptism is the most meaningful sacrament in Christianity as it is an indicator of being a Christian and the first step of the way to salvation for Christians. It is also a unifying sacra¬ment because it is accepted by the Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox, and Protestant Churches. Catholics and Orthodox Churches agree on the seven sacraments (baptism, con¬firmation, Eucharist, penance, anointing of the sick, marriage, and holy orders) with a few exceptions. However, since the Protestants adopt an understanding of religion based upon the Bible, they only accept the baptism and Eucharist mentioned in the Bible as a sacrament. Although the Protestants agree on baptism, they have opposing views about infant baptism. The only source between the Protestant Churches about infant baptism is the Bible. These groups accept only Biblical texts as a legitimate source, not the Church fathers. However, the debate on whether the references in the Bible refer to the baptism of babies or the baptism of adults has reached to today. Since adults were baptized during the spread of Christianity, there was no significant debate about infant baptism in the early period. Generally, Church Fathers did not state infant bap¬tism as a systematic sacrament, but rather as a spiritual blessing. Therefore, baptism was accepted as a ritual that involves the infant, adult, and patient baptism in Christian litera¬ture. However, with the emergence of some heretic groups against infant baptism, the meaning of infant baptism and adult baptism has been used differently by Christians. As a result of the first discussions between heretic groups and the Church Fathers, some defense attempts of infant baptism have started in the Christian world. On the one hand, theologians struggled against those who are against infant baptism; on the other hand, the Church de¬cided to support infant baptism in councils. It was accepted that babies should be baptized even if they cannot speak during the sacrament and cannot answer questions about faith. It became widespread after Christianity was accepted as an official religion by Rome, and it was officially accepted by the Catholic church in the 13th century. Infant baptism discus¬sions have increased again after the Reform. While Catholic, Orthodox, Anglican, Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, and Congressional churches accept infant baptism; groups such as Baptists, Pentecostalists, Anabaptists, Seventh-Day Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, and Last-Day Saints are against infant baptism.According to churches practicing infant baptism, babies should be baptized as soon as pos¬sible for God's divine grace and salvation. However, the churches that oppose infant baptism claim that this is a meaningless reason. According to them, baptism was only performed at Easter and Pentecost in the early period and even a candidate who wanted to be Christian was tested for a length of time. This practice reveals the connection of baptism with wisdom and faith. They claim that baptism is a meaningful and dogmatic action, not an ordinary practiceç Therefore, infant baptism, which is not based on reason, weakens faith. These churches point out that this ritual is deceptive, and it will lose children's faith over time since it is not supported by faith. They also criticize the idea that this baptism will make the person a member of the public. In this regard, they emphasize that members of the current society no longer live in villages and do not consist of groups recognizing each other. Thereby, It is clear that the membership of the current society has lost its sociological meaning in the modern society.Criticisms of these churches refusing infant baptismhave become more noteworthy in the recent period by the contributions of authors, Karl Barth (b. 1966) and Emil Brunner (d. 1966). All these criticisms focus on the fact that infant baptism is not based on the essential references of religion, but rather on the practices of church fathers. Therefore, they argue that families, who believe but not investigate, baptized babies only for the tradition. In other words, people care about society, not religious beliefs, but according to these groups, this is meaningless anxiety. These discussions reveal infant baptism is not only theological debate, but also socio-cultural.In our opinion, most of the references in the texts shown as evidence for infant baptism point to the inseparable bond between God and children, like in the Old Testament. We think that claim of these groups that faith requires a level of consciousness is a consistent criticism. In this context, it can be stated that the criticisms of the infant baptism in the post-reform period are effective and that groups who believe in this baptism could not respond to these criticisms through sacred texts and rational proofs. (shrink)

In this text, the problem of tolerance is discussed in the light of recent works of Umberto Eco and Stefan Afloroaei. The author argues that in the case of tolerance, the success lies not in tolerating the other, (not even in the weaker sense of the word), but rather in accepting him. The acceptance of the Other is the complete and powerful meaning of tolerance. Accep- tance ends where the very presence of the concept of tolerance is undermined and compromised (...) by its history of colonialism and exploitation. Therefore, the primary solution to understand and apply tolerance is the recognition of alterity, in an inner and outer meaning alike. (shrink)

In her poetry collection The Language We Were Never Taught to Speak (2021), Grace Lau, a Hong Kong-born Chinese Canadian poet, showcases different experiences of exclusion and inclusion, some connected to the long history of prejudice and discrimination. The aim of this article is to discuss depictions of three types of exclusion experienced by Lau – that of a postcolonial subject, a queer subject, and, finally, a queer subject of colour – and the impact those experiences have on her identity. (...) The analysis of three of Lau’s poems – "Birth/Right”, “Another God”, and “Perfect Groupie” – provides an insight into her reflections on different instances of exclusion she experienced, whether motivated by her ethnicity and nationality, her sexual orientation, or the combination of both, and the impact they had on her identity as a queer postcolonial subject. (shrink)

End period 30 - beginning. 40's of the twentieth century. in Transcarpathia it was extremely difficult. After the overthrow of the government of the independent Carpathian Ukraine by the Hungarian troops, a military administration was established in the territory of Transcarpathia. The Orthodox Church has been held hostage to international events and has become the epicenter of the struggle between Hungary and Yugoslavia. It should be noted that the religious situation in Transcarpathia during this period was tense. About 61.9% of (...) the population belonged to the Greek Catholic Church, 17.2% to the Orthodox Church, less believers were Jewish, Roman Catholic, Reformed, Evangelical and other churches. Among the Orthodox, since the 20's of the twentieth century. Two ecclesiastical jurisdictions dominated - the Serbian and Constantinople, whose representatives fought each other. The recognition and support of the Czech state before the Hungarian occupation had Serbian jurisdiction, which was represented by the vast majority of the clergy. (shrink)

Starting mostly with the second half of the 20th century, the churches and the religious communities are facing the challenges raised by the process of secularization, which is considered by some sociologists of religion as irreversible. The most affected ones were / are the traditional churches and the most obvious area where this phenomenon has become very visible is the Western Europe. This study aims to analyze the situation of the traditional churches in Romania, with a special focus on the (...) Greek-Catholic Church, from the same perspective: the impact of post-modernity over a church which is very much orientated towards the West, which is becoming more and more urban and is still passing through a complicated process of structuring and transition. The study underlines the fact that one of the answers to the problems raised by the process of secularization is based on the way in which the ecclesiastical community is built and on how deep is the consciousness of the confessional identity rooted in the mind and the soul of the believers. (shrink)

This study looks at the ways how the Reformed Church encountered the new modern mission movement in Transylvania with the arrival of Dr. Béla Kenessey and Dr. István Kecskeméthy to the newly established Reformed Theological Seminary at Cluj in 1895. By the time being, some theologians expressed grave concerns about the dangers of theological liberalism to the Confessions. The paper argues that these young professors, touched by the mission movement and revival also sought to encompass those who had an evangelistic (...) fervor to reach unbelievers and to serve those people in their personal and social needs. As a result, Christian Covenant was established in 1896, with official recognition in 1903 as the Christian Endeavor. It is hoped to unfold the major shifts regarding the attitudes to mission in the Reformed Church of Hungary and throw lights on ambiguous beginnings of mission movements. (shrink)

This study aims at chronicling current aspects and transformations in the relationship between the Jehovah's Witnesses religious minority and the Romanian state (1989-2010), focusing on this religious group's changing official status. Considering both previous contributions and debates on the relations between state and religion, and the distinction between the concepts of denomination versus sect, the present work analyzes the key issues of the long-lasting conflict between the state and this particular religious minority, as well as the factors influencing these relations (...) in Post-Communist Romania. It will be argued that the latest improvements concerning the recognition of religious freedom (Jehovah's Witnesses were officially recognized as a religious denomination in 2003) owes less to internal factors than to an external influence, namely the pressure exerted by the international community at the time of Romania's accession to both NATO and the EU. Furthermore, the study concludes that the evolution of the relation between the state and the Jehovah's Witnesses has influenced the background on which this relation has evolved, as well as the internal evolution of the religious minority. (shrink)

In 1962, after insisting upon the Vienna moment and comparing the points in the second Leopold Diploma, the author believed that the union was fulfilled in Vienna where the imperial authorities played an essential role. The Jesuits, who were considered the artisans of the union up to that moment, were reduced to the role of negotiators and forgers of the documents of 1697, 1698 and 1700. Because of the resentments against the “traitors” of the nation, S. Dragomir could not or (...) did not want to understand the great change brought about in the history of Transylvanian Romanians by the political programme initiated by Inochentie. When we take into account the fact that Dragomir was one of the nationalists at the beginning of the 20th century in Transylvania, it is hard to understand his refusal to identify the birth of nationalism in Transylvania with the political action caused by the Greek- Catholic bishop. His historical writings were also influenced by the new political realities in Romania after 1944. The author hesitated to establish the causes of the religious movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara because he was influenced by the Marxist philosophy. In his interwar studies he thought the movements led by Visarion Sarai and Sofronie of Cioara had religious determinations and aimed at reestablishing the Orthodox faith. After 1955 the historian changed his conclusions, considering them social and national movements against the Hapsburgs. (shrink)

Toleration and neutrality are not always distinguished. When they are, they are often offered as two complementary solutions for the problem of achieving political unity and a degree of mutual acceptance within a pluralist liberal polity. The essay shows the concepts to be fundamentally distinct, and then argues that instead of being mutually supporting, they are mutually exclusive. Neutralist liberals, it is argued, must give up toleration in favour of the virtue of neutrality on the part of citizens.

