The social identity of a researcher can affect their position in a community, as well as the uptake of their ideas. In many fields, members of underrepresented or minority groups are less likely to be cited, leading to citation gaps. Though this empirical phenomenon has been well-studied, empirical work generally does not provide insight into the causes of citation gaps. I will argue, using mathematical models, that citation gaps are likely due in part to the structure of academic communities. The (...) existence of these ‘structural causes’ has implications for attempts to lessen citation gaps, and for proposals to make academic communities more efficient. These proposals have the potential to create feedback loops, amplifying current structural inequities. (shrink)

Fred Dretske’s account of mental causation, developed in Explaining Behavior and defended in numerous articles, is generally regarded as one of the most interesting and most ambitious approaches in the field. According to Dretske, meaning facts, construed historically as facts about the indicator functions of internal states, are the structuring causes of behavior. In this article, we argue that Dretske’s view is untenable: On closer examination, the real structuring causes of behavior turn out to be markedly different from Dretske’s meaning (...) facts. Our argument proceeds in three steps. First, we set forth the problem of meaning individuation: We argue that the proposal that meaning facts are structuring causes of behavior commits Dretske to a very fine-grained individuation of meanings that is deeply counterintuitive. In a second step, we show that even these finely individuated meaning facts cannot do the job that they are supposed to do, since information facts—which are constitutive of, but distinct from Dretske’s meaning facts—are better candidates for the role of structuring causes. Finally, we argue that it is not even information facts, but facts of co-instantiation which are the real structuring causes of behavior. In concluding, we briefly consider the options that are left for Dretske if our arguments succeed. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: A Triggering Causal Explanation A Structuring Causal Explanation Further reading.

The government recognizes that social factors cause racial inequalities in access to resources and opportunities that result in racial health disparities. However, this recognition fails to acknowledge the root cause of these racial inequalities: structural racism. As a result, racial health disparities persist.

We propose new definitions of (causal) explanation, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. The definition is based on the notion of actual cause, as defined and motivated in a companion article. Essentially, an explanation is a fact that is not known for certain but, if found to be true, would constitute an actual cause of the fact to be explained, regardless of the agent's initial uncertainty. We show that the definition handles well a number of problematic examples (...) from the literature. (shrink)

We propose a new definition of actual causes, using structural equations to model counterfactuals. We show that the definition yields a plausible and elegant account of causation that handles well examples which have caused problems for other definitions and resolves major difficulties in the traditional account.

Within this study, the necessity of a causative-holistic approach to health, viewed through philosophical and spiritual contexts, is substantiated. The author focuses on the structural analysis of the health model, based on the conducted research on the understanding of the phenomenon of health by ancient philosophers, medieval thinkers, and contemporary scientists. The article acknowledges the importance of spirituality in health and defines it as a causal factor that sets parameters for the development of physical health. The research offers a (...) detailed description of the structure of holistic health, which includes unity, duality, and trinity, forming the foundation on the tripartite model “spirit-soul-body,” which has shaped the understanding of holistic health since medieval times and remains unchanged. Based on the metaphysical system proposed by the German mystic Jacob Böhme, the author substantiates the septenary structure of the spirit, reflecting in the septenary manifestation of the human being, and should have its analogy in the physical body and social dimension of the human being. A decenary model of health is also proven, appearing in the connection of the septenary «earthly human» with the triple metasystem complex, reflecting the spiritual aspect of holistic human. This decenary model forms a new causative-holistic view on human health and can be the basis for changing the medical paradigm, which should be based on primary spiritual factors of health for the preservation and improvement of both physical health and the health of the metasystem complex human-collective-society-planet. (shrink)

Currently, two frameworks of causal reasoning compete: Whereas dependency theories focus on dependencies between causes and effects, dispositional theories model causation as an interaction between agents and patients endowed with intrinsic dispositions. One important finding providing a bridge between these two frameworks is that failures of causes to generate their effects tend to be differentially attributed to agents and patients regardless of their location on either the cause or the effect side. To model different types of error attribution, we (...) augmented a causal Bayes net model with separate error sources for causes and effects. In several experiments, we tested this new model using the size of Markov violations as the empirical indicator of differential assumptions about the sources of error. As predicted by the model, the size of Markov violations was influenced by the location of the agents and was moderated by the causal structure and the type of causal variables. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Reasons as Not (Efficiently) Causal, Underwriting Irreducibly Teleological Explanations Reasons as Efficient Causes Reasons, Causes, and Physicalism Causally Relevant, though Not Causes Structuring Causes Reasons, Causes, and Free Will References Further reading.

