The historical Molyneux’s question – roughly, whether congenital blind subjects can visually identify shapes in front of them right after being made to see – is having its renaissance in recent years (Ferretti and Glenney, 2021). While there have been many different formulations of it, and many attempted answers as well, no clear consensus has been reached. Moreover, although arguably both memory and imagination are involved in the process, their roles in the Molyneux’s task have not been adequately discussed. In (...) this paper, I focus on a specific version of Molyneux’s question, propose a specific hypothesis in relation to that version, and sketch the roles of structural correspondence, memory, and imagination in the relevant hypothesis. One key moral of this discussion is that while Molyneux’s question has primarily been regarded as a perceptual puzzle, other kinds of mental episodes such as memory and imagination have to be taken into account as well in order to have a more satisfying answer to versions of Molyneux’s question (Macpherson and Dorsch, 2018). (shrink)

This paper elaborates on the following correspondence theorem (which has been defended and formally proved elsewhere): if theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of applications A, but was superseded later on by a different theory T* which was likewise successful in A, then under natural conditions T contains theoretical expressions which were responsible for T’s success and correspond (in A) to certain theoretical expressions of T*. I illustrate this theorem at hand of the phlogiston versus oxygen (...) theories of combustion, and the classical versus relativistic theories of mass. The ontological consequences of the theorem are worked out in terms of the indirect reference and partial truth. The final section explains how the correspondence theorem may justify a weak version of scientific realism without presupposing the no-miracles argument. (shrink)

Organizational research constitutes a differentiated, complex and fragmented field with multiple contradicting and incommensurable theories that make fundamentally different claims about the social and organizational reality. In contrast to natural sciences, the progress in this field can’t be attributed to the principle of truthlikeness where theories compete against each other and only best theories survive and prove they are closer to the truth and thus demonstrate scientific knowledge accumulation. We defend the structural realist view on the nature of organizational (...) theories in order to demonstrate that despite the multiplicity of isolated and competing explanations of organization-environment relations these theories are still logically compatible and mutually consistent which, in turn, assures theoretical progress in the field. Although postulating different and incompatible ontologies, three most successful organization-environments theories, namely, contingency theory, new institutionalism and population ecology share the same explanations of the relations between organizations and environments at the structural level. Without this principle one would say that what occurs in the field of organization theory is a change rather than a progress. (shrink)

This paper utilizes a logical correspondence theorem (which has been proved elsewhere) for the justification of weak conceptions of scientific realism and convergence to truth which do not presuppose Putnam's no-miracles-argument (NMA). After presenting arguments against the reliability of the unrestricted NMA in Sect. 1, the correspondence theorem is explained in Sect. 2. In Sect. 3, historical illustrations of the correspondence theorem are given, and its ontological consequences are worked out. Based on the transitivity of the concept (...) of correspondence, a correspondence-based notion of convergence to truth is developed in Sect. 4. In the final Sect. 5 it is argued that the correspondence theorem together with the assumption of ' minimal realism' yields a justification of a weak version of scientific realism, which is then compared to metaphysical realism and to instrumentalism. (shrink)

Starting from a brief recapitulation of the contemporary debate on scientific realism, this paper argues for the following thesis : Assume a theory T has been empirically successful in a domain of application A, but was superseded later on by a superior theory T * , which was likewise successful in A but has an arbitrarily different theoretical superstructure. Then under natural conditions T contains certain theoretical expressions, which yielded T's empirical success, such that these T-expressions correspond (in A) to (...) certain theoretical expressions of T * , and given T * is true, they refer indirectly to the entities denoted by these expressions of T * . The thesis is first motivated by a study of the phlogiston–oxygen example. Then the thesis is proved in the form of a logical theorem , and illustrated by further examples. The final sections explain how the correspondence theorem justifies scientific realism and work out the advantages of the suggested account. Introduction: Pessimistic Meta-induction vs. Structural Correspondence The Case of the Phlogiston Theory Steps Towards a Systematic Correspondence Theorem The Correspondence Theorem and Its Ontological Interpretation Further Historical Applications Discussion of the Correspondence Theorem: Objections and Replies Consequences for Scientific Realism and Comparison with Other Positions 7.1 Comparison with constructive empiricism 7.2 Major difference from standard scientific realism 7.3 From minimal realism and correspondence to scientific realism 7.4 Comparison with particular realistic positions CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

This paper studies the topological duality between diagonalizable algebras and bi-topological spaces. In particular, the correspondence between algebraic properties of a diagonalizable algebra and topological properties of its dual space is investigated. Since the main example of a diagonalizable algebra is the Lindenbaum algebra of an r.e. theory extending Peano Arithmetic, endowed with an operator defined by means of the provability predicate of the theory, this duality gives the possibility to study arithmetical properties of theories from a topological point (...) of view. We find topological characterization of $\Sigma_1$-sound theories and of sentences that are $\Sigma_1$-conservative over such a theory. (shrink)

This article uses the methods of citation and network analysis to map the global structure of the intellectual field and its development over time. Through the case study of Mersenne's, Oldenburg's and Darwin's correspondences, we show how looking at letters as a corpus of data can provide a global representation of the evolving conversation going on in the Republic of Letters and in intellectual and scientific fields. Aggregating general correspondences in electronic format offers a global portrait of the evolving composition (...) of the intellectual and scientific scene, its changing foci of interests and the fortune of the intellectual discussions as expressed in cited persons in the letters. Such tools help replace a purely metaphoric use of the term “network” by a visible map of the intellectual relations between people on which well defined calculations of the centrality of the positions of different actors can be made as well as their evolution over time. These techniques provide welcome additions to the tool kit of scholars in an age where the computer and the web offer new ways of mapping and mining the rich store of information contained in intellectual correspondences. ☆ I would like to thank Alain Couillard for the production of the figures and Vincent Larivière and the anonymous referees of the journal for useful comments and suggestions on an earlier version of this paper. Thanks also to the many comments received over the last 10 years as I presented preliminary results of this research at the REHSEIS research center of Université of Paris VII in 1999, the Dibner Institute for the History of Science and Technology at MIT in 2000, at Pietro Corsi's seminar at Oxford University in 2007 and at the History Department of Ottawa University in 2010. (shrink)

