This paper describes some results of a multi‐decade study of the drums of Altai shamans, begun in 1922 with the active cooperation of shamans from several ethnic groups and in several regions of the Altai mountains. These studies were a part of broad scale research of Altai culture. Knowledge of the customs and language of these people, along with my sincere interest, was the principal reason the Altai shamans developed significant trust in me, and this feeling of trust by the (...) Altai people led to my adoption as a member of the Mundus clan. The adoption was confirmed with a shaman's prayer ceremony, followed by a horse sacrifice.The 1920s were a period of renaissance of shamanism in the Altai, which undoubtedly favored my research. I was able to study and photograph drums, to ask about their construction and ornamentation, and to discuss in detail their designs. This renaissance of shamanism developed as a result of Bolshevik pressure on the Russian Orthodox church after 1917, the Church having been the primary opponent of shamanism in the Altai region. Spiritual missions and churches were closed by the government, but shamanistic cults were not interfered with. The Communists were fighting all religions, but did not regard shamanism as a religion, considering it instead as a survival of the local clan system. My work in the Altai at this time was particularly productive thanks to exactly this fortunate coincidence of circumstance. (shrink)

There is a growing interest in Evald Ilyenkov’s work and its significance for contemporary debates. This interest spans several disciplines. One key thread in Ilyenkov’s ideas concerns a perspective on the relation between biology and psychology. In rejecting crude reductionism and individualism, Ilyenkov put forward a view of mind and personhood as emerging from activity and social practice. In his rejection of brain-bound notions of the mind, Ilyenkov’s ideas bear interesting resonances with current work in 4E cognition. One particularly interesting (...) resonance that has occasionally been noticed are the connections with the enactive approach to life and mind. However, beyond some hints at interesting convergences, there is to date no detailed comparison between the two views. The present article attempts to address this gap, examining both complementarities and possible tensions between the two approaches. Rejecting cognitive views detached from environmental and social processes, the enactive approach, as exemplified by De Jaegher and Di Paolo’s concept of participatory sense-making, emphasises the dynamic constitution of cognition through embodied and situated activities. The article draws parallels between Ilyenkov’s emphasis on historically and culturally situated activity, notably labour, and the enactive understanding of human bodies as dynamically constituted in human activity. The article explores the Ilyenkovian and enactive perspectives on the dialectics of ideality, challenging traditional dualistic views and proposing that the ideal emerges as metastable patterns in the ongoing interactions between world, practices, norms, and bodies. The article concludes by suggesting future research directions for the enactive approach, particularly in areas emphasised by Ilyenkov, such as labour and the mediation of material/cultural artefacts. (shrink)

This short interview explores the influence of Evald Ilyenkov’s work on contemporary philosopher, art theorist, and writer Keti Chukhrov. The interview focuses on Evald Ilyenkov’s contributions to Soviet culture, dialectics, and epistemology. She reflects on the distinct intellectual milieu of Soviet thinkers like Ilyenkov, Vygotsky, Davidov, and Lifshitz, who established connections between Marx and the broader world culture. The interview also addresses Žižek’s interpretation of Ilyenkov’s cosmology, emphasizing the ethical dimension of Ilyenkov’s communist spirit. Furthermore, Chukhrov touches on Ilyenkov’s critique (...) of cybernetics and its relevance in contemporary discussions about AI and philosophy. (shrink)

Special Issue “Risks of artificial general intelligence”, Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 26/3 (2014), ed. Vincent C. Müller. http://www.tandfonline.com/toc/teta20/26/3# - Risks of general artificial intelligence, Vincent C. Müller, pages 297-301 - Autonomous technology and the greater human good - Steve Omohundro - pages 303-315 - - - The errors, insights and lessons of famous AI predictions – and what they mean for the future - Stuart Armstrong, Kaj Sotala & Seán S. Ó hÉigeartaigh - pages 317-342 - - (...) - The path to more general artificial intelligence - Ted Goertzel - pages 343-354 - - - Limitations and risks of machine ethics - Miles Brundage - pages 355-372 - - - Utility function security in artificially intelligent agents - Roman V. Yampolskiy - pages 373-389 - - - GOLEM: towards an AGI meta-architecture enabling both goal preservation and radical self-improvement - Ben Goertzel - pages 391-403 - - - Universal empathy and ethical bias for artificial general intelligence - Alexey Potapov & Sergey Rodionov - pages 405-416 - - - Bounding the impact of AGI - András Kornai - pages 417-438 - - - Ethics of brain emulations - Anders Sandberg - pages 439-457. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:HUME'S BUNDLES, SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS AND KANT Even if we are inclined to view Hume's attempt to explain ascriptions of personal identity as an abysmal failure, we might still be sympathetic toward his proposal to replace the going substance theory of the nature of mind with his bundle account. Thus we might fault Hume for erecting an unachievably high standard for personal identity, or round on him for excluding bodily criteria (...) 2... from his solution, but nonetheless applaud his spiriting away of the Cartesian soul substance leaving his "true idea of the human mind" (261) as a collection of perceptions in its stead. However, Hume's concern to give an account of the idea of the unity of a human mind in terms of related perceptions has run into notoriously rough sledding, not the least of which is the fact that Hume himself in his Appendix to "Of Personal Identity" seems to abandon his bundle theory in despair. In this paper I shall first be concerned to examine the criticism of his bundle theory which Hume brings forth in the Appendix and explain why I think the core difficulty remains insoluble for Hume. I shall then go on to suggest that the unworkability of Húmete bundle theory is directly tied to his failure to appreciate certain features of the peculiarly first person nature of his question about the make-up of minds. In thus emphasizing the place of the first person voice in my interpretation I am stealing a leaf, if not a chapter, from Kant. But this is as it should be since one of the aims of this essay is to provide an interpretation of Hume's difficulties with his account of the nature of mind which explains part of the reason why 'self-consciousness' (or 'apperception') looms so very large in the Critique of Pure Reason attack upon Hume's type of bundle theory. 60. 1. Hume's Second Thoughts In a burst of self criticism at the Appendix to the section on personal identity, Hume brings forth this objection to his own efforts:...Having thus loosen' d all our particular perceptions, when I proceed to explain the principle of connexion, which binds them together, and makes us attribute to them a real simplicity and identity; I am sensible, that my account is very defective, and that nothing but the seeming evidence of the precedent reasonings cou'd have indue' d me to receive it (635). After additional reflections Hume encapsulates his objection thus:...All my hopes vanish, when I come to explain the principles, that unite our successive perceptions in our thought or consciousness (6SS-6). What is the defect Hume calls to our attention? Notice first that the footnote on page 635 explicitly refers us back to that part of his account Hume considers defective; and when we look back to the text of the Treatise in question, page 260, we find it is precisely there that Hume uses the analogy of a republic to sketch his bundle theory of the unity of mind in terms of the two associative principles, resemblance and causation. So it must somehow be that this account in terms of the associative principles is mistaken. But what then is the mistake? According to Hume it is that he cannot 'explain' the principles which unite the discrete percepts. Now it seems to me there are only two possible things Hume could mean in saying this. He could mean either (1) that the principles which connect the percepts of one mind are instances of the associative principles, but he cannot explain them; or (2) there must be other, non-associative, principles which connect the percepts of a single mind and these he cannot explain. 61. I think we can safely conclude (1) cannot represent Hume's misgivings when he says he is unable to explain the uniting principles of the mental bundles. There is first the fact that he does not call into question his general programme of accounting for the nature of the unity of complex things by the principles of causation, resemblance and contiguity — for example, ships, plants, animals, houses and rivers (e.g. 257f) — but only his... (shrink)

