_Purpose._ The article aims to analyse the consciousness of masses in the communication system of the 20th century projecting the individual level onto the social one. _Theoretical basis._ In the fields of philosophy and other humanities since the middle of the last century there has dominated an opinion that the category of mass and its communication are second-rate and non-elitist phenomena. Condensing the experience of human history (especially – the nineteenth century – the time (...) of the bourgeois revolutions and the two world wars), such parameters were set by the creators of social psychology Gustave Le Bon and Sigmund Freud in their basic research "The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind", "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego". Since ancient times the masses have really resembled immoral emotional neoformations, which minimized the individual qualities of the components of the whole and showed the features of a predominantly animal nature. It is no coincidence that those masses were called emotional, or just a crowd, regardless of the topos of existence: streets and squares, or the infospace of the first mass media (newspapers, radio, cinema, television). However, analysing the crowd, the scientists noted that this is only an extreme modification of the mass, and, in addition to it, there may be others – quite the opposite in their nature. With the advent of the World Wide Web, the situation has changed: scientists and futurists have been talking about the mass of intellectuals, which seems to be formed and combined in the field of information technology. And it surpasses the traditional elite in many respects. _Originality._ Having analysed the works of classic and modern researchers, we came to the conclusion that in fact the masses, like individuals (according to C. G. Jung), are divided into four types. Correspondingly, each of them has its own behaviour, psychology, philosophy etc. This article focuses on beliefs and ideological positions as the basis for the functioning of emotional, sensory, intuitive and rational masses in the context of 20th century philosophy. The object of our analysis was the philosophical schools of neo-positivism, hermeneutics, psychoanalysis, existentialism, pragmatism, anthropology, phenomenology, and others. _Conclusions._ According to our assumption, regardless of the type of mass and direction of modern philosophy as a field of its implementation, rationalism comes to the fore everywhere (as a primary source and theoretical basis or motivation). Thus, it can be concluded that the rational mass now dominates, not emotional (which was thoroughly described by Le Bon and Freud). And this is quite natural in the age of digital technology. (shrink)

The article identifies elements of national experience that became the preconditions for such revival, as well as determined the originality of French political philosophy. Based on the publi- cations of V. Descombes, G. Labelle, D. Tanguay, M. Foessel,. Jourdain, the author distin- guishes between French political philosophy in the narrow sense, which is represented by C. Castoriadis, C. Lefort, P. Rosanvallon, M. Gauchet, P. Manent, Ph. Raynaud (paying special atten- tion to the Ukrainian translations of their works), and the articulation (...) of political questions in terms of philosophical theory by well-known representatives of French theory. The reasons that hindered the development of political philosophy in France were the dominance of the positiv- ist paradigm in the social sciences and Marxism in the French intellectual milieu. The impulsion for the revival of political philosophy in France was the crisis of Marxism and preparations for the celebration of the 200th anniversary of the French Revolution of 1789. The distinguishing features of French political philosophy, according to the author, are the study of political problems in the context of intellectual, social, cultural history and ethnology, as well as through the prism of the works of classical French authors. The author also pays attention to the special role of R. Aron in the revival of French political philosophy. (shrink)

This article argues for a transregional historical approach to explain the career of political secularism, i.e. the ideas and practices that inform the modern state’s relationship to and administration of religion, in the 20th century. More specifically, it asks in how far we can understand secularism in South and Southeast Asia between the end of the First World War and decolonisation after 1945 as a result of transregional patterns that evolved within and beyond these regions. The argument is (...) based on three brief case studies on Atatürk’s Turkey as a contested source of inspiration for state secularity and religious reform, regional women’s networks to foster secularism and social change in the 1930s, and secularism as a strategy of postcolonial state-building and territorial integration. Conceptually, the article suggests to use global intellectual history as a means to combine research on connectivity with historical comparison. (shrink)

Historical consciousness of the modern period, which shows a clear distinction from that of the previous periods, is well displayed in intellectual history, which is investigation into the development of ideas and transmission of knowledge. To understand the academic issues that are grappled with in intellectual history, it is necessary to understand how it interacts with other relevant academic disciplines. Firstly, it is connected to classics and philology, in which historicity is regarded as part and parcel (...) of their research. Critical investigation into them leads intellectual historians to take the stance that perception on historicity lies not in a factual stratum but in an interpretive stratum. Further, they usually focus on coherently organizing inconsistent, inessential, contradictory elements of interpretation within the frame of temporality on which all texts have a footing. Next, intellectual history is closely tied to philosophy and the history of philosophy because it is a historiography of ideas and thinkers. On the basic assumption that the historicity of philosophy should be involved for a proper understanding of philosophical texts, intellectual history focuses on diachronic influences and changes of ideas which are intertextually detected. Clearly, intellectual historians assume that texts may be considered as ahistorical or even trans-historical when historicity was not a concern between traditions nor is it in modern interpretive traditions of philosophy. As a result, a tension between intellectual history and philosophy is inevitable, and the former has conditioned and simultaneously fostered understanding of the latter. Taken together, it may look as if intellectual history, being based on classics and philology, attempts a risky pas de deux with philosophical traditions which may be understood as ahistorical where their foci are given to doctrinal sides. The hitherto mentioned issues of intellectual history raised by Western critical approaches to historicity are also inherent in Buddhist studies and Buddhist intellectual history which have developed on Western soil. For example, the historicity of person(s) as seen in such examples as the historicity of Maitreya(-nātha), and the transition of philosophical thought in the works attributed to Vasubandhu/ Vasubandhu-s—which have become controversial since the 20th century, can be understood within the bigger frame of modern historical consciousness and how its coupled intellectual history unfolded. Specifically regarding these issues, efforts have been consistently made to construct a proper intellectual history in spite of limited sources of inner- and outer-textual evidence. The seemingly diversified opinions and cacophony in the development of interpretations of the issues epitomizes intellectual history, including the theoretical process which explores ways of thinking about various possibilities and the presuppositions of those possibilities. (shrink)

The book is arguably the first comprehensive collection of essays on Michael Polanyi’s social, political philosophy. The essays combine philosophical and historical approaches to show Polanyi’s social thought in the context of his epistemology and philosophy of science as well as the 20th century intellectual history. This volume appeals to specialists in Michael Polanyi’s philosophy, political philosophers who are interested in the 20th century political thought, mainly conservative-liberal political tradition. Furthermore it appeals (...) to scholars focusing on the intersections between epistemology and political philosophy. (shrink)

