By definition, pain is a sensory and emotional experience that is felt in a particular part of the body. The precise relationship between somatic events at the site where pain is experienced, and central processing giving rise to the mental experience of pain remains the subject of debate, but there is little disagreement in scholarly circles that both aspects of pain are critical to its experience. Recent experimental work, however, suggests a public view that is at odds with this conceptualisation. (...) By demonstrating that the public does not necessarily endorse central tenets of the “mental” view of pain (subjectivity, privacy, and incorrigibility), experimental philosophers have argued that the public holds a more “body-centric” view than most clinicians and scholars. Such a discrepancy would have important implications for how the public interacts with pain science and clinical care. In response, we tested the hypothesis that the public is capable of a more “mind-centric” view of pain. Using a series of vignettes, we demonstrate that in situations which highlight mental aspects of pain the public can, and does, recognize pain as a mental phenomenon. We also demonstrate that the public view is subject to context effects, by showing that the public’s view is modified when situations emphasizing mental and somatic aspects of pain are presented together. (shrink)

This article articulates our everyday notion of cooperation. First, I topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory by arguing that shared intentions to J are neither necessary nor sufficient for J to be cooperative. I refute the necessity claim by providing examples of shared intention-free cooperation (in institutional contexts and beyond). I refute the sufficiency claim by observing that coercion and exploitation need not preclude shared intentions but do preclude cooperation. These arguments, in turn, lead to my positive proposal. People (...) cooperate, I argue, just in case their activities are coordinated in ways that do not undermine any participant’s agency. (shrink)

History is familiar with great scientific traditions which have been substantial, effective, cumulative and progressive.* At the level of great eras of civilization, extensive and not episodic phenomena, very ancient Chinese science, Greek science and Arab science are objects of investigation for historical erudition, but also for the scientific historian and the philosopher of sciences. Many of the elements of these systems were the source of “modern science”, as it is called, or are integral parts ol’ this system of knowledge (...) and practice which has been constructed over a little more than three centuries. Diachronically, the “scientific revolution” of the classical age in Europe does not signify a total break with what preceded it: Chinese astronomy, Arab algebra and the hospital organization of the Islamic world were used, even if the ideology of scientists when they wrote their own history, particularly from the 19th century onward, tends to make of modern science a purely European phenomenon. (shrink)

Climate change calls for resource saving, sustainable ways to generate energy as well as moderation in growth and industrialization. Religion can help to develop a general change in our worldview and a realignment of our aims and lifestyles. If we are seeking a new outlook on life, religion should be a part of it, as religion and culture shape and form our outlook in significant ways. Gordon Kaufman is one of those theologians who have early on openly acknowledged the scope (...) and responsibility of religion concerning environmental exploitation and destruction.1 Due to his dissatisfaction with traditional anthropomorphic talk about God and the world, Kaufman was always looking for new ways of shaping... (shrink)

The paper undertakes a comparison of the philosophies of Stanley Cavell and Emmanuel L_vinas, focusing on their interpretation of skepticism and the crucial role of the problem of the other or other minds in the works of both. The comparison proceeds in three major steps: first, differences in their respective interpretations of Descartes’ stance on the problem of other minds are discussed. In the second section, Cavell’s examination of the intelligibility of someone else’s pain and L_vinas’ questioning of the sense (...) of suffering are juxtaposed. Finally, the author analyzes their respective treatment of skepticism. This results in the opening of an ethical dimension which grounds the dominating theoretical relationship towards the world and the other human being in epistemology and ontology. The periodical return and irrefutability of skepticism can thus be regarded not only as evidence of the inevitable limitation of knowledge, but as a consequence of the necessarily social or intersubjective structure of subjectivity itself. (shrink)

The essay reexamines the famous scene from Proust’s ›In Search of Lost Time‹ about the death of the writer Bergotte. In pointing out that the notorious ›patch of yellow wall‹ Bergotte claims to have discovered in Vermeer’s ›View of Delft‹ does not exist in the real painting, the article’s aim is to show that the scene is not to be read as an autobiographical recollection, but rather as a reflection on ›mimesis‹, i.e. on the transcendental conditions of perception and representation. (...) As such, it can be considered to have in large measure inspired the reorientation of Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s later phenomenological oeuvre towards a new ontology. On the basis of Merleau-Ponty’s recently published lecture notes, the essay locates the common concern of the writer and the philosopher in the idea of remembrance not as a derivative phenomenon, but as an originary mode of givenness. (shrink)