Properties of mental representation are related to findings in cognitive science and ideas in shamanism. A selective review of research in cognitive science suggests visual images and spatial memory preserve important functional information regarding physical principles and the behavior of objects in the natural world, and notions of second‐order isomorphism and the perceptual cycle developed to account for such findings are related to shamanic experience. Possible roles of implicit processes in shamanic cognition, and the idea that shamanic experience may involve (...) normally unconscious information becoming temporarily available to consciousness, are considered. The existence of a cognitive module dedicated to processing information relevant to social knowledge and social interaction is consistent with cognitive science and with shamanism, and may help account for the extension of intentionality and meaning that characterize shamanic practice. Overall, findings from cognitive science and ideas from shamanism exhibit a number of correspondences and similarities regarding basic properties of cognition, and this suggests that shamanic and nonshamanic cognition may not be fundamentally different. (shrink)

Although the controversy between Malthus and Ricardo has long been considered to be an important source for the history of economic thought, it has hardly been the object of a careful study qua controversy, i.e. as a polemical dialogical exchange. We have undertaken to fill this gap, within the framework of a more ambitious project that places controversies at the center of an account of the history of ideas, in science and elsewhere. It is our contention that the dialogical co-text (...) is essential for reconstructing the meaning and the evolution of science. In the present paper we try to substantiate this contention by means of a pragma-rhetorical study of this particular controversy. First, we reconstruct, through an analysis of a chunk of the correspondence, a micro-level of specific moves and countermoves which constitute a sequential structure within which also meta-scientific and meta-controversial considerations play a role. We then move to a macro-level of analysis, looking for recurrent patterns of argumentation. Finally, we draw epistemological conclusions on the nature of rationality and progress as manifested in actual scientific controversies. (shrink)

The notion of an ℐ -matrix as a model of a given π -institution ℐ is introduced. The main difference from the approach followed so far in CategoricalAlgebraic Logic and the one adopted here is that an ℐ -matrix is considered modulo the entire class of morphisms from the underlying N -algebraic system of ℐ into its own underlying algebraic system, rather than modulo a single fixed -logical morphism. The motivation for introducing ℐ -matrices comes from a desire to formulate (...) a correspondence property for N -protoalgebraic π -institutions closer in spirit to the one for sentential logics than that considered in CAAL before. As a result, in the previously established hierarchy of syntactically protoalgebraic π -institutions, i. e., those with an implication system, and of protoalgebraic π -institutions, i. e., those with a monotone Leibniz operator, the present paper interjects the class of those π -institutions with the correspondence property, as applied to ℐ -matrices. Moreover, this work on ℐ -matrices enables us to prove many results pertaining to the local deduction-detachment theorems, paralleling classical results in Abstract Algebraic Logic formulated, first, by Czelakowski and Blok and Pigozzi. Those results will appear in a sequel to this paper. (shrink)

Consider a general class of structural inference rules such as exchange, weakening, contraction and their generalizations. Among them, some are harmless but others do harm to cut elimination. Hence it is natural to ask under which condition cut elimination is preserved when a set of structural rules is added to a structure-free logic. The aim of this work is to give such a condition by using algebraic semantics. We consider full Lambek calculus (FL), i.e., intuitionistic logic without any (...) structural rules, as our basic framework. Residuated lattices are the algebraic structures corresponding to FL. In this setting, we introduce a criterion, called the propagation property, that can be stated both in syntactic and algebraic terminologies. We then show that, for any set R of structural rules, the cut elimination theorem holds for FL enriched with R if and only if R satisfies the propagation property. As an application, we show that any set R of structural rules can be "completed" into another set R*, so that the cut elimination theorem holds for FL enriched with R*, while the provability remains the same. (shrink)

Building computational models of engineered exemplars, or prototypes, is a common practice in the bioengineering sciences. Computational models in this domain are often built in a patchwork fashion, drawing on data and bits of theory from many different domains, and in tandem with actual physical models, as the key objective is to engineer these prototypes of natural phenomena. Interestingly, such patchy model building, often combined with visualizations, whose format is open to a wide range of choice, leads to the discovery (...) of new concepts and control structures. Two key questions are raised by this practice: how could discoveries arise from building external representations for which there is wide latitude in choice of the components from which they are built, and thus can be considered significantly arbitrary, and how could such discoveries allow engineering a real-world prototype system. To examine these questions, we present two case studies of discoveries that emerged from the building of such computational models in the bioengineering sciences. We then develop a process model that accounts for the discovery and transfer problems raised by both these cases, focusing on the process of building the model. Specifically, to account for the discovery problem, we propose that the process of building such models gradually leads to a close coupling between the modeler’s internal processes and the external dynamic model. To account for the transfer problem, we propose that the process of building the model leads to the creation of an enactive model that is generic, which closely enacts, and thus reveals, the way the system-level behavior of the engineered prototype emerges in time through the interaction of its parts. This enactive replication process leads to the model and the prototype forming a new class, which allows concepts and control structures developed for the computational model to be transfered to the real-world prototype. We argue that this account requires rethinking correspondence in engineering sciences as a plastic and enactive relation. A closer focus on the process of building models is required to develop a general account of this emerging approach to discovery. (shrink)

A novel account of semantic information is proposed. The gist is that structural correspondence, analysed in terms of similarity, underlies an important kind of semantic information. In contrast to extant accounts of semantic information, it does not rely on correlation, covariation, causation, natural laws, or logical inference. Instead, it relies on structural similarity, defined in terms of correspondence between classifications of tokens into types. This account elucidates many existing uses of the notion of information, for example, (...) in the context of scientific models and structural representations in cognitive science. It is poised to open a new research program concerned with various kinds of semantic information, its functions, and its measurement. (shrink)

Apart from the computationally appealing properties of representation by similarities, it is possible to extend this form of representation when needed to include object parts as well as the correspondence between subobject parts.

