The depths of the sea, their obscure inhabitants and their mysteries have always been a rich source of myths and metaphors for authors and philosophers. Fables about giant squids and monstrous octopuses run through the history of literature and culture. The vampire squid is only a small phylogenetic relic, but it provides a useful model for Flusser's hybrid philosophical fiction Vampyroteuthis Infernalis. Flusser slips metaphorically into the creature’s gelatinous skin in order to speculate on the paradigms of postmodern life, measuring (...) the abyss from the inside and producing a very peculiar, experimental form of thinking and writing. In the present era of virtual reality and computer simulations, we experience fiction as the only reality. According to Vaihinger's definition, fiction is a useful construct that is precisely not real, but enables human beings to create and manipulate their environments. His philosophy of “as if” is perhaps the fullest expression of fictionalism and shows its ambivalent potential. (shrink)

Gerolamo Saccheri, Logica dimostrativa. Edited and translated by Massimo Mugnai and Massimo Girondino. Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2012. Vol. I. LVII +295 pp. Vol. II. II + 168 pp. € 40.00. ISBN...

This anthology translates eighteen papers by Italian philosopher and experimental psychologist Paolo Bozzi, bringing his distinctive and influential ideas to an English-speaking audience for the first time. The papers cover a range of methodological and experimental questions concerning the phenomenology of perception and their theoretical implications, with each one followed by commentary from leading international experts. In his laboratory work, Bozzi investigated visual and auditory perception, such as our responses to pendular motion and bodies in freefall, afterimages, transparency (...) effects, and grouping effects in dot lattices and among sounds. Reflecting on the results of his enquiries against the background of traditional approaches to experimentation in these fields, Bozzi took a unique realist stance that challenges accepted approaches to perception, arguing that experimental phenomenology is neither a science of the perceptual process nor a science of the appearances; it is a science of how things are. The writings collected here offer an important resource for psychologists of perception and philosophers, as well as for researchers in cognitive science. (shrink)

Independently of whether an object of experience becomes a candidate for being a part of the self or a part of the external world, it is always given to us as just an object of experience. The observer-observed relation can be seen as a type of relation with many instances, both between the self and different objects of experience and between any given object of experience and different selves. The self is situated in a spatial grid, where the latter can (...) be characterised as an array of relations, of which the relata include both observers and observed. The world, understood as independent existence, including the self, is empty. However, Paolo Bozzi’s method for identifying the self and delimiting its independent existence from the external world has taught us just the opposite lesson. Bozzi’s project is to teach us how to use them, and to recognise that they allow a self to be situated in a world of objects. (shrink)

Paolo Bozzi developed his «experimental phenomenology» from the Gestalt psychology tradition, particularly from Gaetano Kanizsa’s method. The distinction between «phenomenal description» and «causal explanation» of the «perception» springs up from the analysis of Bozzi’s «S-D psychophysical scheme». What Frege, who was well-known by Bozzi, deals with in paragraph 71 of The Thought theoretically mirrors what is outlined in the Scheme and could also be intended as its source. The juxtaposition between a «science of observable things» or «experimental (...) phenomenology» – conceived as a science which is autonomous from what happens in the brain – and logics, which is set up autonomously from the thinking processes, is a programmatic element that is openly indicated by the author. Frege’s anti-psychologism and realism are both widely shared by Bozzi. The realism and the «naïve physics» Bozzi was a pioneer of lie at the basis of the so-called «New Realism». The following essay aims to localize and highlight some theoretical implications – up to their phenomenological origins – which can be detected particularly in paragraph 71 of The Thought. The present work tries to sketch out the boundaries and the autonomy of the «first person» perceptive experience and to define the scientific explanation that we can give of it. The distinction between science and experience, and the autonomy of experience from science and of the immediate experience of the content of consciousness from neuroscience, entail the impossibility of a naturalization of the phenomenological experience. In the examples taken from Frege can be found a theoretical bridge which connects the Gestalt perceptological tradition, Wittgenstein’s investigations of the philosophy of psychology, and the so called «New Realism». (shrink)

The paper compares the ideas developed by Bozzi and Stumpf with regard to unity, identity, and causality. Although Bozzi’s formulation is independent from the one made by Stumpf in his Erkenntnislehre, these two positions share the same innovative importance granted to perceptual experience and to the problem of the origin of categories. Thus, despite different levels of awareness and formalization, in both authors we see the features of what we can call – analogous- ly to Bozzi’s naïve (...) physics – a “naïve metaphysics”, at whose core lie the refusal of intellectualism, and the determination of the origin of categories in the concrete stream of perception. (shrink)

Fictionalism in ontology is a mixed bag. Here I focus on three main variants – which I label after the names of Pascal, Berkeley, and Hume – and consider their relative strengths and weaknesses. The first variant is just a version of the epistemic Wager, applied across the board. The second variant builds instead on the fact that ordinary language is not ontologically transparent; we speak with the vulgar, but deep down we think with the learned. Finally, on the Humean (...) variant it’s the structure of the ontological inventory, not its content, that may turn out to involve fictional elements. That is, for the Humean the fiction lies, not in the reality of common-sense ontology, but in the laws – of unity, identity, causation, etc. – in terms of which we articulate our experience of that reality. In the end, this is the kind of fictionalism that I find most interesting, sensible, and tenable. And I argue that it is even compatible with the sort of “naive” realism we have all come to appreciate in the work of Paolo Bozzi, to whom the paper is dedicated. (shrink)

La raccolta di contributi analizza alcuni dei temi più significativi dell’opera dello psicologo e filosofo Paolo Bozzi.

