The aim of this paper is to bring recent work on metaphysical grounding to bear on the phenomenon of social construction. It is argued that grounding can be used to analyze social construction and that the grounding framework is helpful for articulating various claims and commitments of social constructionists, especially about social identities, e.g., gender and race. The paper also responds to a number of objections that have been leveled against the application of grounding to (...) class='Hi'>social construction from Elizabeth Barnes, Mari Mikkola, and Jessica Wilson. (shrink)

What is social construction? This essay offers a survey of the various ways in which something could be socially constructed and then addresses briefly the questions whether social constructionism involves an untenable anti-realism and what, if anything, unifies all social construction claims.

Just as contemporary metaphysics, in general, is marked by an interest in ground, contemporary social metaphysics, in particular, is marked by an interest in social construction. It’s no surprise, then, that some contemporary metaphysicians have come to understand social construction in terms of ground. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake. In particular, I argue that any otherwise plausible account of construction as ground is objectionably revisionary. First, I discuss an argument for the view (...) that construction is ground that is endorsed by its proponents, and identify its weaknesses. I then consider, and dispense with, different versions of the view that construction is ground, and argue that these either overgeneralize, undergeneralize, or both. After responding to the objection that my arguments presuppose monism with respect to construction, I conclude that though ground is relevant to construction, extant ground-theoretic accounts of its relevance fail to capture it. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to make headway on a metaphysics of social construction. In recent work, I’ve argued that social construction should be understood in terms of metaphysical grounding. However, I agree with grounding skeptics like Wilson that bare claims about what grounds what are insufficient for capturing, with fine enough grain, metaphysical dependence structures. To that end, I develop a view on which the social construction of human social kinds is a kind of (...) realization relation. Social kinds, I argue, are multiply realizable kinds. I depart from the Wilson by further arguing that an appeal to grounding is not otiose when it comes to social construction. Social construction, I claim, belongs to the “big-G” Grounding genus, but it is the specific “small-g” relation of realization at work in cases of human kind social construction. (shrink)

Social constructionist claims are surprising and interesting when they entail that presumably natural kinds are in fact socially constructed. The claims are interesting because of their theoretical and political importance. Authors like Díaz-León argue that constitutive social construction is more relevant for achieving social justice than causal social construction. This paper challenges this claim. Assuming there are socially salient groups that are discriminated against, the paper presents a dilemma: if there were no constitutively constructed social (...) kinds, the causes of the discrimination of existing social groups would have to be addressed, and understanding causal social construction would be relevant to achieve social justice. On the other hand, not all possible constitutively socially constructed kinds are actual social kinds. If an existing social group is constitutively constructed as a social kind K, the fact that it actually exists as a K has social causes. Again, causal social construction is relevant. The paper argues that (i) for any actual social kind X, if X is constitutively socially constructed as K, then it is also causally socially constructed; and (ii) causal social construction is at least as relevant as constitutive social construction for concerns of social justice. For illustration, I draw upon two phenomena that are presumed to contribute towards the discrimination of women: (i) the poor performance effects of stereotype threat, and (ii) the silencing effects of gendered language use. (shrink)

Sally Haslanger is Ford Professor of Philosophy and Women's and Gender Studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and a leading contemporary feminist philosopher. She has worked on analytic metaphysics, epistemology, and ancient philosophy. Her areas of interest are social and political philosophy, feminist theory, and critical race theory. Her 2012 book, Resisting Reality: Social Construction and Social Critique, collects papers published over the course of twenty years that link work in contemporary metaphysics, epistemology, and philosophy of (...) language with social and political issues concerning gender, race, and the family. It was awarded the 2014 Joseph B. Gittler Prize for “outstanding scholarly contribution in the field of the philosophy of one or more of the social sciences.” In this interview, done in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic and the #BlackLivesMatter movement, we discuss her ideas on social practices, social structure, and structural explanation. We also delve into her debunking project of elucidating the notion of ideology in a way that links it with contemporary work in epistemology, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind, and to do justice to the materiality of social practices and social structures. (shrink)