A key test of any philosophical account of the mind is its treatment of mental causation. Proponents of the token-identity theory point to its strengths in both “demystifying” mental causation — by identifying mental causes with the physical causal mechanisms underlying bodily movements — and in avoiding commitment to dubious forms of causal overdetermination. I argue against this account of mental causation, pointing out that it mistakenly identifies actions with bodily movements. I suggest instead treating action explanations as explanations of (...) redundant causalities in behavior, and the mental causes cited in such explanations as structural causes. (shrink)

In this paper I start by briefly presenting an analysis of token cause and of token causal relevance that I developed elsewhere, and then apply it to the famous thirsty traveler riddle. One general outcome of the analysis of causal relevance employed here is that in preemption cases (early or late) the preempted cause is not a cause since it is causally irrelevant to the effect. I consider several variations of the thirsty traveler riddle. In the first (...) variation the first enemy emptied the canteen and the second enemy threw it away. On this variation, the act of neither enemy comes out, on the analysis employed here, as causally relevant to, and thus not as a cause of, the fact that the traveler died, but the conjunction of the two acts is a cause of it. This version is a case of mutual preemption. I argue that it has the same structure as the voting paradox, which thus has an analogous solution. In the standard version, in which the first enemy added poison to the water in the traveler's canteen, the act of the second enemy (who threw the canteen away) comes out, on the analysis used here, as causally relevant to and as a cause of the fact that the traveler died, but the act of the first enemy comes out as neither. I also make a comparison with Lewis' accounts, and discuss alternative treatments of the puzzle such as those of Hart and Honore and of Gavison, Margalit, and Ullmann-Margalit. (shrink)

Law Schools are now required to provide education to law students on bias, cross-cultural competency, and racism under ABA Standard 303(c). Law clinics, with their social justice orientation, have long taught about structural causes of bias and oppression and ways to intervene at system levels to prevent problems. Medical legal partnership (MLP) clinics have done so by employing concepts from social work and health science programs on structural competency. This article examines MLP and related curriculum to meet the (...) ABA mandate. (shrink)

In this paper I present both a critical appraisal of Humphreys' probabilistic theory of causality and a sketch of an alternative view of the relationship between the notions of probability and of cause. Though I do not doubt that determinism is false, I claim that the examples used to motivate Humphreys' theory typically refer to subjective rather than objective chance. Additionally, I argue on a number of grounds that Humphreys' suggestion that linear regression models be used as a canonical (...) form for the description of causal relations is untenable. I conclude by exploring the variety of ways in which probabilistic elements can be embedded into the structure of causal mechanisms. This investigation suggests both that deterministic mechanisms can produce stochastic behavior and stochastic mechanisms can produce deterministic behavior. (shrink)

In this paper, I discuss observations on when given by Sandström (1993) for constructions of the form ‘When A B’, where A and B both describe events (as opposed to states). Sandströ m proposes that for events described in the simple past, the temporal interpretation of such sequences varies according to whether A describes a culminated process (CP)(accomplishment) or a culmination (CULM)(roughly, an achievement). She offers an account of this behaviour based on the claim that culminations denote changes of state (...) while culminated processes do not. I argue that this claim is unmotivated, and in addition, draw attention to a range of counterexamples to her generalisation. I present an analysis which is not based on the CP/CULM distinction but relies instead on the distinction originally proposed by Dowty (1979) between the event structures CAUSE-BECOME and BECOME. I show that this distinction is closely related to whether the event has a prototypical agent. It is therefore thematic structure rather than temporal structure that determines the behaviour of when in these cases. (shrink)