Journal Name: Cognitive Linguistics Issue: Ahead of print.

Causal set theory and the theory of linear structures (which has recently been developed by Tim Maudlin as an alternative to standard topology) share some of their main motivations. In view of that, I raise and answer the question how these two theories are related to each other and to standard topology. I show that causal set theory can be embedded into Maudlin’s more general framework and I characterise what Maudlin’s topological concepts boil down to when applied to discrete linear (...) structures that correspond to causal sets. Moreover, I show that all topological aspects of causal sets that can be described in Maudlin’s theory can also be described in the framework of standard topology. Finally, I discuss why these results are relevant for evaluating Maudlin’s theory. The value of this theory depends crucially on whether it is true that (a) its conceptual framework is as expressive as that of standard topology when it comes to describing well-known continuous as well as discrete models of spacetime and (b) it is even more expressive or fruitful when it comes to analysing topological aspects of discrete structures that are intended as models of spacetime. On the one hand, my theorems support (a): the theory is rich enough to incorporate causal set theory and its definitions of topological notions yield a plausible outcome in the case of causal sets. On the other hand, the results undermine (b): standard topology, too, has the conceptual resources to capture those topological aspects of causal sets that are analysable within Maudlin’s framework. This fact poses a challenge for the proponents of Maudlin’s theory to prove it fruitful. (shrink)

This book describes a program of research in computable structure theory. The goal is to find definability conditions corresponding to bounds on complexity which persist under isomorphism. The results apply to familiar kinds of structures (groups, fields, vector spaces, linear orderings Boolean algebras, Abelian p-groups, models of arithmetic). There are many interesting results already, but there are also many natural questions still to be answered. The book is self-contained in that it includes necessary background material from recursion theory (ordinal notations, (...) the hyperarithmetical hierarchy) and model theory (infinitary formulas, consistency properties). (shrink)

This paper proposes an account of mathematical reasoning as parallel in structure: the arguments which mathematicians use to persuade each other of their results comprise the argumentational structure; the inferential structure is composed of derivations which offer a formal counterpart to these arguments. Some conflicts about the foundations of mathematics correspond to disagreements over which steps should be admissible in the inferential structure. Similarly, disagreements over the admissibility of steps in the argumentational structure correspond to different views about mathematical practice. (...) The latter steps may be analysed in terms of argumentation schemes. Three broad types of scheme are distinguished, a distinction which is then used to characterize and evaluate four contrasting approaches to mathematical practice. (shrink)

We study model theory of actions of finite groups on substructures of a stable structure. We give an abstract description of existentially closed actions as above in terms of invariants and PAC structures. We show that if the corresponding PAC property is first order, then the theory of such actions has a model companion. Then, we analyze some particular theories of interest (mostly various theories of fields of positive characteristic) and show that in all the cases considered the PAC property (...) is first order. (shrink)

Retention of structure across theory change has been invoked in support of a ‘structural’ alternative to more traditional entity-based scientific realism. In that context the transition from Newtonian mechanics to the Special Theory of Relativity is often regarded as a very significant instance of structural preservation, or retention, associated with correspondence-based recovery. The joint derivation, from a small set of elementary and ontologically neutral assumptions, of both the Galilei and the Lorentz transformation exemplifies the virtues of (...) class='Hi'>structural approaches to the foundations of physical theories. The common origination of the resulting two relativistic frameworks sheds light on both the successes and the limitations of correspondence claims. However, the cognitive-operational character of the basic assumptions lends no support to the structural realist’s ‘inference to the best explanation’. (shrink)

The ‘ontic’ form of structural realism , roughly speaking, admits a complete elimination of the objects in the discourse of scientific theories, leaving us with structures only. As put by the defenders of such a claim, the idea is that all there is are structures and, if the relevant structures are to be set-theoretical constructs , as it has also been claimed, then the relations which appear in such structures should be taken to be ‘relations without the relata’. As (...) far as we know, there is not a definition of structure in standard mathematics which fits their intuitions, and even category theory seems not to correspond adequately the OSR claims. Since OSR is also linked with the semantic approach to theories, the structures to be dealt with are taken to be set-theoretical constructs. But these are ‘relational’ structures where the involved relations are built from basic objects , and so no complete elimination of the relata is possible, although it would be adequate for characterizing OSR. In this paper we present a definition of a kind of relation that does not depend on the particular objects being related in the sense that the ‘relation’ continues to hold even if the relata are exchanged by suitable objects. Although there is not a ‘complete’ elimination of relata, our definition might be viewed as an alternative way of finding adequate mathematical ‘set-theoretical’ frameworks for describing at least some of the intuitions regarding OSR within a ‘set-theoretical’ framework. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to analyse the structure of written argumentative texts produced by pupils in grades 3, 5, 7 and 11 in relation to three different tasks: Group A — subjects are assigned a topic question consisting of a single statement (open question); Group B — subjects are given a topic question consisting of both a statement and its opposite (opposite opinions); Group C — subjects are given an initial and a final sentence of a text, which (...) they have to complete, and which refers to opposite opinions (oriented task). Six different types of text organization were evidenced on the basis of the argumentative moves presented in the texts, the linguistic indexes used to express the relationships between the moves, the presence or absence of counter-arguments and the type of argumentation or reasoning used. The organization of the texts range from a simple affirmation of a position (repitition of the proposition or its opposition without any support) to a use of data or reasons to support a position, to others still in which two positions are presented in the body of a unitary structure, developed ‘in parallel’ and interconnected regularly. Our analysis found a well-defined tendency corresponding to the age levels in the types of texts produced by the subjects. The texts produced by the younger group, the pupils in elementary school, contained a fairly simple structural organization, characterized by very few argumentations or a lack of explicitness of the essential moves and a juxtaposing of arguments. The older subjects, in particular those attending secondary school, were able to produce texts which were more complex with regard to the presence and the organization of the argumentative moves, and more coherent and cohesive with respect to their articulation of opinions and use of adequate linguistic indices to analyze t topic. As regards the different types of tasks, when the subjects were presented explicitly with two opposite opinions (though in different terms), they developed both positions in their responses, contrary to the situation in which they produced one position when only one of two opinions was presented. (shrink)