Transylvania is a multiethnic society that was part of the Hungarian legal space for centuries. Still, after the WWI, this territory became part of Romania, alongside with a significant number of Hungarian-speaking minority population. What happened with Hungarian as a legal language after the annexation of Transylvania to Romania? The article deals with the history and current status of Hungarian legal language in Romania, emphasizing the frequent contradictions between legal texts and realities, the importance of political context, and fluctuations in (...) the minority rights. The focus is on two problems: the language of legal education and the language of the court proceedings. There are arguments brought to prove the conditionality between these two at the intersection of history of legal education and minority rights. (shrink)

We live in a world of states: a world in which the dominant form of “persisting structure” for the wielding of political power is characterized by territorially concentrated power exercised through political institutions that exert sovereign control in the sense of being able to exclusively command compliance. Within such a world, calls for reorganization of the way these institutions are organized so as to devolve power to groups oppressed or marginalized within existing structures are inevitable. However, for proponents of liberal (...) states, such calls for devolving power pose a problem. When substate groups call for a reorganization in which power is devolved rather than reformed, they imply that within some portions of the state’s territory, or for certain of the state’s inhabitants, state-level political institutions cannot rightfully command compliance, or at least, cannot do so exclusively. Proponents of liberal states might respond to this problem by letting go of the need for exclusive command. However, for many proponents of liberal states, the prospect of a competing source of rightful command that may assert priority over decision making that applies to the entire territory is impractical, and conceptually difficult to sustain. An alternative response, one that preserves the pre-eminent position of institutions that encompass the state’s entire territory and population, is to insist that such institutions have a vital role in ensuring that the decision making of sub-state groups meets minimal conditions of moral equality and respect for human rights. Emphasizing the role of institutions that encompass the entire territory in guaranteeing minimal conditions of moral equality and respect for human rights seems promising, but it cannot provide a satisfactory account of the desirability of empowering state officials to exercise powers of oversight, and so it cannot justify reserving such powers in the face of calls for power to be devolved. This is most obvious in relation to oppressed an marginalized groups, as state officials recognize cannot reasonably expect members of such groups to accept officials as credible guarantors of moral equality or human rights. This problem aside, there is a basic problem with the way decision making is conceived of in arguments for the importance of reserving powers of oversight as groups calling for devolution of power are not susceptible to the kind of characterization that state officials would have to engage in to effectively gauge whether to intervene to secure moral equality and human rights. (shrink)

Cosmopolis A Review of Cosmopolitics -/- 2015/3-4 -/- Editorial Dominique de Courcelles & Paul Ghils -/- This issue addresses the general concept of “spirituality” as it appears in various cultural contexts and timeframes, through contrasting ideological views. Without necessarily going back to artistic and religious remains of primitive men, which unquestionably show pursuits beyond the biophysical dimension and illustrate practices seeking to unveil the hidden significance of life and death, the following papers deal with a number of interpretations covering a (...) wide field extending from belief to theory, from emotions to concepts, from the wisdom of personal experience to the most sophisticated doctrines. Spirit and spirituality are indeed many-faceted notions. They may refer to the intricate world of the interacting spirits which inhabit living beings in animistic traditions, without excluding a “grand force” linking human beings within a dynamic whole on which their very existence rely . They also bear upon more atomistic and either/or approaches of Western philosophy, which have become embodied in Cartesian dualism against a monotheist background, to the point of freezing the essence of individuals and culminating in the extreme individualism that characterizes our contemporaries. However, this equally refers to the opposite conception of materialism, across times and cultures, from ancient India and Greece (Cārvāka, originally known as Lokāyata, or some Buddhist doctrines for the former, Democritus or Lucretius for the latter) to more contemporary materialistic schools, whether modern or postmodern. -/- The following papers look at the contrasting forms of the philosophy and spirit of the human factor set into a whole, with no artificial disjoint between the psychical and the physical levels, as Wittgenstein put it: “And how can a body have a soul?”. This approach is not unrelated to the notion of anthropocene examined in a recent issue of Cosmopolis, with provides another comprehensive framework open to a spiritual life emerging from the very environment that generated it. -/- *** The first section of this issue was edited by Dominique de Courcelles, director at the National French Research Centre (CNRS), whom we wish to thank for collecting relevant studies relating to the religious and political questions, with a view to focusing on the war of ideas inevitably waged behind images, concepts and perceptions, taking an asymmetrical approach. To the extent that they are mindful of global/local interactions and include representations, opinions and beliefs, such disciplines as philosophy, philology, history and social sciences can provide useful studies accounting for new practices in geopolitics and a fair diplomacy. -/- In her introduction, Dominique de Courcelles first poses the question of how the religious and political spheres interrelate, with their corresponding religious demands and humanistic values. She then suggests that the right question today may be breaking with the philosophy of human rights concerned with the defense of human beings against the hazards of arbitrary politics or the instrumental use of religion, in favour of a fair philosophy of humankind, a new humanism. This would consist in recognizing a common loyalty of all towards one interhuman, not only interstate community, to protect it from both the autonomy demanded by individuals and the instrumental use of minorities. -/- Considering the fact of diversity, so important today in terms of both politics and religion, Abdelhai Azarkan looks at the conditions under which tolerance could obtain the double status of right and duty. He revisits to two philosophers, John Locke and Voltaire, who thought about it from the historical reality of religious wars. The former made tolerance into a right, basing his analysis on the political-legal level, while the latter saw tolerance as a duty, from an analysis based on ethical-political criteria. -/- Mathieu Guidère examines what he calls semantic denominationalism, a term which implies religious attributes and identities, whichever national loyalties or personal belonging they may have at the same time. Since the early 2000s, thie phenomenon has expanded tremendously, compounded by the “war on terror” and the over media-oriented terrorist actions. Denominational expressions act as formal names for ordinary and high-profile players in domestic and foreign policies of democratic states. These systems reveal a receding secularization, while the powerful comeback of religious identities signals the failure of nation-states and the weakening of the humanist spirit. -/- Barbara De Poli retraces the history of a contemporary jihadism claiming its Islamic essence and asserting the truth of genuine coranic principles via the war on infidels, with a view to restoring the Caliphate. After defining the term jihad, she shows that even if this contemporary jiadism is spreading in the Muslim world, it radically departs from Islamic law and the received use of the term jihad, in so far as it is rooted in the early radical thinking of Islamic ideologues in the 20th century, starting with with Hassan al-Banna, the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood. This current has been fueled by by international conflicts since the outbreak of the war in Afghanistan, in which the so-called Western countries bear a major responsibility. -/- Abderrazak Sayadi starts from the Tunisian experience to ask the question of humanist values and democracy within the relationships between the religious and political spheres. As a historian of religion, he is brought to demystify certain islamic principles and to paying attention to the reform of law, seeing the separation of religion and politics as a precondition to a successful democratic gamble and the establishment of a renewed humanism. -/- Dominique de Courcelles reminds us that getting a better knowledge of narrations and words makes it possible to better understand how logical and rhetorical thinking works for those who wage an asymetriccal war, re-enchanting and mystifying the world to better take control. As soon as 1932, an exchange of letters between Einstein and Freud made it clear that, in order to free man from fatality and war, education understood as culture was fundamental. Such illustrations as the exécution of Oussama ben Laden and the Caliph’s speech in Mossoul show that a premiminary analysis of images and words is essential to a fair diplomacy conducted by people from civil society, whose culture and wisdom allow justice and force to speak together and better resist war. -/- Marcel Boisard thinks that on the day the guns fall silent, exhausted by war, we will not return to the state borders that have prevailed for a century as an outcome of the Sykes-Picot agreement of 1916. It is time to prepare the “day after”, which will be a huge challenge. To this end, a summit of Middle-East nations is urgently needed to globally decide the fate of those peoples. On the condition that we know who the enemy is and accept to name it, to understand the history of the countries, groups and alliances, and to question any false or self-interested sense of certainty. -/- *** In the second section, Paul Schafer provides the author’s experiences to explain how culture, from the artistic to the biological, has the power to to open the doors to spirituality, from the inner self to the global environment. He asks himself whether a relative permanence of spirituality can arise from the specific moments that characterize it. Laurent Ledoux synthesizes the conclusion of a symposium held on 22 January 2015 on the links between philosophy and management, on the basis of the spiritual dimension conceived as “natural” and the answers it may suggest to the issues that face the organizations in a “contemporaniversal” world. Jacques Rifflet makes that question in a secular perspective, based on the wellsprings of personal commitment before it can be caught by any religious creed or scientific theory. In this sense spirituality, in alliance with reason, both inspires human consciousness and illuminates its destiny. Sami Aldeeb asks himself whether Islam can be reconciled with human rights. Caught between the belief in an absolute and final Word descended from the sky, and evidence showing that any religion is the creation of a given culture and a society situated in time and space, the Makkan and … contexts et médinois call for differentiated, if not opposite answers and exegeses. Bernard Carmona provides the outline of a dialogical framework, which is known to be a feature of debates between the various philosophical schools of classical India, exemplified here by the transdisciplinary perspective of debates within a Buddhist context. *** The articles not focused on the previous topic include a study by Landry Signé on China’s strategy, competing with the United States to control African resources. The author deals with the specific case of China’s rapprochement with Southern Sudan since Sudan was broken up. In the last paper, Goran Fejić and Rada Iveković, return to the essential role that women should play, and comments upon the role of some international legal instruments related in particular to the elimination of all forms of discrimination. The perspective is transnational and transethnic and is based on secular criteria, as regards nation-building and more generally society-building. Considering the persistence of widespread violence, whether in times of armed conflict or in times of peace, the question remains whether it is possible to fully implement rights and justice instruments. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS Unbaptized God. The Basic Flaw in Ecumenical Theology. By ROBERT W. JENSON. Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. Pp. v + 152. $16.95 (paper). The thesis of this potentially revolutionary book is nicely summarized in its title: the basic flaw in ecumenical theology is the unbaptized-that is, insufficiently trinitarian-God of Christians East and West, Protestant and Catholic. The book is revolutionary because it proposes a new way of reading (...) the logic of a myriad of ecumenical dialogues over the last quarter century; as a result, ecumenical theology and praotice for which God is among the " settled " issues ought be appropriately chastised by this book. But I think that Unbaptized God is only "potentially " revolutionary because I think Jenson leaves two crucial questions unanswered. Jenson's daring argument is made with rare clarity and compactness. Consider the argument in three stages. First, in an introduction, Jenson describes " the frustration of dialogue." He does not mean the frustration created by the meager knowledge or acceptance of the results of ecumenical dialogues on the popular level-or the reception without action of these results by Church officials (p. 2). He focuses on " a third mode of frustration ": a dialogue will proceed toward a " convergence," not without "tolerable divergence "; but the initially tolerable divergence eventually yields " a newly virulent division." The process is seemingly "circular" (p. 3). "No set of convergences ever seems to be enough, once the separations are there " (p. 4). Why? And what can be done about this? Second, Jenson illustrates the frustration and starts showing the way beyond it in several different ways. He describes the dialogues in the first two parts of the book. In Part One, Jenson takes up "The Early Ecumenical Convergences " on issues central to the sixteenth century reformations, Ca.tholic and Protestant: Justification (ch. 1), Real Presence (ch. 2), and Eucharistic Sacrifice (ch. 3). Part Two takes up Churchly Office (ch. 4), Episcopacy (ch. 5), Roman Primacy (ch. 6), and The Church's Mediation (ch. 7). The distinctions between the issues of Part One and Part Two seem to be both historical and logical. Historically, the issues of Part Two are what Walter Kasper called the surprising "displacement of the problematic" (p. 44) from issues 677 678 BOOK REVIEWS considered central by Trent and the Reformers (especially justification and the eucharist) to issues that emerged after the Reformation (especially ecclesiology). Logically, the distinction between Part One and Part Two is the distinction between the traditional matters of controversy (Part One) and what are claimed to be differences "hidden at some conceptual level deeper than that occupied by the traditional matters of controversy" (Part Two) (p. 7). I will not rehearse Jenson's splendid summaries of the many dialogues in English, French, and German (although the book ought be recommended on these grounds alone). The unofficial Groupe des Dombes is regularly regarded as the most ecumenically insightful, and the Dominican J. M. R. Tillard plays a particularly crucial role among Roman Catholic theologians. It is enough to say that Jenson successfully shows how each dialogue can be read as an instance of the frustration he initially mentioned: a " convergence " occurs on each topic which later turns into a " divergence " which later is converted into a " convergence " and so forth. By the end (ch. 7), everything seems to circle back to the doctrine of justification (ch. 1). But the appearances, Jenson argues, are deceiving. "The pattern of the dialogue's history proves to be more like a spiral than a circle on a plane" (p. 103). Thus, besides describing the dialogues, Jenson must also prove that the dialogues exhibit a non-circular movement. One of the fascinating features of Jenson's argument at this stage is that he does this in a slightly different way in each of the first seven chapters. For example, he sometimes clears away "illusory dissensus" (p. 22). He sometimes concludes that "the Catholic side is right." Indeed, the Catholic side seems right on most crucial issues-on convictions about the temporal constitution of persons that constitute the background for arguments over Real Presence (p. 32); on the "new" Catholic theology of eucharistic sacrifice (p. 41) ; on episcopal succession (p. 74... (shrink)

