Author's reply about various questions regarding Islamic teachings for an ordinary Muslim.

Study on the importance of Islamic ethics, custom and practices in view of Islamic teachings.

On the lives and philosophy of the Prophets of Islam and Sufi Muslim saints.

Education; Islamic ethics; Arab countries.

The question of providence and contingency in contemporary Western thought: a critical study from an Islamic perspective.

Islamic civilization; Arab countries; intellectual life; history.

This chapter contains sections titled: Personal Sins Augustinian Original Sin Modern Philosophical Critiques Works cited.

Both Confucian and Islamic traditions stand in fraught and internally contested relationships with democracy and human rights. It can easily appear that the two traditions are in analogous positions with respect to the values associated with modernity, but a central contention of this essay is that Islam and Confucianism are not analogous in this way. Positions taken by advocates of the traditions are often similar, but the reasoning used to justify these positions differs in crucial ways. Whether one approaches (...) these questions from an intra-traditional, cross-traditional, or multi-traditional perspective, the essay shows that there is great value in getting clear on the ways in which one’s textual “canon” may constrain one. In the end, we will see that while there are creative Islamic approaches to taking human rights seriously, the looser constraints under which Confucians operate today may make things easier for Confucian advocates of human rights and democracy. (shrink)

El trabajo expone, analiza, y evalúa los datos de una nueva fuente sobre las visiones jurídicas de los ‛ulamā’ con respecto al estatuto islámico de las comunidades islámicas bajo dominio cristiano en la Península Ibérica desde el siglo XII hasta el siglo XVI. Se trata de una fetua desconocida e inédita del sabio andalusí Ibn Rabī‛ y fetuas desconocidas de los principales cadíes de los cuatro madhabs sunníes en El Cairo hacia 1510 A.D. Muy probablemente, hay que relacionar la primera (...) fetua con los acontecimientos en Murcia tras la sublevación mudejar de 1265 y la reconquista cristiana de la ciudad en 1266. El muftí subraya que los musulmanes que viven bajo dominio cristiano están imperativamente obligados a emigrar a territorio islámico. Los principales cadíes de los cuatro madhabs sunníes en El Cairo al principio del siglo XVI, sin embargo, defienden un modo de ver mucho más pragmático. Probablemente, las preguntas fueron planteadas por mudejares de Valencia, que estaban en El Cairo camino de la peregrinación. Finalmente, los autores plantean que hay que distinguir dos tipos coexistentes de visiones con respecto al estatuto del Islam bajo dominio cristiano en la Península Ibérica desde principios del siglo xii; una visión pragmática, equivalente a un reconocimiento de facto del Islam bajo dominio cristiano, y una visión «de rechazo», que asume la obligación de emigrar de la España cristiana a Dār al-Islām. El impacto variable de estas visiones jurídicas merece un estudio más profundo dentro del ambiente histórico de las complejas y cambiantes relaciones políticas entre Islam y Cristiandad en esa época. (shrink)

Abstract. Our human condition is often defined in terms of human fallibility; we are human specifically because we fail to live up to our own expectations. This paper explores various conceptions of one form of human fallibility: self-control failure. Self-control failure is examined through two conceptualizations, with each conceptualization observed through a corresponding theological and psychological lens: first, as the result of a divided, conflicted humanity, as understood by the Catholic Doctrine of Original Sin and psychological Dual-Process Theories of Cognition; (...) and second, as the result of limited goal perception, as understood by Islamic conceptions of human memory and psychological Construal Level Theory. A concluding discussion considers two broader implications of the preceding analysis: first, that an appropriate understanding of human fallibility can help us to mitigate its effects, and second, that a conversation regarding overlapping concepts across academic disciplines and religious traditions can enrich understanding of said concepts. (shrink)

El nuevo libro de Xavier de Planhol, L'Islam et la mer es el primer intento, por parte de un especialista occidental, de evaluar el papel del mar en el mundo islámico. No es un libro que se dedique a describir acontecimientos sino a establecer paradigmas culturales e intelectuales, llegando a la conclusión de que «el islam es incompatible con el mar». En consecuencia, explora las implicaciones de esta antipatía a lo largo de la historia islámica desde tiempos pre-islámicos (...) hasta el presente. Su tesis, sin embargo, puede ser cuestionada desde diversas perspectivas, y este artículo, a la vez reseña y estado de la cuestión, sugiere aspectos en los que, tanto las fuentes que él cita, como otras no utilizadas en el libro, pueden ser interpretadas para llegar a conclusiones muy diferentes. (shrink)

Understanding of the afterlife significantly determines life of members of individual religions and this article defines how Muslims understand the last realities, which paths lead to Jannat (heaven) and which to Jahannam (hell), and how these afterlife dwellings are presented in Qur’an. Demonstration of Islamic soteriology includes a description of differences between the Sunni and the Shia interpretation of salvation, because the differences between them are often overlooked or remain in the background due to the generally widespread Sunni interpretation of (...) Islam. Finally, the article opens the question of who is, according to the Islamic teaching, the recipient of salvation and shows why it is difficult to give a one-dimensional answer to the question whether only the righteous Muslims will be saved or if the salvation is also intended to be achievable to adherents of other religions or even to non-religious. (shrink)