Bad philosophy is responsible for the climate and nature crises, and other global problems too that threaten our future. That sounds mad, but it is true. A philosophy of science, or of theatre or life is a view about what are, or ought to be, the aims and methods of science, theatre or life. It is in this entirely legitimate sense of “philosophy” that bad philosophy is responsible for the crises we face. First, and in a blatantly obvious way, those (...) institutions, organizations, corporations, businesses, endeavours, and activities of humanity that cause the crises and global problems we face, do so because of the aims they pursue (profit perhaps, or power, or heat and light for homes), and the methods adopted in pursuit of those aims – the philosophy in other words, built into the institution, organization, business, human activities, or whatever it may be. It is the philosophy of these institutions, organizations and activities that we need to change to put a stop to, or at least lessen the severity of, the crises we face, the global problems that confront us, above all the climate and nature crises. One institution has an especially crucial role in this respect: our universities. They are dominated in a multitude of ways by a particularly disastrous philosophy, a philosophy of inquiry which may be called knowledge-inquiry. This holds that the basic aim of the university is to acquire and apply knowledge. First, knowledge is to be acquired; once acquired, it can be applied to help solve social problems. But this philosophy of knowledge-inquiry is an intellectual disaster. As a result, universities are, in devastating and almost entirely unrecognized ways, humanitarian disasters too. Judged from the standpoint of helping to promote human welfare, the university shaped by the philosophy of knowledge-inquiry violates THREE of the four most elementary rules of rational problem solving conceivable in a wholesale, structural fashion, and it is this gross, wholesale, structural irrationality of the university, unnoticed by all but a few scientists and scholars, that is in part responsible for the creation of our grave global problems, and our current incapacity to learn how to solve them. The pursuit of knowledge, conducted in universities, within the framework of knowledge-inquiry over the decades and centuries, has produced much of great benefit to humanity. It has made the modern world possible. It has led to modern power production, modern industry and armaments, modern agriculture, modern hygiene and medicine, modern travel and communications, and the internet. But these very successes have also created many of our most serious current global problems: the climate crisis; the destruction of natural habitats, the catastrophic loss of wild life, and impending mass extinction of species (the nature crisis); the lethal character of modern war; the impact on the natural world of the rapid growth of the human population; the menace posed by nuclear weapons; pollution of earth, sea and air; threats to democracy caused in part by the internet and social media. All these grave global problems have been made possible by modern science and technology, pursued largely in universities within the framework of knowledge-inquiry. Nevertheless, it is not science and technology as such that are the problem, but science pursued in a way that is dissociated from a more fundamental task of the university to help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways, so that progress may be made to a better world. Science and technology, pursued within the framework of knowledge-inquiry, create for some of us the power to act, but not the power to act wisely – not the power to learn how to resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational ways. For that, we need our institutions of learning, above all our universities, to take as their primary task to help humanity learn how to do it. In order to do that, the philosophy of inquiry put into practice by universities needs to be dramatically transformed. We urgently need to bring about a revolution in the overall aims and methods of academic inquiry – a revolution in the philosophy of the university, all around the world, wherever possible, so that the basic aim becomes to seek and promote wisdom, construed to be the capacity, active endeavour, and perhaps desire, to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others, wisdom in this sense including knowledge, understanding and technological know-how, but much else besides, methods being dramatically modified too so as to help achieve the new academic aim. The basic task of the university would be, not to solve problems of knowledge, but rather to help people in the social world beyond the university to resolve conflicts and problems of living so that what is of value in life may be realized by everyone, insofar as that is possible. The pursuit of knowledge would be vital, but not intellectually fundamental. The intellectual and institutional revolution we so urgently need in our universities would affect every discipline and aspect of the university; it would dramatically affect both research and education, and the whole way the university is related to the rest of the social world. The revolution, from knowledge-inquiry to wisdom-inquiry would dramatically enhance the intellectual integrity and rationality of natural science, social inquiry, the humanities and technology, the character of these disciplines and the relationships they have with one another. University education throughout the university would be dramatically improved. And academic inquiry as a whole would do what, on the whole, it fails to do at present: it would help humanity resolve conflicts and problems of living in increasingly cooperatively rational and, as a result, increasingly successful ways, progress at last being made to a genuinely good, civilized world – a world in which there is peace, justice, liberal democracy, individual freedom, education, reasonable equality, sustainable prosperity and worthwhile opportunities in life, all of these for everyone, insofar as this is possible. Why, it may be asked, has academic philosophy not noticed that we urgently need to transform the current bad philosophy of inquiry of knowledge-inquiry into the far more intellectually rigorous and humanly valuable philosophy of wisdom-inquiry, so that we can begin to do what so far we have failed to do so lamentably: learn how to avoid impending disasters, and even make progress to a better world, something that seems at present almost unthinkable given the horrors of war, poverty, political enslavement of the 20th century, and the horrors of this century so far too? The answer is that academic philosophy is in a particularly pitiful state, as philosophers themselves, are just beginning to realize and lament. That is why academic philosophers are blind to the intellectual and humanitarian disaster of the bad philosophy that dominates universities today, and inconceivable to them to them that they might have, as a disciplinary task, to ensure academic inquiry implements a good philosophy of inquiry, and advocate and argue for change if it does not. Once upon a time, in Europe at least, philosophy was an intellectual power in the world. In the 17th century it created modern science which massively increased and improved our knowledge and understanding of the world, which in turn led to the Enlightenment, the industrial revolution, and the modern world. Philosophy was once so intellectually powerful and influential that it changed the course of history. But philosophy also made in the past three disastrous intellectual blunders: the post-Cartesian blunder, the post-Newtonian blunder, and the Enlightenment blunder. Never acknowledged and corrected by subsequent philosophy right down to the present, these unrecognized intellectual blunders rendered academic philosophy the esoteric, pathetic, and powerless discipline it is today, so that throughout the last century and, so far, throughout this one, academic philosophy has remained blind to the intellectual disaster of knowledge-inquiry, and thus failed entirely to take up its proper disciplinary task of warning fellow academics of the structural irrationality of the philosophy that prevails in the university, and of proposing what steps need to be taken to put things right. Instead of performing such an urgently needed philosophical task, so-called analytic philosophy was reduced to analysing the meaning of words. Since then, there has been hardly any discernible improvement, even if analysis of concepts no longer dominates the scene. Bad academic philosophy is indeed responsible for intellectual and humanitarian failures of the university. What the three past intellectual blunders of philosophy are, why their persistence so dramatically reduces academic philosophy to a triviality, and why, furthermore, this results in the failure of scientists and scholars to see what is so blatantly bad about the philosophy prevailing in universities around the world – the failure to see what so urgently needs to be done to put right what has been wrong for so long: all this is made clear in this book. A new kind of philosophy emerges during the course of the argument, critical fundamentalism, which has as its task to keep alive imaginative and critical – that is rational – thinking about our fundamental problem: How can our human world, the world we experience and live in – the world of living things, people, consciousness, free will, meaning and value – how can all of this exist and best flourish embedded as it is in the physical universe? That problem encompasses all others of life, science and thought. Critical fundamentalism tries to improve answers to aspects of this problem; but it also seeks to encourage everyone to think about the problem, from time to time, and think about how it interacts, in both directions, with more urgent particular and specialized problems of life and thought. Critical fundamentalism sets out to help improve bad philosophy wherever it is to be found: in social, political, commercial, legal, financial, and international life; and especially in academia, in institutions of learning, so that they become devoted to enhancing the capacity of people to learn how to achieve what is of genuine value in this brief life of a few decades if we are fortunate. Critical fundamentalism does everything it can to bring about the revolution in our universities we so urgently need. If taken up by mainstream philosophy, it might really have an impact, and begin to transform universities for the better, in both intellectual and humanitarian terms, and thus, enable humanity to learn how, after the grim failures and horrors of the last century and this one, to make progress to a better world. -/- . (shrink)

The widespread impression that recent philosophy of science has pioneered exploration of the “social dimensions of scientific knowledge” is shown to be in error, partly due to a lack of appreciation of historical precedent, and partly due to a misunderstanding of how the social sciences and philosophy have been intertwined over the last century. This paper argues that the referents of “democracy” are an important key in the American context, and that orthodoxies in the philosophy of science (...) tend to be molded by the actual regimes of science organization within which they are embedded. These theses are illustrated by consideration of three representative philosophers of science: John Dewey, Hans Reichenbach, and Philip Kitcher.Author Keywords: Social dimensions of science; Logical positivism; Democracy; Context of discovery/justification; Goals of science. (shrink)

Ali Bey Huseynzade, one of the prominent representatives of Azerbaijan's literary, cultural, social-political, and philosophical thought in the 20th century, was the first publisher of the political-Turkism movement in Azerbaijan. He was a distinguished political figure, talented scientist, thinker, and publicist, and holds a unique place in the history of the Azerbaijani people. Over time, there is an increasing need to deeply comprehend and study the magnificent artistic works created by Ali Bey Huseynzade. Throughout his life, (...) Huseynzade dedicated his prolific writing to the research and promotion of pan-Turkish spiritual values, fighting with all the strength of his brilliant talent for the progress of the Turkic people. He played an important role in the formation of the theoretical-philosophical foundations of the Azerbaijani national idea, striving for reforms in public and cultural life and artistic consciousness through his rich creative output. With his famous "Threefold Formula"-"Turkification, Islamization, Modernization" - he contributed to the formation of the ideology of Azerbaijanism. He advocated for the necessity of abandoning sectarian divisions and uniting all Muslims under the umbrella of a single religion-Islam. In his article titled "What is Young Turkism?", he explained the essence of the Turkish reform movement and expressed his views in many articles published in newspapers and magazines, arguing that Ottoman Turkish should become the common language of all Turks. Having spent more than 30 years of his life in exile, Ali Bey’s complex and turbulent life path was marked by political and cultural struggles aimed at the unity and wholeness of the Turkic world. The article emphasizes the significance of national-democratic values, highly relevant today, and their reflection in Azerbaijani philosophy and social-political thought. It also highlights the necessity of the establishment of the Azerbaijan Democratic Republic as the first historical embodiment of the national-democratic statehood ideology, which began in the early 20th century. Ali Bey Huseynzade’s multifaceted activities and his intellectual contributions, not only for Azerbaijani Turks but for the entire Turkic world, affirm the relevance of the subject as he remains a valuable thinker on a broader scale. (shrink)

The article shows that Russian philosophical community is very sensitive towards the history and the current state of philosophy of science and of science studies, which are a subject matter of special interest by virtue of a dedicated space in the university education system. This status is also supported by its proximity to the international philosophical mainstream of the 20th century and its specific object, its connection with science. Philosophy of science at the same time retains some (...) neutrality in relation to the dominant political ideology and proposes claims for an objective knowledge. History of philosophy of science, therefore, serves largely as a history of philosophical rationalism, and its prospects are determined by the strengthening of the role of science in modern culture. However, the modern existence of philosophy of science is undergoing substantial change and experiences a series of challenges. Among them there are the humiliation of intellectuals and scientists in society political voluntarism, mass consumption and the cult of mysticism. Under these conditions, a philosophical study of science and technology is forced to take on the challenges of social criticism and shape special civil institutions for self-preservation. Thus philosophy of science integrates the political, ethical and even social engineering components that allow for treating it as a hard core of interdisciplinary interaction of all socio-humanitarian disciplines. (shrink)

Philosophical Thought in Russia in the Second Half of the 20th Century is the first book of its kind that offers a systematic overview of an often misrepresented period in Russia's philosophy. Focusing on philosophical ideas produced during the late 1950s – early 1990s, it reconstructs the development of genuine philosophical thought in the Soviet period and introduces those non-dogmatic Russian thinkers who saw in philosophy a means of reforming social and intellectual life. Covering such areas (...) of philosophical inquiry as philosophy of science, philosophical anthropology, the history of philosophy, activity approach as well as communication and dialogue studies, the volume presents and thoroughly discusses central topics and concepts developed by Soviet thinkers in that particular fields. Written by a team of internationally recognized scholars from Russia and abroad, it examines the work of well-known Soviet philosophers (such as Mikhail Bakhtin, Evald Ilyenkov and Merab Mamardashvili) as well as those important figures (such as Vladimir Bibler, Alexander Zinoviev, Yury Lotman, Georgy Shchedrovitsky, Genrich Batishchev, Sergey Rubinstein, and others) who have often been overlooked. By introducing and examining original philosophical ideas that evolved in the Soviet period, the book confirms that not all Soviet philosophy was dogmatic and tied to orthodox Marxism and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism. It shows Russian philosophical development of the Soviet period in a new light, as a philosophy defined by a genuine discourse of exploration and intellectual progress, rather than stagnation and dogmatism. In addition to providing the historical and cultural background that explains the development of the 20th-century Russian philosophy, the book also puts the discussed ideas and theories in the context of contemporary philosophical discussions showing their relevance to nowadays debates in Western philosophy. With short biographies of key thinkers, an extensive current bibliography and a detailed chronology of Soviet philosophy, this research resource provides a new understanding of the Soviet period and its intellectual legacy 100 years after the Russian Revolution. (shrink)