In verse twelve of the Tao Te Ching, Lao Tzu makes a curious claim about the five flavors; namely that they cause people not to taste or that they jade the palate. The five flavors are: sweet, sour, salt, bitter and spicy or hot as in 'heat'. To the Western mind, the claim, 'The five flavors cause them [persons] to not taste,' is counterintuitive; on the contrary, the presence of the five flavors in a dish or in a meal would (...) expand or enhance the senses and the palate, i.e., taste would be augmented by the five flavors. So what is the plausible meaning of the Taoistic claim? To answer this question, I look very briefly at the history of the doctrine of the five flavors and the history of Chinese cuisine. Lao Tzu probably has Confucian feasts in mind in making such a claim, but other interpretations are discussed. (shrink)

In this study, I surveyed students' evaluative perceptions of instructor behavior and their possible influence on academic dishonesty. Slightly over 20% of 1,369 student respondents admitted to academic dishonesty in at least 1 class during 1 term at college. Students who admitted to acts of academic dishonesty had lower overall evaluations of instructor behavior than students who reported not committing academic dishonesty. Implications for student learning and the enhancement of academic integrity in the classroom are discussed.

Commentary with 11 supercommentaries, on Brahmasūtra of Bādarāyaṇa, work on Vedanta philosophy.

Frank Jackson has abandoned his famous knowledge argument, and has explained why in a brief "Postscript on Qualia" . This explanation consists of a direct argument, and an attempt to explain away the intuition that lies at the heart of the knowledge argument. The direct argument is clarified and found to be subtly question-begging. The attempt to explain away the key intuition is reviewed and found to be inadequate. False memory traces, which Jackson mentions at the beginning of the direct (...) argument, are discussed and found not to materially affect the force of the knowledge argument. (shrink)

The article proposes that the hypothetical framework of Kierkegaard's "Philosophical Fragments" is determined by the question 'How is it possible for one to become a disciple?' An account of this framework is provided by employing an original interpretation of the concept 'the Moment'. This enables an understanding of 'the condition' by means of a contrast between 'Universalist' and 'Particularist' perspectives. Moreover, it is only when the insights offered by both perspectives are combined that the answer to the determining question of (...) the Fragments becomes apparent. (shrink)

This book examines Augustine's description of the actually existing world, especially that aspect most important for the human pursuit of happiness: the human being and God. It begins with an overview of the characteristics of the human individual and the context in which they must live out their lives, a context dominated by two seemingly contradictory realities: the existence of God and the existence of evil.

In "mind-Body identity, Privacy and categories" richard rorty set forth a new form of the identity theory of the mind, (called the 'disappearance' version) in which he suggested that instead of identifying sensations with neural events, Sensations might be eliminated. Using an illustration of rorty's I show that 'pain' cannot come to refer to a brain process for neural events are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. For 'pain' to refer to something unpleasant, We would have to give 'brain process' the connotation (...) of unpleasantness. But to do this would be to identify the brain process with the sensation of pain--I.E., To return to the older identity theory. (shrink)

An introductory work on the various school of Indian philosophy.

In this lecture Justice Breyer examines three classical criticisms of constitutional judicial review. Those criticisms say that a grant to unelected judges of the power to set aside legislation as contrary to a written constitution leads to judicial decision-making that is (a) undemocratic, (b) subjective, and impractical. Justice Breyer describes features of the constitutional decision-making that do not dictate results in individual cases, but none the less hold the judges' 'subjective' will in check. He also describes necessary judicial efforts to (...) focus upon considerations of administrative practicality. The description seeks, not to refute the criticisms in their entirety, but to help evaluate the extent to which those criticisms militate against the adoption of a system of constitutional judicial review. (shrink)