The present paper defends the thesis that Spenser's recovery of place, as enacted in 'The Faerie Queene,' Book VI, can be linked in a direct way to his use of a poetic phenomenology which informs and clarifies his work as an epic writer. Spenser's "Book of Courtesy" enacts a Neo-Platonic movement from the lower levels of temporal existence to an exalted vision of spiritual perfection. The paper explores this movement along phenomenological lines as a mysterious adventure that embraces self and (...) other, personality and community, aesthetics and ethics, in a sequence of images that opens up a new interpretation of imaginative fulfillment. -/- . (shrink)

Steadman suggests that these poets, along with most other Renaissance poets, did not actually regard themselves as divinely inspired but, rather, resorted to a common fiction to create the appearance of having special insight into the truth.

This paper looks at a passage from the History of England in which Hume says that Edmund Spenser is an excellent but unread writer. This type of remark (the ‘Spenser judgement’) should not be explained away. Hume himself does not show how the Spenser judgement is possible, but a passage in ‘Of the Standard of Taste’ can nevertheless be reinterpreted so as to yield a distinction on which an acceptable account relies.

To stress the subjectivity of the analyst is to accept the centrality of countertransference in the analytic relationship. Psychoanalysts have long recognized the importance of transference in the analytic setting—that is, the analysand's way of relating to the analyst in terms of his strong, ambivalent unconscious feelings for earlier figures , a process whose successful resolution constitutes the psychoanalystic "cure." But, since the patient's transference is only experienced by the analyst through his countertransference responses, recent theorists have come to emphasize (...) the importance of countertransference in psychoanalysis. In what Otto Kernberg calls its "totalistic" definition, countertransference refers to "the total emotional reaction of the psychoanalyst to the patient in the treatment situation."1 It is, therefore, a source of both empathic understanding and defensive misunderstanding, of distortion and insight. Hans Loewald remarks: "Since a psychoanalytic investigation can be carried out only by a human mind, we cannot conceive of one in which the analyst's [counter] transference and resistance are not the warp and woof of his activity."2 · 1. Otto Kernberg, Borderline Conditions and Pathological Narcissism , p. 49. · 2. Hans Loewald, "Psychoanalytic Theory and the Psychoanalytic Process," The Psychoanalytic Study of the Child 25 : 56. Cf. Heinz Kohut, "Introspection, Empathy, and Psychoanalysis," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 7 : 459-83. For a clear discussion of the background of the countertransference concept in Freud, see Humberto Nagera, et. al., Basic Psychoanalytic Concepts on Metapsychology, Conflicts, Anxiety and Other Subjects , pp. 200-206. Two surveys of the literature on the topic are particularly useful: Douglas Orr, "Transference and Countertransference: A Historical Survey," Journal of the American Psychoanalytic Association 2 : 621-70, and Kernberg, pp. 49-66. Arthur F. Marotti, associate professor of English at Wayne State University, has written a number of essays on Ben Jonson, John Donne, Thomas Middleton, and Edmund Spenser. He is completing a book-length social-historical and psychoanalytic study of Donne's poetry and a book on Jonson; some of the theoretical assumptions behind both projects are discussed in this article. See also: "Psychoanalysis and the Marionette Theater: Interpretation is Not Depreciation" in Vol. 5, No. 1. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Conquest and English Legal Identity in Renaissance IrelandBrian LockeyLike the Spanish administrators of the American territories, English administrators of Ireland attempted to impose their own native legal system on the Irish inhabitants. Nonetheless, important differences existed between the two kingdoms' legal approaches to their respective colonial contexts. Because Spanish jurisprudence was allied with universalist Catholic doctrine and was officially based on Justinian's Corpus Iuris Civilis (the ancient Roman legal (...) code which had close affinities to natural law discourse), Spanish administrators expected New World inhabitants to accept what they considered to be the "universal values" that were inherent in Spanish law.1 In contrast English common law had its roots not in natural law but in the peculiar customs of the English people. Thus, while the Spanish were able to claim that they were replacing unnatural Indian customs with a legal system rooted in universal natural law, the English were attempting to reform what they considered to be the unnatural practices of the Irish by imposing a legal system defined by its insularity and its peculiar affinity with English institutions.2 In this essay I show that Renaissance ethnographies on Ireland by such English administrators of Ireland as Edmund Spenser, Sir John Davies, and Fynes Moryson are fractured by a conflict between a commitment to natural-law theory, which had its origin in continental writings, and a corresponding commitment to the native English tradition of common law. I examine how works by Spenser, Davies, and Moryson dealt with this conflict within their collective project of articulating a legal justification and strategy for the pacification of Ireland. [End Page 543]Despite reports throughout Europe of Spanish-perpetrated cruelty throughout the Americas, the idea that war or conquest could be just or even charitable when prosecuted against oppression originated within the Catholic tradition of scholastic just-war theory.3 Many of the sixteenth-century writers who were writing about war and conquest in legal or ethical terms were Spanish or continental theologians who had attempted to evaluate Spanish imperial policy in the New World. On the one side were such figures as the Scottish theologian John Major and Spanish historian Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda, both