The author advances the thesis that Max Horkheimer’s philosophy is a social one, the constitutive element of which is historiosophy. Contrary to the interpretative stereotype, dominating the philosophical literature, the Author strives to prove that Max Horkheimer’s philosophical point of view—that he calls the critical theory—is distinguished by its uniformity, because albeit the critical theory evaluated under the influence of the 20th-century Europe turbulent history, left its identity intact. The Author thinks that the identity of the (...) critical theory has two major indicators: 1. a visible criticism of the founding father of the Frankfurt philosophical school throughout his intellectual development towards the socio-historical circumstances that deprives the intellectual unity of autonomy and suppresses an independent thought and 2. the inconsolable thirst of changing things into better ones. Three stages of the development of Horkheimer’s philosophical conception have been depicted and briefly characterized in the article: prewar (the forming of the evidence of the critical theory), wartime (thehistoriosophical conception depicting the auto destruction of enlightenment) and postwar (the prediction of “an administered world”). (shrink)

The article shows that Russian philosophical community is very sensitive towards the history and the current state of philosophy of science and of science studies, which are a subject matter of special interest by virtue of a dedicated space in the university education system. This status is also supported by its proximity to the international philosophical mainstream of the 20th century and its specific object, its connection with science. Philosophy of science at the same time retains some (...) neutrality in relation to the dominant political ideology and proposes claims for an objective knowledge. History of philosophy of science, therefore, serves largely as a history of philosophical rationalism, and its prospects are determined by the strengthening of the role of science in modern culture. However, the modern existence of philosophy of science is undergoing substantial change and experiences a series of challenges. Among them there are the humiliation of intellectuals and scientists in society political voluntarism, mass consumption and the cult of mysticism. Under these conditions, a philosophical study of science and technology is forced to take on the challenges of social criticism and shape special civil institutions for self-preservation. Thus philosophy of science integrates the political, ethical and even social engineering components that allow for treating it as a hard core of interdisciplinary interaction of all socio-humanitarian disciplines. (shrink)

The contribution of Jesuits to the different fields of knowledge, including philosophy, is historically well known. In fact, since the foundation of the Society of Jesus, in the 16th century, Jesuits from different generations and cultures have taken part in the philosophical debates of their time and their different contexts. Since the foundation of the Society of Jesus, in 1540, the Jesuits, individually and as a body, have engaged in a fruitful dialogue between the Christian tradition and different dimensions (...) of human culture. During almost five centuries, numerous Jesuits taught philosophy in academic institutions all over the world. Some of them have their names recorded in the history of philosophy. Of course, the majority of them is not anymore remembered, despite their valuable contribution to the development of the Jesuit intellectual tradition up to our times. In fact, as an heir of the Roman College, the first academic institution founded by the Society of Jesus, in 1551, the Pontifical Gregorian University, in Rome, is a witness to this tradition, which has been kept alive thanks to the discrete work of both Jesuits and lay intellectuals. Known as the University of the Nations, this institution corroborates not only the capacity of the Jesuit tradition to put faith in dialogue with reason, but also the option to take the concrete reality of each human culture and its historical context as its point of departure. The Jesuits’ willingness to engage in dialogue with different intellectual perspectives is underpinned by one of the most defining traits of the Jesuit charism, namely, the conviction that God can be found and served in all things. Accordingly, Jesuits have adopted, from the beginning, an amenable stance towards the world with its different cultures and intellectual trends. As such, Jesuits have, since the beginning, inhabited the frontiers of human thought. According to the contemporary philosopher Paul Gilbert, SJ, within the institutions under the leadership of the Society of Jesus, it was always possible to maintain an equilibrium between two principles: “intellectual unity” and “openness to the world.” Without detriment to the Jesuit identity, the companions of Ignatius have been willing to dwell in the various dimensions of human reality, in their multiplicity and plurality. Either in the renewal of Aristotle’s and Aquinas’ metaphysics, or in the dialogue with modern philosophers such as Descartes, Kant, or Hegel, and even in the inculturation in non-European contexts, the Jesuits have been able to preserve the Christian tradition through an original development of human culture in all its richness and diversity. With respect to the last century, it has to be acknowledged that a significant number of Jesuits made significant contributions, with recognized competence, to philosophy. Certainly, the 20th century was particularly complex in many respects. It would be enough to recall that this period, which brought with it unprecedented social, scientific, and technological developments, was also the stage for the two World Wars. With the emergence or consolidation of philosophical currents such as Marxism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Structuralism, and Post-Modernism, the past century was, without any doubt, fascinating from the intellectual point of view. Jesuits such as Karl Rahner, Frederick Copleston, Bernard Lonergan, William Norris Clarke, John F. Kavanaugh, Teilhard de Chardin, Gaston Fessard, Jean Daniélou, Henri de Lubac, Michel de Certeau, Xavier Tilliette, Paul Valadier, Paweł Siwek, Ignacio Ellacuría, Francisco Taborda, Henrique de Lima Vaz and, in the Portuguese context, Diamantino Martins or Júlio Fragata, among many others, were able to engage different philosophical currents, problems and controversies of their times. Faithful to their long tradition of being present in the frontiers of thought, those Jesuits have engaged in a fruitful dialogue with these intellectual trends, offering relevant contributions to different ongoing debates. Within this context, the present volume recalls and discusses the philosophical contribution of some of the most prominent Jesuit protagonists of the intellectual interchange that took place in the 20th century. This volume also intends to celebrate the 75th anniversary of the Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia, which happens just before the inauguration of the Ignatian Year. Decreed by Father Arturo Sosa, the Superior General of the Society of Jesus, this celebratory Year will start on May 20, 2021, precisely 500 years after Ignatius of Loyola, the founder of the Jesuit Order, was wounded at the battle of Pamplona. We are happy that this volume could bring together outstanding specialists in the thought of some of the most prominent Jesuits philosophers of the last century, namely Paul Valadier, Paul Gilbert, Józef Bremer, Jacek Poznański, Alexander Maar, Patrick H. Byrne, M. Ross Romero, Carlos Alvarez, Hélio Pereira Lima, José Gama, Domingos Terra, Gabriel Flynn, Marie-Gabrielle Lemaire, José Sols Lucia, Lorena Zuchel Lovera, Pedro Pablo Achondo Moya, Enzo Solari, Massimo Borghesi, Mendo Castro Henriques, João Barbosa, and Dominique Lambert. In addition, in the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Júlio Fragata’s birth, Maria Teresa Fragata presents a memory of his life and thought. We hope that this volume may be useful to all those interested in the Jesuit philosophical tradition. Hopefully, it will stimulate scholars to pursue a fruitful and creative dialogue with contemporary philosophy, in the footsteps of the Jesuit philosophers featured here. We would like to thank all the authors and all those who, in different ways, made this volume possible. (shrink)

Critique and Affirmation in Erich Fromm explores the relations between Erich Fromm's theory and practice in politics and the psychoanalytic clinic - their points of continuity and contradiction. Drawing on a systematic reading of Fromm's published output, as well as extensive research in the Fromm archives, Matheus Romanetto extracts the fragments of ontology, logic, and ethics implicit in his writings, leading to a re-evaluation of Fromm's place in 20th century intellectual history. Interpolated with the theoretical argument (...) are three historical excursi thematizing Fromm's practice in political life, religious life, and the psychoanalytic clinic, setting the grounds for a new political sociology of radical humanism and critical theory. Critique and Affirmation in Erich Fromm will be of great interest to psychoanalysts and to academics and scholars of psychoanalytic studies, sociology, contemporary philosophy, political theory, and critical theory. (shrink)

The term 'systems theory' is used to characterize a set of disparate yet related approaches to fields as varied as information theory, cybernetics, biology, sociology, history, literature, and philosophy. What unites each of these traditions of systems theory is a shared focus on general features of systems and their fundamental importance for diverse areas of life. Yet there are considerable differences among these traditions, and each tradition has developed its own methodologies, journals, and forms of anaylsis. This book explores (...) this terrain and provides an overview of and guide to the traditions of systems theory in their considerable variety. The book draws attention to the traditions of systems theory in their historical development, especially as related to the humanities and social sciences, and shows how from these traditions various contemporary developments have ensued. It provides a guide for strains of thought that are key to understanding 20th century intellectual life in many areas. (shrink)

Americans have a long history of public arguments about taste, the uses of leisure, and what is culturally appropriate in a democracy that has a strong work ethic. Michael Kammen surveys these debates as well as our changing taste preferences, especially in the past century, and the shifting perceptions that have accompanied them. Professor Kammen shows how the post-traditional popular culture that flourished after the 1880s became full-blown mass culture after World War II, in an era of unprecedented (...) affluence and travel. He charts the influence of advertising and opinion polling; the development of standardized products, shopping centers, and mass-marketing; the separation of youth and adult culture; the gradual repudiation of the genteel tradition; and the commercialization of organized entertainment. He stresses the significance of television in the shaping of mass culture, and of consumerism in its reconfiguration over the past two decades. Focusing on our own time, Kammen discusses the use of the fluid nature of cultural taste to enlarge audiences and increase revenues, and reveals how the public role of intellectuals and cultural critics has declined as the power of corporate sponsors and promoters has risen. As a result of this diminution of cultural authority, he says, definitive pronouncements have been replaced by divergent points of view, and there is, as well, a tendency to blur fact and fiction, reality and illusion. An important commentary on the often conflicting ways Americans have understood, defined, and talked about their changing culture in the twentieth century. (shrink)