What is involved in acting together with others? Most shared agency theorists endorse the Shared Intention Thesis, i.e., the claim that shared agency necessarily involves shared intentions. This article dissents from this orthodoxy and offers a minimalist account of shared agency—one where parties to shared activities need not form rich webs of interrelated psychological states. My account has two main components: a conceptual analysis of shared agency in terms of the notion of plan, and an explanation of undertheorized agency‐sharing mechanisms. (...) My analysis states that we act together just in case our activities conform to a plan and that plan figures in an explanation of our activities’ joint conformity to it. To sloganize: shared activity is plan‐coordinated activity. Sometimes, plan‐coordination goes by way of shared intentions. However, besides shared intentions, there are at least two additional families of agency‐sharing mechanisms. The first features a central planner who determines the content of a plan and attributes the different parts of that plan to a collection of agents. The second does away with the planner and involves a roughly Darwinian selection of patterns of activity. Both families of mechanisms enable us to act together even in the absence of shared intentions. (shrink)

Introduction -- Matter, form of cognition, form of sensibility, form of understanding, time and space -- Sensibility, imagination, understanding, pure a priori concepts of the understanding or categories, schemata, answering the question Quid Juris, answering the question Quid Facti, doubts about the latter -- Ideas of the understanding, ideas of reason, etc. -- Subject and predicate. the determinable and the determination -- Thing, possible, necessary, ground, consequence, etc. -- Identity, difference, opposition, reality, logical, and transcendental negation -- Magnitude, alteration, change, (...) etc. -- Truth, subjective, objective, logical, metaphysical -- On the I, materialism, idealism, dualism, etc. -- Short overview of the whole work -- My ontology -- On symbolic cognition and philosophical language. (shrink)

In the present article, we consider the question of the primary elements in Plato’s Timaeus, the components of the whole universe reduced, by an extraordinarily elegant construction, to two right triangles. But how does he reconcile such a model with the infinite diversity of the universe? A large part of this study is devoted to Cornford’s explanation in his commentary of the Timaeus and its shortcomings, in order to finally propose a revised one, which we think to be entirely consistent (...) with Plato’s text. This analysis is an essential step for the understanding of the connection between the sensible world and the mathematical principles that underlies Timaeus’ cosmological account. (shrink)

"Brilliant and bedraggled, the picaresque Jewish philosopher Solomon Maimon was one of the great thinkers of the eighteenth century.

Se presenta la obra de Vicente Raga Rosaleny sobre el escepticismo de Montaigne. Con el fin de resaltar la importancia de esta investigación, para el público hispanohablante, se hace una breve relación de los apartados acerca de Montaigne en algunas historias de la filosofía al uso, los cuales se caracterizan por su exigüidad y la reiteración de lugares comunes, sin ningún espíritu crítico; y, también, se muestra la suerte de los Ensayos en español, los cuales han estado signados por la (...) censura. Es en este escenario: de ausencias, lugares comunes y de tenue recepción y censura, que se debe valorar y acoger con la mayor fruición esta publicación. (shrink)

The Chhoti Sadri inscription of the Mānavāyaṇi king Gauri of Malwa is a most unusual specimen of a Sanskrit verse praśasti. Its remarkably poor Sanskrit has attracted the most attention, but its rhetorical structure is also quite abnormal. It is proposed here that such unusual features as the first person presentation and the fronting of subjects with demonstrative pronouns suggest a setting involving an actual, or perhaps only an imagined, presentation of a royal portrait gallery, such as are attested both (...) in Sanskrit literature and in Indian archaeology. (shrink)