El número que aquí presentamos no está exento de complicación y polémica. Entendemos que su hábitat natural es una revista del prestigio y carácter polifacético de la que nos acoge, por lo que los participantes nos hemos sumido, tras enviar nuestros trabajos, en un intelectual y silencioso recogimiento a la espera del posible fragor de ideas que pueda desencadenarse mañana. Las razones de esa complicación y esa polémica están claras: las realidades complejas exigen explicaciones y reflexiones no menos complejas, por (...) lo que nos enorgullece configurar un grupo de comentadores a la altura de lo comentado. En cuanto a la polémica, y por mucho que hubiéramos preferido poder hablar de debate intelectual, lo cierto y verdad es que alguna de las fundamentadas meditaciones que aquí se albergan despertarán, sin lugar a dudas, reacciones contrarias que, por otra parte, son tan lógicas como las ideas que las provocan, pues tan natural es el deber intelectual y científico de cuestionar, como el vértigo de quien percibe repentinas sacudidas en su zona de confort. (shrink)

Bu çalışma İbn Sînâ (ö. 428/1037) felsefesinde mantıkî tümelin tümel olmak bakımından değerine ve Gazzâlî’nin (ö. 505/1111) mantıkî tümel bağlamında İbn Sînâ’ya yönelttiği eleştirilere odaklanmaktadır. Bu iki düşünürün tümel ve tümel türlerini nasıl açıkladıklarına değinip, onların düşünce sisteminde tümelin tekabül ettiği manayı ortaya koyarak Gazzâlî’nin İbn Sînâ’ya yönelttiği eleştirilerinin felsefi analizi yapılmaktadır. Buna göre İbn Sînâ tümelin üç türünden bahsetmektedir. Bu tümeller tabiî, aklî ve mantıkî olarak üç türe ayrılır. Bu tümeller arasındaki ilişkiyse zâtî bir ilişkiye dayanır. Bu türden ilişkiyi (...) belirleyen ve ilke veren ise tümellerin dışında olmak zorundadır. Ona göre tümellerin anlamını ve tümel türleri arasındaki zâtî ilişkiyi varlık kavramı belirlemektedir. Bu bakımdan aklî tümel tabiî tümelin makulü; aklî tümel mantıkî tümelin lazımı olabilir. Öyleyse İbn Sînâ’da tümel kavramı varlığa ilişkindir. Gazzâlî’de ise tümelin üç türünden bahsedebiliriz. O tümelin türlerini isimlendirmez ama onları betimleyerek birbirinden ayırır. Onun ayrımında ise ortaklık kavramı bilfiil ve bilkuvve olmak bakımından ele alınır ve bu kavramsal ayrımlardan hareketle varlık taksim edilir. Bu bakımdan İbn Sînâ’nın tümellere yüklediği anlam ile Gazzâlî’nin tümellere yüklediği anlam arasında arızî bir ayrımdan söz edemeyiz. Bunun tam aksine iki düşünürünün tümellere yüklediği anlam arasında zâtî bir farklılık vardır. Bu ayrılıktan hareketle Gazzâlî’nin İbn Sînâ’ya yönelttiği eleştiriler de zâtî bir nitelik arz etmektedir. Gazzâlî’nin İbn Sînâ’ya yönelttiği eleştirilerin en açık göstergelerinden biri onun mantıkî tümele yüklediği anlam ve mantıkî tümel bağlamında verdiği örnekte yatmaktadır. Gazzâlî mantıkî tümeli bilkuvve ve bilfiil olmak bakımından ortaklığı kabul etmeyen mana olarak ele alarak ondaki ortaklığı ise tasdiğe konu olan şeyin dışında bir nedene bağlamaktadır. İbn Sînâ, Gazzâlî’nin mantıkî tümele yüklediği anlamın, söylenmenin tasdikin dışında olması hususuna katılmakla beraber tasavvura konu olmayı açıkça vurgulamaktadır. Gazzâlî ise İbn Sînâ’nın bu gönderimini göz ardı etmiş ve mantıkî tümel bağlamında verdiği “İlah” örneğinden hareketle İbn Sînâ’nın bunu kabul edeceğini vurgulamıştır. Halbuki İbn Sînâ’nın felsefi sisteminde “İlah” lafzının tasavvura konu olması mümkün değildir. Çünkü “İlah” tasavvur edilmez ama idrak edilir. Ona göre tasavvura konu olanlar bilkuvve çokluk barındırır. Ama “İlah” lafzı ancak zorunlu varlık olması bakımından tasavvurun konusu olmaya elverişli değildir. Bu bakımdan Gazzâlî’nin eleştirilerinin beş sanat bakımından cedelî mi yoksa safsata mı olduğu analiz edilebilir. Gazzâlî’nin hem mantıkî tümele yüklediği anlam hem de bu anlam için verdiği örnekler onun eleştirilerinin safsata türünden olduğunun zâtî niteliğini teşkil etmektedir. (shrink)

