Hate is widespread online, hits everyone, and carries negative consequences. Crowd moderation—user-assisted moderation through, e. g., reporting or counter-speech—is heralded as a potential remedy. We explore this potential by linking insights on online bystander interventions to the analogy of crowd moderation as a (lost) public good. We argue that the distribution of costs and benefits of engaging in crowd moderation forecasts a collective action problem. If the individual crowd member has limited incentive to react when witnessing hate, crowd moderation is (...) unlikely to manifest. We explore this argument empirically, investigating several preregistered hypotheses about the distribution of individual-level costs and benefits of response options to online hate using a large, nationally representative survey of Danish social media users (N = 24,996). In line with expectations, we find that bystander reactions, especially costly reactions, are rare. Furthermore, we find a positive correlation between exposure to online hate and withdrawal motivations, and a negative (n-shaped) correlation with bystander reactions. (shrink)

Summary According to the so-called Starnberger Group1, the amenability of a science to science policy measures, conceptualised by the Group in terms of finalization , depends crucially on conditions intrinsic to the science not invariably present at every stage of its development. Finalization is possible only at junctures where the science in question faces methodologically divergent alternative lines of development. The most significant kind of case depends on the presence of completed , or classical , theories.

It is argued that C. Wright's worry over the Basic Argument for Quitism is misplaced since the argument is incoherent. An even more basic argument is considered, and some consequences traced for, inter alia, the Tractarian view in metaphysics and Dummett's Metaphor Thesis, connecting ontology and semantics. In the course of the argument, work by, primarily, C. Peacocke and J. McDowell is touched upon.

In "representing and intervening", Ian hacking argues that on a fregean semantics of scientific theory, Incommensurability between competing theories threatens, In the strong sense of precluding their being about the same entities; whereas no such threat arises on putnam's account. On fregean principles, Hacking's argument would however at best support a much weaker claim. In any case, The pivot of his argument is the completely unfounded assumption that the fregean is commited to semantical holism.