As he recalls in his book Naive Physics, Paolo Bozzi’s experiments on naïve or phenomenological physics were partly inspired by Aristotle’s spokesman Simplicio in Galileo’s Dialogue. Aristotle’s ‘naïve’ views of physical reality reflect the ways in which we are disposed perceptually to organize the physical reality we see. In what follows I want to apply this idea to the notion of a group, a term which I shall apply as an umbrella expression embracing ordinary visible collections (of pieces of (...) fruit in the fruit bowl), but also families, populations, kinds, categories, species and genera. I will try to determine to what extent we can understand what groups, in this broad sense, have in common and how they are distinguished from two sorts of entities with which they are standardly confused, namely sets and wholes. (shrink)

Georges Kalinowski, dans « Raison, entendement et philosophie » [Kalinowski 1974, 125-127], isolait quatre fonctions d’une même faculté : l’intellect comme fonction de la connaissance intuitive, la raison (des anciens) comme fonction de la connaissance médiate, l’entendement fonction d’élaboration des sciences (au sens moderne) et la raison (des modernes) fonction d’élaboration de la philosophie ou au moins d’une partie de la philosophie. Kalinowski reconnaissait ainsi à la pensée ancienne et à la pensée moderne des contributions originales différentes. Le présent essai (...) veut être un hommage à Georges Kalinowski, dans l’esprit de ces précisions : il donne lieu aujourd’hui, avec une brève introduction sur les rapports entre la logique de Boole et de Frege et les fondements de l’informatique, à une méditation que l’on prévoit beaucoup plus vaste sur les rapports entre logique aristotélico-thomiste, logique symbolique, mathématique, théorie des ensembles et informatique. (shrink)

This book features a theoretical depiction of the Italian phenomenological tradition. It brings together the main Italian phenomenologists of the present to discuss the positions and theories of the most important Italian phenomenologists of the past. Those profiled include Antonio Banfi, Sofia Vanni Rovighi, Enzo Paci, Dino Formaggio, Giuseppe Semerari, Enzo Melandri, Paolo Bozzi, Carlo Sini, Giovanni Piana and Paolo Parrini. This collection shows not only the variety of perspectives but also the inner consistency, peculiarity and originality of the (...) tradition. Moreover, the contributors connect continental and analytical traditions, the scientific approach and existentialism. Italian phenomenology, the rise of which dates back to Antonio Banfi’s writings on Husserl in 1923, proves to be from its very beginning, a relational philosophy. It is a philosophy that is capable, precisely by means of its method, of developing actual forms of communication and exchange among the different sciences. This book will provide graduate students and researchers with unique insights into the Italian school of phenomenological thought. (shrink)

Fictionalism in ontology is a mixed bag. Here I focus on three main variants—which I label after the names of Pascal, Berkeley, and Hume—and consider their relative strengths and weaknesses. The first variant is just a version of the epistemic Wager, applied across the board. The second variant builds instead on the fact that ordinary language is not ontologically transparent; we speak with the vulgar, but deep down we think with the learned. Finally, on the Humean variant it’s the structure (...) of the ontological inventory, not its content, that may turn out to involve fictional elements. That is, for the Humean the fiction lies, not in the reality of common-sense ontology, but in the laws—of unity, identity, causation, etc.—in terms of which we articulate our experience of that reality. In the end, this is the kind of fictionalism that I find most interesting, sensible, and tenable. And I argue that it is even compatible with the sort of “naive” realism we have all come to appreciate in the work of Paolo Bozzi, to whom the paper is dedicated. (shrink)

The research Lucia Pizzo Russo carried out all over her academic and scientific career is focussed on a the following idea: human mind and behaviour make up a cognitive device from whose complexity stems an evolutionary advantage. Hence, the psychological study of mind should take into account all those cognitive functions that underlie man’s ability of perceiving structures and affordances in the visual world as much as of solving problems, where perception and thought deeply interact, and of giving shape to (...) representations, be they artistic forms or scientific theories. But for an adequate psychological account to obtain that complexity must be traded off against the assumption that mind and behaviour are a psychophysical unity. That means that cognition does imply a neurobiological basis, and at the same time that a phenomenological stance is required just as that instanced by Gestalt psychology. In this interview a picture of a piece of life is meant to be given as it goes along with a research whose reference are issues in psychology, psychology of arts and such figures as Brandi, Piaget, Gombrich, Arnheim, Bozzi. (shrink)