Explores the use of allegory in the writing of the renowned 11th- century Muslim philosopher known in the West as Avicenna, showing how it fit into the tradition of Islamic allegory, and has influenced later developments in the East and West. His Mi'rag Nama is translated here as a prime example of the journey allegory. Annotation copyrighted by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

Counterfeiting has become a prevalent business worldwide, resulting in high losses for many businesses. Considerable attention has been paid to research an individual attitude toward purchasing luxury counterfeit products in the offline context. However, there is currently lesser-known literature on the given phenomenon in the context of social commerce. Moreover, researchers observed that counterfeiting consumption is associated with consumer ethical values or beliefs. Practitioners and researchers are keen to find those factors that affect consumers’ ethical consumption behavior to reduce pirated (...) products’ demand. However, the role of religion in shaping ethical behavior is less documented in the counterfeiting context. Therefore, this study investigated the effect of religiosity on the counterfeiting of luxury products in Pakistan. A five-dimensional Islamic religiosity model was adopted to understand the consumption phenomena. For quantitative research, cross-sectional data were collected from the generation M of Pakistan through self-administrative questionnaires. A total of 394 valid responses from active online users were collected to empirically examine the conceptual model by employing the partial least square structural equation model. The results reveal that all five dimensions of religiosity negatively affect the attitude of generation M. Moreover, it is found that knowledge has the highest negative effect on attitude, followed by orthopraxis, experience, central duties, and basic duties. The study also explains the theoretical and practical implications of the research. Finally, limitations and future research were also discussed. (shrink)

Because of the impact of Islam in the development of Arab culture, the first Arabic thinkers were theologians. Their main concern was not to prove God's existence or his creation of the world (both these facts being obvious in their view), but to solve questions related to human destiny. They argued about such questions as whether the Muslim who had committed a major sin had thereby lost his faith and deserted the community of believers, and about the exact status (...) of human freedom. This second question was particularly perplexing since, if a person is the author of his own acts and therefore responsible for them, God's power would be curtailed, but on the other hand, if the person is not responsible, his freedom of action is suppressed and God would be unjust in punishing him for his bad deeds. (I make no distinction here between the terms “God” and “Allah,” since for Muslim authors the God of Islam is also the God of Judaism and Christianity.). (shrink)

En este artículo nos proponemos destacar la originalidad de las inscripciones árabes que adornan el arco de la llamada Casa del Conde de Toledo, fechadas en el siglo XV. La principal inscripción del arco es una oración a Santa María escrita en aljamiado, lengua romance con grafía árabe muy elaborada, y las secundarias, más legibles, repiten ora en aljamiado, ora en árabe los nombres de Jesús y de Santa María. Además, en el segmento en árabe, Jesús está nombrado en su (...) versión musulmana, ʿĪsā, y se insiste en su filiación con María como una reminiscencia de uno de los principales desacuerdos entre islam y cristianismo en torno a la figura de Jesús. A partir de una lectura paralela a la de Rodrigo Amador de los Ríos, proponemos un análisis epigráfico y lingüístico, antes de estudiar el contenido y el sentido de los textos. Analizando el contexto, la relación entre artesano y comitente, y comparando con otras inscripciones mudéjares que plantean problemáticas similares, acabamos por considerar estas inscripciones como un reflejo de la voluntad por parte de los comitentes cristianos de sintetizar varias tradiciones religiosas y culturales. No pensamos sin embargo que haya que entender esta conciliación entre islam y cristianismo como la expresión de una apertura hacia creencias ajenas sino más bien como un intento hegemónico de abarcar a todos debajo del poder cristiano. (shrink)