In their book, Roman but Not Catholic, Kenneth Collins and Jerry Walls make the case that certain beliefs central to the Roman Catholic faith are unreasonable. This article evaluates, from the point of view of Eastern Orthodoxy, some of the arguments Collins and Walls make. In particular, it argues first that Collins and Walls are correct to criticize John Henry Newman’s theory of the development of doctrine as a reason to accept otherwise insufficiently supported Catholic doctrines. Secondly, it offers some (...) points of clarification concerning the matter of sacred tradition and attempts to show the areas of agreement and disagreement between Eastern Orthodoxy and the position that Collins and Walls articulate. Thirdly, it argues that Collins and Walls rely on what is, from an Eastern Orthodox point of view, a questionable view about the interpretation of scripture by assuming without good reason that the clear meaning of scripture is equivalent to the literal interpretation. (shrink)

The city of Manado and province of North Sulawesi have built a public identity based on religious harmony, claiming to successfully model tolerance and inter-religious relations for the rest of Indonesia. Yet, in discourses and practices relevant to everyday interactions in schools and political debates in the public sphere, two primary contested frames for belonging emerge in tension with one another. On the one hand, "aspirational coexistence" recognizes a common goal of working toward religious harmony and inclusive belonging. On the (...) other hand, "majoritarian coexistence," in which the legitimacy of religious minorities is understood as guaranteed exclusively by the goodwill of the Protestant majority, also emerges in discourses and practices of coexistence. These two agonistic frames of coexistence stem from both a real pride at having staved off ethno-religious violence that plagued surrounding regions at the turn of the twenty-first century, as well as a concern about whether the area will maintain a Christian majority in the future. Based on ethnographic research in Manado, North Sulawesi, a Protestant-majority region of Indonesia, Ethics of Belonging investigates the dynamics of ethical deliberation about religious coexistence. In this analysis, schools are understood as central sites for exchange about the ethics and politics of belonging in the nation. The author draws on in-depth fieldwork at three secondary schools (a public high school, private Catholic boarding school, and public madrasah), an inter-religious "exchange" program among university students, and societal debates about religion and belonging. Each of the schools promotes a distinct method to addressing diversity and a particular understanding of the relationship between religious and civic values. Larson's research demonstrates how ethical frameworks for approaching religious difference are channeled and negotiated through educational institutions, linking up with their broader political context and debates in the community. This resource argues for a consideration of ethical reflection as a fundamentally pedagogical process, with important ramifications beyond the immediate environment. The focus on educational institutions provides a critical connection between interpersonal and public ethical deliberation, elucidating the entanglements of ethics and politics and their manifestation across different societal scales. (shrink)

Nowadays, more than three centuries after John Locke’s affirmation of the separation between state and church, confessional systems of government are still widespread and, even in secular liberal democracies, politics and religion often intermingle. As a result, some ecclesiastical institutions play a significant role in political affairs, while minority groups and individuals having alternative worldviews, values, and lifestyles are frequently discriminated against. Locke’s theory of religious toleration undeniably has some shortcomings, such as the exclusion of Roman Catholics and atheists from (...) toleration and an emphasis on organized religion in A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689). However, Locke’s theory of toleration, which presents a Christian’s defense of the civil rights of those who have different religious opinions, still provides powerful arguments for the oft-neglected separation of politics from institutional religion, thereby urging us to leave theological dogmas and ecclesiastical authorities out of political life. (shrink)

Ernst Troeltsch was one of the great modern theologians who studied extensively the transformation of Christianity in modern times. The present article discusses Troeltsch's many-sided historical, sociological and systematical analysis of the relation between Christianity and modernity. The Enlightenment - the beginning of modern age - means to Troeltsch a break with the old - catholic and reformed - churches, which up till then dominated society as a whole. The separation between State and Church is the main characteristic of modernity. (...) Nevertheless it is wrong to construct here an absolute antithesis. Sectarian Christian groups like the Baptists, the Quakers and the so-called protestant 'Spiritualists' made a contribution to modernity by demanding the toleration of individualist forms of piety and liberty of conscience. These principles have to be adopted by the churches, if they want to survive. Troeltsch's ecclesiastical ideal is a pluralistic church, which guarantees a maximum of religious freedom ti its members. Modernity, however, not only requires a change in religion but also in theology. An appeal to supernatural revelation or authority as such is no longer valid. Theology has to be transformed into a mainly historical discipline with general accepted scholarly methods. Troeltsch advocates a more empirical approach focussing on actual religion and not so much on dogmatical niceties. As far as the above would suggest the picture of Troeltsch as a happy 'Kulturprotestant', one must keep in mind that he was deeply concerned about what he considered to be the devastating consequences of industrial capitalism and the modern bureaucratic state for human freedom. Christianity was in his view one of the possible ressources to counteract these dangerous tendencies. The value of personalism, as metaphysically rooted in a transcendent God, is the main contribution of Christianity to the world according to this 'theology of culture'. (shrink)

If we are to understand the concept of toleration in terms of everyday life, we must address a key philosophical and political tension: the call for restraint when encountering apparently wrong beliefs and actions versus the good reasons for interfering with the lives of the subjects of these beliefs and actions. This collection contains original contributions to the ongoing debate on the nature of toleration, including its definition, historical development, justification, and limits. In exploring the issues surrounding toleration, the essays (...) address a variety of provocative questions. Is toleration a moral virtue of individuals or rather a pragmatic political compromise? Is it an intrinsically good principle or only a "second best-solution" to the dangers of fanaticism to be superseded one day by the full acceptance of others? Does the value of toleration lie in respect to individuals and their autonomy, or rather in the recognition of the right of minority groups to maintain their communal identity? Throughout, the contributors point to the inherent indeterminacy of the concept and to the difficulty in locating it between intolerant absolutism and skeptical pluralism. Religion, sex, speech, and education are major areas requiring toleration in liberal societies. By applying theoretical analysis, these essays show the differences in the argument for toleration and its scope in each of these realms. The contributors include Joshua Cohen, George Fletcher, Gordon Graham, Alon Harel, Moshe Halbertal, Barbara Herman, John Horton, Will Kymlicka, Avishai Margalit, David Richards, Thomas Scanlon, and Bernard Williams. (shrink)

In explicating the terms "Evangelical," "Catholic," and "Reformed," Vassady outlines what he thinks are the essential characteristics of any new Church communion. His analysis generally develops along classical or Neo-Orthodox Protestant lines, as is most obvious in his treatment of the apostolic succession of the episcopacy. The new Church will have a functional episcopacy but "without declaring any particular doctrine of the episcopacy." Given Vassady's theological leanings and conception of the Church, it is somewhat anomalous that he thinks organic unity (...) so highly desirable.—D. J. B. (shrink)

