G. E. L. Owen; XVI—Gilbert Ryle, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 77, Issue 1, 1 June 1977, Pages 265–270, https://doi.org/10.1093/aristotelian/7.

Most of the essays that follow have originally appeared in philosophical journals, Indian and Western. They are reprinted here with the hope that in spite of the wide variety of topics with which they deal there is nevertheless a certain unity of treatment. A few major ideas and distinctions run through all the essays: I need not further single them out here. For permission to reprint, I have to thank the editors of the journals and books in which the essays (...) originally appeared. My former pupil Miss Manjusree Ray has been kind enough to help me in preparing the book for the press. J. N. MOHANTY May, I968, Calcutta CONTENTS Preface v Part One I. Modes of Givenness 3 II. The Given 12 III. Thought and Action 22 IV. Meaning and Truth-I 0 3 V. Meaning and Truth-II 50 VI. Language and Reality 60 VII. On Reference 2 7 VIII. Remarks on the Content Theory 84 IX. Phenomenology and Ontology 2 9 Part Two X. A Note on Modern Nominalism I07 XI. A recent Criticism of the Foundations of Nicolai Hartmann's Ontology II5 XII. Remarks on Nicolai Hartmann's Modal Doctrine 129 XIII. The 'Object' in Edmund Husserl's Phenomenology 138 XIV. Individual Fact and Essence in Edmund Husserl's Philosophy 152 XV. Gilbert Ryle's Criticisms of the Concept of Conscio- ness 163 XVI. On G. E. Moore's Defence of Common sense 170 Part Three XVII. (shrink)

This now-classic work challenges what Ryle calls philosophy's "official theory," the Cartesians "myth" of the separation of mind and matter. Ryle's linguistic analysis remaps the conceptual geography of mind, not so much solving traditional philosophical problems as dissolving them into the mere consequences of misguided language. His plain language and esstentially simple purpose place him in the traditioin of Locke, Berkeley, Mill, and Russell.

These two puzzles were classic if academic examples of the dilemmas Professor Ryle is concerned with.

There is a certain emotion of repugnance which I, and I hope a good many would-be philosophers, feel when asked the conventional question, “If you are a philosopher, to what school of thought do you belong? Are you an Idealist or a Realist, a Platonist or a Hobbist, a Monist or a Pluralist?”.

Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and yet misunderstood philosophers of the Twentieth Century. Long unavailable, _Collected Essays 1929-1968: Collected Papers Volume 2_ stands as testament to the astonishing breadth of Ryle’s philosophical concerns. This volume showcases Ryle’s deep interest in the notion of thinking and contains many of his major pieces, including his classic essays ‘Knowing How and Knowing That’, ‘Philosophical Arguments’, ‘Systematically Misleading Expressions’, and ‘A Puzzling Element in the Notion of Thinking’. He (...) ranges over an astonishing number of topics, including feelings, pleasure, sensation, forgetting and concepts and in so doing hones his own philosophical stance, steering a careful path between behaviourism and Cartesianism. Together with the _Collected Papers Volume 1 _and the new edition of _The Concept of Mind_, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle’s work. Each volume contains a substantial preface by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language. _Gilbert Ryle_ was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of _Mind_, and a president of the Aristotelian Society. _Julia Tanney_ is Senior Lectuer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle was one of the most important and controversial philosophers of the Twentieth century. Long unavailable, Critical Essays: Collected Papers Volume 1 includes many of Ryle’s most important and thought-provoking papers. This volume contains 20 critical essays on the history of philosophy, with writing on Plato, Locke and Hume as well as important chapters on Russell and Wittgenstein. It also includes three essays on phenomenology, including Ryle’s famous review of Martin Heidegger’s Being and Time first published (...) in 1928. Although Ryle believed phenomenology ‘will end in self-ruinous subjectivism or in a windy mysticism’ his review also acknowledged that Heidegger was a thinker of great originality and importance. While surveying the developments in the philosophy of language and philosophical logic, Ryle sets out his own conception of the philosophers’ role against that of his predecessors and contemporaries. Together with the second volume of Ryle’s collected papers Collected Papers Volume 2 and the new edition of The Concept of Mind , all published by Routledge, these outstanding essays represent the very best of Ryle’s work. Each volume contains a substantial introduction by Julia Tanney, and both are essential reading for any student of twentieth-century philosophies of mind and language. Gilbert Ryle (1900 -1976) was Waynflete Professor of Metaphysics and Fellow of Magdalen College Oxford, an editor of Mind , and a president of the Aristotelian Society. Julia Tanney is Senior Lecturer at the University of Kent, and has held visiting positions at the University of Picardie and Paris-Sorbonne. (shrink)

Gilbert Ryle; Intelligence and the Logic of the Nature-Nurture Issue Reply to J. P. White, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 8, Issue 1, 30 May 2006, P.

Essays analyze the nature of the human mind, thought, and imagination and explore the connection of thought to teaching.

This is, as from the author of The Concept of Mind it could scarcely fail to be, a bold and rollicking book. It is also one of the most important works about Plato to have appeared since the first volume of Sir Karl Popper's The Open Society. Whereas The Concept of Mind was a general offensive against Cartesian views of man, eschewing any precise references to particular sources, Plato's Progress deals with scholarly questions of datings and developments, showing and demanding (...) familiarity with a wide literature. Yet Professor Ryle is still incapable as ever of the dry-as-dust. (shrink)

Res Cogitans is a stimulating and exasperating book. Again and again Vendler makes new breaks through the crusts of meaning-theory, epistemology and Cartesian exegesis; and then, through these breaks, pulls out plums that had rotted off their trees many summers ago. Out of his valuable improvements upon Austin's locutionary taxonomy he rehashes the most romantic things in the Meno and the Meditations . In Chomsky's wake, he effectively assails Skinnerian stimulus-response learning-theory; but then, in Chomsky's wake, he surrenders learning-theory to (...) Skinner, finding a shelter for just a few epistemic pets in a Darwinianized doctrine of racial concept-inheritance that is, pace Chomsky, unfenced even from Book I of Locke's Essay . Vendler's powerful chapter ‘On What One Knows’ blocks for good current attempts to reduce knowing to an élite suburb of believing; yet the book's central concept of Thinking is so glued to the ‘that…’-clause that thinking is, by implication, denied to Beethoven and Capablanca, as well as to us when doing our undoctrinal car-driving, translating, verse-composing and aporia -tackling. (shrink)

v. 1. Critical essays.--v. 2. Collected essays, 1929-1968.

We falter and stammer when trying to describe our own mental acts. Many mental acts, including thinking, are what the author calls ‘chain-undertakings’, that is, courses of action with some over-arching purpose governing the moment-by-moment sub-acts of which we are introspectively aware. Hence the intermittency and sporadicness of the passage of mental activity which constitutes thinking about something.