In the polemical literature against Judaism, it is stated that Islam is the last religion, Prophet Muhammad was foretold in the Bible, and the Bible is distorted. Among the authors of such works, there are many who embraced Islam from Jews and Christians. Through their works, these converts show Muslims how serious they are in embracing Islam. In this article, the treatise under the evaluation was first brought to the agenda in 1867 by Gustav Flügel (d. 1870). (...) Flügel claimed that the author of the treatise was a Spanish or Moroccan convert Jew named Rakili. However, recent researches have revealed that Rakili is the name of the copyist and the author is an unknown Jew. Due to the Hebrew words in the text of the treatise, the author is thought to be a Jewish convert. The author of the treatise makes use of intensive quotations from Tanakh. However, it seems that the criticism of the treatise is not as strong as Ibn Hazm. The author also quotes from the Jewish oral tradition. Although the author is thought to be a Jewish convert, it is difficult to say that there is a very strong polemic of Judaism. Rather than showing that the Torah has been tampered with, using the passages of Tanakh, he wants to demonstrate that the Israelites went astray. In doing so, he tries to refute the Jewish claim of chosenness. Instead of stating that the Jews were not at the point of religious representation of God’s message, the author claims that Muhammad's followers were the addressees of this election. This method, which we occasionally encounter in other polemical treatises, appears as a much more intense and central agenda in this treatise. The most original aspect of this treatise at issue is the Ishmael-Isaac, Hagar-Sarah and Moses- Muhammad comparisons. The author insistently emphasizes that the chosen line is not the lineage of Isaac, but the lineage of Ishmael. As a natural consequence of this, he tries to prove that Muhammad is the greatest prophet to be obeyed and followed. What is interesting here is that the author, as a Jewish convert, tried to refute the idea of the chosennes of Jewish nation. According to him, there is an election not through Sarah and Isaac, but through Hagar and Ishmael. It is seen that those who have converted do such things both to prove their sincerity and to be accepted by Muslim administrators. The author’s glorifications of the Prophet Muhammad and his miracles by scorning Moses' miracles and Jewish ancestors can be described as an extreme attitude in this sense. The author also devotes a place to the subject of Biblical prophecies about the Prophet Muhammad. In this part, the author of the treatise stated that the gematria (abjad) value of some words in the Torah and the word Muhammad are equal. He claims that there are passages pointing to Muhammad. However, these passages are known in the polemical literature and are issues that were mentioned before the author. Apart from these widely known passages, there are some other passages he quoted. But these passages are also based on strained interpretations. Again, in some passages he quoted from Tanakh, it is seen that he was flexible and not loyal to the text. One of the points that the author dwells upon is the sins committed by the Israelites and the curses that were inflicted on them. The author of treatise supports this with passages different from Tanakh. Drawing attention to the fact that the Jews were cursed in their own books, which they consider sacred, the author tries to show that a nation so cursed cannot be a chosen people. The author, contrary to the Jews' expectation of the Messiah, points out that Jesus will come back, break the cross, kill the pig, and rule the earth. The writer, who reported the hadith that the Jews would be killed in the End Times, even reports that when the Jews hid behind the stones, the stones would say "There is a Jew behind me, come and kill". According to him, the time for Jews to repent has passed, because they could not take this opportunity by denying Muhammad either. The author has an interesting explanation as to why the hereafter and resurrection are not mentioned in the Torah. According to this claim, when God sent down the Torah to Moses, he ordered the Israelites to keep their orders and refrain from their prohibitions. Since God knows the hardness and stubbornness of the hearts of the Israelites, that most of them are devilish, engaged in magic and pagan cults, and prefer the world to the hereafter, he did not mention the issues such as heaven, hell, reward and punishment in the Torah. On the contrary, in many parts of the Torah, God said to them if you keep my orders, your sustenance will increase, your generation will increase, fertility will increase, and you will win victories over your enemies. (shrink)

En las sociedades islámicas medievales, las convenciones culturales y las normas sociales tenían un papel importante en la educación, pero los pensadores musulmanes también prestaron atención a las diferencias individuales entre los estudiantes y a la necesidad de ajustar tanto el contenido de la enseñanza como los métodos educativos al contexto familiar de esos estudiantes, así como a sus habilidades personales, sus inclinaciones y sus aspiraciones. Esto pudo deberse no sólo a la herencia de los "árabes preislámicos y del (...) class='Hi'>Islam temprano" como sugirió S. D. Goitein, sino también a la influencia cultural extranjera (por ejemplo, griega), especialmente en el ámbito del pensamiento educativo. En principio, podría parecer que el kuttab ofrecería menos atención individualizada a los que allí estudiaban que otras instituciones educativas. Sin embargo, los ulemas, en general, tenían en mente al estudiante individual cuando discutían asuntos de educación elemental, tales como el currículum, la edad de admisión del niño, la selección de métodos educativos apropiados, los juegos de los niños, la compañía de otros niños, la selección de una profesión para el niño y la participación del padre en la educación formal. (shrink)

The subject of values presents certain dangers. Why not the moral philosophy of Islam or even the ethics of Islam? The term “moral” seems traditional, if not antiquated: it connotes the ideas of good and evil, a long list of commandments and interdictions; it evokes a restraint of the individual, something limiting and narrow. The word “ethics” is more acceptable; it is closer to the idea of a system of values, a global vision of the moral life, but (...) it may also express a normative process. Max Weber speaks of Islam and other religions as being ethical religions, that is. “a complex of commandments and bans whose transgression is sin,” and he imputes this particularity to prophecy that “produces a centralization of ethics.” The term “values” is often used today, and it corresponds better to modern sensitivity preoccupied with the search for dispersed or connected values on which to base its behavior and its image. We know that the “theory of values” began with Western moralist philosophers as a substitute for the old morality, experienced as submission, and to introduce the idea of a personal morality, the essential being to conform to freely-chosen values. However, we may also speak of collective values or even of values attached to a particular line of conduct that they establish, for example, “martial values.” “tribal values” or “fundamental values.” A value may be isolated, like a Platonic idea, put into a package or even a system. It remains none the less abstract, since it is itself the product of an abstraction and rarely a creation. To look for the values of a culture, a religion or a society is to devote oneself to an operation of extraction from a multitude of data. It is truly a quest, one that allows for personal interpretation in selection from the lime that one becomes sensitive to one line of values rather than to another. Thus is presented the problem of the divergence of values within a single ethical system, especially if it is as vast as that of Islam. My purpose here is not selective. It is to go in search of the values of Islam in their variety while trying to find a guideline and also locating them at various levels of comprehension. (shrink)