Semantic Structures is a large-scale study of conceptual structure and its lexical and syntactic expression in English that builds on the theory of Conceptual...

Philosophical accounts of thought crucially involve an array of abilities to identify general properties or features of the world (corresponding to concepts) and objects that instantiate those general properties. Abilities of both types can be grounded in a naturalistic account of the usefulness of cognitive structures in adaptive behaviour. Language enhances these abilities by multiplying the experience bases giving rise to them and helping to overcome subjective biases.

ABSTRACT A new algebraic construction -called rotation- is introduced in this paper which from any left-continuous triangular norm which has no zero divisors produces a left-continuous but not continuous triangular norm with strong induced negation. An infinite number of new families of such triangular norms can be constructed in this way which provides a huge spectrum of choice for e.g. logical and set theoretical connectives in non-classical logic and in fuzzy theory. On the other hand, the introduced construction brings us (...) closer to the understanding the structure of these connectives and the corresponding logics. From the application point of view, results of this paper can be especially useful in the field of non-classical logic, fuzzy sets, and fuzzy preference modeling. (shrink)

Academic emotions can play a major role in students’ learning in their English classes. The literature about emotional scaffolding strategies is not widely developed; most of the studies merely focus on negative emotions in EFL contexts. However, in today’s world of varied psychological elements, it is more critical than ever before to scaffold students’ positive emotions to provide more opportunities for their classroom engagement. This study is to explore teachers’ strategies of enhancing students’ positive emotions in English classes in Iran. (...) To investigate the correspondence between students’ and teachers’ views on the effective emotional scaffolding strategies of English teachers, an exploratory sequential mixed-methods design was conducted. First, the researcher conducted semi-structured interviews with 11 high school students of Salami School in Kazeroun to collect in-depth qualitative data. Then, the interview-based Likert scale questionnaires were distributed and completed by 60 high school English teachers in Kazeroun for the quantitative data. According to the teachers’ self-reports, expressing optimism and hope about the students’ future lives and prospective jobs was the most frequently used strategy. There was a significant difference among the teachers’ views on the emotional scaffolding strategies. Moreover, some of the strategies taken into consideration as effective strategies by the students are the least frequently used ones according to the teachers’ reports. The results and findings have several theoretical and practical implications for English teachers in EFL contexts; they might bolster their understanding of appropriate emotional scaffolding strategies preparing them to play a contributing role as great facilitators in English classes. (shrink)

This dissertation defends the place of representation in music. Music’s status as a representational art has been hotly debated since the War of the Romantics, which pitted the Weimar progressives (Liszt, Wagner, &co.) against the Leipzig conservatives (the Schumanns, Brahms, &co.) in an intellectual struggle for what each side took to be the very future of music as an art. I side with the progressives, and argue that music can be and often is a representational medium. Correspondence (or resemblance) (...) theories of representation, such as the one I offer, have been much maligned in philosophy since the 1960s. Most theories assimilate representation under “meaning,” which has usually been thought to belong primarily to language. As a result, representational content has been taken to be purely conventional in the way that sentential meaning is. People want to know what music “means,” and these theories interpret this as “what does it refer to?” or “what propositions does it express?” I argue that propositional communication is only one (small) part of the issue. Once we overcome the bias of conceiving of musical works as essentially linguistic items, speech acts (performed) or sentence tokens (written), we can begin to take music on its own terms to discover how it represents—one way in which it “means.” The first step is to “naturalize” music’s representational content. Influenced by recent discussions in the philosophies of mind and science, I argue in Chapter 1 that composers represent extra-musical objects, events, and states of affairs through their works by exploiting antecedent relations (such as similarities in pitch, timbre, and structure) in order to secure reference to them. In Chapter 2, I survey and respond to the main challenges that those skeptical of music’s representational possibilities would raise against my theory of musical representation. In Chapter 3, I explore a number of ways through which music has been claimed to represent in order to show how my theory accounts for these diverse phenomena better than its conventionalist rivals, both in terms of the metaphysics and the epistemology. Chapter 4 extends this discussion by offering an account of how we perceive, understand, appreciate, and interpret sophisticated musical representations. I conclude by teasing out some of my theory’s implications and suggesting areas for further research. (shrink)

Under the assumption that the so-called space-time fluctuationy(x) in a classical sense, attached to each point of the gravitational field at some microscopic stage, is summarized as the metrical fluctuation in the formg λκ (x)=gλκ (x)·exp2σ(y(x)), some new physical aspects induced by the conformal scalarσ(x) (≡σ(y(x))) are found: By introducing the torsionT κ λμ (x) from a general standpoint, the resulting micro-gravitational field is made to have a conformally non-Riemannian structure, where a special form ofT κ λμ (i.e.,T κ λμ (...) =δ κ λ σμ−δ κ μ σλ(σμ=∂σ/∂x μ)) shows some peculiar features. An averaging process with respect toy is taken into account, by which the spatial structure of the corresponding macro-field is shown, in general, to have a somewhat “non”-Riemannian structure due to the contributions of the torsionT κ λμ. (shrink)