Although scholarship in the social construction of technology has contributed much to illuminating technological development, most work using this theoretical approach is committed to an agency-centered approach. SCOT scholars have made only limited contributions to illustrating the influence of social structures. In this article, the authors argue for the importance of structural concepts to understanding technological development. They summarize the SCOT conceptual framework defined by Trevor Pinch and Wiebe Bijker and survey some of the methodological and explanatory difficulties (...) that arise with their approach. Then the authors present concepts from organizational sociology and political economy that illuminate structural influences in shaping phenomena of interest to SCOT scholars. These structural concepts can be applied to the study of the design, development, and transformation of technology. The authors conclude that the limited amount of scholarship on structural factors in the social shaping of technological development presents numerous opportunities for research. (shrink)

Feminist metaphysics is guided by the insight that gender is socially constructed, yet the metaphysics behind social construction remains obscure. Barnes and Mikkola charge that current metaphysical frameworks—including my grounding framework—are hostile to feminist metaphysics. I argue that not only is a grounding framework hospitable to feminist metaphysics, but also that a grounding framework can help shed light on the metaphysics behind social construction. By treating social construction claims as grounding claims, the feminist metaphysician and the (...) class='Hi'>social ontologist both gain a way to integrate social construction claims into a general metaphysics, while accounting for the inferential connections between social construction and attendant notions such as dependence and explanation. So I conclude that a grounding framework can be helpful for feminist metaphysics and social ontology. (shrink)

One influential view is that at least some putatively natural human kinds are actually social constructions, understood as some real kind of thing that is produced or sustained by our social and conceptual practices. Category constructionists share two commitments: they hold that human category terms like “race” and “sex” and “homosexuality” and “perversion” actually refer to constructed categories, and they hold that these categories are widely but mistakenly taken to be natural kinds. But it is far from (...) clear that these two commitments are consistent. The sort of mismatch between belief and underlying nature constructionists’ suppose is often taken to indicate a failure of reference. Reliance on a causal-historical account of reference allows the preservation of reference, but unfortunately, constructionists' appropriation of causal historical accounts of reference is beset by difficulties that do not attend natural kind theorists’ appeals to such accounts. Here, I set out these difficulties, but argue that they can be answered, allowing terms for apparently natural human kinds refer to some sort of social construction about which there is massive error. (shrink)

Do not chew with your mouth open! Take your hat off when you enter a church! Do not skip the queue! Pay your taxes! Do not cross on a red light! These are familiar imperatives, and their immediate source are ‘socially constructed norms’: norms that exist as a matter of social fact. These range from informal etiquette and politeness norms to the complex norms making up our legal systems. While we often feel bound by these norms, we are also (...) aware that they can be pernicious: the product of injustice and vehicles for its perpetuation. The question thus arises: when and why, if ever, does the fact that a socially constructed norm requires us to perform a certain action place us under a genuine moral obligation to comply? In Morality and Socially Constructed Norms, I answer that such an obligation, when it exists, is grounded in a broader, familiar duty, namely the duty to respect people’s permissible and authentic exercises of agency. This is what I call the ‘Agency-Respect View.’ The first part of the book outlines and defends the view, the second part considers relevant applications. (shrink)

Applying social construction theory to the study of other animals, this article reports research conducted on ecotourist constructions of orangutans. Two "stories" dominated: Orangutan as Child and Orangutan as Pristine. The cultural and historical specificity of these constructs as well as their implications for conservation are discussed.

Stereotypes of social construction suggest that the existence of social constructs is accidental and that such constructs have arbitrary and subjective features. In this paper, I explore a conception of social construction according to which it consists in the collective imposition of function onto reality and show that, according to this conception, these stereotypes are incorrect. In particular, I argue that the collective imposition of function onto reality is typically non-accidental and that the products of such imposition (...) frequently have non-arbitrary and objective features. These conclusions are interesting in and of themselves since they debunk important aspects of our socially constructed conception of social construction. Yet, additionally, they have important implications for the viability of mathematical social constructivism since resistance to such constructivism is frequently grounded in the observation that mathematics is non-accidental, non-arbitrary, and objective. As a secondary focus, I explore these implications in this paper. (shrink)