İslâm felsefesinde en önde gelen âlimlerden biri olan İbn Sînâ ruh üzerine çok sayıda eser te’lif etmiştir. Bu eserlerden biri de Arap edebiyatı açısından da önemli bir yere sahip olan el-Ḳaṣîdetu’l-‘Ayniyyetu’r-Rûḥiyye fî’l-Nefs adlı kasidesidir. İbn Sînâ kasidesine ruhu, yüksek bir konumdan insan bedenine inen bir güvercine benzeterek başlamaktadır. Kasidenin devamında ruhun insan bedeninde yaşadığı tecrübeleri anlattıktan sonra ruhun bedenden ayrılmasına değinmektedir. Kasidenin sonunda nefs-i nâṭıḳanın insan bedenine indirilmesindeki hikmetin ne olduğunu sorgulamaktadır. Eser üzerine çok sayıda şerh, tercüme ve tahmîs yapılması (...) eserin ilim dünyasındaki önemine işaret etmektedir. Çalışmada kasidenin Türkçeye ilk tercümesi de olan tasavvuf üzerine önemli eserler te’lif etmiş Ali Dede el-Bosnevî’nin tercümesi ele alınmaktadır. Çalışmada ilk olarak el-Ḳaṣîdetu’r-Rûḥiyye’nin içeriği ve üzerine yapılan çalışmalara değinilmiştir. Ardından Ali Dede el-Bosnevî’nin hayatı ile eserleri, Tercüme-i Ḳaṣîde-i Rûḥiyye’nin nüshalarının tavsifi ve metin tesisinde takip edilen metot hakkında bilgi verilmiştir. Daha sonra el-Bosnevî’ye ait tercümenin temin edilen dört nüshası karşılaştırılarak transkripsiyonlu metni tesis edilmiş ve Arapça beyitler ile beraber verilmiştir. Ayrıca el-Bosnevî’nin tercümesi altına kasidenin günümüz Türkçesine yapılan tercümesi de eklenmiştir. Çalışmanın sonunda el-Bosnevî’nin tercümesi değerlendirilmiştir. (shrink)

Aristoteles’in Peri Hermêneias’ta olumlama ve olumsuzlama arasında ortaya attığı öncelik ve sonralık ilişkisinin mantık açısından yükleme ve hüküm bağlamında birtakım önemli sonuçları olmuştur. Mantıksal bakımdan karşımıza çıkan problem olumlama, yani bir şeyi bir başka şey hakkında öne sürme ile olumsuzlamanın, yani bir şeyi başka bir şeyden ayırarak öne sürmenin söz olmak bakımından aynı statüde olup olmadıklarına ilişkindir. İbn Sînâ, eş-Şifâ külliyatının Peri Hermêneias’a karşılık gelen eseri olan, el-İbâre’nin birinci makalesinin beşinci faslında (el-İbâre, I.5) olumlama ve olumsuzlamayı bu mantıksal sorun bakımından (...) ele alır ve konuya dair kendi pozisyonunu nispet ve hüküm ayrımı üzerinden ortaya koyar. Ne var ki eş-Şeyh’ur-Reîs’in metni bazı açılardan okuyucu için kapalı bir görünüm arz etmektedir. Bu kapalılığın sebebi İbn Sînâ’nın metninin arka planında Helenistik şarihler arasında cereyan eden bir tartışmanın yatmasıdır. Bu makale el-İbâre’nin mevzubahis pasajlarındaki mantıksal problemi daha iyi anlamak için mevzubahis metni Helenistik şarihlerle birlikte okumayı teklif etmektedir. Bu okumada başvuracağımız kaynak, Peri Hermêneias’a Latince şerh yazmış olan Boethius’tur. Çalışmamızda Boethius’un şerhinin ilgili bölümünde, fikirlerini aktardığı Helenistik şarihlerin (Aphrodisiaslı İskender, Porphyrios ve Syrianos) pozisyonlarının İbn Sînâ’nın olumlama ve olumsuzlamaya dair savunduğu ve eleştirdiği görüşlerle örtüştüğünü ortaya koymaya çalışacağız. Bu bakımdan makaledeki okumamız, bir yandan İbn Sînâ’nın ilgili metnini ve bu metindeki mantıksal sonuçları, diğer yandan filozofun Helenistik şarihlerle ilişkisinin boyutlarını daha iyi anlamayı amaçlamaktadır. (shrink)

