Although most natural law ethical theories recognize moral absolutes, there is not much agreement even among natural law theorists about how to identify them. The author argues that in order to understand and determine the morality (or immorality) of a human action, it must be considered in relation to the organized system of human practices within which it is performed. Such an approach, he argues, is to be found in the natural law theory of Thomas Aquinas, especially once it is (...) recognized that the logical structure of Aquinas's ethical theory is basically that of an Aristotelian science. In order to depict this structure and to explain how it bears upon the analysis of action, the author investigates a number of issues that have attracted the attention of Thomistic and Aristotelian scholarship. He examines the nature of practical reason, its relationship with theoretical reason, the derivation of lower from higher ethical principles, the incommensurability of human goods, the relationship between will and intellect, and the principle of double effect. The book will be useful to students and scholars interested in ethics, especially from an Aristotelian and/or Thomistic perspective. One appendix reproduces the Leonine text of the De malo (question 6), with facing English translation. Another appendix provides facing Latin text and English translation of the Summa Theologiae I-II (question 94, article 2). ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., author of many works on the history of logic--particularly Aristotelian logic--is dean of the faculty of philosophy and professor of the history of ancient philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome. PRAISE FOR THE BOOK: ""I know of no more careful and detailed study of Thomas's principle that the realms of theoretical and practical rationality are parallel. This principle is indeed central to an understanding of Thomas Aquinas's ethical thought, and Father Flannery examines its ramifications most perspicaciously. His book constitutes a valuable and important addition to the Thomistic literature. Father Flannery's writing is lucid, if not always extremely engaging, and his arguments are well supported by references to, and quotations from, the Aristotelian and Thomistic texts upon which they are based.""--The Medieval Review ""It would be hard to overstate the importance of this book at the present juncture of Thomistic studies.""--Ralph McInerny, University of Notre Dame ""... of interest and of great value mostly to specialists in Aquinas's ethics or moral theory more generally. Flannery presents complex matters clearly, and his explanations of the logical presuppositions of Aquinas's moral thought are always illuminating.""--Jean Porter, Theological Studies ""This is a significant work that belongs on the bookshelf of any serious student of Aquinas.... An important contribution to Thomistic studies.""--Irish Theological Quarterly ""This scholastic text will particularly appeal to thinkers interested in Aristotelian mathematics and logic and their practical integration into Thomistic natural law ethics. However, all natural law scholars must address the questions of context and method raised by Flannery's insights and his careful, precise textual analyses."" -- Beverly Whelton, Review of Metaphysics. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Contradiction and Legislation Regarding the Right to LifeKevin L. Flannery, S.J.Unborn Human Life and Fundamental Rights: Leading Constitutional Cases under Scrutiny. Edited by Pilar Zambrano and William Saunders, with concluding reflections by John Finnis. Berlin: Peter Lang, 2019.The most fundamental principle of law is the principle of non-contradiction. This is Thomas Aquinas's position in the seminal article on the natural law, Summa theologiae I-II, question 94, article 2, (...) where, citing Aristotle, he formulates the principle as, "One should not simultaneously affirm and negate." Lafter in the same article, Thomas offers a practical formulation of the same principle, "Good is to be done and pursued and evil avoided"; but in law, since it is contained in propositions (airmations and negations) as distinct from ideas regarding the pursuit of goods, the prior formulation is the more immediately relevant of the two.The book under review is important in that, by going through the legal history regarding abortion and related issues in a number of different countries—the United States, Canada, Italy, Spain, Poland, Ireland (Eire), Costa Rica, Argentina, Chile, Mexico, and Peru—it causes to emerge any number of times the realization that legislation and judicial decisions in favor of abortion "rights" invariably infect a legal system with contradictions and inconsistencies of various sorts. The present essay is, therefore, not your typical book review. Its objective is simply to list some of the legal contradictions and inconsistencies identified by the book's various authors as they describe the legal status of the unborn in their respective nations. [End Page 1323]William Saunders's very clear and comprehensive first chapter is entitled, "Judicial Interference in the Protection of Human Life in the United States: Actions and Consequences." In it, he describes, among other things, the Human Cloning Prohibition Act passed by the U.S. House of Representatives in 2003, which prohibited "any person or entity, public or private" from performing human cloning (23). He speaks also of a bill proposed in the U.S. Senate once the Human Cloning Prohibition Act had passed in the House of Representatives. This Senate bill (which was entitle, "The Human Cloning Ban and Stem Cell Research Protection Act") would have prohibited "any person or other legal entity" from conducting human cloning, even while allowing nuclear transplantation, which it defines as "transferring the nucleus of a human somatic cell into an oocyte from which the nucleus... ha[s] been... removed or rendered inert." The problem here, as Saunders explains, is that this latter definition "is the very definition of cloning" (25). In other words, in the same year, two pieces of legislation were considered in the Congress of the United States, both purporting to ban human cloning, one of which would have permitted what the other described (correctly) as human cloning and so prohibited.In the second chapter, "Whither United States Abortion Law?" by Gerard V. Bradley, discussed, among other things, is the inconsistency between the United States Supreme Court's pro-abortion decision Roe v. Wade and various laws, both state and federal, prohibiting feticide. Bradley says of the 2004 federal Unborn Victims of Violence Act that, "in pertinent part it says that 'whoever' 'causes the death of or bodily injury to,' a 'child who is in utero' is guilty of an offense apart from any accompanying offense against the woman carrying the child." The penalty for such an act is the same as would be imposed if the act were inflicted upon the unborn child's mother: if, for instance, the mother was killed. "A child in utero," reports Bradley, "is defined as a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is carried in the womb'" (37).The problem here is that prosecutable under this law are acts identical with those performed legally by abortionists. Bradley mentions two cases in which a woman's male partner—in one case the woman's husband—effected by stealth the abortion of her child. In one case, the male purchased abortion pills and affixed to their container a pharmacy label indicating that it contained a common antibiotic; in the other, the husband obtained the same type of... (shrink)