This essay introduces the term arbitrary cause as a precise description of the contingent structural relationship of figurative language to social reality. At the present time our critical vocabulary lacks a term that characterizes that relationship. The aim of the present essay is to establish the importance of the notion of arbitrary cause in understanding the process of figurative representation. The essay examines Saussurean linguistics, structuralist and poststructuralist revisions of Saussure, and provides a detailed set of examples (...) demonstrating the instability of the concept of the arbitrary in common usage. The essay concludes with a discussion of literary expression. (shrink)

This article examines the transition from causes to laws in research during the early modern period in Europe. It discusses Stillman Drake's claim that the search for causes of events in nature that guided science from the time of Aristotle was superseded at the dawn of modern science starting with the work of Galileo. However, there are complications for the suggestion that there was a process by which causes gave way to laws in science. This suggests that Drake's remark that (...) there has been a progression in modern science from causes to laws may suggest that there was a decisive and permanent transition to Bishop Berkeley's view that explanation in terms of scientific laws involves a mere subsumption of particular events under inductive generalizations, as opposed to an inference to metaphysically robust causal structures. (shrink)

In this paper I present both a critical appraisal of Humphreys' probabilistic theory of causality and a sketch of an alternative view of the relationship between the notions of probability and of cause. Though I do not doubt that determinism is false, I claim that the examples used to motivate Humphreys' theory typically refer to subjective rather than objective chance. Additionally, I argue on a number of grounds that Humphreys' suggestion that linear regression models be used as a canonical (...) form for the description of causal relations is untenable. I conclude by exploring the variety of ways in which probabilistic elements can be embedded into the structure of causal mechanisms. This investigation suggests both that deterministic mechanisms can produce stochastic behavior and stochastic mechanisms can produce deterministic behavior. Note: Link is to the article in a subscription database available to users affiliated with Butler University. Appropriate login information will be required for access. Users not affiliated with Butler University should contact their local librarian for assistance in locating a copy of this article. (shrink)

Psychoanalytic accounts offer a mix of reasons and causes to explain action. Adolf Grünbaum argues that these fail to be proper explanations because they are neither justified by inductively established laws, nor fit the standard form of rational explanation, the belief-plus-desire-yields-action structure of the practical syllogism. Grünbaum accepts rational explanation as cogent and transparently causal because, he asserts, reasons are causes. Yet he omits to show how they can be, especially in the face of the apparent fact that reasons, being (...) defined in terms of their propositional content, cannot be causes. Clarifying the position of psychoanalytic explanation does involve seeing it and rational explanation as similarly causal. This requires a realist analysis showing how reasons may be understood, not as defined in terms of their propositional contents or objects, but as states of persons caused by entering into relations with situations, and how reasoning is a causal process. Freud's philosophical intuitions on this were correct. His much criticized metapsychology offers a causal account of motives defined by source, not object, and sketches an account of the way these cause action in interaction with external situations. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

Recent debates over the nature of causation, casual inference, and the uses of causal models in counterfactual analysis, involving inter alia Nancy Cartwright (Hunting Causes and Using Them), James Woodward (Making Things Happen), and Judea Pearl (Causation), hinge on how causality is represented in models. Economists’ indigenous approach to causal representation goes back to the work of Herbert Simon with the Cowles Commission in the early 1950s. The paper explicates a scheme for the representation of causal structure, inspired by Simon, (...) and shows how this representation sheds light on some important debates in the philosophy of causation. This structural account is compared to Woodward’s manipulability account. It is used to evaluate the recent debates – particularly, with respect to the nature of causal structure, the identity of causes, causal independence, and modularity. Special attention is given to modeling issues that arise in empirical economics. (shrink)

Recently the terms “codes” and “information” as used in the context of molecular biology have been the subject of much discussion. Here I propose that a variety of structural realism can assist us in rethinking the concepts of DNA codes and information apart from semantic criteria. Using the genetic code as a theoretical backdrop, a necessary distinction is made between codes qua symbolic representations and information qua structure that accords with data. Structural attractors are also shown to be (...) entailed by the mapping relation that any DNA code is a part of (as the domain). In this framework, these attractors are higher-order informational structures that obviate any “DNA-centric” reductionism. In addition to the implications that are discussed, this approach validates the array of coding systems now recognized in molecular biology. (shrink)