"Pre-modern philosophy" means the line of reflection that started with Plato andvAristotle, passed through Augustine and Boethius, and reached its acme in Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez. The whole line was harshly judged by Descartes, then mocked by the empiricsts of the 18th Century. Why, then, did Pope Leo XII make a determined effort to revive it? And, more importantly, why was the revival a stunning success by the middle of the 20th Century? The answers to both questions (...) are found in a famous German book, Philosophie der Vorzeit by Josef Kleutgen, now available for the first time in English. Pre-ModernPhilosophy Defended shaped and strengthened Pope Leo's resolve. It showed how inaccurate the harsh judgments had been and how sadly inferior the modern replacements from Descartes to Hegel had turned out to be in many respects. Not in all. Kleutgen was no knee-jerk reactionary. He made no bones about the obsolete status of pre-Newtonian physics and cosmology. Rather, he focused on the central boast of "modern" thought, namely, that it had turned at least to the "subject" and had provided a long-needed thing called a "critique of knowledge." This book is must reading for intellectual historians and for philosophers working today in epistemology. But most of all, it is essential reading for laity and clergy concerned about revivals of modernism in the church. What was modernism, after all, but an attempt to make the Church revise her theology in the "light" of Kant or Hegel? This is why every Modernist knew Kleutgen's name and hated this book. Here is the first English translation (from the German) of the master work of Josef Kleutgen, the nineteenth century social philosopher whose thought lies at, or near, the heart of Catholic Social Thought. Kleutgen is widely and rightly seen as the shadow author of the social encyclicals of Leo XII. Leo's Rerum Novarum remains the origin and constant reference point of all Catholic Social Teaching. And Popes since have dated their own social encyclicals from Rerum Novarum - hence, Quadragesimo anno and Centesimus annus. --Gerard V. Bradley, University of Notre Dame Pre-Modern Philosophy Defended is must reading for intellectual historians and for philosophers working today in epistemology. And it is essential reading for laity and clergy concerned about revivals of modernism in the church. What was modernism, after all, but an attempt to make the Church revise her theology in the 'light' of Kant or Hegel? This is why every Modernist knew Kleutgen's name and hated Philosophie der Vorzeit (Pre-Modern Philosophy Defended). (shrink)

This anthology brings together a selection of historical and contemporary writings on topics in African-American Philosophy. Questions regarding a wide range of issues--including slavery and freedom, social progress, self-respect, alienation, sexuality, cultural identity, nationalism, feminism, Marxism and violence--are critically examined from different perspectives by well-known philosophers and by non-philosophers from many disciplines. It emphasizes the historical significance of the philosophical arguments within very specific social and political contexts. Features substantial extracts, and in some cases complete works by important (...) 19th- and 20th-century social and political thinkers--organized under sections on Antebellem Critical Thought, Emigrationist and Diaspora Thought, Assimilation and Social Uplift, Contemporary Black Feminist Thought, Civil Rights and Civil Disobedience, Marxism and Social Progress, Rebellion and Radical Thought, Social Activism Reconsidered, Black Women Writers on Rape, and Alienation and Self-Respect. For anyone interested in the African-American experience and American history. (shrink)

Paradigms of historiography of philosophy in India have being changed since late 19th c. till present, depending on the social and cultural context of the history of Indian philosophy as a part of contemporary Indian culture. This change manifests itself in the conceptions of Indian historians concerning the teaching of Buddhist Mahāyāna school of Yogācāra (4th c. and later). Historians of colonial times, basing themselves on the philosophy of Neovedаntism (S. Radhakrishnan, S. Dasgupta), regarded Buddhism as a derivate (...) of late Vedic culture and Yogācāra as a teaching that reflected - though in an essentially transmuted form - the ideology of Upaniṣads. The latter, according to Neovedantists, was based on the postulate of the existence of the single cosmic soul - Brahman, the true human Self (Ātman) being identical to it. Historians of the late colonial and early postcolonial times (P.T. Raju, D.P. Chattopadhyaya, A.K. Chatterjee, partly also S. Dasgupta) brought Yogācāra closer to the teachings of European idealism, mainly to conceptions of G. Berkeley, G.W.F. Hegel, F. Bradley, J.E. McTaggart, trying to demonstrate a principal identity of fundamental problems in Indian and Western philosophy. At the same time, they brought Yogācāra together with the teaching of Brāhmaṇic school, Advaita Vedānta, regarded as another form of Indian idealism. In later times, following the evolution of contemporary Indian culture and changings in its social and political context, historians like D.J. Kalupahana became to analyze Yogācāra as a kind of philosophy of mind. All these facts show the dependence of strategies of historico-philosophical studies in India on its social, political and cultural context: in the Yogācāra teaching mainly those aspects call attention that a historian sees as the closest to the problematic field of contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

This book is the first to offer a full account of the philosophical work of Else Voigtländer. Locating the sources of her thought in the philosophy and psychology of the 19th and 20th centuries in figures such as Nietzsche and Lipps, the book uncovers and examines Voigtländer’s intellectual exchanges with both phenomenology and psychoanalysis. The major themes within her work are also considered in light of more recent developments in the philosophy of emotion, self, and sociality.

Intellectual history in the United States has long borne a peculiarly close kinship to social history. The twin fields rose together a century ago in a filial revolt against the cloistered, conservative study of political institutions. Sharing a progressive interest in social thought and social reform, they joined in the self-styled “social and intellectual history” of the interwar decades. After mid-century, however, they moved in divergent directions. Many social (...) historians adopted the quantitative methods of the social sciences, documenting the diverse experiences of workers, women, immigrants, slaves, native peoples, and others often marginalized in the textual record as well as the property regimes, modes of production, patterns of inheritance and mobility, and large-scale demographic and environmental forces that governed their lives. Intellectual historians tended to favor the qualitative evidence gleaned from the more cohesive letters and libraries of traditional elites, specializing in close readings of the intricate discursive, aesthetic, and spiritual templates of social experience found in religion, science, philosophy, political theory, and art and literature. Both subdisciplines had come into parallel crises by the 1980s, chastened by postmodern attacks on “master narratives” of any kind, whether idealist or materialist. In the decades since, social historians have sought a more nuanced consideration of thought and culture, while intellectual historians have at once broadened the range of their subjects and sources and limited more carefully the claims they make for them. (shrink)

Interview of Vsevolod Khoma with Professor Tamara Yashchuk within the framework of the research program “Ukrainian Philosophy of the 60s-80s of the 20th Century” of the Student Society of Oral History of Philosophy.

The 'history of ideas', better known these days as intellectual history, is a flourishing field of study which has been the object of much controversy but hardly any historical exploration. This major new work from Donald R. Kelley is the first comprehensive history of intellectual history, tracing the study of the history of thought from ancient, medieval and early modern times, its emergence as the 'history of ideas' in the 18th century, (...) and its subsequent expansion. The point of departure for this study is the perspective opened up by Victor Cousin in the early 19th-century on 'Eclecticism' and its association with the history of philosophy established by Renaissance scholars. Kelley considers a broad range of topics, including the rivalry between 'ideas' and language, the rise of cultural history, the contributions of certain 19th- and 20th-century practitioners of the history of ideas in interdisciplinary areas of philosophy, literature and the sciences, and finally the current state of intellectual history. The central theme of the book is the interplay between the canon of philosophical thought and the tradition of language and textual study, the divergence of the latter marking the 'descent of ideas' into the realm of cultural history. (shrink)

The essays in this book demonstrate the breadth and vitality of American intellectual history. Their core theme is the diversity of both American intellectual life and of the frameworks that we must use to make sense of that diversity. The Worlds of American Intellectual History has at its heart studies of American thinkers. Yet it follows these thinkers and their ideas as they have crossed national, institutional, and intellectual boundaries. The volume explores ways in (...) which American ideas have circulated in different cultures. It also examines the multiple sites--from social movements, museums, and courtrooms to popular and scholarly books and periodicals--in which people have articulated and deployed ideas within and beyond the borders of the United States. At these cultural frontiers, the authors demonstrate, multiple interactions have occurred - some friendly and mutually enriching, others laden with tension, misunderstandings, and conflict. The same holds for other kinds of borders, such as those within and between scholarly disciplines, or between American history and the histories of other cultures.The richness of contemporary American intellectual history springs from the variety of worlds with which it must engage. Intellectual historians have always relished being able to move back and forth between close readings of particular texts and efforts to make sense of broader cultural dispositions. That range is on display in this volume, which includes essays by scholars as fully at home in the disciplines of philosophy, literature, economics, sociology, political science, education, science, religion, and law as they are in history. It includes essays by prominent historians of European thought, attuned to the transatlantic conversations in which Europeans and Americans have been engaged since the seventeenth century, and American historians whose work has carried them not only to different regions in North America but across the North Atlantic to Europe, across the South Atlantic to Africa, and across the Pacific to South Asia. (shrink)

Abhinavagupta is undoubtedly the most famous Kashmirian medieval intellectual: his decisive contributions to Indian aesthetics, Saiva theology, and metaphysics, and to the philosophy of the subtle and original Pratyabhijna system, are well known. Yet so far his works have often been studied without fully taking into account the specific historical, social, artistic, religious, and philosophical context in which they are embedded. The purpose of this book is to show that this intellectual background is no less exceptional than (...) Abhinavagupta himself. (Series: Leipzig Studies on the Culture and History of South and Central Asia / Leipziger Studien zu Kultur und Geschichte Sud- und Zentralasiens, Vol. 6) [Subject: History, Abhinavagupta, India Studies, Religious Studies]. (shrink)