of whom had justified Spanish conquest and treatment of the Indians using arguments based on the foundation of natural law.4 On the other side were those who had, on similar terms, voiced criticisms of the cruelties which Spanish forces were inflicting on the Indians. Francisco de Vitoria and Bartolomé de las Casas were certainly the most notable Spanish writers who favored more ethical treatment of New World inhabitants.5 Other prominent defenders of Indian rights were Domingo de Soto and Melchor Cano.6 Whether directly or through intermediaries, the ideas of many of these writers permeated the ideological fabric of England.Sir Fulke Greville's famous statement about Sir Philip Sidney's goal of fostering alliances with New World inhabitants in order to overthrow the Spanish authorities included an awareness of the "inhuman cruelties" of the Spanish forces, an awareness that probably originated in the English translation of Las Casas's Brevissima relación de la destrucyión de las Indias (1552).7 Beyond [End Page 544] this significant text, however, there were others. One important book that captured the ideas of the early Spanish debates on the ethics and justice of the New World conquests was Antonio de Guevara's Relox de príncipes (1529), a work twice translated into English during the sixteenth century.8 The third book of the Relox de príncipes, which treats the princely virtues of justice, peace, and magnificence, contains several sections that together constitute a polemic against violent imperialism and unjust conquest. In one notable episode Guevara employs the example of ancient Roman imperialism to produce a veiled critique of the injustices which Spain had committed against New World polities. A "villain of Danuby" from a German province newly conquered by Rome makes a speech to the Roman senate in which he criticizes the injustice of his Roman oppressors. The German villain characterizes the conquest of Germany in the following terms: "For I let you know, if you do not know it, that when... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:English Classical: The Reform of Poetry in Elizabethan England STEPHEN ORGEL Roger ascham, writing in the 1560s, in the course of a treatise on education, urged the reform of English poetry on classical models: “Our English tongue, in avoiding barbarous rhyming, may as well receive right quantity of syllables, and true order of versifying... as either Greek or Latin....”1 He cites as an example of right quantity of syllables (...) and true order of versifying this translation by the scholar and poet William Watson of a verse from the Odyssey: All travelers do gladly report great praise of Ulysses. For that he knew many men’s manners, and saw many cities. This does not sound much like English poetry, but if we count it out we can see that it does, more or less, follow the quantitative rules. The trouble is that the rules have little to do with English pronunciation. Vowels are long by position (followed by two consonants) regardless of how they are pronounced ; moreover, Watson makes vowels long if they are stressed (such as the a in “travelers” and “manners” and the i in “cities”), again regardless of how they are pronounced. For the Elizabethans, this was a problem not with the rules, but with English, both in its dissimilarity from the classical tongues and in the variety of spelling and pronunciation at the time—proponents of quantitative verse in English observe that a necessary first step would be to stabilize the language, as Gabriel Harvey wrote to Edmund Spenser, “there is no one more regular and justifiable direction, either for the assured and infallible certainty of our English artificial prosody particularly, or generally to bring our language into art and to arion 27.2 fall 2019 frame a grammar or rhetoric thereof, than first of all universally to agree upon one and the same orthography.”2 But even with a stable orthography, the application of quantitative rules to English is problematic. To begin with, it is not clear in what sense an English vowel can be said to be long or short—to consider the vowels in stressed syllables invariably long, as Watson does, is entirely arbitrary. There is obviously a difference between the a sound in “rat” and in “rate”; such vowels are now described as short and long, but in pronunciation, they may or may not be of equal extension : thus, the a in “rate” is not, in speaking, longer than the a in “rat,” it is simply pronounced differently; whereas the i in “rise” is certainly longer than the i in “rid.” If quantity means length, English vowels are too erratic to serve—Harvey observed to Spenser that in some quantitative hexameters Spenser had sent him, “the,” “ye” and “he” were treated as short, but “me” was long.3 The issue is especially vexed in the case of vowels that are long by position. The most common examples in English are the -ing endings of participles, which are invariably unaccented and stubbornly short when spoken. In fact, Thomas Campion confronted precisely this problem; and his way of dealing with it gives a clear sense of how willed the whole quantitative system in English necessarily was: For though we accent the second [syllable] of Trumpington short, yet is it naturally long, and so of necessity must be held of every composer.4 What can “naturally” mean here? Are the rules of Latin prosody laws of nature? Harvey had a clear sense of the practical problems, writing to Spenser, “in short, this is the very short and long: position neither maketh short nor long in our tongue,” and concludes that some other rule must be found for English “that should as universally and canonically hold amongst us as position doth with the Latins and Greeks.”5 The larger assumption behind Ascham’s and Harvey’s proposals for a new poetry was that the “barbarous” England 44 english classical of the time could be rectified by the application of classical rules. A return to the classics held out the promise of culture and civility—not only in poetry, of course, but poetry seemed a particularly clear example. Nobody thought the transformation would be easy; a hectoring... (shrink)