Causal reductionism is the widespread assumption that there is no room for additional causes once we have accounted for all elementary mechanisms within a system. Due to its intuitive appeal, causal reductionism is prevalent in neuroscience: once all neurons have been caused to fire or not to fire, it seems that causally there is nothing left to be accounted for. Here, we argue that these reductionist intuitions are based on an implicit, unexamined notion of causation that conflates causation with prediction. (...) By means of a simple model organism, we demonstrate that causal reductionism cannot provide a complete and coherent account of ‘what caused what’. To that end, we outline an explicit, operational approach to analyzing causal structures. (shrink)

This chapter explores some issues having to do with the structure of the evidential reasoning we use to infer causal and lawful claims. It is argued that such reasoning always makes use of prior, causally, or nomologically committed information, thus undercutting various views that attempt to reduce causal and lawful claims to claims about regularities. A non-reductive account of laws and causes built around the notion of invariance is advanced as an alternative.

Madison Powers and Ruth Faden's book Structural Injustice: Power, Advantage, and Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2019), is an invaluable contribution to help us grasp the contemporary ills of our nonideal world. The authors' general claim is that the concept of structural injustice allows us to identify the causes and social processes leading to the violation of human rights and the production of unfair systems of disadvantage and privilege. Building on Powers and Faden's well‐known thesis that social justice (...) is concerned with the achievement of a sufficient level of well‐being, the book delves into an in‐depth discussion of their conceptual framework, incorporating concrete examples to illustrate their analysis. (shrink)

Does the fact that everything has a cause imply that all events are causally determined? Drawing on discussions from the history of philosophy, John Burbidge's Cause for Thought captures the diverse dynamics found in physics, chemistry, biology, animal psychology, and rational action. At each level, forms of activity emerge that cannot be reduced to the functioning of simpler, more elementary components. By exploring the logic of what happens when two causal conditions reciprocally interact, Burbidge develops a concept of (...) complex cause in which an agent generates effects not simply because of the action of its constituent components, but also because of the way those components mutually supplement and reinforce one another. By extending this to the interaction of agents with their environment, Burbidge throws light on the structure of organisms, on the distinctive contributions of consciousness and rationality, and on the quest for a comprehensive explanation of the cosmos. Recovering the force and legitimacy of metaphysical inquiry by focusing on the concept of cause and causality, Cause for Thought offers a new way of understanding natural processes, the role of consciousness and free will, and the significance of rational explanation. (shrink)

According to a widespread view, which can be traced back to Russell’s famous attack on the notion of cause, causal notions have no legitimate role to play in how mature physical theories represent the world. In this paper I first critically examine a number of arguments for this view that center on the asymmetry of the causal relation and argue that none of them succeed. I then argue that embedding the dynamical models of a theory into richer causal structures (...) can allow us to decide between models in cases where our observational data severely underdetermine our choice of dynamical models. (shrink)

BackgroundFear of cancer recurrence is an important cause of suffering for cancer survivors, and both empirical evidence and theoretical models suggest that prognostic uncertainty plays a causal role in its development. However, the relationship between prognostic uncertainty and FCR is incompletely understood.ObjectiveTo explore the relationship between prognostic uncertainty and FCR among patients with ovarian cancer.DesignA qualitative study was conducted utilizing individual in-depth interviews with a convenience sample of patients with epithelial ovarian cancer who had completed first-line treatment with surgery (...) and/or chemotherapy. Semi-structured interviews explored participants’ understanding of their prognosis; experiences, preferences, and attitudes regarding prognostic information; and strategies for coping with prognostic uncertainty. Inductive qualitative analysis and line-by-line software-assisted coding of interview transcripts was conducted to identify key themes and generate theoretical insights on the relationship between prognostic uncertainty and FCR.ResultsThe study sample consisted of 21 participants, nearly all of whom reported experiencing significant FCR, which they traced to an awareness of the possibility of a bad outcome. Some participants valued and pursued prognostic information as a means of coping with this awareness, suggesting that prognostic uncertainty causes FCR. However, most participants acknowledged fundamental limits to both the certainty and value of prognostic information, and engaged in various strategies aimed not at reducing but constructing and maintaining prognostic uncertainty as a means of sustaining hope in the possibility of a good outcome. Participants’ comments suggested that prognostic uncertainty, fear, and hope are connected by complex, bi-directional causal pathways mediated by processes that allow patients to cope with, construct, and maintain their uncertainty. A provisional dual-process theoretical model was developed to capture these pathways.ConclusionAmong patients with OC, prognostic uncertainty is both a cause and an effect of FCR—a fear-inducing stimulus and a hope-sustaining response constructed and maintained through various strategies. More work is needed to elucidate the relationships between prognostic uncertainty, fear, and hope, to validate and refine our theoretical model, and to develop interventions to help patients with OC and other serious illnesses to achieve an optimal balance between these states. (shrink)

