Edgington has proposed a degree-theoretic account of vagueness that yields a highly elegant solution to the sorites paradox. This paper applies her account to the paradox of Theseus’ ship, which is generally classified among the paradoxes of material constitution and not as a sorites paradox.

This article will critically examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of substance (_dravya_). The Buddhists are reductionists, who believe that there is no substance over and above its attributes (_guṇa_) or parts (_avayava_). Thus, a pot is a set of a certain shape, size, color, texture, etc. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher thinks that a pot is a substance that houses all of its attributes and actions (_karman_). It holds all these together. Also, it binds its parts. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school defines a (...) substance, it does not seem to offer any theory of the diachronic identity of a substance; it does not discuss a Theseus’-ship-like case. In this article we shall offer a theory of diachronic identity of a substance based on a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of substance. (shrink)

I do four things in responding to Patrick Toner’s incisive critique of my Aquinas and the Ship of Theseus (AST). First, I further motivate Aquinas’s position that Socrates exists in the post-mortem and ante-resurrection state by noting that Socrates’ situation is at least analogous to other states of affairs that would certainly count as atypical (although not impossible). Secondly, I offer a revised Thomistic account of artefact identity through time in light of Toner’s objections to Aquinas’srestrictive view. Unlike (...) the restrictive view, this revised account is compatible with common-sense intuitions. Thirdly, I show how my defense of Aquinas’s substance metaphysic in AST is useful for the purpose of constructing defeators for certain kinds of arguments for reductionism. Fourthly, I defend Aquinas’s views on the unity of substance against Toner’s suggestion that they are implausible on the grounds that they are in conflict with certain so-called “scientifically informed”common-sense beliefs. (shrink)

Does the Ship of Theseus present a genuine puzzle about persistence due to conflicting intuitions based on “continuity of form” and “continuity of matter” pulling in opposite directions? Philosophers are divided. Some claim that it presents a genuine puzzle but disagree over whether there is a solution. Others claim that there is no puzzle at all since the case has an obvious solution. To assess these proposals, we conducted a cross-cultural study involving nearly 3,000 people across twenty-two countries, (...) speaking eighteen different languages. Our results speak against the proposal that there is no puzzle at all and against the proposal that there is a puzzle but one that has no solution. Our results suggest that there are two criteria—“continuity of form” and “continuity of matter”— that constitute our concept of persistence and these two criteria receive different weightings in settling matters concerning persistence. (shrink)

The story of the Ship of Theseus is one of the most venerable conundrums in philosophy. Some philosophers consider it a genuine puzzle. Others deny that it is so. It is, therefore, an open question whether there is or there is not a puzzle in the Ship of Theseus story. So, arguably, it makes sense to test empirically whether people perceive the case as a puzzle. Recently, David Rose, Edouard Machery, Stephen Stich and forty-two other researchers (...) from different countries have undertaken that task. We argue that their tests do not provide any evidence that bears on the question as to whether the Ship of Theseus case is a genuine puzzle. In our discussion we address also what should be taken into account if one wishes to test the puzzling, or not puzzling, status of the Ship of Theseus story. (shrink)

This paper outlines a novel solution to the Ship of Theseus puzzle. The solution relies on situations, a philosophical tool used in natural language semantics among other places. The core idea is that what is true is always relative to the situation under consideration. I begin by outlining the problem before briefly introducing situations. I then present the solution: in smaller situations the candidate is identical to Theseus’s ship. But in larger situations containing both candidates these (...) identities are neither true nor false. Finally, I discuss some worries for the view that arise from the nature of identity, and suggest responses. It is concluded that the solution, and the theory that underpins it, are worth further investigation. (shrink)