Bu çalışma İslam’da i‘adetü’l-ma‘dûm (var olmayanın yeniden yaratılması) üzerine olan tartışmaların gelişimini, i‘adetü’l-ma‘dûm fikrini, bu fikrin reddedilmesi ve kabul edilmesinin arkasında yatan sebepleri ve mümkün olup olmadığı hakkındaki delilleri sunar. İade, yok edilmiş bir varlığı kimliğini koruyarak yeni- den yaratma eylemine dayanmaktadır. İbn Sînâ öncesi kelâmcıların çoğu iadenin imkânını kabul eder fakat bir aslî (ma‘dûmun sübûtu) ve bir de ferî meselede (belli varlık sınıflarının iade edilebilmesi) ihtilaf ederler. İadeyi kabul etmek kelâmcıların cismânî bir antropoloji ile yeniden dirilmenin imkânını uzlaştırmalarını sağlamıştır. (...) İbn Sînâ, iadenin imkânına karşı üç ana delilden oluşan etkili bir delil ortaya koymuştur: bu delil, (ma‘dûmun sâbit olmaması göz önüne alınacak olursa) sezgiden, iade edilen varlığın eşdeğer kopya- sından ayırt edilemezliğinden ve zamanın iadesinin yol açtığı çelişkilerden oluşur. İbn Sînâ öncesi düşünce ekollerinden sadece Eş‘arîler iadenin imkânını savunmuştur. Klasik sonrası dönemin tartışmaları İbn Sînâ ve mütekaddimûn kelâmcılar tarafından ana hatları çizilen cedelî bir asıl üzerine inşa edilmiş daha karmaşık formülasyonları (modal değişmezlik argümanı), itirazları, cevapları ve aynı zamanda hem iadeyi destekleyen (tasavvurî parçaların imkânı, hatırlama, varsayımsal imkân) hem de iadeye karşı olan (ara boşluk, illetlerin iadesi) bütünüyle yeni bazı argümanları öne sürer. (shrink)

On six sins generally committed by women, according to Islam; translated from Urdu.

Meryem Sebti, Avicenne. Prophétie et Gouvernement du Monde. (İbn Sînâ: Nübüvvet ve Âlemin Yönetimi), Paris: Les Editions du Cerf (Islam, Nouvelles Approches), 2021, 314 sayfa. ISBN 9782204143172.