Some commentators have worried that Descartes‘s ontological proof is a kind ofafterthought, redundancy, or even embarrassment. Descartes has everythingneeded to establish God as the ground of certainty by Meditation Three, so whybother with yet another proof in Meditation Five? Some have even gone so far asto doubt his sincerity.1Past literature on this topic is of daunting variety andmagnitude, dating back to the seventeenth century.2The current discussion hasfocused on Descartes‘s premises in relation to the coherence of his concept ofGod.3I wish to (...) take up this issue from a somewhat different tack, showing that Descartes‘s ontological proof actually involves a subtle change in the direction ofhis argument from a reflective to a recollective theory of innateness. In the FifthMeditation, Descartes does not simply expand on his previous discussion of God,which arose out of reflection on his self; rather, the ontological proof depends ona kind of recollection of God‘s being that could only be based on the causalpositivity, or ―power,‖ of His existence. God is the structural cause of our idea ofhim and thereby restricts the way in which we may think of Him, in the sameway as the essence of a triangle structurally determines the ways we must thinkof it.4We are not free to construct such ideas in any way we want, so there mustbe a cause, or a reason, that restricts such construction.The specific argument of Meditation Five, however, must be understoodin its larger context, for part of the structurally determined idea of God containsnecessary existence, which Descartes interprets in terms of causal power. In theprocess of explaining this causal power, first to Caterus and, later to Arnauld,Descartes develops a way of interpreting God‘s causal relationship to himself, interms of a scholastic distinction between God as causa sui and ens a se, whichpreserves the universality of the causal principle and allows us to understand whyGod can be considered as the formal cause of His own being—the self-groundingground of all existence—an idea of subsequent importance to Malebranche andSpinoza, among others. Understanding this position on God and cause allows usto see a complementarity between Mediations III and V that has previously beenoverlooked.5While the principle of eminent causality found in Meditation Threeis central to the structural causation argument of Meditation Five, it is God‘spower, the positivity of His causal relationship to himself, that allows theargument from his effects to his existence in the first place.The dualistic structure to Descartes‘s arguments for God‘s existence inMeditations Three and Five mirrors Anselm‘s approach in the Monologion andthe Proslogion. Appreciating this stylistic debt is crucial for understandingDescartes‘s attempts to improve on Anselm‘s arguments, as well as his attempt totruly ground all knowledge in the certainty of God‘s existence. Yet whileAnselm‘s dual argument is ultimately based on a negative intuition of God‘sbeing, described in the Monologion as that without which the world cannot be,Descartes‘s dual argument in Meditations Three and Five is based on a positiveintuition or recollection of God‘s being as a necessary structural restriction on our concepts of the world. The ontological proof is primarily based on thisrecollective theory of innateness. It is God as causa sui, recollected as thenecessary ground of all things, that is the sole efficient cause of the existence ofevery finite, limited thing—especially human beings and their clear and distinctideas. (shrink)