Today, liberals face a predicament: how to defend liberal principles, when adherence to them seems to constitute a fatal disadvantage against unprincipled opponents. The challenge is not new. In the early years of the twentieth century, liberalism was attacked, by critics on both the right and, especially, the left for being hypocritical, naïve, irresponsible, and impotent. It couldn't, for example (anti-liberalists thought), address the acute inequality of imperial rule, racial segregation, and socio-economic poverty. These issues of social justice (...) it was claimed by critics required a politics marked by an uncompromising commitment to ultimate ends, and an unrelenting use of power. Faced with such sentiments and the practical successes of anti-liberal ideologies (i.e. Fascism, Nazism, and Communism) liberals felt pressure to silence their scruples and doubts, and embrace the confidence, ruthlessness, and intransigence exhibited by their opponents. But doing so seemed tantamount to abandoning liberal hopes for, and commitments to, human freedom and all they valued in the first place. In Liberalism for Dark Times, Cherniss tells the story of the liberal response to this challenge in the twentieth century. Through a close study of five leading intellectuals engaged in these debates-Max Weber, Raymond Aron, Albert Camus, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Isaiah Berlin-Cherniss reconstructs a distinctive, neglected strand of liberal thought. This strand defines and defends liberalism as a political ethos: a complex of dispositions, temperament, and sensibility and style-which include skepticism; openness to experience; and careful, discriminating judgment-that shape how individuals make choices, meet challenges, understand and pursue possibilities, and conduct themselves toward others in the course of political struggle. In reconstructing the history of, what he calls, a tempered liberalism, and formulating it as a distinctive political perspective, Cherniss offers an alternative to the prevalent ways of thinking about both, liberalism's history and the intellectual resources available to it today. (shrink)

"Pre-modern philosophy" means the line of reflection that started with Plato andvAristotle, passed through Augustine and Boethius, and reached its acme in Aquinas, Scotus, and Suarez. The whole line was harshly judged by Descartes, then mocked by the empiricsts of the 18th Century. Why, then, did Pope Leo XII make a determined effort to revive it? And, more importantly, why was the revival a stunning success by the middle of the 20th Century? The answers to both questions (...) are found in a famous German book, Philosophie der Vorzeit by Josef Kleutgen, now available for the first time in English. Pre-ModernPhilosophy Defended shaped and strengthened Pope Leo's resolve. It showed how inaccurate the harsh judgments had been and how sadly inferior the modern replacements from Descartes to Hegel had turned out to be in many respects. Not in all. Kleutgen was no knee-jerk reactionary. He made no bones about the obsolete status of pre-Newtonian physics and cosmology. Rather, he focused on the central boast of "modern" thought, namely, that it had turned at least to the "subject" and had provided a long-needed thing called a "critique of knowledge." This book is must reading for intellectual historians and for philosophers working today in epistemology. But most of all, it is essential reading for laity and clergy concerned about revivals of modernism in the church. What was modernism, after all, but an attempt to make the Church revise her theology in the "light" of Kant or Hegel? This is why every Modernist knew Kleutgen's name and hated this book. Here is the first English translation (from the German) of the master work of Josef Kleutgen, the nineteenth century social philosopher whose thought lies at, or near, the heart of Catholic Social Thought. Kleutgen is widely and rightly seen as the shadow author of the social encyclicals of Leo XII. Leo's Rerum Novarum remains the origin and constant reference point of all Catholic Social Teaching. And Popes since have dated their own social encyclicals from Rerum Novarum - hence, Quadragesimo anno and Centesimus annus. --Gerard V. Bradley, University of Notre Dame Pre-Modern Philosophy Defended is must reading for intellectual historians and for philosophers working today in epistemology. And it is essential reading for laity and clergy concerned about revivals of modernism in the church. What was modernism, after all, but an attempt to make the Church revise her theology in the 'light' of Kant or Hegel? This is why every Modernist knew Kleutgen's name and hated Philosophie der Vorzeit (Pre-Modern Philosophy Defended). (shrink)

This book is the thirty-third volume in the "Philosophy of Russia of the first half of the 20th century" series. It traces the life and intellectual trajectories of three European thinkers with Russian roots: A. Koyré, A. Kojève, and I. Berlin. It explores their methodological strategies, explains the cultural and existential premises of their thinking styles that enabled them to succeed and gain recognition as European philosophers, traces their intellectual links with Russia, and reflects on the (...) importance of Russian intellectual culture for these thinkers and for twentieth-century European philosophy as a whole. The book is addressed to a wide range of readers interested in philosophy, social and political thought, and the intellectual history of the Russian exiles of the first half of the 20th century. (shrink)

The article presents a comparison of the interpretations of Edmund Husserl’s early philosophy, created in different local contexts: ones by Polish researchers (Kazimir Tvardovsky, Jan Luka sevich, Vladyslav Tatarkevych, Roman Ingarden, Aleksander Rozenblum-Augustowski) in the period 1895-1945, and Ukrainian philosopher Volodymyr Yurynets. This comparison takes place against the background of considering the differences in the conditions of the development of philosophy in pre-war and interwar Poland and the USSR. The author demonstrates the similarity of the readings of Husserl’s phenomenology by (...) Polish researchers and Yurynets and proves that the similarity between them is not only in the thematic focus of criticism of phenomenological philosophy, but also in its validity and level. In addition, the author offers an approach to the study of Yurynets’ figure and work, based on considering him primarily as a representative of Western intellectual culture. In particular, the possibility of considering Yurynets ‘ objections to Husserl’s project of phenomenological philosophy not as determined by ideological dictates, but as symptomatic of the European intellectual culture of the beginning of the 20th century is substantiated. Both Yurynets and the Polish phenomenological movement criticize phenomenology for its lack of coherence, and it is about both the internal coherence of phenomenological philosophy and its coherence with contemporary sciences. Particular attention is paid to the role of Yurynets in the history of Ukrainian studies of phenomenological philosophy in the context of the discussion about the origins of phenomenological studies in Ukraine.The author considers the investigations of the phenomenological movement in Poland to be fruitful for modern studies of phenomenological philosophy in Ukraine - a phenomenon that had a significant impact on the development of a wide range of humanitarian disciplines in Europe in the 20th-21st centuries and which has direct intersections and common personalities with Ukrainian philosophy. The same seems promising for other European local traditions. (shrink)

Hòa Hảo Buddhism belongs to that traditional lay and frugal buddhism encouraging practicing at home (tu tại gia) while being engaged with the world (nhập thế). It appeared in Southern Vietnam at the end of the 1930’s. Obviously, colonial contest and economic depression have played the part of a powerful catalyst in the spread by a young charismatic and reformist character of this millenarianism. Then, during three decades of postcolonial and cold wars (1945–1975), this New Religious movement hardly expressed its (...) Buddhist ethic of social statements in order to lend moral support and material protection to the local peasantry. Eventually, at the end of the war, this autonomous Buddhist community finally tried to morph again into a legal religion at a time when the Vietnamese Communist Party had to urgently impose a new sovereign socialist republic (1976). In other words, the new regime had to reunify the Nation and build a new secular state. In the southern part of the country, the replacement of a former liberal regime (Republic of Vietnam) by a socialist republic (called formerly a Democratic Republic in Northern Vietnam) completely changed the nature of the State-Church relations. Therefore, many religious groups’ agencies suffered a drastic blow as these groups were subordinated to the Patriotic Front and its mass organizations. Nevertheless, in 1991, the reorientation of the religious policy officially reaffirmed the religions’ social utility. Since then, new debates emerged to define the nature of the social actions of religious groups and then to delineate the legal sphere of their activities in this secular state. This essay intends to question how the two notions of being engaged with the world (nhập thế) and that of the secular state (nhà nước trung lập thế tục) interacted during these last decades. To tackle this pivotal issue, we focused on the specific implementation of Hòa Hảo social activism, from 1940’s until now, to underline how this activism evolved under different political regimes and how a new culture of social service has been promoted since the Hòa Hảo official church was recognized in 1999 and achieved years later. It questions more generally how religious groups can negotiate with the state for the emergence of a civil society or, at least, for the acceptance of their own tribute to the prosperity of the Nation. (shrink)