This collection of previously published essays attempts to rescue the classical orthodoxy of Milton's theology from the oft-repeated charge of Arianism. With the discovery of Milton's theological essay Christian Discourses in 1823, scholars concluded that Milton's theological orthodoxy was questionable; he was suspected of the heresy of Arianism. Paradise Lost was then reinterpreted in the light of this widely accepted charge. This interpretation has lasted for over 100 years. Beginning in the 1950's, and quite independently, the authors of these essays (...) published papers attempting to show that the charge of Arianism was a misinterpretation: which conclusion, at the same time, required a reinterpretation of Paradise Lost. The issues to be resolved centered around the role of Christology in the trinity, and whether or not Milton subordinated the second person of the trinity in an unacceptable and heretical way. In order to restore Milton to the tradition of Orthodoxy, the authors were called upon to investigate the theological and philosophical vocabulary surrounding the language of essence, substance, person, and hypostaseis; [[sic]] and to analyze their philosophical relevance including the meaning of ousia as developed by Aristotle and the Stoics. It was also necessary to investigate the history of Christian thought, including both Reformation and Renaissance orthodoxy and the relationships of Milton to such traditions. They thereby traced Milton's orthodoxy back to Tertullian, to the orthodoxy of the creed of Nicea and its long dispute over Homoousia, as well as to a pre-Nicean orthodoxy. They found in pre-Nicean orthodoxy a doctrine of subordination which is not Arian and with which Milton is quite compatible. In view of Milton's role as the poet of the Logos, they investigated the Logos concept in Platonic and Neo-Platonic sources-noting the continuity, but also the differences, between Milton and such Neo-Platonism. They also distinguish Milton from the antitrinitarians among his contemporaries. One major section is devoted to the relationship of the Son to God; and another, to the relationship of the Son to man and the Universe: for not only did the authors need to establish the proper relationship within the Godhead, but they needed, as well, to escape the inclination toward pantheism. Finally the authors are able to reinterpret Paradise Lost in the light of Milton as a non-Arian, suggesting that his poetic solution of the problems of his age allowed him to reconcile orthodox dogma with poetic drama. Although the authors do not attempt here to reply to the responses which have already appeared to these articles since they were originally published, it is clear they have discovered a new Milton who deserves a voice. This collection will be a significant aid to students of literature and intellectual history in making a case for the Milton or orthodoxy available in a single volume.--H. A. D. (shrink)

As the crime rate rises and attempts to rehabilitate criminals prove unsuccessful, attacks upon recent reforms in our handling of crime increase. In this book van den Haag offers both a theory of punishment which supports traditional penal policies and factual data which show the failure of recent reforms. van den Haag claims that the main purpose of a legal system is to preserve order but that not every system that does this is acceptable. Along with preserving order, a legal (...) system should also be retributively just, i.e., punish those and only those who deserve it, because only such a system will gain public support. Although van den Haag does not present an original thesis on the moral justification of punishment, he covers many important issues in a lucid fashion, argues forcefully for his views, and presents some new arguments. In his discussion of our legal system’s exclusion of illegally obtained evidence, he argues that such evidence should be admissible in court since the misconduct of the police is irrelevant to the guilt or innocence of the accused. If the police obtain evidence illegally, then they should be punished rather than society harmed by allowing the guilty to go free. In defending the death penalty, van den Haag contends that it is the opponents of the penalty’s effectiveness as a deterrent who have the burden of proof. Since, other things being equal, increasing the severity of the penalty decreases the incidence of various crimes, it must be assumed that the incidence of any crime can be decreased by increasing the severity of the punishment. Thus, without clear evidence to the contrary, the death penalty would have to be deemed likely to have a deterrent effect. The factual data presented by van den Haag is interesting and one recent experiment he discusses has produced particularly surprising results. This experiment on student cheating showed that the threat of punishment was effective in producing the desired behavior, but that exhortations to be honest were counterproductive.—M.G. (shrink)

An important figure in the history of German thought, Valentin Weigel, a contemporary of Michel de Montaigne, was for long time unjustly underestimated. In the last years, however, there has been a reawakening of interest in him, proved by the new start of the historical-critical edition sponsored by the Academy of the Sciences of Mayence in 1996 as well as by a number of recent studies, among which the notable monograph by Andrew Weeks, Valentin Weigel : German Religious Dissenter, Speculative (...) Theorist, and Advocate of Tolerance. In his works as a theologian, a philosopher, and an alchemist, Weigel anticipated the advent of a tolerant culture of individual knowledge and conscience. His sources are to be found in the traditions of medieval mysticism, Renaissance philosophy, and Reformation-era radical theologians. He looked with sympathy at Thomas Müntzer and at the Anabaptists, which led to his exclusion from mainstream Lutheranism. Weigel argued for the inner autonomy of the lay individual in search of knowledge and salvation. (shrink)

The term “toleration”—from the Latin tolerare: to put up with, countenance or suffer—generally refers to the conditional acceptance of or non-interference with beliefs, actions or practices that one considers to be wrong but still “tolerable,” such that they should not be prohibited or constrained. There are many contexts in which we speak of a person or an institution as being tolerant: parents tolerate certain behavior of their children, a friend tolerates the weaknesses of another, a monarch tolerates dissent, a church (...) tolerates homosexuality, a state tolerates a minority religion, a society tolerates deviant behavior. Thus for any analysis of the motives and reasons for toleration, the relevant contexts need to be taken into account. (shrink)