The American rock band KISS is notorious. Its notoriety derives not only from the band’s otherworldly costumes (except for of course during the unmasked period), the fact that they were inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame, their numerous hit records or the amazing stage theatrics and pyrotechnics of their live shows. It’s also related to the band’s constantly changing makeup (and I don’t mean the kind on their faces!). Of the four members, only Paul Stanley and Gene (...) Simmons were fixtures. With so many changes to the band’s composition, has KISS always remained the same band? Some see this head-scratcher as roughly similar to a conundrum in philosophical metaphysics (that’s the area of philosophy addressing problems of existence): the puzzle of Theseus’s ship. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:American Journal of Philology 1.1 (2000) 149-153 [Access article in PDF] Sophie Mills. Theseus, Tragedy and the Athenian Empire. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997. x 1 293 pp. Cloth, $98. Interest in Theseus continues to run high; this decade alone has seen the publication of three books devoted to the hero and his meaning for Athens: Claude Calame's Thésée et l'imaginaire athénien (Lausanne 1990), Henry Walker's Theseus (...) and Athens (New York 1995), and now Sophie Mills's revision of her 1992 Oxford dissertation. Calame's brilliant study is in a different category from those of Mills and Walker, since his central focus is the relation of myth and cult, for which Theseus provides a rich and complex example. Walker and Mills are much closer in aim and scope, but their intellectual styles are different, as are many of their conclusions. Walker probes the sources for signs of internal tensions and contradictions, and finds them. Mills looks for ideologically consistent elements, and finds them. Both approaches have value. Mills footnotes particular items of convergence or disagreement with Walker but does not attempt a full-scale confrontation of views, which is no doubt just as well.Mills's first two chapters canvass a wide range of evidence for the myth of Theseus and its meanings. "Images of Theseus before Tragedy" is devoted to showing how Athenian or Athenian-inspired sources of the Late Archaic period take the often unpromising material found in the oldest strata of the legend and transform it to produce a national hero, that is, a figure who embodies "the best qualities of the nation in its own eyes" and can be recreated as the idealized image of Athens changes, "so as to present consistently an ideal standard of conduct" (25). "The Athenian Image of Athens" surveys the ideal of Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, arguing that a consistent image (essentially that of the surviving epitaphioi logoi) can be found in nearly every relevant source. For Mills, the funeral encomia present in exaggerated form an ideology that "pervades mainstream Athenian thought about Athens and Athenian identity" (52). She argues that Thucydides stands outside the mainstream; his "cynicism and desire to expose the falsehood of popular ideology should... not be used as an indication of what the average Athenian generally felt about the empire" (85).The ideal Athens is portrayed in the "mainstream" tradition, with only changes of emphasis over time, as a civilizing force, whose military strength and cultural superiority go hand in hand. Stories and imagery combine to present Athens as "the only truly Greek city" (59) in its courage and daring, its steadfast pursuit of justice, and its generosity in dealing with others, and thus support the claim that Athenians are not merely superior to barbarians (as are all [End Page 149] Greeks) but different from and better than other Greeks. And if Athens is a super-Greek city, "Theseus, as its representative in tragedy, is a kind of super-Greek" (60). All of this is to some degree a useful corrective to the emphasis on discomfort and equivocation in many recent studies of Athenian ideology. One may not be entirely convinced (I shall express some of my own reservations below), but the case is made intelligently, using a wide array of ancient sources and relevant modern scholarship.The heart of the book is a sequence of three chapters devoted to Mills's analysis of three tragedies (Euripides' Suppliants and Heracles and Sophocles' Oedipus at Colonus) in which Theseus appears in his role of Athenian king and embodiment of the Athenian ideal. Given the views I have just outlined, there is little that surprises in these interpretations and, indeed, little that could be called new, but no one else has made the case that Theseus embodies a coherent image of the ideal Athens with such thoroughness or argued for its significance with such cogency. Discussing Heracles, Mills is careful to recognize that Theseus and Athens can only go so far in alleviating the suffering that seems to be an inevitable part of human... (shrink)

The aim of this article is to literally explore the declinations of the status of the “monstruous thing”, investigating if and when monsters are abnormal phenomena, not of nature but of culture. Which features, of both expression and content, must a non-living artificial subject present in order to be perceived and judged as a “monster”? In the West, the image of the monster is traditionally associated with an abominable creature belonging to the universe of nature whose touchstone is a standard (...) unit of measurement associated with a human or animal body. Here, we are interested in seeing what happens when these value judgments about monsters are applied to non-organic entities. Our case study of the large cruise ships, starting with ocean liners and moving toward the modern behemoths that now enter our historic cities, discloses a new semiosis of monstrosity caused by the war of movement produced by globalization. (shrink)

It is widely acknowledged that the Galilean Relativity Principle, according to which the laws of classical systems are the same in all inertial frames in relative motion, has played an important role in the development of modern physics. It is also commonly believed that this principle holds the key to answering why, for example, we do not notice the orbital velocity of the Earth as we go about our day. And yet, I argue in this paper that the precise content (...) of this principle is ambiguous: standard presentations, in both physics and philosophy, fail to distinguish between two principles that are ultimately inequivalent, the “External Galilean Relativity Principle” (EGRP) and the “Internal Galilean Relativity Principle” (IGRP). I demonstrate that EGRP and IGRP play distinct roles in physics practice (e.g., EGRP is connected to the concept of Galilean invariance, but IGRP is not) and that many classical systems that satisfy IGRP fail to satisfy EGRP. I further show that the Relativity Principle introduced by Einstein in 1905—which is not restricted to classical systems—also leads to two inequivalent principles, an external one analogous to EGRP, and an internal one analogous to IGRP. I conclude by noting that the phenomenon originally captured by Galileo’s famous ship passage is much more general than contemporary discussions in the philosophy of symmetries suggest. (shrink)