The principle of common cause asserts that positive correlations between causally unrelated events ought to be explained through the action of some shared causal factors. Reichenbachian common cause systems are probabilistic structures aimed at accounting for cases where correlations of the aforesaid sort cannot be explained through the action of a single common cause. The existence of Reichenbachian common cause systems of arbitrary finite size for each pair of non-causally correlated events was allegedly demonstrated by Hofer-Szabó (...) and Rédei in 2006. This paper shows that their proof is logically deficient, and we propose an improved proof. (shrink)

The problems that exist in relating quantum mechanical phenomena to classical concepts like properties, causes, or entities like particles or waves are well-known and still open to question, so that there is not yet an agreement on what kind of metaphysics lies at the foundations of quantum mechanics. However, physicists constantly use the formal resources of quantum mechanics in order to explain quantum phenomena. The structural account of explanation, therefore, tries to account for this kind of mathematical explanation in (...) physics, and hinges on the following claims: i) scientific models are central in scientific explanation; ii) in some cases the relevant information for the explanation/understanding of a phenomenon P consists in the sole structural properties of the (models displayed by the) theory; iii) in these cases, the interpretation of the formalism in terms of a categorial framework is unessential for the explanation of P and a mathematical model can be at the base of an objective and effective scientific explanation. The present paper will carry a reflection about some issues arising from R.I.G. Hughes and Robert Clifton’s works in the attempt to outline some details of structural explanation. (shrink)

Ouvrage dense et paru de façon tronquée, La Philosophie de l’algèbre de Jules Vuillemin (tomes I et II) peut sembler composite. Nous montrons au contraire que ce manifeste de la structure en philosophie n’est pas rhapsodie mais système : ses parties ne prennent tout leur sens que dans leur relation au tout. Loin de remettre en cause le résultat de l’analyse structurale, l’étude génétique met au jour un souci constant de préservation de la systématicité au fil des transformations successives.

We propose the Selfish Goal model, which holds that a person's behavior is driven by psychological processes called goals that guide his or her behavior, at times in contradictory directions. Goals can operate both consciously and unconsciously, and when activated they can trigger downstream effects on a person's information processing and behavioral possibilities that promote only the attainment of goal end-states (and not necessarily the overall interests of the individual). Hence, goals influence a person as if the goals themselves were (...) selfish and interested only in their own completion. We argue that there is an evolutionary basis to believe that conscious goals evolved from unconscious and selfish forms of pursuit. This theoretical framework predicts the existence of unconscious goal processes capable of guiding behavior in the absence of conscious awareness and control (theautomaticity principle), the ability of the most motivating or active goal to constrain a person's information processing and behavior toward successful completion of that goal (thereconfiguration principle), structural similarities between conscious and unconscious goal pursuit (thesimilarity principle), and goal influences that produce apparent inconsistencies or counterintuitive behaviors in a person's behavior extended over time (theinconsistency principle). Thus, we argue that a person's behaviors are indirectly selected at the goal level but expressed (and comprehended) at the individual level. (shrink)

Social scientists appeal to various “structures” in their explanations including public policies, economic systems, and social hierarchies. Significant debate surrounds the explanatory relevance of these factors for various outcomes such as health, behavioral, and economic patterns. This paper provides a causal account of social structural explanation that is motivated by Haslanger (2016). This account suggests that social structure can be explanatory in virtue of operating as a causal constraint, which is a causal factor with unique characteristics. A novel causal (...) framework is provided for understanding these explanations–this framework addresses puzzles regarding the mysterious causal influence of social structure, how to understand its relation to individual choice, and what makes it the main explanatory (and causally responsible) factor for various outcomes. (shrink)