The book reconstructs the history of Western ethics. The approach chosen focuses the endless dialectic of moral codes, or different kinds of ethos, moral doctrines that are preached in order to bring about a reform of existing ethos, and ethical theories that have taken shape in the context of controversies about the ethos and moral doctrines as means of justifying or reforming moral doctrines. Such dialectic is what is meant here by the phrase ‘moral traditions’, taken as a name for (...) threads of moral discourse, made in turn of other interwoven threads, including transmission of shared codes, appeals to reform of prevailing custom, rational argument about the justification of some precept on the basis of some shared general teaching or principle, and rational argument about the ultimate basis for principles and justification of authoritative teaching. That is, the approach adopted to the reading of ethical texts depends on a firm belief in the fact that philosophers hardly created any ethical doctrine out of nothing. The main point this book tries to highlight is how different philosophical theories emerged and followed each other as a result of attempts at accounting for what was going on in the world of moral traditions. Changes were propelled by controversies between different schools, and highly abstract arguments were the unintended effects of moves made by controversialists forced to transform (and occasionally to turn upside down) their own doctrines in order to face the challenge posed by other arguments. This is the reason why the book examines not only texts that already enjoy pride of place in the history of philosophy (Aristotle, Kant, Hegel), but also other texts usually treated in the histories of religions (the Bible, the Talmud, the Quran), and others considered to be much less philosophical (Plutarchus, Pufendorf). -/- 1. Plato and a response to ethical scepticism. Two different traditions of morality in VI-V century Greece are described. The birth of philosophical questioning of traditional morality and temporal and spatial variation of custom is described within the context of the v century crisis, the demise of traditional aristocratic and tyrannical rule and the birth of democracy. Two conflicting answers to the challenge are reconstructed, namely conventionalist or immoralist theories formulated by the Sophists and the eudemonist and intellectualist Socratic theory. Plato’s own reformulation of Socrates answer to the Sophists is reconstructed. His psychological views, his classification of the four cardinal virtues and his political theory are described as parts of a unitary system, culminating in an extremely realist moral ontology identifying the idea of the good with the essence of the (moral and extra-moral) world itself. -/- 2. Aristotle and the invention of practical philosophy. Aristotle’s invention of practical philosophy as a field separated from first philosophy is shown to be an implication of his break with Plato moral ultra-realism. Aristotle’s agenda in his moral works is arguably dependent on a polemical intention, namely dismantling Socratic intellectualism. The semi-inductive or virtuously circular method of practical philosophy is illustrated, starting with the received opinions of the better and wiser individuals and trying dialectically to sift what is left of mistake and inconsistence in such opinions, finally trying to correct mistakes and make the overall practical science more consistent. The chapter illustrates then the relationship of individual ethics, or ‘monastics’, with the art and the science of the pater familias, or ‘economics’, and the science of the ruler and citizen, or politics. The nature of virtues, or better, excellences of character, is discussed, highlighting the basic role of hexis, or ‘disposition’. Prudence, or better practical wisdom, is the focus of the chapter. Its relationship with bouleusis or deliberation is examined, and its autonomous status vis-à-vis theoretical knowledge is stressed. -/- 3. Diogenes and philosophy as a way of life. The chapter provides an overview of Hellenistic ethics, which almost amounts to Hellenistic schools of philosophy, in so far as ‘philosophy’ became in these centuries primarily the name for a way of life. The typical character of the Cynical movement is highlighted, that of a school of life, not a school aimed at providing any kind of intellectual training was to be provided. -/- 4. Epicurus and ethics as self-care. The peculiar character of the Epicurean school is described, a combination of a science of well-being aiming, more than at pleasure as in the popular view, at reduction of useless suffering, of unnecessary needs, and at a balanced selection of pleasures of the best and most durable kind. -/- 5. Epictetus and ethics as therapy of the passions. The various phases of Stoicism are described, and the shifting place given to ethics in the Stoic system of idea, culminating in the paradoxical view of ethics, its impossibility in principle notwithstanding, as the only truly significant and necessary part of philosophy. Cicero is treated, showing how his own synthesis of various Hellenistic trends is as a truly philosophical enterprise, deserving serious consideration after one or two centuries when he was confined to the role of literate. Epictetus is chosen as the best example of what the Stoic tradition could yield, an art of living based on sophisticated introspection, in turn aimed at making a kind of cognitive therapy possible, dismantling obnoxious passions at their root by systematically correcting false representations. -/- 6. Philo and the reconciliation of Torah and Platonism. A reconstruction of basic ideas from a few books of the Hebrew Bible is provided, starting with the Prophetic tradition and the focus on God’s mercy as the source of motivation and standard for human behaviour. Then a comparative analysis is undertaken of a parallel tradition, namely the three codifications of the Torā (Law or, better, Instruction), highlighting how a core of moral ideas may be recognized as a basis and preamble of codification of civil law, cultural practice, and regulation of ritual purity. The importance of Leviticus is stressed as the turning point when emphasis mercy, typical of the Prophetic tradition, is combined with the legal tradition, yielding the change in sensibility of the Second Temple time. Philo of Alexandria is described as one of the three leading figures – together with Rabbi Hillel and Rabbi Yeshua – at the apex the emergence of the mentioned new sensibility, gradually including mercy as an essential part of justice and establishing the starting point of both the Rabbinic and the Christian tradition. This consists precisely in the precept of one’s neighbour’s love or of the golden rule, two eventually identical precepts whose meaning is arguably more sober and sensible than the long-lasting Christian tradition deriving from John and Augustine has made us believe and no novelty vis-à-vis so-called Ancient-Testament teachings. -/- 7. Augustine and Christianity as Neo-Platonism. The first section examines the moral doctrines of so-called 'ethical Treaties' from the Talmud, a group of treaties, among which the best known is Pirqé Avot, that were left out of the six "orders" of the canon as they did not fit in any of the six groups of issues ritual or legal on which the division was based. According to Maimonides, their peculiar theme is provided by the Deòt, 'opinions', i.e., mental dispositions, that is, the translation of the Greek term hexeis and Arab akhlak (in turn providing in this language the name for ethics as such). The three topics I reconstruct are: i) the notion of Torah: The Torah is understood as the world order itself, or as the ‘Wisdom’ that existed even before creation and was ‘the tool by which the world was built’; however, the Torah is an earthly and human entity, as it was "received" by humans, and from that very moment belongs to them; ii) the relationship between love of God and love of neighbour; the treaties require us to study and practice the Torah ‘for its own sake’, that is, require us to act out of love, not out of fear or hope of reward; iii) the idea of sanctification of daily life: having disappeared with the destruction of the Temple the possibility of any conflict between liturgical service and everyday life, the latter is assumed to be in itself divine service: to give food to the poor has the same value as sacrifices in the Temple, and as an implication, the insistence become recurrent on the goodness of created things in themselves along with a polemic against ascetic currents. The conclusions drawn are: i) the moral teachings of the Talmud and those of Yeshua are, rather than similar, virtually identical; one may safely say that the precept of love and the golden rule are central ones for all Talmudic rabbis, that mercy plays an indispensable role alongside with justice, and the latter is not a different thing from one’s neighbour’s love; ii) a peculiarity of Talmud rabbis facing Yeshua is the idea of study as worship, and knowledge as a source of justice; but this is an idea of Judaism after the Temple's destruction that cannot be attributed to the Pharisees of Yeshua’s time; iii) the relation of study and practice in the Talmud parallels that between faith and deeds in Paul's epistles, that is, respectively faith or learning are a necessary and sufficient condition to be recognized as righteous , but deeds are the inevitable effect of either faith or learning. The sayings ascribed to Yeshua are examined first, yielding the conclusion that a close equivalent may be found for every saying in Talmudic literature and yet the whole is ascribed to one rabbi, with rather consistent stress on God’s mercy and unconditional forgiving as the mark of true imitation of God. Thus, Yeshua’s teaching is pure Judaism. The third section describes briefly the galaxy of Gnostic currents and Manichaeism, trying to sketch the profile of moral teachings resulting from an encounter of Asian spiritual traditions, Hellenistic lore and sparks of teachings from apocalyptic Jewish currents. The last section summarizes the turbulent history of several encounters between Christian currents and Hellenistic philosophical schools. The first one was with late Cynicism. Recent, rather controversial, literature discovered the jargon and a few topics from the Stoic-Cynical popular philosophy in a few books from the New Testament itself. This, far from proving that Rabbi Yeshua had been influenced by cynic preachers, is a proof of the necessity felt by Christian preachers to translate the original ‘Christian’ teaching into a Greek lexicon deeply impregnated with cynic terminology. The second was with Platonism, yielding the mild and temperate moral teaching of Clemens of Alexandria, teaching the sanctity of nature and the human body, the joy of moderate fruition of ‘natural’ kinds of pleasures, and the beauty of the marital life – in short, the opposite of the standard picture of Medieval Christianity. Ambrose of Milan brings about a different kind of synthesis, namely with Middle Platonism, where Stoic themes prevail. The most shocking case is Augustine, where an early Manichean education is overcome in a former phase by a synthesis of Plotinian Neo-Platonism and Christian preaching, yielding a sustained polemic with the Manicheans and rather optimistic views on life and Creation, the body and sexuality, and Hebrew-Judaic tradition not far from Clemens of Alexandria. In a later phase, occasioned by controversy on the opposite front, with such Christian currents as the Pelagians and Donatists, Augustine comes back to heavily anti-Judaic and world-denying ascetic attitudes where is earlier Manichean upbringing seems to emerge again. The tragedy of medieval Christianity will be the later Augustine’s overwhelming influence. A final section is dedicated to the monastic tradition where a curious mixture of world-denying asceticism with an astonishingly penetrating ‘science’ of introspection emerges. -/- 8. Al Farabi and the reconciliation of Islam and Platonism. The Qurān and the qadit, that is, collections of sayings ascribed to the prophet Muhammad contain a wealth of precepts and catalogues of virtues mirroring moral contents from the Jewish and the Christian traditions, among them the basic notion of imitation of the Deity, where mercy is assumed to be its basic trait. An important tradition within Islam, namely Sufism, stressed to the utmost degree the role of mercy, turning Islam into a mystic doctrine centred on retreat from the world, abandonment to God’s will, and a peaceful and fraternal attitude to our fellow-beings. A secular literary tradition originating in the Sassanid Empire, the literature of advice to the Prince had for a time a widespread influence in the newly constituted Arabic-Islamic commonwealth. In a later phase, the legacy of Hellenic philosophy made its way into the intellectual elite of the Islamic world. The first important legacy was Platonic, and the Republic became the main text for Islamic Platonism. Al-Farabi wrote an enjoyable remake of the Platonic Republic, arguing that the citizen’s virtues were the basis on which the political building needs to rest. The secular lawgiver is enlightened by the light of reason in his everyday practice of governance, but room is made for the Prophet as the voice of revealed truth that confirms and completes the rational truth that philosophy may afford. In a second phase also Aristotelian and Stoic influence were assimilated. Miskawayh’s treatise was the masterwork at the time Arabic philosophy reached its Zenith. It is a treatment of the soul’s diseases and their remedies, combining the Aristotelian doctrine of the golden mean with the Stoic doctrine of the passions and elements of Galenic medicine. Towards the eleventh-twelve centuries a war raged among theologians and philosophers, finally won by the former with disappearance of philosophy as such. The newly established mainstream, yet, was no kind of intolerant fanaticism. It drew from the work of mystic theologian Al-Ghazālī, the best heir of Sufism, teaching a tolerant and peaceful attitude to our fellow-beings and a passive attitude to destiny as an expression of the Divine will. -/- 9. Moshe ben Maimon and the reconciliation of Torah and Aristotelian ethics. The encounter between the Talmudic tradition and Hellenic philosophy had taken place a first time in Alexandria at the time of Philo but the two traditions had parted way again. In fact, the kind of Platonic Judaism founded by Philo survived only within Christianity, in the fourth Gospel and then in writings by Clemens of Alexandria. The Talmudic literature had absorbed just less striking traits from the Hellenic Philosophy, namely an idea of ethics as care of the self and a role for the education of character as propaedeutic to theoretical knowledge. In the Arabic-Islamic world, a second round started when Jewish authors writing in Arabic undertook the task to prove the full compatibility of the tradition deriving from Torah and Platonic philosophy. The culmination of this attempt is provided by Moshe ben Maimon who tried to use Aristotelian ethics as a language into which the teaching from the Pirké Avot could be translated. -/- 10. Thomas Aquinas and the reconciliation of Christian morality and Aristotelian ethics. In the first section the fresh start is described of philosophical ethics in Latin Europe at the turn of the Millennium. In a first phase, Anselm and Peter Abelard built on a Platonic and Augustinian legacy. In this phase. remarkable innovations are introduced, including Abelard’s claim of the obliging character of erring consciousness. In a second phase, the rediscovery of Nicomachean Ethics thanks to Latin translation of Arabic versions gives birth to a new wave of ethical studies, recovering the very idea of Aristotelian practical philosophy, with the potential implication of full legitimization of natural morality, i.e. ethics without Revelation. Aquinas’s ethics is a theological ethics out of which it would be vain to try to extract a self-contained philosophical ethics. His treatment of topics in philosophical ethics, yet, does not boil down to repetition of Aristotelian arguments but is rather a creative reshaping of such arguments. For example, he introduces also in the practical philosophy a first principle parallel to the principle of non-contradiction; and he also carries out a synthesis of Aristotelianism, Stoicism, and neo-Platonism. Even though it is essentially moral theology, Aquinas’s doctrine - unlike Augustine – grants full citizenship to "natural" morality, firstly by rejecting the claim that the corruption of human nature due to the original sin is so radical as to leave "pure nature" incapable of moral goodness. The doctrine is presented in a more sophisticated formulation in a few of the Quaestiones, such as De Malo and De Veritate, in the Summa contra Gentes and in the commentaries to Aristotle than in the famous Summa Theologica, but the latter work includes the only or the largest exposition of some decisive part of the theory. Thus, the Summa Theologica should be read for what it is more than criticized for not being what it was not meant to be. It was not meant to be the brilliant synthesis of all that Reason he had been able to produce with what Revelation had added about which the Neo-Thomists used to dream, but rather a manual for the training of preachers and confessors, where theoretical claims are not too demanding and a few serious tensions are left. Besides a jump between the Prima Secundae and the Secunda Secundae, being the former an essay in virtue theory and the latter a handbook for confessors, the most serious tension is perhaps the one between the ethics of right reason presented in most of Ia-IIae and the eudemonistic ethics developed in quaestiones 1-5 of the same part; the alternative ethical theory which also may be found in Augustine, the Stoic view of a cosmic reason eventually coincident with the moral law, was believed by Anselm (followed by John Duns Scotus and William of Ockham) to be incompatible with eudemonism. It is questionable whether Thomas could reduce the tension proving that it is just an apparent tension, in so far as the right reason and bliss derived from knowledge of God tend to coincide, but this is just a conjecture. Thomas’s ethics is a virtue ethic, not a law-based one, and moral judgment focuses on the virtues, particularly charity, not on the commandments and even less on absolute prohibitions; Thomas, however, would not have considered a drastic alternative between law and the virtues such as the one which has been advanced in late twentieth-century philosophy to be justified. Nonetheless, when it discusses ‘special’ virtues, it ceases to be an ethics of virtue and becomes a disappointing and often contradictory discussion of legal and illegal acts. Such a discussion takes most of the time ‘reasonable’ middle positions on controversial issues but not the alternative approach that Aristotelianism would have made possible; even when some occasional Aristotelian claim shows up, such as money’s barrenness as a reason against usury, this seems to be made by an author who apparently ignores the Aristotelian Thomas of the Prima Secundae. It is an ethic of human autonomy which recognizes the binding character of the individual conscience and, potentially, even a duty to disobey unjust laws. It is true that what Thomas writes in his discussion of death penalty and persecution of heretics is simply disgusting, and yet we should blame Thomas the man, not Thomist ethical theory. Finally, Thomas’s ethics is not ethical ‘absolutism’, as both traditionalist Catholic theologians and secularist enemies of dogmatic morality tend to believe. It is instead an ethic of prudential judgment. Exceptions to this approach – or better results of logical fallacies – are such claims as the absolute character of negative precepts and of the existence of "intrinsically evil acts", claims that simply cease to make sense in the light of Thomas’s own distinction between human act and natural act, carrying consequences Thomas did not live long enough to draw or was not consistent enough to dare to draw. -/- 11. Francisco de Vitoria and casuistry. The first topic illustrated is the discussion about the notion of pura natura, namely the human condition after the original sin and before divine revelation. The core notion was already there in Aquinas but was later developed by Caietanus (Thomas de Vio) with a number of interesting implications: firstly a view of human nature as such much more positive than Augustine’s and his followers’ view, including both Calvinists and Jansenists; secondly, the implication that the philosopher’s morality, as opposed to the Christian’s morality, is a quite respectable kind of morality; thirdly, that theocracy and prosecution of the unfaithful