Written for non-specialists, this concise and accessible work by moral philosopher Kevin L. Flannery engages in a careful reflection of the moral issues of greatest importance in the lives of Christians today. After introductory chapters on the relationship between ethics and church teaching, and on the relevance of action theory--the study of the nature and structure of human actions--Flannery applies Aristotle's and Thomas Aquinas's theory of human action to the following topics: sexual morality, reproduction, killing and keeping (...) alive, cooperation in the evil acts of others, and conscience. The book treats a number of controversial issues, not so much because they are controversial, but because they usefully explain the philosophical principles underlying church teaching. Flannery considers, for example, whether it is moral for a spouse who has contracted a disease such as HIV or AIDS to make use of a prophylactic during sexual intercourse. Flannery also addresses whether it is moral for a politician to vote in favor of legislation that permits same-sex marriage, or for a family or doctor to withdraw nutrition and hydration from a patient in a vegetative state. A major theme discussed throughout the book is intention and its effect on the moral character of human acts. ABOUT THE AUTHOR: Kevin L. Flannery, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Pontifical Gregorian University in Rome, is author of many works on ethics and on the history of logic, including Acts Amid Precepts: The Aristotelian Logical Structure of Thomas Aquinas's Moral Theory (CUA Press). (shrink)

Since its publication in the year 2000, M. Cathleen Kaveny’s article “Appropriation of Evil: Cooperation’s Mirror Image” has had a notable influence upon several scholars who appear to agree with its central argument— namely, that the theory of cooperation with evil needs to be supplemented by a concept that Kaveny calls “appropriation.” The main point of the present article is that Kaveny misrepresents the traditional theory regarding cooperation with evil and that appropriation, as she understands it, is therefore not the (...) mirror image of cooperation, although it is granted that Kaveny mentions cases that the traditional theory of cooperation with evil is unsuited to deal with—and that they need to be dealt with. (shrink)

Dans la théologie et la philosophie morales contemporaines, dans le monde anglophone, Germain Grisez apparaît comme une grande figure de ces dernières années. L'article présente une rapide rétrospective et de son œuvre. L'A. aborde les divers thèmes philosophiques, théologiques et moraux sur lesquels Grisez a bâti sa réputation . L'A. s'étend plus longuement sur le second tome d'une tétralogie inachevée : Living a Christian Life.

This chapter contains sections titled: Presocratics Plato Aristotle Hellenistic and Later Philosophy Works cited.