Reedition of papers in English spanning from 1986 to 2009 /// Historical background -- An imposed legacy -- Twentieth century contemporaneity -- Appendix: The philosophy of teaching legal philosophy in Hungary /// HISTORICAL BACKGROUND -- PHILOSOPHY OF LAW IN CENTRAL & EASTERN EUROPE: A SKETCH OF HISTORY [1999] 11–21 // PHILOSOPHISING ON LAW IN THE TURMOIL OF COMMUNIST TAKEOVER IN HUNGARY (TWO PORTRAITS, INTERWAR AND POSTWAR: JULIUS MOÓR & ISTVÁN LOSONCZY) [2001–2002] 23–39: Julius Moór 23 / István Losonczy (...) 29 // ON THE SURVIVAL OF ILMAR TAMMELO’S LETTER AND MANUSCRIPT ADDRESSED TO PROFESSOR MOÓR [2009] 41–44 // PROFESSIONAL DISTRESS AND SCARCITY: ALEXANDER HORVÁTH AND THE LEGACY OF NATURAL LAW IN HUNGARY [2005] 45–50 // HUNGARIAN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE 20TH CENTURY [2011] 51–72: I. The Pre-war Period [1. Bódog (Felix) Somló (1871–1920) 52] / II. The Inter-war Period [2. Gyula (Julius) Moór (1888–1950) 54 / 3. Barna Horváth (1896–1973) 55 / 4. József Szabó (1909–1992) 57 / 5. István Bibó (1911–1979) 58 / 6. Tibor Vas (1911–1983) 59 / 7. István Losonczy (1918–1980) 60] III. The Post-war Period (Communism) 61 [8. Imre Szabó (1912–1991) 62 / 9. Vilmos Peschka (1929–2006) 63 / 10. Kálmán Kulcsár (1928–2010) 65] IV. Contemporary Trends and Perspectives 66 [11. Csaba Varga (b. 1941) 66 / 12. András Sajó (b. 1949) 69 / 13. Béla Pokol (b. 1950) 70] V. Our Understanding of the Law Today 71 --- AN IMPOSED LEGACY -- LOOKING BACK [1999] 75–94: 1. On Ideologies and Marxism in general 75 / 2. Life of an Intellectual in Communism 79 / 3. On Marxism and its Socialist Cultivation in Particular 82 / 4. Legal Philosophising [4.1. Approaches to Law 87 / 4.2. Arriving at a Legal Ontology 91] 5. Conclusion 94 // LEGAL PHILOSOPHY OF THE MARXISM OF SOCIALISM: HUNGARIAN OVERVIEW IN AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE [2003] 95–151: I. Development and Balance of Marxist Philosophising on Law in Hungary [1. Preliminaries (until 1948) 96 / 2. Stalinism (from the Soviet Occupation on) {a) Liquidation of the »Residues« 98 / b) Soviet-type Uniformisation [Gleichschaltung] 99 / c) Denial of the Past, with a Dual Effect 99 / d) »Socialist Legality«, Drawn from the Progressive Past of Western Europe 103 / e) Search for the Germs of Scholarly Evolution 103} 3. Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation (from the 1960s) [a) Epigonism Becoming the Scholarly Ideal 104 / b) Stalinism in a Critical Self-perspective 105 / c) Disciples Diversified Launching their own Trends 107 / d) Comparatism 110 / e) (Re)discovery of the Western Legal Philosophy as a Competitor 112 / f) A Leading Mediatory Role within the »Socialist World Order« 114} 4. Disintegration (in the 1980s) {a) Attempt at Laying New Foundations for Marxism with Epigonism Exhausted 115 / b) Competitive Trends Becoming Exclusive 115 / c) Western Legal Philosophy Acknowledged as a Fellow-traveller within the Socialist Orbit Proper 116 / d) Hungarian Legal Theory Transforming into a National Corpus 118 / e) The Practical Promotion of Some Balance 119} 5. End-game for a Substitute State Religion (in the 1990s) 120] II. Marxist Legal Philosophising in an International Perspective [Ad 1: To the Preliminaries 122 / Ad 2: To Stalinism 124 / Ad 3: To Institutionalisation Accompanied by Relaxation {a) Late Separation from Vishinskiy’s Theory 125 / b) From Ideological Self-closure to an Apparently Scholarly Openness 127 / c) From Political Ideology to Genuine Scholarship 130 / d) International Recognition of Socialist Jurisprudence as an Independent Trend 135 / e) Together with Western Trends 137} Ad 4: To Disintegration {a) Loss of Attraction as Mere Epigonism 139 / b) Exclusivity of Competing Trends 139 / c) Fellowship with »Bourgeois« Trends 140 / d) An own Trend, Internationally Recognised 141 / e) A yet Progressive Role 142} Ad 5: To the Present state 143] III. A Temporary Balance 145 // AUTONOMY AND INSTRUMENTALITY OF LAW IN A SUPERSTRUCTURAL PERSPECTIVE [1986] 151–175: 1. The Strange Fate of Concepts 151 / I. A Relational Category 2. Basis and Superstructure: The Genuine Meaning 154 / 3. Exerting Social Influence as a Conceptual Minimum 156 / 4. Relationships within the Prevailing Totality 158 / 5. Attempts at Interpretation in Hungary 159 / 6. The Lukácsian Stand 162 / 7. Lukács’s Recognitions 168 / 8. Some Criticism 169 / II. The Law’s Understanding 171 / 9. Law Interpreted as Superstructure 171 / 10. Conclusions Drawn for the Law’s Understanding 173 // LEGAL THEORY IN TRANSITION (A PREFACE FROM HUNGARY) [2000] 177–186 // DEVELOPMENT OF THEORETICAL LEGAL THOUGHT IN HUNGARY AT THE TURN OF THE MILLENNIUM [2006] 187–215: 1. International Environment 188 / 2. The Situation in Hungary 190 / 3. Outlook I: The Historical-comparative Study of Legal Cultures and of the Lawyerly Way of Thinking 203 / 4. Outlook II: The Paradigmatic Enigma of the Transition to Rule of Law 207 / 5. Incongruity in Practice 213 / 6. Perspectives 214 --- TWENTIETH CENTURY CONTEMPORANEITY -- CHANGE OF PARADIGMS IN LEGAL RECONSTRUCTION: CARL SCHMITT AND THE TEMPTATION TO FINALLY REACH A SYNTHESIS [2002] 219–234: 1. Dangers of Intellectualism 219 / 2. Schmitt in Facts 221 / 3. Schmitt and Kelsen 222 / 4. On Bordering Conditions 226 / 5. With Kelsen in Transubstantiation 230 / 6. Polarisation as the Path of Theoretical Development 232 // KELSENIAN DOCUMENTS IN HUNGARY: CHAPTERS ON CONTACTS, INCLUDING THE GENESIS OF AUTOBIOGRAPHY [2006] 235–243: 1. Preludes 235 / 2. The Search for Moór’s Bequeath 235 / 3. Moór’s Collegiality 238 / 4. Bibó as a Disciple Translating 241 // THE »HART-PHENOMENON« [2002] 245–267: I. The Hart-miracle 246 [1. The Scene of Britain at the Time 247 / 2. The Personal Career 250 / 3. The Opus’ Career 252 / 4. Verbal Sociologism 255 / 5. Growing into the British Pattern 259] II. The Hart-phenomenon 260 [6. Origination of a Strange Orthodoxy 261 / 7. Mastering Periods of the 20th Century 263 / 8. Raising the Issue of Reception in Hungary 365] // LITERATURE? A SUBSTITUTE FOR LEGAL PHILOSOPHY? [2007] 269–287: 1. The Enigma of Law and its Study 269 / 2. “Law and Literature” 271 / 3. Varieties of “Law and Literature” 274 / 4. The German Study of Artistic Representations 280 / 5. Some Literary Reconsiderations 285 / 6. Conclusion 287 --- APPENDIX -- THE PHILOSOPHY OF TEACHING LEGAL PHILOSOPHY IN HUNGARY [2007] 291–320: I. Why and How to Philosophise in Law? 291 / II. The State of Teaching Legal Philosophy 294 / III. The Philosophy of Teaching Legal Philosophy 296 / IV. Programme at the Catholic University of Hungary 300 [1. Graduate Studies 300 {a) Basic Subjects 301 / b) Facultative Seminars 305 / c) Closing Subjects 309 / d) Written Memoranda and the Thesis 312} 2. Postgraduate Studies 313 / 3. Conclusion 317] V. Perspectives 318 /// Index of Subjects 321 / Index of Normative Materials 328 / Index of Names 329 . (shrink)

The early 20th century a new style of Chinese women sector, is in the "revolution in the text," the social context, in Liang "new style" reality show ideas and writing demonstration, with the women's liberation movement since the commencement of the body into its . Revolution in women's Evans into the text, thus producing a unique application of magic; from the women's liberation movement of the actual needs, to break old stereotypes composition, heart open style, so that (...) harvest unprecedented in the history of Chinese literary masterpiece and a rare woman beauty of the text; the use of affinity with the woman in the language of expression, so that large group of women "do not have a magic." Women's world has become a new style of new literature written in accessible modern woman's "magic" of the bridge, it is not only acting on the Revolution of 1911 nation / state / women's liberation movement, but also for "54" period, even after the development of the modern women's writing laid the strong foundation. The new type of writing for the womenfolk in the early 20th century began with the liberation movement of the women in the social background of "Literature Revolutionary" which guided by the new type writing of Liang Qichao. There are several characteristics of the new type writing as following: Firstly, it was much attractive with the revolutionary of womenfolk; Secondly, many great literary works came out in Chinese literature history with breaking the old style of article; Thirdly, a loving and harmonious article style for women had been adopted which was attractive strongly for the womenfolk. Therefore, the new type of writing for the womenfolk just likes a bridge for the women modem new literature which not only acted on the liberation movement of the nation and women during the Xinhai Revolutionary period but also provided a stable base for the modem women literature during and afterwards May Fourth period. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AMERICAN OATHOLlC THEOLOGY AT CENTURY'S END: POS'I100NCIL!IAR, POSTMODERN, POST...THOMISTIC * J. A. D1No1A, O.P. Domiinican House of Studies Washiington, D.O. I N CENTURY'S END-.a iascinaiting recent hook describing the decades at the turn of the centuries from the 990s throiUgh the 1990s-cultural historian Hillel Schwartz writes: "The millennial year ~000 has gravitamona1l tides of maximal reach. Its entire precedirng hundred years, our century, has come to (...) he felt as a final epoch, a time of grotesque·extremity...." 1 Along with other modern intellectual inquiries, American Catholic theology has felt the pull of the app :voaching miHenium. Any interpretation of its current stateas well as of the 'l:"ole that the ·thought of St. Thomas Aquinas may continue to play in it--'ll.eeds to take account of long range intellectual and theological trends. Clearly, the main currents in fate 20th century American Catholic theology result at least in part from the play of large tides reaching over the past hundred years and hey;ond. Among the most significant of these is Ohrist]anity's continuing endeavor to meet the pl'leS'sing surge of modernity. This endeavor engaged the energies of Catholics and Protestants for nearly two centuries, :before reaching 1someth:ing orf a climax in the Second Vatican C01Uncil. Assimilating the 1Work of several *A version of this paper was presented on May 4, 1990 in Rome at an Angelicum University symposium on the role of St. Thomas in contemporary thought. 1.Hillel.Schwartz, Oentury's End: A Oultural History of the Fiin de Siecle from the 990s through the 1990s (New York: Doubleday, 1990), p. 239. 499 500 J. A. DI NOIA1 O.P. generrutions of,bishops and theologians, the Council oombined a reaffirmation of the Catholic Christian identity of the Church with a positive, a:lbeit critical, approach to modernity. Now, just when disagreements about the conciliar stance to modernity preoccupy and divide eurrent American Catholic theologians, the advent of " :postmodernity " is being hailed in a1,chitecbure, literary oriticism, science, philosophy, and other fields. No wonder the decades ushering in the 21st century have seemed to many "a final epoch, a time of grotesque extremity " in theology an:d in Church life. The condition of late 20th century American theology is intelligible, I shall af'gue here, only when viewed in the perspective of the complex responses of Catholic and Protestant Christianity to the once swelling and now receding tides of modernity. The fortunes of the study of Aquinas ha,V'e shifted in tandem with these :fluctuations. In both Aquinas's late 19th century 11evival and, at least in American CathoJic circles, his late 20th century eclipse, alternative Christian assessments of the challenge of moderniity figured prominently. But the situation is again in flux. There is a recovery of Aquinas underway, in connection with theological developments that encompass at least a measure of the refreshing postmodern agenda. It is here, I shall suggest, that we can identify some of the most creative currents at work in present-day American theology. I Although united in their appeal to the authority of Vatican II, rival American Catholic theological positions are divided by two opposed readings of the nature of the conciliar response to modernity and its implioataions for the theo1ogica:l a:genida. Acco1 •ding to one reading, the Coundl is understood to commend,a strong reaffirmation o.f Catho·lic Christian identity, taking the broadest view of its historic traditions, yet open to the cultural and religious pluralism characteristic of our times. But in the eyes of a numerous and influential group of American theologians, such a reading reverses the true priorities of AMERICAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY 501 the Council. It was not resfomtion, ibut modernization, dialogue, a.nd social oommitment that V:atican IT chiefly sought to culti¥ate in the contemporary Church. To a. large extent, the state of theology in the U.S. (and perhaps elsewhere as well) refLects the predominance of the second interpreta.tion of the Council. Ressourcement or aggiornamento? As the conciliar documents reveal, both of these progmms were ruddressed and embraced by Viatican II. But which of them has priority? The documents themselrves... (shrink)