Julian Cole argues that mathematical domains are the products of social construction. This view has an initial appeal in that it seems to salvage much that is good about traditional platonistic realism without taking on the ontological baggage. However, it also has problems. After a brief sketch of social constructivist theories and Cole’s philosophy of mathematics, I evaluate the arguments in favor of social constructivism. I also discuss two substantial problems with the theory. I argue that unless (...) and until social constructivists can address the two concerns, we have reason to be skeptical about social constructivism in the philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

'Social construction' is a central metaphor in contemporary social science, yet it is used and understood in widely divergent and indeed conflicting ways by different thinkers. Most commonly, it is seen as radically opposed to realist social theory. Dave Elder-Vass argues that social scientists should be both realists and social constructionists and that coherent versions of these ways of thinking are entirely compatible with each other. This book seeks to transform prevailing understandings of the relationship (...) between realism and constructionism. It offers a thorough ontological analysis of the phenomena of language, discourse, culture and knowledge, and shows how this justifies a realist version of social constructionism. In doing so, however, it also develops an analysis of these phenomena that is significant in its own right. (shrink)

The paper brings into discussion the social construction of organization and proposes a new model in organizational development. The paper begins with a synthesis on the paradigm of social constructionism, emphasizing its utility in organizational studies. In times of uncertainty and rapid changes, a lot of organizations lose their missions and meanings, or have the capacity to reinvent and to thrive. The question is what makes the difference? In this line, the paper proposes a theoretical model, gathering the (...) social constructionism, relational constructionism, and appreciative inquiry. Using the grounded theory strategy, in-depth interviews and focus groups were developed with employees and leaders from nongovernmental organizations, Iasi, and Bacau Counties. Data are analyzed through NVivo program and present multiple perspectives regarding their activity in social field. The theoretical model may be an inspiration for organizations that are interested in achieving new ideas, solutions, and results. (shrink)

This article considers the social construction of mental toughness in line with prevailing social attitudes towards success and dominance in elite sport. Critical attention is drawn to the research literature which has sought to conceptualise mental toughness and the idealistic rhetoric and metaphor with which it has done so. The concept of mental toughness currently reflects an elitist ideal, constructed along the lines of the romantic narrative of the ‘Hollywood hero’ athlete. In contrast, the mental and moral virtues (...) which should form the basis of mental toughness are often neglected when an athlete ‘fails’. Currently, mental toughness exists as a characteristic used to describe successful athletes and is only applied in hindsight. Finally, we recommend that the morally problematic association of mental toughness (within the media, society, and the research community) with ultimate success needs to be removed in order to rescue the concept from the elitist discourses which currently surround and suffocate it. (shrink)

"Social Construction and Speech Acts," a talk at Dalhousie University, Halifax, Nova Scotia, March 1996.

This chapter contains sections titled: References and Further Reading.

This article illustrates the less-acknowledged social construction of the concept of ‘incompetency’ and draws attention to the moral concerns it raises in health care encounters in the south Indian city of Chennai. Based on data drawn from qualitative research, this study suggests that surgeons subjectively construct the idea of incompetency through their understanding of the perceived circumstantial characteristics of the patients and family members they serve. The findings indicate that surgeons often underestimate patients and family members’ capacity based on (...) constructed assessments, which leads to paternalistic practice. In this article, I illustrate how these assessments influence the surgeons’ practices and provide the moral and practical justifications for their actions. The constructed knowledge becomes a source for drawing normative justification for surgeons’ actions and, in conjunction with socially enforced power relationships, results in patients and family members to be on the receiving end of disrespectful attitudes. Based on the data analysis and by drawing on philosophical analysis, I emphasize the need to focus on ‘respect for persons,’ to rethink the framework of ‘capacity,’ and to practice respect in hospital settings. (shrink)