The essay begins with an explanation of St. Alphonsus Liguori’s understanding of the distinction between formal and material cooperation, identifying also some problems inherent in that understanding. The essay goes on to expound related ideas in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, ideas that are applicable to cases not easily analyzable by means of the distinction between formal and material cooperation. The essay then applies these ideas to two contemporary issues: the use of vaccines connected in some way with abortions (...) and the objection by the Little Sisters of the Poor to the contraceptive mandate issued by the US Department of Health and Human Services. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE ARISTOTELIAN FIRST PRINCIPLE OF PRACTICAL REASON KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. Pontijicia Universitas Gregoriana Rome, Italy INTRODUCTION* I N THE Summa Theologiae I-II, q. 94, a. 2,1 Thomas Aquinas identifies what is often spoken of as "the first principle of practical reason"-that is, "that good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." Thomas explains: All other precepts of the natural law are (...) based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) *I am grateful to Peter Ryan, S.J. and Stephen Brock for commenting on a draft of this paper. 1I shall use a number of abbreviations: ST= Summa Theologiae; An.Post. =Posterior analytics; An.Pr. =Prior analytics; DA =De anima; EE =Eudemian ethics; EN = Nicomachean Ethics; GA =De generatione animalium; lnsomn. =De insomniis; Int. = De interpretatione; Metaph. =Metaphysics; MM= Magna moralia; Phys. =Physics; R. =Republic; Rhet. =Rhetorica; SE =Sophistici elenchi; FPPR =the first principle of practical reason; PNC =the principle of non-contradiction. I also use a number of transliterated Greek terms such as akolasia (depravity), akolastos (depraved person), akrasia (weakness of will), akrates (person subject to weakness of will), egkrateia (continence in spite of temptation), egkrates (person who remains continent in spite of temptation ), and phronesis (practical wisdom). I use them for brevity's sake and since they have also found their way into the standard philosophical vocabulary, at least in Aristotelian studies. I also speak in this essay as if Aristotle was the author of MM. For an argument in favor of a qualified understanding of this thesis, see note 14. For the Greek text of the works of Aristotle I have for the most part used the Oxford Classical Texts. The one major exception is Susemihl's edition of the MM: Franz Susemihl, ed., Aristotelis: Magna moralia (Leipzig: Tuubner, 1883). For most (but not all) of the translations from Aristotle, I have made use of Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: the Revised Oxford Translation, 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). For English translations of Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae, I have used the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920). 441 442 KEVIN L. FLANNERY, S.J. belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided. Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good and consequently as objects of pursuit, and their contraries as evil, and objects of avoidance. Wherefore according to the order of natural inclinations, is the order of the precepts of the natural law.' As its name suggests, the first principle of practical reason (FPPR) is no incidental tenet. Thomas compares it in this same article to the first principle of theoretical reason, better known as the principle of non-contradiction (PNC): "that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time."3 On the other hand, it is also commonly acknowledged that Thomas's (philosophical) ethical theory is Aristotelian. How is it then that we never hear of an Aristotelian first principle of practical reason, either in the secondary literature or (as it seems) in Aristotle himself? I shall argue in this essay that there is such a principle in Aristotle's ethical theory and that it has the logical status that Thomas attributes to it. It is none other than the well-known paradoxical Socratic principle that no one deliberately does wrong4-understood in a certain way. (I shall refer to this principle as "the Socratic Principle.") I shall also argue that Aristotle has a fairly elaborate theory about how, psychologically, a person accommodates himself to a violatiqn of the first principle of practical reason. I shall leave one issue unaddressed: whether (as in the question from ST above) Aristotle's FPPR includes "all other precepts of the natural law." It will be apparent, however, 2 The best exegesis of this article of ST is Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A... (shrink)

This article considers M. Therese Lysaught’s analysis of an apparent abortion that occurred in Phoenix, Arizona, in 2009. Since Lysaught invokes it, the article considers Rev. Martin Rhonheimer’s theory about the bearing of vital conflict situations on the object of the act performed. A vital conflict situation is present when, for instance, the life of a mother might be spared if her fetus is aborted, otherwise she and the fetus will die. The article argues that the use of such situations (...) in this way by Lysaught and Rhonheimer (and possibly others) is incompatible with Church teaching. The article concludes by suggesting that certain cases might be analyzed in such a way that the mother’s life is saved and the fetus dies but there is no direct abortion. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 11.4 (Winter 2011): 691–704. (shrink)

An examination of traditional sources for the Roman Catholic under-standing of marriage reveals that the ends of marriage might be ordered differently, given different contexts. This permits one working within that tradition to see marriage as a political and cultural entity existing independently of the individuals who participate in it. Marriage is also the standard with respect to which sexual activity is judged to be proper or not, a standard that applies to all human beings by virtue of their rational (...) nature. Understanding this allows one to understand how some people, including some of the mentally handicapped, might legitimately be prevented from marrying and even from engaging in genital sexual activity. It also allows one to solve some theoretical difficulties regarding contraception and homosexuality and connected with the fact that sterile couples cannot procreate and yet are permitted to marry. (shrink)

The author offers, first, an account of St. Thomas Aquinas’s Aristotelian-inspired understanding of the object of a moral act and of what morally that species contributes to the act of which it is a part. Then, with special (but not sole) attention to two passages in Aquinas cited frequently by the proponents of the new natural law theory—that is, Summa theologiae 2-2.64.7 and the commentary on Peter Lombard’s Sentences 2.40.1.2—the author argues that a close analysis of Aquinas’s remarks on objects (...) and intentions does not support the claim that the new natural law theory is Thomistic. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13.1 (Spring 2013): 79–104. (shrink)

Rev. Kevin Flannery, SJ, has helpfully drawn attention to some key sources for magisterial teaching on “vital conflicts,” where interventions to save a mother’s life would involve or lead to the death of her unborn child. However, former responsa by the Holy Office on this topic from 1884 to 1902 need to be interpreted carefully and understood in relation to the context of the time. Recent teaching has indeed clarified that the condemnation of direct abortion is de fide. (...) Nevertheless, in the last forty years, the magisterium has, de facto, tolerated debate among faithful Catholic scholars over the ethics of craniotomy. Appeal to former magisterial teaching is not sufficient to settle this contemporary debate over what constitutes direct abortion. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14.1 : 81–104. (shrink)

Long, Kevin Review of: Report of Rosendo Salvado to propaganda fide in 1883, translated and edited by Stefano Girola, introduction by John Molony, Northcote, VIC: Abbey Press, 2015, pp. 307, $34.95.