The article is preceded by “Introductory Remarks”, in which the author, for the sake of comparison, outlines the situation of Socinianism in Holland, England and France. The main part of the article is devoted to the discussion of the German scene, and describes the subject in seven points, namely: 1. The 17th century—the orthodoxy of the Protestant Germany in its fight against the Socinian phantom; 2. Leibniz; 3. The 18th century: orthodoxy and the Neologians; 4. The stance of (...) Lessing; 5. Socinianism as seen through Kantian-tinted spectacles; 6. Otto Fock: the first modern, scientific monograph of Socinianism; 7. Wilhelm Dilthey on the role of Socinianism in the intellectual history of Europe. (shrink)

The Baltic philosopher Vasily Sesemann (1884-1963), rooted in the Classics and influenced but not dominated by Kant, Herder, Bergson, Husserl, and Lossky, was a first-rate scholar in the fields of aesthetics, epistemology, logic, and history of philosophy. But he is still relatively unknown internationally because he wrote mostly in Lithuanian and some of his many works are only now being translated into English. This successor volume to his Aesthetics collects eight noteworthy essays, ranging from the scholarly to the popular, (...) on aesthetics, aesthetic education, national culture, and theory of knowledge. They reveal a sympathetic and responsive mind equally at home in Ancient Greek and modern French, German, and Russian philosophy; and capable both of untendentiously expounding their dominant ideas and fruitfully anticipating newer developments even as the latter began to take shape in early-to-mid-20th-century Western European philosophy. Hallmarks of Sesemann's thought are the Heraclitean preference for becoming (dynamism, change) over being (stasis, timelessness) and the idea that any culture, in order to survive and grow, must be intellectually deep and open to foreign influences. This insight has crucial relavance to the debates about multiculturalism today. Does it make sense to refer to the social and political existence of the Baltic countries as to being between civilizations of East and West, or as being on the boundary of two worlds? What are the most characteristic features of modern moral imagination? How does it manifest itself in the politics and cultures of the Baltic countries? These will be the main foci of the book series intended and launched as a critical examination of identity, politics, and culture in the Baltic countries. We are not going to confine this series to Soviet and post-Communist studies. By offering a wide scope of the social science and humanities disciplines, we would like to encourage intercultural dialogue and also to pursue interdisciplinary research in the field of Baltic studies. (shrink)

Some central issues of fin-de-siècle Hungarian philosophy and intellectual tradition can be retrieved from the writings of József Eötvös and his mid-nineteenth century contemporaries. An ambiguous attitude towards metaphysics, emphasis on sociological issues as well as a regional perspective are apparent in his texts prior to the emergence of the great fin-de-siècle generation of Hungarian intellectuals. They survived the Habsburg Empire thanks to the post-Monarchical literary tradition and Péter Esterházy’s works; they provided an adequate vocabulary for the Central (...) European experience following the Soviet Era. (shrink)

These autobiographical reflections by a major contemporary philosopher offer an enjoyable and enlightening tour not only of his own intellectual development but of the rich and fruitful collaboration of minds during a rich period in German cultural history. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author of Truth and Method, traces his "philosophical apprenticeships" with some of the most important thinkers of the 20th century.Perhaps more than anyone else, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who is Professor Emeritus at the University of Heidelberg, is (...) the doyen of German philosophy and the recognized chief theorist of hermeneutics. His book Reason in the Age of Science is an ideal introduction to his thought and to the problems of hermeneutics more generally. Philosophical Apprenticeships is included in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. (shrink)

This essay is an introduction and summary of my detailed study under preparation on the idea of Europe in contemporary Spanish thought. An historical interpretation of Spanish civilization from its earliest beginnings to the present time is presented in the article. I undertake the problem of Spain’s European vocation, specific features of its Christian culture, especially Iberian links with the Islamic world and the question of changes in Spanish identity. The article presents reflections on Europe by the Generation of ‘98 (...) Spanish writers and thinkers (chiefly Angel Ganivet, Miguel de Unamuno and Ramiro de Maeztu) who, in the face of defeat (1898) in the Spanish-American War, proclaimed a program of moral and cultural rebirth for Spain. Their ambivalent attitude towards Europe was rejected by José Ortega y Gasset and Salvador de Madariaga, both the most pro-European 20th century Spanish intellectuals. The problem of Spanishrelation to Europe was also widely discussed after the Civil War under General Franco regime. The evolution from initial isolation to a fuller integration with Europe of the regime and its conservative Catholic culture are also shown in the article. Much attention is devoted to the present-day civil and European Spain led by democratic socialists. (shrink)

Confronted with the decline of Western hegemony, the post-Great-War American society witnessed a prevailing trend of racism represented by Lothrop Stoddard, who proposed to suppress the nationalist movements in Asia and completely prohibit the immigration of Asians into the United States to maintain white supremacy across the world. His racist discourse also constituted the historical context of Sun Yat-sen’s speech to The Kobe Chamber of Commerce. Unlike previous studies of the speech that focused on Sun’s expression of “Greater Asianism,” this (...) paper examines his critical remarks on Stoddard, intending to explore the intellectual origin of the renewed outlook held by Sun on Chinese culture in his later years, as he intentionally misinterpreted Stoddard’s main idea as cultural revolt, neutralied such notions as biological determination and human inequality, and replaced white supremacy with the ascendancy of Chinese culture by emphasizing its originality, historical unity and moral superiority. On the very basis, Sun presented an alternative mode of modern civilization that diverged from the Euro-centric capitalist modernity. Echoing various anti-capitalist and counter-enlightenment thoughts of this period, Sun’s proposal could be taken as an integral part of the “new cultural conservatism” promoted by Chinese intellectuals in the 1920s. (shrink)

This concise biography tells the story of John Dewey, a pioneer of pragmatism and the first original school of philosophy created in America. The school was born out of a specific historical context, in the wake of a country at war with itself, and in response to the rapid changes of industrialization. Dewey's pragmatism celebrated human intelligence and agency and the promise that tomorrow could be better than today. For Dewey, pragmatism was the philosophy of democracy. Dewey lived from just (...) before the Civil War to just before school integration. As such, the book touches on many key moments in American history, from social reform in turn of the century Chicago, to censorship during world war one, and to the government's responsibilities in the Great Depression. It covers all this in the context of the life of a man whose ideas helped shape American culture and intellectual life. John Dewey: Prophet of an Educated Democracy will appeal to students, scholars, and all those interested in American philosophy and history of the 19th and 20th centuries. It will also compliment humanities courses on American philosophy, history, and intellectual traditions. (shrink)

This article proposes the historico-philosophical analysis of interpretative practices of French postmodernist philosophers through their contextualization in intellectual debate and social-institutional conditions of production of philosophical knowledge in French in the 60-70 of the 20th century. Philosophical strategies of postmodernism are placed in the context of «in-terpretative wars» that took place between historians of philosophy and new interpreters. The article considers specificity and the new criteria of postmodern interpretation that appears as a radicalization of hermeneutics on (...) the terrain of se-miology and, simultaneously, focuses on literature as a new model of philosophical discourse. The article examines the main contradictions of postmodern project that does not allow it to become “the other” in the fight against “the same” in French philosophy. Demonstrating the incompatibility of postmodern pluralism of sense and the historical-philosophical principles of objectivity and contextualization, the author introduces the distinction between historico-philosophical studies and philisophizing that appeals to philosophical texts of the past. (shrink)

The present article proposes an examination of the disciplinary evolution of demographic research in Communist Romania, as a case study of the mutually constitutive, multifaceted relationship between science, politics, ideology and memory. My research tries to compensate for the lack of access to the archives of the central institutions for population research during Communism, by combining published sources, with different archival documents, mainly coming from personal funds of two population researchers, from the fund of the Central Commission for Planning, of (...) the Chancellery of the Romanian Communist Party and from diplomatic archives. I pay attention to the side of the story offered by the actors themselves, focusing on the way in which the legacy of interwar demography was assumed and invoked in different post-war accounts regarding the history of demographic discipline in Romania. By doing so, I seek to contribute to writing a history of science as a product of complex entanglements between the different factors that circumscribe the process of knowledge production within a larger social and political context: specific professional interests and institutional settings, subjective interpretations, ideological pressures and attempts of political control. (shrink)