The present volume contains 14 contributions presented at a colloquium on "Structure and Approximation in Physical Theories" held at Osnabruck in June 1980. The articles are presented in the revised form written after the colloquium and hence also take account of the results of the discussion at the colloquium. It is a striking feature that the problem of approximation in physical theories has only recently found some attention in the philosophy of science, although the working physicist is con stantly confronted (...) with those questions. No interesting theory of exact science exactly fits its experimental data; almost every relation between different theories is an approximate one. There fore an adequate reconstruction of physical theories must take into account and conceptualize the moment of approximation. The majority of the articles in this book is centered around this subject. There are at least two elaborate, 'structuralistic' approaches to the formalization of physical theories in which the aspect of approximation has been incorporated: the approach due to P. Suppes, J. Sneed, W. Stegmuller ("S-approach") and the approach of G. Lud wig and his co-workers ("L-approach"). The articles in this book correspondingly fall into three classes: presentation, elaboration and critique of the L-approach [Hartkamper/Schmidt, Ludwig, Neumann, Werner, Schmidt, Mayr, Kamiah, Majer, Grafe] or of the S-approach [Moulines, Balzer, Cooke], and articles referring to both approaches or concerned with related matters [Scheibe, Pfarr, Castrigiano]. Of course, this is only a rough classification and each article must be appraised in its own right. (shrink)

RésuméDans l'article qui précède, l'auteur s'efforce, à l'intention surtout de ceux qui enseignent les Eléments, de mettre en lumière la signification et l'importance de deux ouvrages concernant la géométrie. Le court écrit de M. G. Bouligand fait apparaǐtre la structure algébrique et logique de cette science et présente une ȧxiomatique introduisant les notions d'ensemble et de groupe de transformation. Ainsi s'élabore une classification progressive des problèmes selon le genre des solutions qui leur conviennent. Le livre beaucoup plus étendu de M. (...) F. Gonseth analyse les aspects intuitif, expérimental et théorique de ce qui constituait l'élémentaire dans les traités classiques, puis expose les recherches suscitées par le postulat d'Euclide qui ont amené au développement de la méthode axiomatique. Le triomphe de l'atomisme, découvrant un monde où les notions élémentaires de la géométrie ne s'applíquent plus intégralement, vient rendre plus aigu encore le problème du fondement de la vérité géométrique et celui de la nature de l'espace. Grǎce à l'introduction de notions telles que celle de correspondance schématique et celle de modèle, la géométrie apparaǐt comme une science rationnelle en évolution et à laquelle l'axiomatique sert de critère. Mais bien loin de présenter les caractères d'une pure rationalité, cette axiomatique retient certaines données intuitives, měme dans son application aux géométries non euclidiennes; elle organise un contrǒle de nos intuitions les plus élémentaires les unes par les autres, et assure par leur intermédiaire la portée expérimentale et la cohérence de la géométrie. On assiste ainsi à une véritable mutation de l'élémentaire; mais celle‐ci n'est pas due au hasard. La méthode qui a présidé à cette transformation, dont les étapes historiques sont décrites, est clairement dégagée et il est visible qu'elle régit également les formes nouvelles de la physique dont la constitution théorique ne diffère pas essentiellement de la géométrie considérée comme la science rationnelle de l'espace. Cette méthode est le statut d'une science ouverte. Ainsi se trouve pleinement légitimé un exposé comme celui de M. Bouligand. En s'illustrant l'un l'autre, les deux ouvrages offrent des horizons nouveaux à l'enseignement, měme élémentaire, de la géométrie. La portée philosophique de ces ouvrages n'est pas moindre que leur portée pédagogique.ZusammenfassungIn der voranstehenden Besprechung möchte der Rezensent insbesondere diejenigen unter den Lesern, die die Elemente unterrichten, auf zwei bedeutende Geometriewerke hinweisen. G. Bouligands knapp gehaltene Schrift stellt den algebraisch‐logischen Aufbau dieser Wissenschaft ins Licht und bietet eine Axiomatik, die die Begriffe der Menge und der Transformations‐gruppe einführt. Ausgehend von der passenden Lösungsart gelangt der Verfasser zu einer fortschreitenden Klassifizierung der Aufgaben. In seinem viel breiter angelegten Werk untersucht F. Gonseth das in den klassischen Lehrbüchern als das Elementare angesehene vom intuitiven, experimentellen und theoretischen Gesichtspunkte aus und macht daran anschliessend mit den von Euklids Postulat ausgehenden Nachforschungen, die zur Entwicklung der axiomatischen Methode geführt haben, bekannt. Der eigentliche Siegeszug des Atomismus und die mit dieser Wissenschaft verbundene Entdeckung einer Welt, in der die grundsätzlichen Begriffe der Geometrie ihre volle Bestätigung nicht mehr erfahren, macht die Frage nach den Grundlagen der Geometrie und die nach dem Wesen des Raums besonders brennend. Die Einführung von Begriffen wie Schema und Modell lässt die Geometrie als eine in Entwicklung begriffene Rationalwissenschaft erscheinen, welcher die Axiomatik als Prüfstein dient. Letztere trägt aber durchaus nicht die Züge reiner Vernunftmässigkeit, sie hält vielmehr, selbst in ihrer Anwendung auf die nichteuklidischen Geometrien, an gewissen intuitiven Voraussetzungen fest; sie ermöglicht eine wechselseitige Kritik unserer elementarsten intuitiven Erkenntnisse unter sich und gewährleistet so die experimentelle Tragweite und die Kohärenz der Geometrie. Es findet also eine eigentliche Mutation des Elementaren statt, doch bleibt dieser Wandel nicht dem Zufall überlassen. Die Planmässigkeit, mit der er sich vollzog, wird unter Beschreibung der geschichtlichen Entwicklungsstufen klar dargelegt, womit erkennbar wird, dass er auch die neueren Formen der Physik bestimmt, die sich ja nach ihrem theoretischen Grundgesetz von der Geometrie als der rationalen Wissenschaft vom Raume nicht wesentlich unterscheidet. Eine solche Methode erfüllt das Lebensgesetz einer offenen Wissenschaft. Durch sie finden Ausführungen wie die Bouligands ihre volle Rechtfertigung. Sich gegenseitig ergänzend und erläuternd eröffnen beide Werke selbst dem Elementarunterricht in der Geometrie neue Möglichkeiten. Der pädagogischen kommt ihre philosophische Bedeutung gleich.In the foregoing article the author endeavours—especially for all who are teaching the Elements—to set forth the significance and importance of two books about geometry. Mr. G. Bouligand's short writing brings out the algebraic and logical structure of that science and presents an »axiomatic« introducing both the notions of »whole« and »group of transformation«. A progressive classification of problems is thus elaborated according to the kinds of solutions that suit them. Mr. F. Gonseth, in his far more comprehensive work, analyses the intuitive, experimental and theoretical aspects of what used to constitute the elementary in classical treatises, then states the researches raised up by Euclid's postulate and leading to the development of the axiomatic method. The triumph of atomism, discovering a world to which the elementary notions of geometry do no longer apply fully, makes it still more difficult to solve the problems of the basing of both geometrical truth and the nature of space. Thanks to his introducing such ideas as »schematic correspondence« and »model«, geometry appears as a rational science in progress using the »axiomatic« as its criterion. But far from offering the characteristics of pure rationality, such an »axiomatic« retains some intuitive bases, even when applied to non‐Euclidian geometries; it organizes a control of our most elementary intuitions by setting them against one another, and secures through their medium the experimental significance and coherence of geometry. Thus a real mutation of the elementary takes place; but it is not owing to mere chance. The method which has presided over that transformation, the historical changes and stages of which are described, is clearly shown, and it is made evident that it also determines the new forms of physics, the theoretical constitution of which does not differ essentially from geometry considered as the rational science of space. That method is the statute of an open science. So Mr. Bouligand's account is fully justified. By elucidating each other, both books open new horizons to the teaching—even elementary—of geometry. The philosophical significance of those books is of no less importance than the pedagogical one. (shrink)