En publiant en 1965 Le Péché et la durée de l’ange, le P. Guérard des Lauriers, o. p. (1898-1989) offrait une contribution majeure à un débat qui divisait les thomistes. En 1946 en effet, la parution de Surnaturel du P. de Lubac avait remis en cause, textes de Thomas d’Aquin à l’appui, la thèse de l’impeccabilité naturelle de l’ange, jusqu’alors (presque) unanimement reçue dans l’École thomiste. Deux interprétations de Thomas d’Aquin polarisèrent alors le débat : la raison de la (...) peccabilité de l’ange est à rechercher ou bien dans son élévation à l’ordre surnaturel ( De malo, q. 16, a. 4), ou bien dans la structure même de la créature angélique ( Summa theologiae I a Pars, q. 63, a. 1). Servi par une herméneutique renouvelée des textes de Thomas sur la peccabilité de l’ange, et fort d’un redéploiement d’une doctrine thomiste de la liberté, articulée dans sa double dimension de spécification et d’exercice, Guérard établit que le fondement de la liberté des créatures spirituelles – et donc leur peccabilité – se situe au cœur de leur constitution métaphysique, dans la distinction réelle entre nature et personne, sans qu’intervienne nécessairement la distinction des ordres naturel et surnaturel. Son analyse pénétrante et novatrice le conduit à mettre au jour une structure du libre arbitre, laquelle intègre et unit sans confusion les deux ordres de réalité engagés dans l’acte libre : le métaphysique et le moral. Il offre ainsi une contribution de premier plan à l’élaboration d’une philosophie contemporaine de la liberté, attestant par-là la fécondité de la tradition thomiste. (shrink)

The subject of the present work is noema and its structure in various stages of the objectivating process. Despite its great importance, this issue has never been adequately explained, neither by Husserl nor by his followers. The main objective is to provide the theory that would describe the structure of noema and its function without simplifying the case or appealing to non-phenomenological data. This has been achieved by way of analysis divided into four sections. The first provides an overview of (...) noema. The second section is devoted to analysis of the process of objectivation, i.e., how an active awareness of the object in a logical sense is constituted by a series of passive experiences. The third section refers to a noema as found at different stages of objectivation. It explains how the increasing level of activity, which turns out to be a noetic function, causes changes to the structure of a noema. The last section summarises the results and stresses the advantages of the developed theory in comparison with other interpretations, especially those offered by Drummond, Smith and McIntyre. (shrink)

Shin and DuBrow propose that a key principle driving event segmentation relates to causal analyses: specifically, that experiences that are attributed as having the same underlying cause are grouped together into an event. This offers an alternative to accounts of segmentation based on prediction error.

Those who hold that all fundamental sparse properties have dispositional essences face a problem with structural (e.g. geometrical) properties. In this paper I consider a further route for the dispositional monist that is enabled by the requirement that physical theories should be background-free. If this requirement is respected then we can see how spatial displacement can be a causally active relation and hence may be understood dispositionally.

Microaggressions are hypothesized to play a causal role in undesirable population effects such as racial health gaps, but the mechanisms through which this occurs are not yet well understood. I call inquiry about these mechanisms the “explanatory project.” I suggest that the explanatory project has been hindered by microaggression concepts tailored to be applicable under conditions of lived uncertainty, rather than to facilitate understanding of structural causes. I defend a pluralist, structural account of microaggressions from arguments by Regina (...) Rini that, while appropriate for ethical projects, do not apply to the explanatory project. (shrink)

It is the true function of thought, Lotze said, to show “how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world.” I do not propose to discuss the problem of mechanism versus teleology, but rather to point out and emphasize the importance of a distinction, drawn alike by Plato and Kant, between a narrower and a wider kind of determination, and (...) to indicate the subordinate character of the former. (shrink)

-/- Although much of its history has been neglected or misunderstood, a structuralist ‘tendency’ has re-emerged within the philosophy of science. Broadly speaking, it consists of two fundamental strands: on the one hand, there is the identification of structural commonalities between theories; on the other, there is the metaphysical decomposition of objects in structural terms. Both have been pressed into service for the realist cause: the former has been identified primarily with Worrall's ‘epistemic’ structural realism; the (...) latter with Ladyman's ‘ontic’ form. And both raise important issues of general interest within the philosophy of science and metaphysics, respectively. The former invites questions regarding the identification and appropriate representation of these commonalities; the latter touches on different views regarding the nature of objects, the constitutive role of properties and the seat of causal powers. Both strands have recently come under critical fire. It is my intention to present a unified account of the 'structuralist tendency’ which emphasizes the dual roles of structure as representational and constitutive, and to indicate how the more acute critical remarks can be dealt with. (shrink)