Polish philosophy of science has been the beneficiary of three powerful creative streams of scientific and philosophical thought. First and fore­ most was the Lwow-Warsaw school of Polish analytical philosophy founded by Twardowski and continued in their several ways by Les­ niewski, Lukasiewicz, and Tarski, the great mathematical and logical philosophers, by Kotarbinski, probably the most distinguished teacher, public figure, and culturally influential philosopher of the inter-war and post-war period, and by Ajdukiewicz, the linguistic philosopher who was intellectually sympathetic with (...) the anti-irrationalist (as he would say), logistic and meta-theoretical inquiries of the Vienna Circle. Second was independent and lively Polish Marxism, with its fine development of social research under Krzywicki, a social anthropologist and younger contemporary of Engels, and then after the war the economist Lange, the philosophers Schaff, Kolakowski, Baczko, and many others. Finally there has been a wide range of philosophical, scientific and humanistic scholar­ ship which lends its various qualities to the understanding of both the logic of science and the historical situation of the sciences: we mention only that great and humane physicist Infeld, the phenomenologist with deep epistemological interest Ingarden, the historian of scientific ideas Zawirski, the historian of philosophy and aesthetics Tatarkiewicz, and the mathematical logicians such as Mostowski and Szaniawski. (shrink)

The remarks which follow deal with the ideas which I developed in more detail in my book: between Experience and Metaphysics. They are inspired principally by the vigorous polemic aroused by the publication several years ago of a work which caused a great uproar in epistemological circles; I am speaking of The Structure of Scientific Revolution by T.S. Kuhn. One could thus consider this essay, as well as my book, as an element to be added to that polemic's dossier. It (...) goes without saying that I am indebted to a great number of those who before me have given their points of view on the question, whether I agree with their opinions or not. (shrink)

Tomasello offers a compelling account of the emergence of humans’ sense of obligation. We suggest that more needs to be said about the role of affect in the creation of obligations. We also argue that positive emotions such as gratitude evolved to encourage individuals to fulfill cooperative obligations without the negative quality that Tomasello proposes is inherent in obligations.

In the early sixties there broke out a fierce controversy concerning rationality in science which was labelled as the Popper-Kuhn controversy. It can be conceived in terms of the rationalism-relativism opposition. This may seem dubious, for the proper contrast to rationalism is irrationalism, and the one to relativism is absolutism. What is at issue, however, is whether scientific change comes about in consequence of argument or in consequence of-to use Kuhn's favourite dictum-conversion. The notion of argument does not involve here (...) anything absolute, while the one of conversion is intended to cover not merely the idea of irrationality of change, but the idea of self-authentication and constitution as one among many possible patterns of rationality. Thus the main message is that of break of communication between otherwise rational agents and not of their apparent irrationality. These are my reasons for thinking this unusual opposition better than the usual ones pointing at the substance of the controversy. I think also this opposition has in fact been implicit in the resulting debate. This explains, for instance, why in the first decade of the debate Feyerabend was commonly perceived as Kuhn's comrade and, consequently, largely misunderstood. Conflation of two different oppositions into one, on the other hand, results in some obscurity. This is perhaps why different commentators have rather freely qualified some participants of the debate to one or other faction. Among those who have been subjected to such a treatment there are found, in the first place, the authors of such mediational conceptions of the seventies as Lakatos (methodology of scientific research programmes), Sneed and Stegmiiller (non-statement view), Laudan (research traditions), and, in my country, Amsterdamski (ideals of science). It may well have been expected that Larry Laudan, who has recently put forward a new mediational conception of his own (see Laudan [1984]), again will be treated in the same way. This is due to the clear Popperian and Kuhnian inspirations of his work and his fidelity to his masters which is surprisingly great consider. (shrink)

Theoretical determinism, as it is usually ascribed to Laplace, is neither verifiable nor falsifiable and has therefore no real content. It is not the same as predictability of actually observable phenomena. On the other hand, predictability is not an abstract principle; rather it is true to a certain degree, depending on the phenomena considered. It can be discussed only by examining the scientific state of affairs. This is done in some detail for classical statistical mechanics. Much of a recently published (...) debate on determinism (Amsterdamski et al. 1990) is thereby obviated. (shrink)