(Spanish) RESUMEN: La libertad absoluta postulada por Viktor Emil Frankl y Jean-Paul Sartre, la Shoah y la creencia en un dios omnipotente, bueno y justo parecen contradecirse. La pregunta por el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas del Holocausto (la verdadera catástrofe, el mayor crimen contra la humanidad), simbolizado por Auschwitz, y como punto de inflexión en la historia, es terriblemente dolorosa y parece no tener una respuesta filosófica ni teológica. A mi juicio, es importantísimo distinguir entre las víctimas inocentes (...) de la Shoah que perecieron y las víctimas inocentes que sufrieron un verdadero infierno y perdieron a sus seres queridos, pero que lograron sobrevivir. Ambas son víctimas, por supuesto, pero así como encontrarle un posible sentido al sufrimiento de las víctimas masacradas y gaseadas podría suponer un insulto a su sufrimiento y agonía –en especial, al horror que sufrieron los niños–, el horrible sufrimiento de los supervivientes pudo dar, tal vez, de alguna manera, un sentido a sus vidas después de la liberación de los campos de concentración y exterminio, ya fuera como voz, como protesta o como simple supervivencia. Frankl apuesta por un sentido último (que abraza el sentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas), y Sartre, aunque parezca no apostar por sentido alguno, volcó su vida al compromiso político después de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, y ello parece vislumbrar una minúscula pizca de sentido después de la barbarie. La filosofía de Frankl es un sí a la vida incluso en las situaciones más extremas, un grito casi nietzscheano que exalta el valor de la vida más allá de cualquier sufrimiento. Frankl, padre de la logoterapia y superviviente del Holocausto, abre una puerta a Dios al hablar de un dios inconsciente, una dimensión suprahumana y una fe incondicional, y define la religión como espiritualidad y como la búsqueda del hombre por el sentido último. Según Frankl, la libertad no se contradice con Dios, y la religión existe no a raíz de la barbarie, sino a pesar de la barbarie. El existencialismo sartreano es una filosofía de la libertad radical y de la responsabilidad. El hombre está condenado a ser libre. El ser humano es un ser en el que la existencia precede a la esencia. Somos totalmente responsables de lo que somos. Sartre afirma que la libertad humana es incompatible con Dios. En un mundo sin Dios, la moral la construyen los hombres, con sus propias decisiones y sus acciones, y la existencia y el sufrimiento de las víctimas no tienen sentido alguno. Sartre define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, angustia y contingencia. Frankl define al hombre como libertad, responsabilidad, espiritualidad y búsqueda de sentido. Con esta tesis me propongo entrar en la resbaladiza dimensión del dolor, la desesperación, el sentido y sinsentido del sufrimiento de las víctimas (teniendo presente los horrores de Auschwitz, que en teología y filosofía ha simbolizado desde la liberación de los campos la muerte de Dios y la muerte de la moral). Es verdad que no solo los hombres, mujeres y niños judíos fueron víctimas de la barbarie alemana, pero, como reza el mensaje de Elie Wiesel en la exposición permanente del Block 27 del Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". La Shoah no es un episodio dentro de la Segunda Guerra Mundial, sino un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad, y es una catástrofe que nos concierne a todos, hombres y mujeres judíos y no judíos, religiosos e irreligiosos, creyentes e increyentes, como seres libres, responsables y morales que somos –o que deberíamos ser. Muchas de las víctimas del Holocausto, en medio de la desesperación, entraron en las cámaras de gas orando, aferrándose a la esperanza de que ese final espeluznante no era un punto final. Con esta tesis no me propongo de ninguna manera responder a la eterna pregunta de si Dios existe o no, sino que propongo interpretar ese grito hacia Dios como un desesperado anhelo de esperanza. También me propongo encontrar una coherencia en las posturas de estos dos grandes pensadores para quienes la libertad y la responsabilidad definen al hombre: Frankl (quien apuesta por una dimensión suprahumana donde existe un sentido último en el que el sufrimiento de las víctimas tiene que tener algún sentido, aunque ese sentido sea completamente incomprensible en la dimensión humana) y Sartre (el existencialista ateo por excelencia, para quien el mundo, la existencia y el sufrimiento son absolutamente contingentes). En el primer capítulo expongo la logoterapia y el existencialismo sartreano: describo las tres dimensiones del hombre y las tres búsquedas de sentido propuestas por Frankl, y expongo las cinco consecuencias de "l'existence précède l'essence", centrándome en la libertad y la responsabilidad, y hablo del suicidio. El segundo capítulo está dedicado al dios inconsciente frankleano, la dimensión suprahumana, la búsqueda por el sentido último y la fe incondicional. En el tercer capítulo ilustro la libertad sin Dios sartreana, la ontología sartreana, el ateísmo sartreano y el humanismo sartreano, y hablo sobre la responsabilidad, la mauvaise foi, la contingencia, la situation y la angustia. El cuarto capítulo es necesariamente histórico (sin dejar de ser filosófico): me pregunto por la muerte de Dios después de Auschwitz, argumento y defiendo la unicidad del Holocausto (la Shoah es un punto de inflexión en la historia de la humanidad), describo las masacres antes de los campos de exterminio (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), el gigantesco complejo de Auschwitz (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), reflexiono sobre Dios y el mal (centrándome en los niños de Auschwitz), describo los días de Frankl en Auschwitz, hablo de Dios como esperanza, de la inmortalidad y la escatología, de la crueldad de Dios, de la relación entre el cristianismo y el antisemitismo, del islam y el antisemitismo, critico el silencio de Dios, hablo de la muerte de Dios y del juicio contra Dios. En el quinto capítulo expongo la moral frankleana (una moral que atañe al hombre y no a Dios), basándome en su teoría del amor y en su única obra de teatro (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), y la moral sartreana (una moral que atañe a una humanidad sin Dios), recordando a Dostoyevsky, analizando la famosa cita de Garcin en Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", criticando el marxismo de Sartre y cuestionando (con la mirada de Frankl y Sartre) el verso de Brecht "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; al final del capítulo incluyo una reflexión propia y las críticas frankleana y sartreana sobre la impunidad de los verdugos y colaboradores después del Holocausto (con el permiso de Dios). Después de la Conclusión, añado un Apéndice sobre las vidas de Frankl y Sartre, para poder entender mejor su obra. PALABRAS