5 sehr merkwürdiger Tatsachen zutage gefördert, die vordem verborgen waren, und wirklich psychologische Tatsachen, wenn auch die Physiologen manche große Gruppen von ihnen ihrer eigenen Wissenschaft mit zurechnen. Mag die Einstimmigkeit 5 in der theoretischen Interpretation dieser Tatsachen auch sehr weit zurückstehen hinter derjenigen der exakten naturwissen­ schaftlichen Disziplinen, so ist sie in gewisser Hinsicht doch wieder eine vollkommene, nämlich was den methodischen Stil der gesuchten Theorien anlangt. Jedenfalls ist man in den inter- 10 nationalen Forscherkreisen der neuen Psychologie der (...) festen Überzeugung, einer bis vor kurzem ungebrochenen Überzeugung, daß nun endlich die allein wahre und echte Psychologie in den Gang gebracht sei, als eine strenge Wissenschaft, auf deren Wegen die Gesamtheit aller psychologischen Probleme, aller 15 zur individuellen und Kulturgeistigkeit gehörigen, liegen müssen. Es bedürfe nur, wie in jeder auf elementaren Aufbau und auf die Erklärung aus elementaren Gesetzen bedachten Erfahrungs­ wissenschaft, geduldiger Zurückhaltung und eines ganz vor­ sichtigen Emporschreitens ; man dürfe nur nicht voreilig nach 20 Problemen greifen, die noch nicht zu wissenschaftlicher Be­ arbeitung reif, für die noch nicht die Tatsachenunterlage bereit­ gestellt und die nötigen Erfahrungsbegriffe geschaffen sind. Einen nicht geringen Zuwachs an innerer Sicherheit hat die neue Psychologie durch die gelingende Schöpfung einer Psycho- 25 technik erhalten. Nun schien diese Psychologie wirklich der exakten Physik gleichzustehen. Sie war nun sogar so weit, um ihre psychologische Erkenntnis, ganz so wie physikalische und chemische, technisch nutzbar zu machen. (shrink)

This is the first collaborative volume to place Shakespeare's works within the landscape of early modern political thought. Until recently, literary scholars have not generally treated Shakespeare as a participant in the political thought of his time, unlike his contemporaries Ben Jonson, Edmund Spenser and Philip Sidney. At the same time, historians of political thought have rarely turned their attention to major works of poetry and drama. A distinguished international and interdisciplinary team of contributors examines the full range of (...) Shakespeare's writings in order to challenge conventional interpretations of plays central to the canon, such as Hamlet; open up novel perspectives on works rarely considered to be political, such as the Sonnets; and focus on those that have been largely neglected, such as The Merry Wives of Windsor. The result is a coherent and challenging portrait of Shakespeare's distinctive engagement with the characteristic questions of early modern political thought. (shrink)