lacked justification, with more far-fetching consequences than Aquinas himself had dared to draw. The second topic is casuistry, a new name for a comparatively older way of thinking, which was already there in late Stoicism and Cicero as well as in the Talmudic literature. This is an approach aimed at yielding probable enough solutions for doubtful cases even in absence of completely safe staring points. The genre developed from medieval reference books for confessors and became by the sixteenth-century a sophisticated tool-box for dealing with various fields of applied ethics. Francisco Vitoria, the main authority of Baroque Scholasticism, was a controversial figure, among the proponents of the new discipline of casuistry and a consistent proponent of more separation between the religious and the civil authority, stricter limits to the legitimacy of war, innate rights of non-Christian nations in the New World based on the notion of pura natura, providing a standard of ‘natural’ goodness, previous to revelation, on which the Indian nations were judged to live in a naturally good condition, provided with the institutions of family, justice, and religion had accordingly a right to full respect by Christian sovereigns. Bartolomé de Las Casas, arguing along similar lines, was the leader of a historical battle in defence of the rights of the Indios. -/- 12. Michel de Montaigne and the art of living. A short description of one of the Renaissance Phyrronism, one of the classical philosophies revived in the fifteenth and sixteenth century. Montaigne combines the sceptical epistemology with an understanding of ethics – indeed of philosophy as a whole – in terms of an art of living inspired by two basic ideas, sagesse, that is, practical wisdom as the only kind of rationality available after theology, science, and tradition have declared bankrupt, and an aesthetic ideal of self-transformation through the art of writing and introspection. -/- 13. Pierre Nicole and neo-Augustinianism. The chapter illustrates first the vicissitudes of Augustinianism newly born after the late medieval triumph of Thomist Aristotelianism in the alternative Protestant and Catholic versions processed by the Calvinists and the Jansenists. Then it illustrates the doctrines of Pierre Nicole, Blaise Pascal’s best disciple, on the impossibility of introspection, on the ubiquity of self-deception, on the incurably evil character of the passion of love, and on the two moralities, the one of the man of the world, the morality of honesty which is indispensable for granting peace and order but devoid of any true value for eternal salvation, since the same external behaviour may be prompted by opposite motivations, and the morality of charity, the only true one but also useless to society. The third topic is Pierre Malebranche’s view of self-deception as a ubiquitous phenomenon accounting for human action and responsibility and his reformulated theory of self-love, no less ubiquitous than for Nicole and yet not as incurably evil, given the distinction between morally indifferent and even necessary amour de soi and vicious amour proper, a distinction on which the whole of Rousseau’s moral and political theory rests. -/- 14. Samuel von Pufendorf and the new science of morality. The chapter is dedicated to the discovery of the idea of a ‘new moral science’. Hugo Grotius is discussed first highlighting the real character of his project, much closer to the Thomist idea of a natural law accessible to non-corrupted human reason when human beings are living in a state of pura natura. Then Hobbes’s combination of scepticism, voluntarism, and conventionalism is described and both the continuity with Grotius’s new science, in the search for non-revealed rational morality, and the break with him, in the adoption of voluntarism and refusal of an intellectualist view of natural law, are illustrated. Pufendorf’s work is illustrated as a synthesis of the two previous attempts and the – up to Schneewind underestimated – paradigmatic example of the new science of morality. -/- 15. Richard Cumberland and consequentialist voluntarism. The chapter gives an overview of eighteenth-century Anglican ethics, noticing how the Cambridge tradition gave special weight to natural theology as opposed to positive or revealed theology – and how two Cambridge fellows, John Gay and Thomas Brown, elaborated on Cumberland’s (and Malebranche’s, as well as Leibniz’s) strategy for finding a third way between intellectualist view and voluntarist view of the laws of nature. The result of their elaboration was a kind of a rational-choice account of the origins of natural laws, where a law-giver God chooses among a number possible sets of laws on a maximizing criterion, and God’s maximandum is happiness for his creatures. The chapter notices also how such a solution aimed at solving at once the problem of evil and that of the foundation of moral obligation by proving how God’s choice was justified as far as it was the one minimising the amount of suffering in the world. 16. Richard Price and intuitionism. The chapter describes first the doctrines of the Cambridge Platonists, an example of hyper-rationalist reaction to Calvinism. Secondly it describes the sophisticated and universally ignored – from Sidgwick to Anscombe –version of what was later labelled ‘ethical intuitionism’ – showing how it escapes familiar objections and misrepresentations of intuitionism – from Mill to Rawls – in grounding its argument on transcendental arguments while carefully avoiding recourse to introspection and psychological evidence, which has been taken as a too easy target by critics of intuitionism. Thirdly, the chapter discusses Whewell’s ‘philosophy of morality’, as opposed to ‘systematic morality’, not unlike Kant’s distinction between a pure and an empirical moral philosophy. Whewell worked out a systematization of traditional normative ethics as a first step before its rational justification; he believed that the point in the philosophy of morality is justifying a few rational truths about the structure of morality such as to rule hedonism, eudemonism, and consequentialism; yet a system of positive morality cannot be derived solely from such rational truths but requires consideration of the ongoing dialectics between idea and fact in historically given moralities. Whewell’s intuitionism turns out closer to Kantian ethics than commentators have made us believe until now, and quite different from what Sidgwick meant by intuitionism. -/- 17. Adam Smith and the morality of role-switch. The chapter describes first, Hutcheson’s attempt at basing the ‘new science’ of natural law on different bedrock than Pufendorf and the English Platonists, namely a moral sense, a faculty whose existence is assumed to be proved on an empirical basis. The second step is a reconstruction of Hume’s rejoinder in terms of a new science of man including morality on an ‘experimental’ basis, that is, a ‘Newtonian’ hypothetical-deductive approach, distinguished from Hutcheson’s allegedly uncritical descriptive approach to human nature. The third step is a reconstruction of Adam Smith theory of morality understood as emerging from a spontaneous interplay of exchanges of situations (the most basic meaning of the word ‘sympathy’ as construed by this author). -/- 18. Jeremy Bentham and utilitarianism. The bulk of the chapter is dedicated to the doctrines of Jeremy Bentham. The Enlightenment spirit that suggested the idea of a new morality, free from religion, is illustrated. The notion of utility is illustrated as well as the subsequent formulations of the principle of utility. The idea of felicific calculus is discussed, showing how its inner difficulties prompted several reformulations of the principle of utility in order to avoid undesirable implications of proposed formulations. The role of the thesis of spontaneous convergence between interest and duty is discussed, showing how it left numberless questions open, and the distinction between the virtues of prudence, justice and beneficence is described as a way out of the deadlocks of classical utilitarianism. After Bentham, Mill’s reformed utilitarianism is reconstructed, showing how it is a kind of mixed system – as closer to common sense as it gives up Bentham’s claims to consistency and simplicity – resulting as unintended consequences from the controversies in which Mill was too keen to engage. The hidden agenda of the controversy between Utilitarianism and Intuitionism, going beyond the image of the battle between Prejudice and Reason, is described, showing how both competing philosophical outlooks turn out to be more research programs than self-contained doctrinal bodies, and such programs appear to be implemented, and indeed radically transformed while in progress thanks to their enemies no less than to their supporters. -/- 19. Immanuel Kant, practical reason and judgment. The chapter argues that Kant took from Moses Mendelssohn the idea of a distinction between geometry of morals and a practical ethic. He was drastically misunderstood by his followers precisely on this point. He had learned from the sceptics and the Jansenists the lesson that men are prompted to act by deceptive ends, and he was aware that human actions are also empirical phenomena, where laws like the laws of Nature may be detected. His practical ethics made room for judgment as a holistic procedure for assessing the saliency of relevant moral qualities in one given situation; this procedure yields the same results as the geometry of morals does for abstract cases but does so immediately and without balancing conflicting duties with each other, since what makes for the salient quality of a situation is perceived from the very beginning. Kant's practical philosophy is richer than the received image, making room for an ‘empirical moral philosophy’ or moral anthropology including treatment of commerce, needs, value and price, happiness and well-being; the overall social theory and philosophy of history is less different from Adam Smith's than the received image makes believe; the paradox of happiness is central to Kant's philosophy; a distinction between happiness and well-being is clearly drawn; the distinction plays a basic role in establishing a link between the economic and the moral life. -/- 20. Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and the critique of abstract universalism. The chapter describes first the Romantic movement and the implications some of its concerns, rescuing passions, community, tradition, the individual as the bearer of a unique destiny, and the longing for organic unity between the individual, mankind and nature. Hegel’s contribution is discussed then, highlighting how, on the one hand, he shared a number of these concerns and on the other he had more rationalist leanings. The notion of morality is the pivotal point of the reconstruction, highlighting how Hegel construes this notion as a key to his own diagnosis of the malaise of modernity – the separation of individual and Gemeinschaft – and how his attack on Kant turns around this very idea. -/- 21. Friedrich Nietzsche against Christianity and the Enlightenment. The chapter illustrates first the idea of deconstruction of the back-world of values. Nietzsche claims to be legitimate heir of the French moralists, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, in so far as he allegedly carries out to its deepest implications their discovery of what lies behind traditional naïve belief in the existence of an objective realm of values just waiting for description by the philosopher. The two exemplars form which genealogy draws inspiration are the classical philologist’s historical reconstructions of lost meanings and the chemist’s decomposition of elements. Then the genealogy of the notions of good and evil carried out in the first dissertation of Genealogy of morals is illustrated with its paradoxical conclusion that will to power is in fact the only ‘genuine’ kind of goodness. The third point illustrated is the dialectic of ascetism and self-realization with its ambiguous outcome. The suggested interpretation of such outcome is that Nietzsche’s normative ethics is a kind of virtue ethics taking an aesthetic ideal as a normative standard -/- 22. George Edward Moore and ideal utilitarianism. The chapter discusses the ideas of common sense and common-sense morality in Sidgwick. I argue that, far from aiming at overcoming common-sense morality, Sidgwick aimed purposely at grounding a consist code of morality by methods allegedly taken from the natural sciences to reach, also in ethics, the same kind of “mature” knowledge as in the natural sciences. His whole polemics with intuitionism was vitiated by the a priori assumption that the widespread ethos of the educated part of humankind, not the theories of the intuitionist philosophers, was what was worth considering as the expression of intuitionist ethics. In spite of a naïve positivist starting-point, Sidgwick was encouraged by his own approach in exploring the fruitfulness of coherentist methods for normative ethics. Thus, Sidgwick left an ambivalent legacy to twentieth-century ethics: the dogmatic idea of a “new” morality of a consequentialist kind, and the fruitful idea that we can argue rationally in normative ethics albeit without shared foundations. Then it reconstructs the background of ideas, concerns and intentions out of which Moore’s early essays, the preliminary version, and then the final version of Principia Ethica originated. I stress the role of religious concerns, as well as that of the Idealist legacy. I argue that PE is more a patchwork of rather diverging contributions than a unitary work, not to say the paradigm of a new school in Ethics. I add a comparison with Rashdall’s almost contemporary ethical work, suggesting that the latter defends the same general claims in a different way, one that manages to pave decisive objections in a more plausible way. I end by suggesting that the emergence of Analytic Ethics was a more ambiguous phenomenon than the received view would make us believe, and that the wheat (or some other gluten-free grain) of this tradition, that is, what logic can do for philosophy, should be separated from the chaff, that is, the confused and mutually incompatible legacies of Utilitarianism and Idealism. -/- 23. Edmund Husserl and the a-priori of action. The chapter illustrates first the idea of phenomenology and the Husserl’s project of a phenomenological ethic as illustrated in his 1908-1914 lectures. The key idea is dismissing psychology and trying to ground a new science of the a priori of action, within which a more restricted field of inquiry will be the science of right actions. Then the chapter illustrates the criticism of modern moral philosophy carried out in the 1920 lectures, where the main target is naturalism, understood in the Kantian meaning of primacy of common sense. The third point illustrate is Adolph Reinach’s theory of social acts as a key the grounding of norms, a view that basically sketches the very ideas ‘discovered’ later by Clarence I. Lewis, John Searle, Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. A final section is dedicated to Nicolai Hartman, who always refused to define himself a phenomenologist and yet developed a more articulated and detailed theory of ‘values’ – with surprising affinities with George E. Moore - than philosophers such as Max Scheler who claimed to Husserl’s legitimate heirs. -/- 24. Bertrand Russell and non-cognitivism. The chapter reconstructs first the discussion after Moore. The naturalistic-fallacy argument was widely accepted but twisted to prove instead that the intuitive character of the definition of ‘good’, its non-cognitive meaning, in a first phase identified with ‘emotive’ meaning. Alfred Julius Ayer is indicated as a typical proponent of such non-cognitivist meta-ethics. More detailed discussion is dedicated to Bertrand Russell’s ethics, a more nuanced and sophisticated doctrine, arguing that non-cognitivism does not condemn morality to arbitrariness and that the project of a rational normative ethics is still possible, heading finally to the justification of a kind of non-hedonist utilitarianism. Stevenson’s theory, another moderate version of emotivism is discussed at some length, showing how the author comes close to the discovery of the role of a pragmatic dimension of language as a basis for ethical argument. Last of all, the discussion from the Forties about Hume’s law is described, mentioning Karl Popper’s argument and Richard Hare’s early non-cognitivist but non-emotivist doctrine named prescriptivism. -/- 25. Elizabeth Anscombe and the revival of virtue ethics. The chapter discusses the three theses defended by Anscombe in 'Modern Moral Philosophy'. I argue that: a) her answer to the question "why should I be moral?" requires a solution of the problem of theodicy, and ignores any attempts to save the moral point of view without recourse to divine retribution; b) her notion of divine law is an odd one more neo-Augustinian than Biblical or Scholastic; c) her image of Kantian ethics and intuitionism is the impoverished image manufactured by consequentialist opponents for polemical purposes and that she seems strangely accept it; d) the difficulty of identifying the "relevant descriptions" of acts is not an argument in favour of an ethics of virtue and against consequentialism or Kantian ethics, and indeed the role of judgment in the latter is a response to the difficulties raised by the case of judgment concerning future action. A short look at further developments in the neo-naturalist current is given trough a reconstruction of Philippa Foot’s and Peter Geach’s critiques to the naturalist-fallacy argument and Alasdair MacIntyre’s grand reconstruction of the origins and allegedly unavoidable failure of the Enlightenment project of an autonomous ethic. -/- 26. Richard Hare and neo-Utilitarianism. The chapter addresses the issue of the complex process of self-transformation Utilitarianism underwent after Sidgwick’s and Moore’s fatal criticism and the unexpected Phoenix-like process of rebirth of a doctrine definitely refuted. A glimpse at this uproarious process is given through two examples. The first is Roy Harrod Wittgensteinian transformation of Utilitarianism in pure normative ethics depurated from hedonism as well as from whatsoever theory of the good. This results in preference utilitarianism combined with a ‘Kantian’ version of rule utilitarianism. The second is Richard Hare’s two-level preference utilitarianism where act utilitarianism plays the function of eventual rational justification of moral judgments and rule-utilitarianism that of action-guiding practical device. -/- 27. Hans-Georg Gadamer and rehabilitation of practical philosophy. The post-war rediscovery of ethics by many German thinkers and its culmination in the Sixties in the movement named ‘Rehabilitation of practical philosophy’ is described. Among the actors of such rehabilitation there were a few of Heidegger’s most brilliant disciples, and Hans-Georg Gadamer is chosen as a paradigmatic example. His reading of Aristotle’s lesson I reconstructed, starting with Heidegger’s lesson but then subtly subverting its outcome thanks to the recovery of the central role of the notion of phronesis. -/- 28. Karl-Otto Apel and the revival of Kantian ethics. Parallel to the neo-Aristotelian trend, there was in the Rehabilitation of practical philosophy a Kantian current. This started, instead than the rehabilitation of prudence, with the discovery of the pragmatic dimension of language carried out by Charles Peirce and the Oxford linguistic philosophy. On this basis, Karl-Otto Apel singled out as the decisive proponent of the linguistic and Kantian turn in German-speaking ethics, worked out the performative-contradiction argument while claiming that this was able to provide a new rational and universal basis for normative ethics. An examination of his argument is some detail is offered, followed by a more cursory reconstruction of Jürgen Habermas’s elaboration on Apel’s theory. -/- 29. John Rawls and public ethics as applied ethics. Rawls’s distinction between a “political” and a “metaphysical” approach to one central part of ethical theory, namely the theory of justice, is interpreted as a formulation of the same basic idea at the root of both the principles approach and neo-casuistry, both discussed in the following chapter, namely that it is possible to reach an agreement concerning positive moral judgments even though the discussion is still open – and in Rawls’ view never will be close – on the basic criteria for judgment. -/- 30. Beauchamp and Childress and bioethics as applied ethics. The chapter presents the revolution of applied ethics while stressing its methodological novelty, exemplified primarily by Beauchamp and Childress principles approach and then by Jonsen and Toulmin’s new casuistry. -/- . (shrink)