The paper’s main objective is to bring out the original project of philosophy and history of science, underlying the famous works of Thomas Kuhn. In defiance of what is commonly envisaged, the model of scientific revolutions is demonstrated as a promising conceptual frame to be used with the purpose to reconstruct the development of modern and contemporary science. The analysis of the logic of explanation of scientific changes elaborated by Kuhn is based on two canonical monographs: The Structure of Scientific (...) Revolutions and Copernican Revolution. It is argued that the standard, widespread interpretation of the model, assuming the drastic conceptual cuts to occur as a result of a paradigm change, is essentially untenable. In fact, the model implies that each change leads to the higher level order and is susceptible to rational reconstructions. Kuhn’s conception is subsequently confronted with Stefan Amsterdamski’s notion of ideal of science, with the intention of showing that the reversal of the relationship between explanans and explanandum as established inaforementioned works would have damaging consequences in terms of reconstructive attempts in history of science. It is shown that what is of most value in Amsterdamski’s workis indeed strictly Kuhnian in character. (shrink)

Wrocławska szkoła badań historycznych nad zdrowiem, chorobą i problemami ludzkiej cielesności i emocjonalności wiąże swoją genezę ze standardem badań, wypracowanym w Instytucie Historii Nauki PAN, określanym przez metodologów historii (W. Wrzosek) mianem stylu myślowego IHN PAN. Do jego cech należą historycyzm, antropocentryzm i kulturalizm oraz polimorfizm teoretyczny, związany zarówno z uprawianiem w IHN PAN historii różnych dyscyplin nauki, jak i heterogenicznością inspiracji metodologicznych, do których w tej placówce nawiązywano. Celem artykułu jest przedstawienie kształtowania się wrocławskiego ośrodka badawczego, wywodzącego się z (...) IHN PAN i skupionego wokół prof. Bożeny Płonki-Syroki i jej inicjatyw wydawniczych i organizacyjnych: cyklów konferencji, serii wydawniczych i czasopism naukowych, a także ukazanie inspiracji metodologicznych, do których odwołuje się praktyka interpretacyjna tworzonej przez nią grupy badawczej (F. Znaniecki, L. Fleck, S. Amsterdamski). Artykuł zawiera bibliografię najważniejszych publikacji teoretycznych B. Płonki-Syroki oraz przykłady stosowania propagowanego przez nią ujęcia dziejów nauki (antropologia wiedzy) w praktyce interpretacyjnej autorów akceptujących ten standard metodologiczny. (shrink)

"Revolution in Structure?" Review of Thomas S. Kuhn. Droga po „Strukturze”. Trans. S. Amsterdamski. Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Sic!, 2003.

This small book—six essays in 89 pages of text—is well worth reading. The essays are the proceedings of a conference on Popper’s philosophy which was held in Warsaw in March of 1995. As the title promises, they offer some insights into the significance of Popper’s thought (see, especially, the essays by Joseph Agassi and Ernest Gellner). They also contain perceptive critical comments and suggestions as to how we may use some of Popper’s results to move forward. In the first section, (...) entitled “Karl Popper’s Three Worlds,” John Watkins and Adam Grobler discuss Popper’s three-world theory in relation to evolutionary theory and the theory of rationality, respectively. Essays by Joseph Agassi and Stefan Amsterdamski are presented under the subtitle, “The Scientific Method as Ethics.” Agassi discusses the regrettable lack of honesty in the public relations of science. He sees this lack as a product of a widespread refusal to abandon idealized views of science, which allow one to abandon one’s autonomy. The significance of Popper’s approach is that it calls us to treat science more realistically and individuals to accept responsibility and autonomy: these cannot be delegated to science. The editor’s own contribution contends that knowledge is unavoidably conditioned by historical and sociological circumstances and that in his later philosophy Popper mistakenly sought to avoid this consequence. He somewhat misleadingly calls his view relativist in an attempt to distinguish it from Popper’s even while stressing his debt to him. The last two essays appear under the subtitle “The Open Society and Its Prospects.” Ernest Gellner discusses some of the illiberal traits in Popper’s personality which lead to defects in his, according to Gellner, extremely important defense of liberalism, and which can be improved by a more sociological perspective. (shrink)