The republication of David Bloor's Knowledge and Social Imagery is evidence of the continuing interest and importance of the work but also provides the clearest evidence of the shortcomings of the enterprise. The new Afterword of Bloor's second edition addresses criticisms of the Strong Programme, but the theses which Bloor now defends are substantially weaker claims than the iconoclastic tenets of the original manifesto. Moreover, in a related strategy, Bloor asserts that criticisms made since 1975 have given him no (...) reason to modify the original text, but there are judicious alterations which are revealing. These unacknowledged alterations are documented here. Bloor's Strong Programme was founded on the diametrical opposition between his causal sociological approach and the allegedly a?causal rationalist, psychologist or ?teleological? approach. However, once it was shown that the teleological position is not the straw?man he represented it to be, Bloor's diametrical opposition left him no retreat. Just as Bloor weakens the original claims of the Strong Programme to make them appear compatible with cognitive science, so he eradicates the suggestion that the opposing teleological position was ever as absurd as he had portrayed it. The common rationale of these independent tactics leaves little question about their purpose ? and their futility. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Constructivist Studies of Science and Technology The Origin and Development of the Social Construction of Technology The Social Construction of Technology as a Heuristics for Research Some Philosophical Questions Technology and Ideas Conceptual Issues Logic and Epistemological Issues Ethical Issues Issues of Political Philosophy Religious Issues References and Further Reading.

Autor ovoga clanka bavi se problemom kulturne razlicitosti kroz analizu odnosa Mi - Drugi. On traga za odgovorom na pitanje zasto se kulture drugih naroda ili pojedinaca u mnogim drustvima smatraju inferiornim. Takvim tretmanom dolazi se do krajnosti kojom se pozicija Drugog srozava na nivo?primitivnog?. U tom kontekstu autor analizuje teorijske koncepte prosvetiteljskog racionalizma 18. veka i antropoloskog evolucionizma 19. veka, smatrajuci da se u njima mogu naci zameci negativnog vrednovanja Drugog. Naime, u vecini ovih teorija vrsi se hijerarhizacija kulture (...) po vremenskom i vrednosnom principu, a odatle je moguce razvrstavanje naroda i kultura na?primitivne? i?civilizovane?. Evropski modernizam uprilicio je viziju istorije kao linearnog rasta, cime su savremene kulture a priori proglasavane vrednijim i kulturno uzvisenijim. Ali i savremene kulture razvrstavaju se medju sobom po vrednosnim principima. Diferencijacija kultura vrsi se uz pomoc raznih stereotipa, a ideja progresa kao racionalnog napretka u sferi materijalne kulture, nauke i tehnike ozakonjuje transformaciju razlicitog u primitivno. Iz tih predrasuda, prema misljenju autora, izranja evrocentricna misao o izuzetnosti evropske kulture, cime se latentno opravdava kolonijalizam i druge negativne pojave potekle iz evropske civilizacije. Primitivizam se pokusava predstaviti kao objektivno stanje, a zapravo se radi o socijalnoj konstrukciji kojom se?drugo? zeli proglasiti za?primitivno?. (shrink)

If—as many scholars aver—gender is not a biological but rather a social fact, then how is it possible for someone assigned to the category Man at birth at some point later to feel or otherwise experience a personal (as contrasted with social) reality as a woman? If gender is social, how could a statement of the form “I feel like a woman” be true for such a person? This paper aims to defuse the apparent tension, by articulating (...) an account of the construction of oneself-as-gendered (which we may refer to as a gender token), within the wider context of social construction. The aim is to illuminate the differences between constructions of gender tokens, on the one hand, and the social constructions of gender types (known just as gender), on the other. Illuminating both as constructions, but of distinct origins and requiring differential degrees of social collaboration, defuses the tension. (shrink)

Examines the American Psychological Association Memories of Childhood Abuse report, which contains the opposing view points of 2 subgroups of the working group that produced the report, the clinicians and the researchers. The author views the Final Report of the working group as an exercise in alternative methods of truth making. In the development of his analysis, the author explains his choice of the term "truth-making" rather than "truth finding." The process of constructing truths and the possibility of resolving contrary (...) claims to truth is discussed. The author's remarks are intended as a scaffold for an understanding of why the clinicians and the researchers could find little common ground. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Social construction theorists face a certain challenge to the effect that they confuse the epistemic and the metaphysical: surely our conceptions of something are influenced by social practices, but that doesn't show that the nature of the thing in question is so influenced. In this paper I take up this challenge and offer a general framework to support the claim that a human kind is socially constructed, when this is understood as a metaphysical claim and as a part (...) of a social constructionist debunking project. I give reasons for thinking that a conferralist framework is better equipped to capture the social constructionist intuition than rival accounts of social properties, such as a constitution account and a response-dependence account, and that this framework helps to diagnose what is at stake in the debate between the social constructionists and their opponents. The conferralist framework offered here should be welcomed by social constructionists looking for firm foundations for their claims, and for anyone else interested in the debate over the social construction of human kinds. (shrink)