In recent years, the term experimental phenomenology has come to refer to the work of various researchers, mainly Italian, of whom Gaetano Kanizsa and Paolo Bozzi are the most representative. Their work is well presented in this article by Bianchi and Burro (2022). My objection is to what I consider to be the misnomer and misleading name “experimental phenomenology,” which gives the impression that we are dealing with a homogeneous group following a unified approach. However, this is not the (...) case. The phenomenological view is not the same for everyone, ranging from borrowings from Gestalt theory, as in Kanizsa, to Gibsonian ecologism, as in Bozzi. And, most importantly, the research designs of these researchers are only sometimes experimental, sometimes quasi-experimental, but more often non-experimental. (shrink)

Questo articolo si concentra sul problema del rapporto tra fenomenologia e psicologia della percezione. Nella prima parte presenterò alcuni assunti di fondo che qualificano le ricerche sulla percezione nel campo della fenomenologia teorica e in quella della cosiddetta fenomenologia sperimentale. Successivamente intendo approfondire l’analisi, considerando il concetto specifico di percezione impiegato da Husserl nella sua fenomenologia e un concetto più lasco di percezione compatibile con la prospettiva psicologica per gettar luce sulla possibilità di un approccio integrato, mirante a unificare le (...) analisi fenomenologiche e psicologiche nel pieno rispetto delle loro proprie specificità. Nella parte finale del testo cercherò di presentare alcuni elementi che accomunano l’analisi husserliana della percezione e le ricerche sulla percezione sviluppate da una prospettiva psicologica da Paolo Bozzi e Cesare Musatti. (shrink)

Introduction La présente bibliographie a été constituée sur la base de celle parue en 1995-1996, sous le titre de “Bibliografia podmiotowa i przedmiotowa Profesora Jerzego Kalinowskiego”, Summarium 24-25 (44-45), Lublin, 1995-1996, elle-même inspirée, en ce qui concerne les années antérieures à 1983, de la bibliographie établie par R. Bozzi, La logique deontica di Georges Kalinowski, Naples, 1984, 193-204. Nous l’avons completée par...

Die zeitgenössischen Philosophen haben zwar der Sprache, die wir verwenden, um die Welt der alltäglichen Erfahrung zu beschreiben oder um uns in dieser Welt zurechtzufinden, große Aufmerksamkeit geschenkt, sie haben sich jedoch – von einigen Ausnahmen abgesehen – geweigert, diese Welt selbst als passendes Objekt theoretischer Betrachtungen anzusehen. Im folgenden werde ich versuchen zu zeigen, wie es möglich ist, die Common-Sense-Welt als ontologisch eigenständiges Untersuchungsobjekt zu verstehen. Gleichzeitig werde ich mich bemühen, deutlich zu zeigen, wie eine solch eigenständige Behandlung uns (...) möglicherweise hilft, die Strukturen sowohl der physikalischen Welt als auch der menschlichen Erkenntnis philosophisch besser zu verstehen. (shrink)

This article aims to develop new conceptions of the psychosocial dynamics that drive the re-romanticization of domestic femininity in current financialized capitalism. Feminist scholars have described this heightened cultivation of mothering as a reparative move in response to irreconcilable tensions between cultural ideals of the ‘balancing mother’ and ‘lean-in femininity’. This article adds a materialist-psychosocial lens to these conceptions, to enhance understanding of what drives this craving for domestic femininity. Drawing on a free-association narrative interview study with couples in the (...) financial elite in the comparatively gender-egalitarian Norwegian context, I describe a specific emotional mechanism that resists democratization of gender in this specific group. The interviews reveal a felt need to cultivate ‘the human side of things’ at safe distance from the competitiveness of ‘hard-core finance’. The Nordic earner–carer model with its entwinement of care and professional pursuits, cultivated by the more self-fulfilment-oriented parts of the professional middle-class appears not only unwanted but threatening. In my analysis, I retrieve and develop a psychoanalytically inspired historical-materialist feminism, one that perceives of the gendered division of work as a split in modes of focusing human energy. I suggest that the resurgent cultivation of domestic femininity is nurtured by a self-energizing antagonism between competitive and relational practices. I further argue that the cultivation of domestic femininity in these financial couples points to a potential antagonism between the democratization of love and the specific anxiety-driven competitiveness to which this financial-elite group may be particularly susceptible. (shrink)

The article addresses the gendered implications of Covid-19 in the Global South by paying attention to the intersectional pre-existing inequalities that have given rise to specific risks and vulnerabilities. It explores various aspects of the pandemic-induced ‘crisis of social reproduction’ that affects women as the main caregivers as well as addressing the drastic increase of various forms of gender-based violence. Both, in addition to growing poverty and severely limited access to resources and health services, are particularly devastating in marginalized and (...) vulnerable communities in the Global South. The article looks at specific regions and countries to illustrate wider challenges faced by LGBTQ populations, ethnic minorities, domestic workers, migrants and sex workers. Against the background of these gendered intersectional challenges, the article then moves to discuss feminist initiatives and mobilizations to deal with the crisis in specific local contexts as well as nationally, regionally and transnationally. It concludes by highlighting a number of visions, tensions and dilemmas faced by feminists in the Global South that will need to be taken into consideration in terms of transnational feminist solidarities. (shrink)