Beliefs about the importance of ethical behavior to competent practice have prompted major shifts in psychology ethics over time. Yet few studies examine ethical beliefs and behavior after training, and most comprehensive research is now 30 years old. As such, it is unclear whether shifts in the field have resulted in general improvements in ethical practice: Are we psychologists “ships in the rising sea,” lifted by changes in ethical codes and training over time? Participants completed a survey of ethical beliefs (...) and behaviors. Analyses examined group differences, consistency of frequency and ethicality ratings, and comparisons with past data. More than half of behaviors were rated as less ethical and occurring less frequently than in 1987, with early career psychologists generally reporting less ethically questionable behavior. Recommendations for enhancing ethics education are discussed. (shrink)

It is tempting to see in the life of Archimedes an event that could serve as a foundational moment to the myth of the Archimedean point, where the promised firm point from which to move the earth is itself given a basis and physical context for exposition. As earthbound as Archimedes himself, this foundation is not celestial – not a point in the far reaches of space – but rather terrestrial in nature, located in proximity to the border of land (...) and sea. It is the moment when Archimedes the mathematician launches a half-built ship with the aid of one of his inventions. Further details and further interpretations are open to debate. The ship in question, the Syracusan, seems to have been no ordinary one. The .. (shrink)

In his book review of Graham Priest's The Fifth Corner of Four, Mark Siderits, while criticising Priest's philology, suggests that Priest's work is 'of considerable interest' for two reasons. First, 'when two independent traditions use similar methods to work on similar issues, it is always possible that one may have hit on approaches that the other missed'. Second, 'the decentering that can be induced by looking at another tradition may trigger fresh insights, even if those insights are not ones that (...) were actually developed by the tradition marked 'other''. The main task of this paper is to unpack Siderits' thought. By analysing some of Priest's work, I will suggest a decentering that must have taken place in China when Buddhism was 'exported to China in Buddhist shipping containers'. For anyone familiar with the forms of Buddhist philosophy developed in India, various forms of Chinese Buddhism can often look strange. Some ideas that were debated and defended by Indian Buddhists do not appear anywhere in Chinese Buddhism and some assumptions have been quietly added to Buddhism by Chinese Buddhists. By showing that Priest's work brings out the 'innovation' that Chinese Buddhists gave to Buddhism, I will suggest that it is this decentering that Siderits suggests Priest makes use of. (shrink)

The recent debate about whether gauge symmetries can be empirically significant has focused on the possibility of 'Galileo's ship' types of scenarios, where the symmetries effect relational differences between a subsystem and the environment. However, it has gone largely unremarked that apart from such Galileo's ship scenarios, Greaves and Wallace (2014) proposed that gauge transformations can also be empirically significant in a 'non-relational' manner that is analogous to a Faraday-cage scenario, where the subsystem symmetry is related to a (...) change in a charged boundary state. In this paper, we investigate the question of whether such non-relational scenarios are possible for gauge theories. Remarkably, the answer to this question turns out to be closely related to a foundational puzzle that has driven a host of recent developments at the frontiers of theoretical physics. By drawing on these recent developments, we show that a very natural way of elaborating on Greaves and Wallace's claim of non-relational empirical significance for gauge symmetry is incoherent. However, we also argue that much of what they suggest is correct in spirit: one can indeed construct non-relational models of the kind they sketch, albeit ones where the empirical significance is not witnessed by a gauge symmetry but instead by a superficially similar boundary symmetry. Furthermore, the latter casts doubt on whether one really abandons Galileo's ship in such scenarios. (shrink)

The past few years has seen a resurgence in the public interest in space flight and travel. Spurred mainly by the likes of technology billionaires like Elon Musk and Jeff Bezos, the topic poses both unique scientific as well as ethical challenges. This paper looks at the concept of generation ships, conceptual behemoth ships whose goal is to bring a group of human settlers to distant exoplanets. These ships are designed to host multiple generations of people who will be born, (...) live, and die on these ships long before it reaches its destination. This paper takes reproductive ethics as its lens to look at how genetic enhancement interventions can and should be used not only to ensure that future generations of offspring on the ships, and eventual exoplanet colonies, live a minimally good life but that their births are contingent on them living genuinely good and fulfilling lives. The paper makes the further claim that if such a thesis holds, it also does so for human enhancement on Earth. (shrink)