This essay looks at Norplant qua technology and uses analytic frameworks from the social construction of technology to explain the trajectory of its brief history. The author contend that there were multiple uses of Norplant, in terms of rhetorical strategies, symbolic representations, and contraceptive intentions, constructed by reproductive scientists, population control advocates, pharmaceutical manufacturers, doctors, birth control clinic staffers, government regulators, legislators, judges, women’s health activists, potential users, and actual users. However, while relevant social groups shaped the discourse (...) surrounding Norplant in the 1990s, its ultimate fate was determined by choices made by potential users. At the ‘‘consumption junction’’ of the late twentieth-century contraceptive marketplace, American women ignored the meanings constructed for Norplant by developers, producers, providers, and policy makers and made their decisions based on what Norplant meant to them. Individuals’ decisions to choose other methods of preventing pregnancy coalesced into a collective rejection of this contraceptive technology. (shrink)

How does cultural knowledge shape the development of human minds and, conversely, what kind of species-specific social-cognitive mechanisms have evolved to support the intergenerational reproduction of cultural knowledge? We critically examine current theories proposing a human-specific drive to identify with and imitate conspecifics as the evolutionary mechanism underlying cultural learning. We summarize new data demonstrating the selective interpretive nature of imitative learning in 14-month-olds and argue that the predictive scope of existing imitative learning models is either too broad or (...) too narrow to account for these findings. We outline our alternative theory of a human-specific adaptation for ‘pedagogy’, a communicative system of mutual design specialized for the fast and efficient transfer of new and relevant cultural knowledge from knowledgeable to ignorant conspecifics. We show the central role that innately specified ostensive-communicative triggering cues and learner-directed manner of knowledge manifestations play in constraining and guiding selective imitation of relevant cultural knowledge that is both new and cognitively opaque to the naive learner. (shrink)

In a climate of institutional change and loss of authority, it is urgently needed to rethink the legitimacy of religious authority. This article offers a case study of Paul's authority claims in Corinth, using French & Raven's theory of social power, to offer new insights into the construction of religious leadership. Paul negotiated renewed acceptance as Corinth's founder and apostle by appealing to legitimate power that he was a better leader than Moses, even Christ's ambassador, and by undermining the (...) legitimate power of his opponents who claimed Jewish descent and apostolic miracles as key leadership markers. Similarly, Paul appealed to referent power by portraying his suffering as a mark of Christ-embodying leadership and undermined the referent power of his opponents by denouncing status, patronage support and rhetoric as legitimation for leadership. Paul did not appeal to other power bases, because he could not be sure to outrank his opponents on those counts. This analysis suggests that religious authority in the form of Paul's founding apostleship was difficult to comprehend and embed in the social and cultural structures of Corinth at that time. Paul needed to engage in intense contention and negotiation to construct a socially and culturally viable model of leadership that would do justice to his vision of Christian identity. As a corollary, the evidence of the intensity of this conflict at various levels throughout the epistle can be interpreted as supporting the literary unity of the epistle. (shrink)

In early modern philosophy the motive of logical creation emerged in reaction to the Greek-Medieval legacy of a realistic metaphysics. The dominant nominalistic trends of thought since Thomas Hobbes and Immanuel Kant explored its rationalistic implications. The latter drew the radical (humanistic) conclusion that the laws of nature are present in human thought a priori (i.e. before all experience). The irrationalistic side of nominalism emphasized the uniqueness and individuality of events – thus leading to the historicism of the 19th century (...) and the subsequent linguistic turn. Kant influenced Husserl who, in turn, provided the point of departure for the ideas of Schutz, Berger and Luckmann – compare the joint work of Berger and Luckmann: Social construction of reality (1967). The contemporary “postmodern” idea that we create the world in which we live (either through thought, through language or through social practices) merely continues core elements of (early) modern philosophy. The underlying idea of autonomy highlights the difference between modern Humanism and a Christian view of reality, for in the latter human subjectivity is appreciated as being correlated with universal and constant principles that can only assume a positive shape through human activities of positivization (form-giving). The autonomy ideal of modern Humanism reifies the typical human freedom to positivize underlying principles. At the same time this reification on the one hand collapses the distinction between conditions and being conditioned and on the other it does not provide a basis for supra-individual standards of behaviour. (shrink)