The aim of the study is to contribute to a better understanding of some aspects of the structure of biological knowledge and to make clearer to what extent the methods of reasoning may be useful in this field when only qualitative information is available. A fragment of biological knowledge (theory of cell motility) is analysed from the logico-methodological point of view as a coherent system and the possibility of its formal representation is investigated. The analysis is based on distinguishing the (...) main objects and their features (attributes) of which a given piece of knowledge is composed and on the values which these features may display. The features are interconnected by relations (in which various number of arguments appear) and these relations constitute the main (general, higher level) laws of a given fragment of knowledge (theory). Values of attributes are also mutually connected and these relations correspond to the detailed (lower level) laws. A computer system (in which Prolog language was used) enables to perform inference operations of progressive as well as regressive type. The main categories of reasoning procedures are described and illustrated by examples, namely a) search for conclusions which may be confronted with the actual knowledge in order to verify the system as a whole, b) formation of working hypotheses in the process of their empirical verification and explanation of facts and laws. The problem of development and modification of the system is also discussed. (shrink)

The logic of a physical theory reflects the structure of the propositions referring to the behaviour of a physical system in the domain of the relevant theory. It is argued in relation to classical mechanics that the propositional structure of the theory allows truth-value assignment in conformity with the traditional conception of a correspondence theory of truth. Every proposition in classical mechanics is assigned a definite truth value, either ‘true’ or ‘false’, describing what is actually the case at a (...) certain moment of time. Truth-value assignment in quantum mechanics, however, differs; it is known, by means of a variety of ‘no go’ theorems, that it is not possible to assign definite truth values to all propositions pertaining to a quantum system without generating a Kochen–Specker contradiction. In this respect, the Bub–Clifton ‘uniqueness theorem’ is utilized for arguing that truth-value definiteness is consistently restored with respect to a determinate sublattice of propositions defined by the state of the quantum system concerned and a particular observable to be measured. An account of truth of contextual correspondence is thereby provided that is appropriate to the quantum domain of discourse. The conceptual implications of the resulting account are traced down and analyzed at length. In this light, the traditional conception of correspondence truth may be viewed as a species or as a limit case of the more generic proposed scheme of contextual correspondence when the non-explicit specification of a context of discourse poses no further consequences. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON: SOME COMMENTS AND CLARIFICATIONS DR. BRIAN V. JOHNSTONE, C.Ss.R., pays particular attention to some of my early work in his recent article, " The Structures of Practical Reason: Traditional Theories and Contemporary Questions." 1 He plainly tries to present my views accurately. Still, Johnstone has overlooked some important things I said about the questions he considers. Moreover, in some cases he either misunderstands the (...) positions I tried to explain and defend or, at least, puts matters in ways likely to cause others to misunderstand those positions. They still seem sound to me, although no doubt open to refinement and development. Therefore, since Johnstone is.seriously trying to use my work to advance understanding of important questions, I offer these comments and clarifications to help keep open the way to a more adequate theory of practical reason. I. The first question Johnstone considers is: What is the specific truth of practical reason? To explore this question, he compares the theory of practical reason which I articulated with a " traditional" theory, exemplified by the work of Labourdette. E·arly in this comparison, in pointing out differences, Johnstone offers a summary and criticism: If I understand Grisez correctly, he seeks to develop a theory of practical reason such that practical reason, in itself, can be understood -must be understood-without reference to the will FP,2 1 Tkomist, 50 (1986), pp. 417-46. Johnstone's article will be referred to henceforth as BVJ. 2 FP refers to: Germain Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason : A Commentary on the Summa tkeologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," 9t69 270 GERMAIN GRISEZ p. 193). Further, he places such stress on the distinct way of knowing proper to practical reason, that he implies that the two (practical and theoretical reason) are quite disparate. These distinctions, I would suggest, are too sharply drawn. (BVJ, p. 4~5) I agree with Johnstone in rejecting these positions, for, as formulated, neither is what I tried to explain and defend. For practical reason precisely is reason directed to a work, which will not be done without an intervening act of an appetitive power corresponding to reason, and that power is the will. Hence, volition is included in the very concept of practical reason, and so it cannot be understood without reference to the will. But in the place Johnstone cites (FP, p. 193), I did not say that practical reason can be understood without reference to the wilL Rather, having argued that, because practical principles are self-evident truths, they do not presuppose a divine command, I said: "Nor is any operation of our own will presupposed by the first principles of practical reason." The argument for this is: The first operations of will are natural volitions of ends; these volitions presuppose knowledge directing to these ends; the directive knowledge is the principles of practical reason; therefore, the