CLAVE: logoterapia, existencialismo sartreano, búsqueda de sentido, libertad, responsabilidad, moral, angustia, sufrimiento, supervivientes, víctimas, contingencia, espiritualidad, religión, Dios, esperanza, antisemitismo, culpa, Auschwitz, Holocausto, Shoah. /// (English) ABSTRACT: The absolute freedom defended by Viktor Emil Frankl and Jean-Paul Sartre, the Shoah and the belief in an omnipotent, benevolent and just God seem to contradict each other. The question of the meaning of the victims' suffering of the Holocaust (the true catastrophe, the biggest crime against humanity), simbolised by Auschwitz and as a turning point in History, is terribly painful and doesn't seem to have an answer. In my opinion, it's crucial to distinguish between the innocent victims of the Shoah who perished and the innocent victims who sufferend a real hell and lost their loved ones, but managed to survive. Both are victims, of course, but just as finding a possible meaning to the suffering of the massacred and gassed victims could result in an insult to their suffering and agony –especially to the horror that the children suffered– the gigantic suffering of the survivors could, maybe, somehow, give a meaning to their lives after the liberation of the concentration and extermination camps, either as a voice, as a protest, or as a simple survival. Frankl believes in an ultimate meaning (that embraces the meaning of the victims' suffering), and Sartre, even if it appears not to embrace any meaning, turned his life to political engagement after War World II, and that attitude seems to give a tiny glimpse of meaning after the barbarity. Frankl's philosophy says yes to life even in the most extreme situations, and it's a Nietzschean-like scream that exalts the value of life beyond any monstrous suffering. Frankl, the father of logotherapy and a Holocaust survivor, opens a door to God when he talks about an unconscious God, a supra-human dimension and an unconditional faith; he defines religion as spirituality and as man's search for ultimate meaning. According to Frankl, freedom is not contradictory with God, and religion exists not because of the barbarity but in spite of the barbarity. Sartrean existentialism is a philosophy of radical freedom and responsibility. Men are condemned to be free. We are beings where the existence precedes the essence. We are completely responsible of what we are. Sartre argues that human freedom is incompatible with God. In a godless world, morality is constructed by people, with their own choices and actions, and human existence and the suffering of the victims don't have any meaning. Sartre defines man as freedom, responsibility, Angst and contingency. Frankl defines man as freedom, responsibility, spirituality and search for meaning. With this dissertation I attempt to enter in the slippery dimension of the pain, despair, meaning and meaninglessness of the victims' suffering (having in mind the horrors of Auschwitz, that in theology and in philosophy have simbolised, since the liberation of the camps, the death of God and the death of morality). It's true that not only Jewish men, women and children were victims of the German barbarity, but, as Elie Wiesel's message from the permanent exhibition from Block 27 of the Auschwitz-Birkeanu State Museum reads: "Not all victims were Jewish in this place, but all Jews were victims". The Shoah is not an episode inside War World II, but a turning point in the history of humankind, and a catastrophe that embraces us all, Jewish and not not Jewish men and women, religious and not religious, believers and not believers, as the free, responsible and moral beings that we all are –or that we should be. A lot of the victims, in the midst of their desperation, entered into the gas chambers praying, holding to the hope that their horrifying end was not the ultimate end. With this dissertation I do not attempt to answer the eternal question of the existence of God, rather, I will try to interpret that scream to God as a longing for hope. I also intend to find a coherence between the thought of these two great thinkers for whom freedom and responsibilty define man: Frankl (who argues that there is a suprahuman dimension where an ultimate meaning exists and where the victims' suffering has to have a meaning, even if this meaning is completely incomprehensible in the human dimension) and Sartre (the atheist existentialist par excellence, for whom the world, human existence and suffering are absolutely contingent). In the first chapter I expose logotherapy and Sartrean existentialism: I describe the three dimensions of man, the three searches for meaning, the five consequences of "l'existence précède l'essence" and I speak about suicide. The second chapter delves into the unconscious God, the supra-human dimension, the ultimate meaning and the unconditional faith. In the third chapter I expose the freedom without God defended by Sartre, Sartre's ontology, Sartre's atheism, Sartre's humanism, and his ideas about responsibility, mauvaise foi, contingency, situation, and Angst. The fourth chapter is necessarily historical (while being philosophical too): I wonder about the death of God after Auschwitz, I argue and defend the uniqueness of the Holocaust (the Shoah is a turning point in the history of humankind), I describe the massacres before the extermination camps (Einsatzgruppen, Ordnungspolizei y Wehrmacht), the gigantic Auschwitz camp complex (Stammlager, Auschwitz-Birkenau y Monowitz-Buna), I reflect on God and evil (focusing on the children of Auschwitz), I describe Frankl's days in Auschwitz, I talk about God as hope, about immortality and escathology, I discuss God's cruelty, the relationship between Christianity and antisemitism and Islam and antisemitism, I question the silence of God, and I talk about the death of God and about the trial against God. In the fifth chapter I talk about the Franklean morality (a morality that concerns man and not God), on the basis of his love theory and his only work of theater (Synchronisation in Binkerwald), and the Sartrean morality (a morality that concerns a humanity without God), remembering Dostoyevsky, analysing Garcin's famous quote in Huis clos "L'enfer, c'est les Autres", crticizing Sartre's marxism and questioning (with Frankl's and Sartre's eyes) Brecht's verse "Erst kommt das Fressen, dann kommt die Moral"; at the end of the chapter I include my own reflection (and Frankl and Sartre's critique) about the impunity of the executioners and collaborators after the Holocaust (with God's permission). After the Conclusion, I add an Appendix about the lives of Frankl and Sartre, which helps understanding better their work. KEYWORDS: logotherapy, existentialism, search for meaning, freedom, responsibility, morality, Angst, suffering, survivors, victims, contingency, spirituality, religion, God, hope, antisemitism, guilt, Auschwitz, Holocaust, Shoah. (shrink)