Expanding upon the model of vessels of exploration as scientific instruments first proposed by Richard Sorrenson, this essay examines the changing nature of the ship as scientific space on expedition vessels during the late nineteenth century. Particular attention is paid to the expedition of H.M.S. Challenger as a turning point in the design of shipboard spaces that established a place for scientists at sea and gave scientific legitimacy to the new science of oceanography. There was a progressive development in (...) research vessel design from “ship as instrument” to “ship as laboratory” and changing spatial practices aboard these vessels were paralleled by changes in shipboard culture. I suggest that the “ship as laboratory” has now in turn been supplanted by a new model, the “ship as invisible technician”, as oceanographic research vessels deploy remote-sensing equipment and gather data that are no longer analyzed on board. (shrink)

This scarce antiquarian book is a facsimile reprint of the original. Due to its age, it may contain imperfections such as marks, notations, marginalia and flawed pages. Because we believe this work is culturally important, we have made it available as part of our commitment for protecting, preserving, and promoting the world's literature in affordable, high quality, modern editions that are true to the original work.

Reber and Collins are each major researchers in psychology and sociology respectively. Both focus on the analysis and investigation of tacit knowledge. Yet neither had read or cited the other’s work. Here we explore how this similarity of interest can coexist in the midst of ignorance. Over many months we explored the differences in our world views, our approaches to the topic and the difficulties of interdisciplinarity. This paper is a summary of that exchange presented as a kind of case-study (...) in doing science. We conclude with a list of the general properties of the dialogue associated with this kind of “incommensurability” and state our distaste for tribalism in academic life. (shrink)

The empirical content of the modern definition of relativity given in the Andersonian approach to spacetime theory has been overestimated. It does not imply the empirical relativity Galileo illustrated in his famous ship thought experiment. I offer a number of arguments—some of which are in essential agreement with a recent analysis of Brown and Sypel [1995]—which make this plausible. Then I go on to present example spacetime theories which are modern relativistic but violate Galileo's relativity. I end by briefly (...) discussing the prospects for improving on modern relativity. (shrink)

In our paper, we explore the question of what is wrong with Neurath’s “plank-by-plank” method, which Quine later also adopted with enthusiasm. Shipbuilding experts will confirm that plank-byplank replacement is only possible in the dock and never on the open sea. This is simply empty talk, flatus vocis, often attributed to philosophers. The main problem with Neurath’s ship metaphor is that it is completely alien to the seafarers’ way of life, or even in stark contradiction to it. If it (...) is the task of philosophy to bring order into the house of concepts, the use of metaphors should also be scrutinized. Any practical test of the plank-by-plank methodology would prove unsuccessful, for as soon as one would remove a plank from the ship, the ship would sink very quickly due to the onslaught of the water. If the philosophers argue for empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should not use such utopian metaphors in which the practical life world is completely ignored. When philosophers argue for an empiricist epistemology, as Neurath and Quine do, they should be more careful in their use of metaphors that exclude empiricism, practice, and the practical world of life. It is rather a vivid example of abstract armchair philosophy to explain how science works. Finally, it remains a problem to elaborate a concept of epistemology by “philosophizing” abstractly about empiricism and empiricist epistemology without referring to concrete life experiences. Neurath’s boat metaphor, praised by Quine, is, unfortunately, an example of epistemology without reference to concrete forms of life, and it is still questionable whether we can achieve anything factually with such non-functional metaphors, let alone make the process of cognition scientifically plausible. The whole thing is reminiscent of the scholastic witty remark about how someone convincingly tries to talk about swimming without jumping into the water. Every sailor knows that a ship could only be serviced and repaired in a dock. Seafaring as a way of life, all the turbulence associated with this form of life, obviously remained unknown to Neurath, who spent most of his life in a continental, mountainous country, so it is fair to say that he used a very unusual metaphor not grounded in the practice of life, which, to make the paradox even greater, is meant to represent a naturalistic-empiricist concept of knowledge. (shrink)

Athenaeus preserves an intriguing description by the otherwise unknown writerMoschion of a giant grain-ship, the Syracusia, built by Hiero II of Syracuse in thelater third century B.C.1 The account is extremely circumstantial. Besides a fulldescription of the ship's layout, Moschion gives such details as the name of thearchitect , the size of the construction-force , the construction time , details of the launching arrangements devised byArchimedes, and even the procedure for judging crimes committed on board.