Abraham Fraunce’s The Shepherds’ Logic (c. 1585) is one of the first English adaptations of Petrus Ramus’s Dialecticae libri duo (1556). Preserved in a manuscript also containing two shorter essays on Ramist dialectic, the work was later modified and enlarged for publication as The Lawyers’ Logic (1588). But Fraunce’s substantial and almost exclusive use of Edmund Spenser’s The Shepherds’ Calendar (1579) as the source for practical examples makes the manuscript treatise a unique document revealing the influence of the Ramist (...) reform of the arts of discourse on the new literary elite led by Philip Sidney and Gabriel Harvey. This is the first published critical edition of Fraunce’s early treatise and the two companion essays. It presents the texts in modernized spelling, traces their sources and contexts, and draws out their literary and philosophical implications. It also includes relevant excerpts from The Lawyers’ Logic, such as Fraunce’s quantitative-verse translation of Virgil’s Second Eclogue and its Ramist analysis, and a full catalogue of the quotations from Spenser’s Calendar. As a whole, this edition sees Fraunce’s pastoral logic as a first-hand testimony showing how scholarly training in the Renaissance arts of discourse enlightened the composition and interpretation of poetic texts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 35.3 (2002) 244-265 [Access article in PDF] Community, Assimilation, and the Unfamiliar Tim Donovan Fellowship We are five friends, one day we came out of the house one after the other, first one came and placed himself beside the gate, then the second came, or rather he glided through the gate like a little ball of quicksilver, and placed himself near the first one, and then (...) came the third, then the fourth, then the fifth. Finally we all stood in a row. People began to notice us, they pointed at us and said: "Those five just came out of that house." Since then we have been living together; it would be a peaceful life if it weren't for the sixth one continually trying to interfere. He doesn't do us any harm, but he annoys us, and that is harm enough; why does he intrude where he is not wanted? We don't know him and don't want him to join us. There was a time, of course, when the five of us did not know one another, either; and it could be said that we still don't know one another, but what is possible and can be tolerated by the five of us is not possible and cannot be tolerated with the sixth one. In any case, we are five and don't want to be six. And what is the point of this continual being together anyhow? It is also pointless for the five of us, but here we are together; a new combination, however, we do not want, just because of our experiences. But how is one to make this clear to the sixth one? Long explanations would almost amount to accepting him in our circle, so we prefer not to explain and not to accept him. No matter how he pouts his lips, we push him away with our elbows, but however much we push him away, back he comes. — Franz Kafka 1. I want to introduce this essay on Edmund Spenser's early modern dialogue View of the Present State of Ireland with a contemporary question influenced by Franz Kafka's epigraph: What are the principles that presuppose an understanding of community? I have purposely stated the question of belonging as "an understanding" rather than "what are the principles that we presuppose as...." After all, who is this we that so easily gathers identity within the common usage? I begin with a question to maintain uncertainty, [End Page 244] which indicates a responsibility to greet the unfamiliar, all the while knowing very clearly that the concept of community naturally presumes some common measure of familiarity. Yet as Kafka's allegory implies: What presupposes the propriety of those familiar experiences we name our own?Spenser's dialogue is undoubtedly challenging, a challenge that has drawn an enormous amount of recent critical analysis from literary critics and historians. Still, a general difficulty persists. Michael Donnelly summarizes the difficulty quite well when he notes that the View is quite "anomalous in the Spenserian oeuvre," a rather strange dialogue that seems uncharacteristic of the poet's humanist image (1). The challenges certainly begin with the troubling difficulties of an argument that concludes with the stark political necessities of enforced famine, massive relocation, and ethnic cleansing. Furthermore, the anxious burden of justifying this dire program expresses itself in a tone that would be thought intemperate even by many of Spenser's contemporaries (McCabe, 116). More important than the dialogue's dire tone of determination, there is a continued resonance of enforced cultural assimilation and genocide that haunts our contemporary world forewarned by arguments of pathology and apartheid. However, a glance at recent political news would indicate that these forewarnings are repeatedly ignored. I believe the challenge that the View evokes dwells in the traditional lineage of the concept of community. Thus, we cannot so easily dismiss Spenser's dialogue as merely an early modern problem; nor can we dismiss it as another diatribe in the long-standing tradition of racial screeds. The political problems that the dialogue engages foreshadow current... (shrink)

the Logische Untersuchungen,l phenomenology has been conceived as a substratum of empirical psychology, as a sphere comprising "imma nental" descriptions of psychical mental processes, a sphere compris ing descriptions that - so the immanence in question is understood - are strictly confined within the bounds of internal experience. It 2 would seem that my protest against this conception has been oflittle avail; and the added explanations, which sharply pinpointed at least some chief points of difference, either have not been understood (...) or have been heedlessly pushed aside. Thus the replies directed against my criticism of psychological method are also quite negative because they miss the straightforward sense of my presentation. My criticism of psychological method did not at all deny the value of modern psychology, did not at all disparage the experimental work done by eminent men. Rather it laid bare certain, in the literal sense, radical defects of method upon the removal of which, in my opinion, must depend an elevation of psychology to a higher scientific level and an extraordinary amplification ofits field of work. Later an occasion will be found to say a few words about the unnecessary defences of psychology against my supposed "attacks. (shrink)

Teilband 1. Verstand und Gegenstand : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1909-1927) -- Teilband 2. Gefühl und Wert : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1896-1925) -- Teilband 3. Wille und Handlung : Texte aus dem Nachlass (1902-1934) -- Teilband 4. Textkritischer Anhang.