Redakcja naukowa i opracowanie – Kinga Kaśkiewicz Przekład – Kinga Kaśkiewicz i Mirosław Żelazny Salomon Maimon przynależał do trzech kultur: niemieckiej, żydowskiej i polskiej. Pisał po niemiecku i hebrajsku. Będąc intelektualistą swych czasów, postrzegał samego siebie jako Europejczyka należącego do kręgu kultury berlińskiej. Nigdy jednak nie zatracił swej przynależności żydowskiej, o czym najdobitniej świadczy nie tylko tematyka, którą się interesował, ale też pseudonim, jaki przybrał. Nigdy też nie zatracił poczucia przynależności do Polski. Swoje dzieło Versuch über die Transcendentalphilosophie. Mit (...) einem Anhang über die Symbolische Erkenntnis und Anmerkungen podpisał jako Salomon Maimon z Litwy w Polsce i zadedykował je polskiemu królowi. […] Maimon to myśliciel często przywoływany, ale rzadko studiowany. Wielka szkoda, bo znamy kilka przykładów zainteresowania naszych filozofów wczesnym idealizmem niemieckim, a nawet prób twórczego rozwoju tego idealizmu, by przypomnieć Szaniawskiego, Gołuchowskiego, Brzozowskiego, czy w nowszych czasach Siemka i pozostawioną przez niego szkołę. Niestety, choć zakrawa to na paradoks, niniejszy zbiór rozpraw o estetyce, jeśli nie liczyć przywołanej Autobiografii, jest pierwszą publikacją tłumaczeń dzieł filozoficznych Maimona na język polski. Z tym większą przyjemnością przekazujemy go w ręce czytelników. Z Wprowadzenia. (shrink)

Extraits de la Source de vie de Salomon ibn-Gebirol.--Ibn-Gebirol, ses écrits et sa philosophie.--Des principaux philosophes arabes et de leurs doctrines.--Esquisse historique de la philosophie chez les Juìfs.--Appendice.--Texte hébreu des extraits de la Source de vie (2 p.l., 36 numb. l. at end).

In this timely book, Rosemary Salomone offers a reasoned educational and legal argument supporting single-sex education as an alternative to coeducation, particularly in the case of disadvantaged minority students. “A carefully organized, often lively... compendium of everything that matters in the debate: how boys and girls do in classes and on tests, their differing learning styles, and the legal tussles.”—Timothy A. Hacsi, _New York Times_ “Smart, objective, evenhanded. Must reading in this important debate.”—Susan Estrich, University of Southern California Law School (...) “Everyone concerned about inequalities in our schools and our society should want to read it.”—Michael Duffy, _Times Educational Supplement _ “If you have time for only one book and you really want to be informed about single-sex education, then make it _Same, Different, Equal._”—John Borst, _Education Today_ “The single best book I have read about single-sex education. A must-read for every educator who is concerned about the different outcomes for boys and girls in school.”—Michael Thompson, Ph.D, coauthor of _Raising Cain: Protecting the Emotional Life of Boys_. (shrink)

Do participants in shared activity have mutual obligations to do their bit? This article shows this question has no one-size-fits-all answer and offers a pluralist account of the normativity of shared agency. The first part argues obligations to do one's bit have three degrees of involvement in shared activity. Such obligations might, obviously, bolster co-participants’ resolve to act as planned (degree 1). Less obviously, there also are higher and lower degrees of involvement. Obligations to do one's bit might provide our (...) agency-pooling mechanism. When they do, we act together by virtue of satisfying them (degree 2). Conversely, some shared activities involve no obligation (degree 0). In the second part, I argue shared agency theory is best served by a non-moralistic conception of obligation, one on which co-participants’ obligations need be neither strict-performance obligations, nor directed ones. Overall, my arguments suggest that we can choose how to coordinate normatively our shared activities. (shrink)

Directed duties are those duties whose violation would wrong someone in particular. Under what conditions, and in virtue of what, is a duty directed to someone? This is the Question of Direction. In this article, I explore the possibility of providing a Contractualist answer to the Question of Direction—one where the directedness of a directed duty is explained by the way in which that duty is derived in Contractualist moral reasoning. After presenting and rejecting three attempts at such an answer, (...) I arrive at a satisfactory one: An agent has a duty to an individual to perform some action just in case and because, were the agent not to perform that action, the agent would make the individual occupy the standpoint relative to which any principle that permits the agent not to perform that action is unacceptable. (shrink)