principles of practical reason do not presuppose any operation of our will.3 Moreover, I pointed out: "Of course we do make judgments concerning means in accordance with the orientation of our inNatural Law Forum, 10 (1965), pp. 168-201. Although I personally agreed with all of the propositions asserted in this article at the time I wrote it, and still agree with almost all of them, I did not and do not consider the theory proposed in it to be my theory, but that of St. Thomas (and, even more importantly, a very good theory) which I tried to understand, explain, and defend. Moreover, had the article not been a commentary, I would have put many things somewhat differently, and would have provided arguments for certain positions which can be taken for granted within the Thomistic framework. s In FP, p. 193, this argument is introduced by the sentence: "At any rate this is Aquinas's theory," and accompanied by references to his work, to signal the reader that assumptions are being made here which outside the Thomistic framework would require additional support..Johnstone overlooks the signal. THE STRUCTURES OF PRACTICAL REASON 271 tention toward the end " (FP, p. 193). One essential function of practical reason is to reach such judgments (concerning means), which... (shrink)

It is proposed that quantum mechanical systems may spontaneously develop collective modes and other cooperative behavior which lead to a rich structuring of their Hilbert spaces and the consequent appearance ofobjective parameters for their description, in addition to the more familiar wave function description. The paper discusses the time evolution of these objective parameters, both the terms of non-unitary operators and through the dynamical effects of the quantum system's environment. A brief exploration is also made of the way in which (...) the objective parameters corresponding to two quantum systems can “measure” and interact with each other. The significance of a non-unitary time evolution for the origin of the universe is also discussed. (shrink)

In a bipartite quantum system, quantum states are classified as classically correlated and quantum correlated states, the later are important resources of quantum information and computation protocols. Since correlations of quantum states may vary under a quantum channel, it is necessary to explore the influence of quantum channels on correlations of quantum states. In this paper, we discuss CC-preserving, QC-breaking and strongly CC-preserving local quantum channels of the form \ and obtain the structures of these three types of local quantum (...) channels. Moreover, we obtain a necessary and sufficient condition for a quantum state to be transformed into a CC state by a specific local channel \ in terms of the structure of the input quantum state. Lastly, as applications of the obtained results, we present a classification of local quantum channels \ and describe the quantum states which are transformed as CC ones by the corresponding local quantum channel. (shrink)

A countably infinite relational structure M is called absolutely ubiquitous if the following holds: whenever N is a countably infinite structure, and M and N have the same isomorphism types of finite induced substructures, there is an isomorphism from M to N. Here a characterisation is given of absolutely ubiquitous structures over languages with finitely many relation symbols. A corresponding result is proved for uncountable structures.

Correspondences and similarities between ideas in shamanism and ideas in contemporary cognitive science are considered. The importance of interconnectedness in the web of life worldview characteristic of shamanism and in connectionist models of semantic memory in cognitive science, and the extension of meaning to elements of the natural world in shamanism and indistributed cognition, are considered. Cognitive consequences of such an extension (e.g., use of representativeness and intentional stance heuristics, magical thinking, social attribution errors, and social in‐group/out‐group differences) are discussed. (...) It is suggested that attributions of mental states, beliefs, and desires to a computer on the basis of behavioral measures (e.g., the Turing test) is consistent with the extension of meaning and intentionality to nonhuman elements of the natural world in shamanism. In general, the existence of such correspondencesand similarities suggests that elements of shamanism may reflect cognitive structures and processes that are also used by nonshamans and in nonshamanic settings. (shrink)

The identity predicate can be defined using second-order quantification: a=b =df ∀F(Fa↔Fb). Less familiarly, a dyadic sentential operator analogous to the identity predicate can be defined using third-order quantification: ϕ≡ψ =df ∀X(Xϕ↔Xψ), where X is a variable of the same syntactic type as a monadic sentential operator. With this notion in view, it is natural to ask after general principles governing its application. More grandiosely, how fine-grained is reality? -/- I will argue that reality is not structured in anything like (...) the way that the sentences we use to talk about it are structured. I do so by formulating a higher-order analogue of Russell’s paradox of structured propositions. I then relate this argument to the Frege-Russell correspondence. When confronted with the alleged paradox, Frege agreed that reality was not structured, but maintained that propositions (i.e. thoughts) were structured all the same. Russell replied that his paradox showed Frege’s theory of structured thoughts to be inconsistent, to which Frege replied that Russell’s argument failed to heed the distinction between sense and reference. Most recent commentators have sided with Russell. In defense of Frege, I establish the consistency of one version of his rejoinder. I then consider and reject some ways of resisting the argument against a structured conception of reality. I conclude that, if propositions are structured, this is because they correspond not to distinctions in reality, but rather to ways in which those distinctions can be represented. (shrink)