Série de conférences faites à la Sorbonne en 1929, publié en 1931, l'ouvrage reprend le cogito ergo sum cartésien et développe le thème de la phénoménologie transcendantale en suivant le cheminement des Méditations de Descartes.

One of the most important and difficult tasks in medicine is to determine when patients have the capacity to make decisions for themselves. This determination may determine a patient’s life or death. This article presents criteria and approaches now used to make this assessment and discusses how these approaches are presently applied in five common disorders that can serve as paradigms for approaches in other disorders. I propose that since there are new diagnoses and treatments, reconsidering our current practices is (...) warranted. The possibilities that clinicians can nudge patients to make better choices for themselves and, above all, that clinicians can maintain and maximize positive patient/careprovider relationships during and after these assessments, are emphasized. (shrink)

Clinicians and patients and their families may disagree about a course of treatment, and the ensuing conflict may seem intractable. The parties may request mediation, or use mediation-based approaches, to help resolve the conflict. In the process of mediation, and at other times, parties in conflict may feel so pressured to accept a resolution that they acquiesce unwillingly—and such resolutions often unravel. In this article I investigate how “bullied acquiescence” might happen, and how to avoid it.

Clinicians and ethicists routinely encounter complex ethical dilemmas that seem intractable, which have been described as ethical Gordian knots. How can they best assist patients and surrogate decision makers who are entangled in struggles around the capacity to make life-or-death treatment decisions? In this article I describe unconventional and unorthodox approaches to help slice through these dilemmas.

6 werden kann, mußte die Einsicht erwecken, daß das Quantitative gar nicht zum allgemeinsten Wesen des Mathematischen oder "Formalen" und der in ihm gründenden kalkulatorischen Me­ thode gehöre. Als ich dann in der "mathematisierenden Logik" 5 eine in der Tat quantitätslose Mathematik kennenlemte, und zwar als eine unanfechtbare Disziplin von mathematischer Form und Methode, welche teils die alten Syllogismen, teils neue, der Überlieferung fremd gebliebene Schlußformen behandelte, gestalteten sich mir die wichtigen Probleme nach dem allgemei- 10 nen Wesen des Mathematischen (...) überhaupt, nach den natürlichen Zusammenhängen oder etwaigen Grenzen zwischen den Systemen der quantitativen und nichtquantitativen Mathematik, und spe­ ziell z. B. nach dem Verhältnis zwischen dem Formalen der Arithmetik und dem Formalen der Logik. Naturgemäß mußte 15 ich von hier aus weiter fortschreiten zu den fundamentaleren Fragen nach dem Wesen der Erkenntnisform im Unterschiede von der Erkenntnismaterie und nach dem Sinn des Unter­ schiedes zwischen formalen (reinen) und materialen Bestimmun­ gen, Wahrheiten, Gesetzen. 20 Aber noch in einer ganz anderen Richtung fand ich mich in Probleme der allgemeinen Logik und Erkenntnistheorie ver­ wickelt. Ich war von der herrschenden Überzeugung ausgegangen, daß es die Psychologie sei, von der, wie die Logik überhaupt, so die Logik der deduktiven Wissenschaften ihre philosophische 25 Aufklärung erhoffen müsse. Demgemäß nehmen psychologische Untersuchungen in dem ersten (und allein veröffentlichten) B- de meiner Philosophie der Arithmetik einen sehr breiten Raum ein. {[A VII] Diese psychologische Fundierung wollte 11 mir in gewissen Zu- [B VII] sammenhängen nie recht genügen. (shrink)

Therapists treating adolescent gang members face unique ethical dilemmas. These dilemmas arise directly from clinical issues that inevitably emerge in the treatment of this population. Clinical issues related to the adolescent gang member having great difficulty trusting, having experienced and observed much violence, and usually having participated in criminal activities are central to the treatment process. In this article I discuss the ethical problems that subsequently emerge: maintaining confidentiality, discharging one's duty to warn or protect, and imposing one's personal values. (...) Suggestions for future research are offered. (shrink)

The author describes an alternative approach that careproviders may want to consider when caring for patients who request interventions that careproviders see as futile. This approach is based, in part, on findings of recent neuroimaging research. The author also provides several examples of seemingly justifiable “paternalistic omissions,” taken from articles in this issue of The Journal of Clinical Ethics (JCE). The author suggests that while careproviders should always give patients and their loved ones all potentially relevant information regarding “futile” decisions, (...) careproviders may wish to consider, paradoxically, not giving advice in these situations, when the advice is based mostly or wholly on their own moral views, based on this same, ethical rationale. (shrink)