In the social constructionist literature, little has been said about what it means for social factors to cause X in such a way that X would count as causally socially constructed. In this paper, I argue that being caused by social factors – and thus being causally socially constructed – is best defined in terms of a contrastive counterfactual notion of causation. Unlike some plausible alternatives, this definition captures what is at stake in actual social constructionist (...) debates. It makes transparent which factors the truth of a causal constructionist claim may depend on. By doing so, it sheds light on what the disagreements over whether X is causally socially constructed may turn on. It also helps us to see under which condition the claim that X is socially causally constructed is compatible with the claim that X is caused by biological factors. (shrink)

A critical engagement with Black Skin, White Masks in the wake of social construction theory and controversies over critical race theory.

An increasing number of philosophers argue that indeterminacy is metaphysical (or worldly) in the sense that indeterminacy has its source in the world itself (rather than how the world is represented or known). The standard arguments for metaphysical indeterminacy are centered around the sorites paradox. In this essay, I present a novel argument for metaphysical indeterminacy. I argue that metaphysical indeterminacy follows from the existence of constitutive social construction; there is indeterminacy in the social world because there is (...) indeterminacy in how the social world is constructed. (shrink)

Social “construction,” “constructionism” and “constructivism” are terms in wide use in the humanities and social sciences, and are applied to a diverse range of objects including the emotions, gender, race, sex, homo- and hetero-sexuality, mental illness, technology, quarks, facts, reality, and truth. This sort of terminology plays a number of different roles in different discourses, only some of which are philosophically interesting, and fewer of which admit of a “naturalistic” approach—an approach that treats science as a central and (...) successful (if sometimes fallible) source of knowledge about the world. If there is any core idea of social constructionism, it is that some object or objects are caused or controlled by social or cultural factors rather than natural factors, and if there is any core motivation of such research, it is the aim of showing that such objects are or were under our control: they could be, or might have been, otherwise. (shrink)

Experience from a three-year Home Office funded evaluation of a project intended to reduce school exclusions is used to explore methodological dilemmas raised by the current emphasis upon 'evidence-based' policy formation. The social construction of school exclusion rates poses problems of reliability and validity, especially when such rates are simultaneously being used for target setting. In principle, the concept of 'evidence-based' can refer to a wide variety of research questions and appropriate research methodologies. Despite this, moves towards interpreting 'evidence-based' (...) as predominantly measurement and outcomes oriented can be found both in government evaluation guidelines and in procedures for systematic reviews of research. Given the complexity of educational innovations, any neglect of research into the processes of change in naturalistic settings will not only lead to a restricted awareness of a project's impact but also to a failure to understand what certain apparent outcomes actually mean. (shrink)

The main innovation in Questioning Technology is Feenberg?s use of the results of various social constructivist accounts of science and technology to rethink the philosophy of technology. I agree with Feenberg that the social constructivist studies developed by historians and sociologists refute the essentialist account of technology that has been the mainstream position of philosophers of technology. The autonomy of technology seems to be nothing but a myth from the point of view of social construction, since (...) class='Hi'>social and political factors always influence decisions made in technology and science. However, there is a tension in Feenberg?s position, in that he seems to want to keep the general analytical framework that the essentialist account of technology makes available, while at the same time rejecting essentialism and, indeed, showing forcefully how it gets in the way of the positive program he develops for democratizing technology. I argue that Feenberg should clarify what kind of social constructive account of technology he will adopt, and that the general categories for understanding technology that Feenberg retains are problematic. I conclude by arguing that a thoroughgoing antiessentialist philosophy of technology can still provide a general analysis of modernity and develop normative claims including those regarding social justice, without relying on general categories. (shrink)