The Hyde Amendment and Roman Catholic attempts to put restrictions on Title X funding have been criticized for being intolerant. However, such criticism fails to appreciate that there are two competing notions of tolerance, one focusing on the limits of state force and accepting pluralism as unavoidable, and the other focusing on the limits of knowledge and advancing pluralism as a good. These two types of tolerance, illustrated in the writings of John Locke and J.S. Mill, each involve an intolerance. (...) In a pluralistic context f where the free exercise of religion is respected, John Locke's account of tolerance is preferable. However, it (in a reconstructed form) leads to a minimal state. Positive entitlements to benefits like artificial contraception or nontherapeutic abortions can legitimately be resisted, because an intolerance has already been shown with respect to those that consider the benefit immoral, since their resources have been coop ted by taxation to advance an end that is contrary to their own. There is a sliding scale from tolerance (viewed as forbearance) to the affirmation of communal integrity, and this scale maps on to the continuum from negative to positive rights. Keywords: church and state, Hyde Amendment, Locke, Mill, religious liberty, Title X funding, toleration CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

Toleration classically denotes a relation between two agents that is characterised by three components: objection, power, and acceptance overriding the objection. Against recent claims that classical toleration is not applicable in liberal democracies and that toleration must therefore either be understood purely attitudinally or purely politically, we argue that the components of classical toleration are crucial elements of contemporary cases of minority accommodation. The concept of toleration is applicable to, and is an important element of descriptions of such cases, provided (...) that one views them as wholes, rather than as sets of isolated relations. We explain this by showing how certain cases of toleration are multi-dimensional and how the descriptive concept of toleration might be understood intersectionally. We exemplify this by drawing on case studies of mosque controversies in Germany and Denmark. Finally, we propose that intersectionality is not only relevant to the descriptive concept of toleration but also captures an important aspect of normative theories of toleration. We illustrate this by discussing ideals of respect-based toleration, which we also apply to the case studies. (shrink)