This paper is concerned with representational explanations of how one experiences and acts with one’s body as an integrated whole. On the standard view, accounts of bodily experience and action must posit a corresponding representational structure: a representation of the body as an integrated whole. The aim of this paper is to show why we should instead favour the minimal view: given the nature of the body, and representation of its parts, accounts of the structure of bodily experience and action (...) need not appeal to a representation of the body as an integrated whole. The argument proceeds by distinguishing two kinds of explanatory roles for representations: standing-in for absent targets and structuring ambiguous sensory information concerning a target. Representations of body-parts are suited to fulfil both kinds of explanatory role, whereas a representation of the body as an integrated whole is only suited to fulfil the latter, as a means of coordinating representations of body-parts. It is then argued that the structure of the body can itself serve as a means of coordinating body-part representations, rendering representation of the body as an integrated whole explanatorily superfluous. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to analyse the structure of written argumentative texts produced by pupils in grades 3, 5, 7 and 11 in relation to three different tasks: Group A — subjects are assigned a topic question consisting of a single statement ; Group B — subjects are given a topic question consisting of both a statement and its opposite ; Group C — subjects are given an initial and a final sentence of a text, which they have (...) to complete, and which refers to opposite opinions . Six different types of text organization were evidenced on the basis of the argumentative moves presented in the texts, the linguistic indexes used to express the relationships between the moves, the presence or absence of counter-arguments and the type of argumentation or reasoning used. The organization of the texts range from a simple affirmation of a position to a use of data or reasons to support a position, to others still in which two positions are presented in the body of a unitary structure, developed ‘in parallel’ and interconnected regularly. Our analysis found a well-defined tendency corresponding to the age levels in the types of texts produced by the subjects. The texts produced by the younger group, the pupils in elementary school, contained a fairly simple structural organization, characterized by very few argumentations or a lack of explicitness of the essential moves and a juxtaposing of arguments. The older subjects, in particular those attending secondary school, were able to produce texts which were more complex with regard to the presence and the organization of the argumentative moves, and more coherent and cohesive with respect to their articulation of opinions and use of adequate linguistic indices to analyze t topic. As regards the different types of tasks, when the subjects were presented explicitly with two opposite opinions , they developed both positions in their responses, contrary to the situation in which they produced one position when only one of two opinions was presented. (shrink)

‘Second substances’ are Aristotle’s species and genera that reveal the general nature of a thing. Sortals correspond to the most specific, least abstract of these, normally thought of as ‘the’ kind to which a thing belongs. I argue against a common view that artifact terms such as ‘clock’ or ‘pen’ are suitable as sortals and for their being regarded as more like genera. If we can individuate clocks and pens as we do trees and rocks, by a combination of sortal (...) plus ostension, then we must use more specific sortals which indicate the structures by virtue of which the objects perform the functions of clocks or pens. Functions by themselves do not supply the identity conditions of sortals. Similar reasoning supports Wiggins’ view that ‘the kind’ to which we belong is our biological species, not the purely functional kind of being a person. (shrink)

In this paper we consider the notions of structure and models within the semantic approach to theories. To highlight the role of the mathematics used to build the structures which will be taken as the models of theories, we review the notion of mathematical structure and of the models of scientific theories. Then, we analyse a case-study and argue that if a certain metaphysical view of quantum objects is adopted, namely, that which sees them as non-individuals, then there would be (...) strong reasons to ask for a different mathematical framework for describing the structures that would be the models of the corresponding theory. In departing from the standard frameworks, we hope to bring to the scene, within the scope of the semantic approach, the importance of paying attention to some fundamental concepts usually only superficially touched by philosophers of science. (shrink)

The deep structure of Confucianism is identified through structuralist analysis in order to provide a conceptual framework for conducting social psychological research in Chinese society. Through understanding and imitating the Way of Heaven (tiendao), Confucians constructed the Way of Humanity (rendao), which consists of two aspects; ethics for ordinary people and ethics for scholars. Ethics for ordinary people adopts the principle of Respecting the Superior for procedural justice and the principle of Favouring the Intimate for distributive justice; the person who (...) occupies the superior position should play the role of decision-maker and should allocate resources by favouring intimate relationships. Because Confucian cosmology suggests that the Way of Humanity corresponds to the Way of Heaven, Confucians required individuals to cultivate themselves with the Way of Humanity. Ethics for scholars further endows Confucian disciples with the mission of benefiting the whole society with the Way of Humanity. (shrink)

In this paper, the spirit of human was discovered to be a kind of system to process information which is obedient to the life’s oriented. It emanates from body but surpasses body, they can work together harmoniously, and grow up jointly. Just like the hardware and the software of the computer, our physical body corresponds to the hardware, our spirit corresponds to the software. This software system is far from nothing, it has specific structure system and runningmechanism, it exists in (...) the form of information, and its function is obvious. (shrink)

The structure which is generally taken to underlie the composition of the plays of Aristophanes is made up of a number of quantitative parts which have been abstracted by dividing the comedies into broad sections. It roughly corresponds to the quantitative division of tragedy offered by the twelfth chapter of Aristotle'sPoetics, and includes prologue,parodos, ‘proagon’or ‘battle scene,’ ‘epirrhematicagon,’ parabasis, iambic scenes, choral songs orstasimo, exodos.