The article aims for examining the ‘technological stasis’ of the data structure in OpenStreetMap – the successful global collaborative geodata project devoted to ‘create and distribute free geographic data for the world’. Digital structures are strongly influenced by continuing stagnation. This technological stasis – the lack of change in technology – influences data in various ways, as demonstrated by the intensive discussion of the issue by computer scientists and software engineers. However, existing research describing stagnating software is often technic centred (...) and fuzzy, while critical research is barely considering issues of technological stasis in the digital context at all. Therefore, this paper aims for enriching this body of knowledge in order to shed light on aging data structures. I reframe technological stasis with a social-constructivist perspective – using the approach of Social Construction of Technology – especially with the concept of technological frames. Based on the case example of OpenStreetMap, my findings suggest that the data structure – and its stasis – is the outcome of competing understandings and perspectives, shaped by power asymmetries. Although the data structure did not significantly change for more than 10 years, I demonstrate that this is not because of a lack of motivation, nor technological difficulties of carrying out such changes. The technological stasis is rather rooted in the dominant position of few project members who are able to change the software design; it is their perception of the project that defines how data should be stored and what features are dispensable. (shrink)

ONKALO, the world’s first repository for the final disposal of spent nuclear fuel, is being constructed in Eurajoki, Finland. We study how the constructor of this facility portrays it to the local community in order to influence lay understanding of the disposal risk, build trust, and gain public approval for the construction project. The study is based on a framing analysis of the newsletters published by the constructor of the facility in 2000-2014. The results suggest that the nuclear industry has (...) developed increasing understanding of the social and communal aspects of public resistance to nuclear power. To create trust and to increase acceptance locally the industry is socially constructing a nuclear community around the repository. The gap between the nuclear experts and the local residents is narrowed and the repository is portrayed as being a shared project within the local community advancing the common interests of the industry and the residents. This may represent a new trend in pronuclear storytelling. (shrink)

Debates concerning principles of justice need to be attentive to various types of social process. One concerns the distribution of resources between groups defined as talented and untalented. Another concerns the social mechanisms by which people come to be categorised as talented and untalented. Political philosophers have paid considerable attention to the former issues, much less to the latter. That, I shall argue, represents a significant oversight.

Religious texts and historical narratives are instrumental in defining appropriate emotions and moral reasoning in a culture. In the Bhagavad Gıtā, the warrior Arjuna is faced with a twofold dilemma: are his emotions appropriate and should emotions influence his actions? The Gıtā is thought to be a redacted text with three primary layers: the original verses, the Sāmkhya/Yoga layer, and the devotional bhakti layer. Cross-cultural psychological theories of emotions are employed to analyze the layers of the Gıtā. It is argued (...) that each of the three layers corresponds with one of three possible moral codes as proposed by R. A. Shweder and his colleagues (1997; 2000): the Ethic of Autonomy (promoting personal well-being and avoiding shame); the Ethic of Community (maintaining social order and emotional detachment); and the Ethic of Divinity (upholding cosmic order and endorsing emotional devotion). These three perspectives remain relevant for deciding emotionally laden moral dilemmas today. (shrink)

This paper addresses, and seeks to correct, some frequent misunderstandings concerning the claim that science is socially constructed. It describes several features of scientific inquiry that have been usefully illuminated by constructivist studies of science, including the mundane or tacit skills involved in research, the social relationships in scientific laboratories, the causes of scientific controversy, and the interconnection of science and culture. Social construction, the paper argues, should be seen not as an alternative to but an enhancement of (...) scientists’ own professional understanding of how science is done. The richer, more finely textured accounts of scientific practice that the constructivist approach provides are potentially of great relevance to public policy. (shrink)

This article proposes "equality" as a topic for interactionist research. By drawing on the perspectives of Herbert Blumer, Alfred Schutz, and Harold Garfinkel, an attempt is made to lay the theoretical groundwork for studying the interpretive and experiential aspects of equality. Blumer's fundamental premises of symbolic interactionism, Schutz's analysis of relevance and typification, and Garfinkel's treatment of reflexivity and indexicality are explicated and applied to the subject of equality. I then draw upon the moral theory of John Dewey to suggest (...) the positive role that interactionist theory and research might play in the resolution of problematic situations that are framed in terms of equality. Collectively, the complementary aspects of Blumer's, Schutz's, Garfinkel's, and Dewey's thought are used to justify and launch a program of research on a neglected yet important topic: the social construction of equality in everyday life. (shrink)

This book reformulates the sociological subdiscipline known as the sociology of knowledge. Knowledge is presented as more than ideology, including as well false consciousness, propaganda, science and art.