Every year, the member Churches of the World Council of Churches (WCC) are called to actively participate in the meetings organized in the Week of Prayer for Christian Unity. From my perspective, these moments are an extraordinary opportunity to share in the richness of the Orthodox tradition, which means an act of confession and authentic witness. In the first part, I will present critically the canonical synthesis of the Orthodox, the concept of “Ecumenical Eucharist” and of Lima Liturgy, followed by (...) the recommendations of the Special Commission for Orthodox participation in the WCC regarding confessional and interconfessional common prayer. Then, this article will make a historical presentation of the week of prayer. It is very important to know how this initiative started and how it was accepted at the beginning and over the years. At least in Romania, where we have an Orthodox majority, this week has become a controversial issue produced by those who are against ecumenical dialogue. A special attention is for the actual practice approved by the Romanian Patriarchate. Finally, the article will present the statements of the new Orthodox documents and it will end with some conclusions about this moment of common Christian witness. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Comparative Religious Ethics: Everyday Decisions for Our Everyday Lives by Christine E. GudorfMyriam RenaudComparative Religious Ethics: Everyday Decisions for Our Everyday Lives Christine E. Gudorf minneapolis: fortress press, 2013. 256 pp. $49.00.In Comparative Religious Ethics, Christine Gudorf adopts a strictly descriptive approach and eschews normative judgments. She frames her inquiry by offering ordinary, Euro-American scenarios and then briefly describing the guidance that selected religions would offer, leaving the (...) work of comparison to the reader. Gudorf’s book is not afraid to tackle hotly debated religious and moral issues and is designed to foster engaged conversations. Its chapters focus on food, fasting, and feasting; on making work human; on body covering, [End Page 223] appearance, and identity; on sexuality and marriage; on making and keeping families; on anger and violence; and on charity and beggars. The book has an inviting layout, and the frequent use of tables, text boxes, and photographs lends dynamism to the text.The first chapter explains Western ethical categories such as virtue ethics, rule-based ethics, casuistry, and consequentialist ethics. It also introduces Maguire’s wheel for moral decision making and discusses contemporary rethinking of traditionally accepted moral rules. Each subsequent chapter includes sections that frame the chapter’s central issue(s), describes treatments of that issue by different religions (e.g., the chapter on “work” touches on Hinduism, Buddhism, Islam, Christianity, and Judaism), and explores associated ethical questions in contemporary terms. In addition, these chapters feature case studies, discussion questions, recommendations for further reading, and a list of relevant films. Gudorf’s treatments of Christian ethics favor the Roman Catholic tradition, sometimes exclusively—the “work” chapter, for example, omits key Protestant views such as Luther’s doctrine of vocation and Calvin’s conviction that labor glorifies God.The book is written for undergraduates who are “seekers.” By this Gudorf means skeptics who “no longer believe … that any one religion has enough of the answers to justify submitting themselves to the authority of that religion” and who identify as spiritual-not-religious (6). Perhaps to reassure her readers that she will not proselytize, Gudorf frequently mentions her own religious skepticism. She emphasizes that everyone “must, of course, decide for themselves the revelatory status of religious teachings” (41).Throughout Comparative Religious Ethics, Gudorf develops functionalist accounts to explain the existence and meaning of religious beliefs and practices. She also speculates about their physical and emotional “benefits.” Ever aware of her skeptic-seeker-readers, she suggests ways to strip the religious framework from these practices so that, while retaining their benefits, they are transformed into cultural and spiritual practices.In her chapter on “food,” for example, Gudorf analyzes “the proposed purposes” of food-related religious practices and the impact of such practices. Her goal is to help readers “decide on appropriate ethical approaches.” Fasting and food taboos are, in a way, like feasting, she writes, because associated practices can help us “differentiate our days.” Such differentiation is important because we, human beings, do not “tolerate well the boredom of unchanging days.” To combat boredom, “scheduling fast days, and the feast days with which they contrast, adds spice to our lives” (53). Some readers will be troubled by these claims. While fasting to add “spice” to life may appeal to the affluent and food secure, the millions of people who suffer from malnutrition, food insecurity, or starvation will want a different account of why fasting is important in their religious traditions. [End Page 224]Gudorf’s functionalist accounts have two consequences. The first is that instructors will want to supplement Comparative Religious Ethics with materials covering other theories of religion. The second is that, although her choices of themes and case studies are refreshingly up to date, savvy readers will detect white, middle-class privilege at the core of her analyses. Ironically the book will have the added “benefit” of engendering classroom conversations about the kind of privilege to which we should all be alert.Myriam RenaudUniversity of Chicago Divinity SchoolCopyright © 2016 Society of Christian Ethics... (shrink)

Studies of coexistence are based ultimately on the assumption that competitive exclusion is a general and accredited phenomenon in nature. However, the ecological and evolutionary impact of interspecific competition is of questionable significance. Review of three reputed examples of competitive exclusion in the field (Aphytis wasps, red and grey squirrels, and triclads) demonstrates that the widely-accepted competition-based interpretations are unlikely, that alternative explanations are overlooked, and that all other reported cases need critical reinvestigation. Although interspecific competition does undoubtedly occur, the (...) evidence suggests it is usually too weak and intermittent a force to achieve competitive exclusion or any other ecologically-significant result, except perhaps rarely and on a minor scale. Coexistence and community structure are therefore not ecological conditions to be especially accounted for, especially since their inherently comparative methods generate information that is largely superficial. Alternative questions that relate directly to species, the units of diversity, are discussed and they emphasize the primary habitat requirements of species, which are fixed during speciation. Neither the comparative approach of coexistence studies, nor the investigation of pattern is likely to be profitable, since the acquisition of species-specific characteristics during speciation requires historical research. At least one alternative theory of ecology, based on the close adaptation of organisms to the environment, is available. (shrink)

Leibniz is not commonly numbered amongst canonical writers on toleration. One obvious reason is that, unlike Locke, he wrote no treatise specifically devoted to that doctrine. Another is the enormous amount of energy which he famously devoted to ecclesiastical reunification. Promoting the reunification of Christian churches is an objective quite different from promoting the toleration of different religious faiths – so different, in fact, that they are sometimes even construed as mutually exclusive. Ecclesiastical reunification aims to find agreement at least (...) on the most important doctrines. Religious toleration involves accepting and respecting disagreement even on the most important doctrines. If one regards these two projects as alternative rather than complementary strategies for dealing with religious diversity, Leibniz might more readily be characterised as an ecumenist rather than a tolerationist. Such appears to be the conclusion, at any rate, implicit in the balance of critical literature on these topics: whereas a steady stream of studies has discussed Leibniz’s project of ecclesiastical reunification, only a meager trickle has been devoted to his views on toleration; and some of these studies go so far as to conclude that Leibniz had no doctrine of toleration at all. This paper will attempt to show, on the contrary, that a robust, many-layered, and unusually inclusive doctrine of toleration can be gleaned from Leibniz’s writings. This doctrine operated at least at three different levels: philosophical, theological, and pragmatic. As this implies, the doctrine of religious toleration, rather than being in collision with Leibniz’s core project of ecclesiastical reunification, was an essential element of that very project: it should be seen, in other words, not as a competing goal, but as a necessary first step toward ecclesiastical reunification. Yet at the same time it will also emerge that Leibniz’s doctrine of toleration was no mere function of this intra-Christian project of reunification: rather it was a still more fundamental principle which extended beyond the ecumenical project as well. It had the resources for accepting and respecting irreducible religious diversity and disagreement on points of importance not only between Christian communities, but also between Christians and non-Christians, including, in principle, even the atheists. These points will emerge from a discussion of statements on the philosophical, theological, and pragmatic justifications of religious toleration scattered throughout Leibniz’s sprawling corpus of writings. (shrink)

In Toleranz im Konflikt and in other works the German philosopher Rainer Forst presents an intricate interpretation of tolerance as a moral-political virtue. His aim is to resolve many of the well-known paradoxes by distinguishing different components of tolerance and distinguishing the reasons that we may have for objecting, accepting or rejecting certain practices and views. Good ethical reasons for objecting to certain practices and views do not morally justify their suppression by legal means and state power. In this way (...) Forst connects his inclusive analysis of tolerance, with both his account of the contexts of justification and his defense of what he calls the moral right to justification. In his critical discussion Tim Heysse sounds the political implications of this analysis of tolerance. He criticizes its exclusive focus on political and legal power and its corresponding neglect of social power. However, he also calls attention to the fact that Forst’s analysis has the merit of revealing tolerance as a potential source of political conflict in society. (shrink)