These autobiographical reflections by a major contemporary philosopher offer an enjoyable and enlightening tour not only of his own intellectual development but of the rich and fruitful collaboration of minds during a rich period in German cultural history. Hans-Georg Gadamer, the author of Truth and Method, traces his "philosophical apprenticeships" with some of the most important thinkers of the 20th century.Perhaps more than anyone else, Hans-Georg Gadamer, who is Professor Emeritus at the University of Heidelberg, is (...) the doyen of German philosophy and the recognized chief theorist of hermeneutics. His book Reason in the Age of Science is an ideal introduction to his thought and to the problems of hermeneutics more generally. Philosophical Apprenticeships is included in the series Studies in Contemporary German Social Thought, edited by Thomas McCarthy. (shrink)

This essay provides an intellectual history for the cultural turn that transformed the human sciences in the mid-20th century and led to the creation of cultural sociology in the late 20th century. It does so by conceptualizing and contextualizing the limitations of the binary primitive/modernity. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, leading thinkers – among them Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Freud – confined thinking and feeling styles like ritual, symbolism, totem, and devotional (...) practice to a primitivism that would be transformed by the rationality and universalism of modernity. While the barbarisms of the 20th century cast doubt on such predictions, only an intellectual revolution could provide the foundations for an alternative social theory. The cultural turn in philosophy, aesthetics, and anthropology erased the division between primitive and modern; in sociology, the classical writings of Durkheim were recentered around his later, religious sociology. These intellectual currents fed into a cultural sociology that challenged the sociology of culture, creating radically new research programs in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. (shrink)

The beginning of the 20th century coincides with the establishment of the modern disciplines of the social sciences, chiefly in the United States but on a smaller scale in Western Europe as well. These disciplinary structures, which varied from country to country, provide the organizing principle of this handbook.The immediate context of the disciplinarization of sociology was the transformation of two fields, statistics and history, which shed large chunks of content as they took their current shape. (...) The principal body of thought that is excluded from the discipline of history, for example, was philosophy of history. Émile Durkheim provided the earliest and most coherent reconciliation of this fundamental tension, and it is striking how similar the lists of intellectual sources and problems actually were between these principal solutions to the common problem of constructing a “science” out of the materials and topics in question. Durkheim's analytic strategy in this chapter relies on the preexisting methodological tradition about cause and statistics that was established in Mill's System of Logic, but rejected Mill's own understanding of the role of probability in favor of the method of concomitant variation, which Mill had thought was inapplicable in social science. (shrink)

This book traces the development of theories of the self and personal identity from the ancient Greeks to the present day. From Plato and Aristotle to Freud and Foucault, Raymond Martin and John Barresi explore the works of a wide range of thinkers and reveal the larger intellectual trends, controversies, and ideas that have revolutionized the way we think about ourselves. The authors open with ancient Greece, where the ideas of Plato, Aristotle, and the materialistic atomists laid the groundwork (...) for future theories. They then discuss the ideas of the church fathers and medieval and Renaissance philosophers, including St. Paul, Philo, Augustine, Aquinas, and Montaigne. In their coverage of the emergence of a new mechanistic conception of nature in the seventeenth century, Martin and Barresi note a shift away from religious and purely philosophical notions of self and personal identity to more scientific and social conceptions, a trend that has continued to the present day. They explore modern philosophy and psychology, including the origins of different traditions within each discipline, and explain both the theoretical relevance of feminism and gender and ethnic studies and also the ways that Derrida and other recent thinkers have challenged the very idea that a unified self or personal identity even exists. Martin and Barresi cover a number of issues broached by philosophers and psychologists, such as the existence of a fixed and unchanging self and whether the concept of the soul has a use outside of religious contexts. They address the question of whether notions of the soul and the self are still viable in today's world. Together, they reveal the fascinating ways in which great thinkers have grappled with these and other questions and the astounding impact their ideas have had on the development of self-understanding in the west. (shrink)

Despite its linguistic roots in ancient Greek, the concept of empathy is of recent intellectual heritage. Yet its history has been varied and colorful, a fact that is also mirrored in the multiplicity of definitions associated with the empathy concept in a number of different scientific and non-scientific discourses. In its philosophical heyday at the turn of the 19th to the 20th century, empathy had been hailed as the primary means for gaining knowledge of other minds (...) and as the method uniquely suited for the human sciences, only to be almost entirely neglected philosophically for the rest of the century. Only recently have philosophers become again interested in empathy in light of the debate about our folk psychological mindreading capacities. In the second half of the last century, the task of addressing empathy was mainly left to psychologists who thematized it as a psychological phenomenon and process to be studied by the method of the empirical sciences. Particularly, it has been studied by social psychologists as a phenomenon assumed to be causally involved in creating prosocial attitudes and behavior. Nevertheless, within psychology it is at times difficult to find agreement of how exactly one should understand empathy; a fact of which psychologists themselves have become increasingly aware. The purpose of this entry is to clarify the concept of empathy by surveying its history in various philosophical and psychological discussions and by indicating why empathy was and should be regarded to be of such central importance in understanding human agency in ordinary contexts, in the human sciences and for the constitution of ourselves as social and moral agents. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Arthur O. Lovejoy and the Challenge of Intellectual HistoryJohn Patrick DigginsMen and ideas advance by parricide, by which the children kill, if not their fathers, at least the beliefs of their fathers, and arrive at new beliefs.Sir Isaiah Berlin1I was supposed to wind up the study of mine, and become the Lovejoy of my generation—that's the silly talk of scholarly people.Saul Bellow2To become "the Lovejoy," with the implication (...) that each generation could only have one, was the ambition of Moses Herzog in Saul Bellow's novel, written a few years after he had won the Nobel Award for literature. Herzog presents the life of a professor who has as many sexual escapades and as much personal angst as he has scholarly interests, too unfocused to be another Lovejoy. Bellow's novel is full of letters to Nietzsche, Heidegger, and other modernist minds who brought Western intellectual life to a standstill, posing a lasting question mark about the possibilities of knowledge. Bellow taught in the program of the Committee on Social Thought at [End Page 181] the University of Chicago. His colleague and close friend Allan Bloom also taught in that program. But when Bloom wrote the best seller, The Closing of the American Mind, he cited Nietzsche and Heidegger as part of the "German disease" that did so much to subvert academic thought, supposedly turning students into zombies, walking air heads responding only to vacuous visual stimuli and mind-numbing music, with Rock n' Roll blasting through a Walkman and having the effect of a "masturbational fantasy."3While Bellow's epistolary novel interrogated modernist thinkers, Bloom's popular tract of the times cited many classical thinkers as a countervoice to the modernists—Aristotle, Plato, Socrates, Augustine, Aquinas, Dante, Hobbes, Kant, Lessing, Schiller, Locke, and Rousseau. Such minds also figured prominently in the works of Arthur O. Lovejoy. But the recitation of such names leaves the impression that Lovejoy concerned himself only with the main currents of European intellectual history. On the contrary, two of his most important and often neglected books are The Thirteen Pragmatisms and Reflections on Human Nature.4 There one finds profound meditations on two vital episodes in the history of ideas in America: the Enlightenment and the philosophy of pragmatism. Perry Miller, arguably America's greatest intellectual historian, skipped over the Enlightenment as he proceeded to study the Puritans and then the transcendentalists, and he never seemed to have much interest in the pragmatists.5 But what Lovejoy had to write on the Enlightenment and pragmatism is richly ironic.The pragmatists claimed to have liberated modern thought from the easy assumptions of the "Age of Reason," and today's poststructuralists charge that eighteenth-century Enlightenment thinkers deceived themselves in looking to the advent of knowledge as an answer to the presence of power. Lovejoy's books offer a different take entirely, making us aware that it is the modernist thinkers who may be deceiving themselves with the dubious promises of pragmatism and the arrogant conceits of poststructuralism and deconstruction, whose proponents claim to be the first "masters [End Page 182] of suspicion." In many of Lovejoy's works, nothing is resolved and everything is left suspended in a state of honest suspicion.Lovejoy was comfortable with contradiction, and hence more in tune with Augustine, who looked to the depths of human consciousness for spiritual knowledge, than with Aquinas, who believed evidence for God and human freedom could be found in reason alone. Nowhere is Lovejoy's affinity for the emotions of consciousness better seen than in his several essays on romanticism, both English, French, German, and even its origins in Chinese aesthetics and Confucian ethics. It was not reason and the notion of order and regulation that appealed to Lovejoy but the spontaneous promptings of nature springing forth without reflection or design. He delighted in quoting Voltaire against classicists and scholastics. "Worship God and practice justice—this is the sole religion of the Chinese literati.... O Thomas Aquinas, Scotus, Bonaventure, Francis, Dominic, Luther, Calvin, canons of Westminister, have you anything better? For four thousand years this religion, so simple and so noble, has endured in... (shrink)

Public and academic philosophical thinking in contemporary India provides evidence that philosophy and religion have never been truly separated, although there have been attempts to bring philosophy closer to science and, thus, create two autonomous systems. In light of these changes, P. V. Athavale, C. T. K. Chari, N. S. Prasad and some other authors have formed and are developing modern ethical and social theories. Moreover, feminism and gender studies have appeared in the panorama of changing philosophical and sociological (...) thinking in India, embracing gender equality in contemporary Indian society. There has been increasing interest in sociological research and a critical interpretation of Mahatma Gandhi’s spiritual message in the cause of India’s independence, whose thoughts authors engaged in contemporary ethical problems believe to be impractical and useless today. Existentialism as a philosophical stream earned broad public acceptance and played a significant role in the history of modern philosophical thinking in India in the second half of the 20th century. (shrink)