The concept of presentism has been at the center of current discussions in the historical discipline. Among the efforts to define presentism, we face radically different approaches. On the one hand, we have scholars that see it as ‘a cardinal sin’ or as a vice, while on the other, there are many who recognize in it something that is unavoidable and should be understood and welcomed. In this article, we explore and discuss these contrasting positions and argue for three central (...) virtues that presentism can bring to our understanding of the past. Through the analysis of narratives surrounding World War II and the founding of the United States, we argue that presentism: 1. allows history to be critical by motivating present reviews to established–mostly western-centric– accounts; 2. allows us to create new perspectives about the past by strategically using the tools of our present and finally, 3. welcomes pluralism rather than a single historical truth. These points allow us to defend a view of the past that is not static, fixed, and forever closed, but instead, see it as a place of debate, dispute, and constant renewal. (shrink)

The discrete Deffuant model and its alternatives is a family of stochastic spatial models for the dynamics of binary opinions on f issues. Another parameter is also incorporated that prevents interaction between two agents whenever their opinion profiles are at a Hamming distance greater than the confidence threshold θ. By numerical simulations, it was conjectured in (Adamopoulos and Scarlatos, Complexity 2012, 17, 43) that one‐dimensional models exhibit a phase transition at a critical value θ critical approximately equal to f/2. We (...) report on recent mathematical results on this problem that originates from the community of complex systems. © 2016 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. Complexity 21: 437–439, 2016. (shrink)

While trying to preserve the autonomy of their playful activity consisting in a game of ‘questioning and answering’, the Gymnosophists defy Alexander the Great and, more importantly, go against their own chances of survival (since giving a wrong answer to the king’s question amounts to losing their life). Thankfully, we do not need to face such dilemmas when philosophising with children. Nevertheless, the Gymnosophists’ example helps construct a notion of philosophy for/with children as an autonomous playful activity that albeit (implicitly) (...) purposive it is, however, without (explicit) purpose (something akin to Kant’s aesthetic judgement). Alluding to an Aristotelian sense of ‘telos’ in its connection with Platonic ‘paideia’ I understand philosophy for/with children as an activity that we carry out for its own sake. This does not mean that we are to abolish elements such as antagonism, competition, excellence, etc.―there is no question: the competitive element is there. But what does it mean? We could fix its meaning according to a purpose (we compete to excel or persuade and win) or we might entertain the idea of keeping its meaning rather vague or undetermined, implicit. (shrink)

> Future people count. There could be a lot of them. We can make their lives better. > > -- William MacAskill, What We Owe The Future > > [Longtermism is] quite possibly the most dangerous secular belief system in the world today. > > -- Émile P. Torres, Against Longtermism Philosophers,1 2 psychologists,3 4 politicians5 and even some tech billionaires6 have sounded the alarm about artificial intelligence (AI) and the dangers it may pose to the long-term future of humanity. (...) Some believe it poses an existential risk (X-Risk)7 to our species, potentially causing our extinction or bringing about the collapse of human civilisation as we know it. The above quote from philosopher Will MacAskill captures the key tenets of ‘longtermism’, an ethical standpoint that places the onus on current generations to prevent AI-related—and other—X-Risks for the sake of people living in the future.1 2 Developing from an adjacent social movement commonly associated with utilitarian philosophy, ‘effective altruism’, longtermism has amassed following of its own. Its supporters argue that preventing X-Risks is at least as morally significant as addressing current challenges like global poverty. However, critics are concerned that such a distant-future focus will sideline efforts to tackle the many pressing moral issues facing humanity now.8 9 Indeed, according to ‘strong’ longtermism,10 future needs arguably should take precedence over present ones. In essence, the claim is that there is greater expected utility to allocating available resources to prevent human extinction in the future than there is to focusing on present lives, since doing so stands to benefit the incalculably large number of people in later generations who will far outweigh existing populations.1 Taken to the extreme, this view suggests it would be morally permissible, or even required, to actively neglect, harm or destroy large swathes of humanity as …. (shrink)

In the article, we set out to develop the contours of a general containerology, interrogating containment as a technology and an ontological condition that shapes human and more-than-human relations. While exploring containment technologies as spatio-temporal devices of ordering vis-à-vis leakage, we nevertheless stress how containment inevitably remains contextual, provisional, and leaky at best. Addressing the selective permeability of containers, we also discuss the relation between contained interiorities and exteriorities as processes of articulations between milieus. We problematise the opposition and incommensurability (...) between containment and leakage, and instead insist on conceiving them as co-constitutive. Ultimately, we outline an affirmative, positive take on containment beyond exclusionary inclusion, in contrast to prevailing negative conceptions and practices. (shrink)

We investigate the one-dimensional dynamics of alternatives of the Axelrod model (ξ(t)), where t is the time, with k binary features and confidence parameter ε = 0, 1,…, k. Simultaneously, the simple Axelrod model is also critically examined. Specifically, for small and large ε, simulations suggest that the convergent model (ξ(t)) is emulated by a corresponding attractive model (η(t)) with the same parameters (conditional on bounded confidence). (η(t)) is more mathematically tractable than (ξ(t)), and the very definitions of the two (...) qualitative behaviors of cyclic particle systems (fluctuation and fixation) are applicable in special cases. Moreover, we observe a complementarity: for not too small k and equation image, (η(t)) fixates (each site has a final type independent of the possibly infinite size of the lattice), whereas (ξ(t)) fluctuates (each site changes type at arbitrarily larger times t as the size of the lattice increases). (shrink)

Previous examinations of the scope of moral concern have focused on aggregate attributions of moral worth. However, because trade‐offs exist in valuing different kinds of entities, tabulating total amounts of moral expansiveness may conceal significant individual differences in the relative proportions of moral valuation ascribed to various entities. We hypothesized that some individuals (“tree‐huggers”) would ascribe greater moral worth to animals and ecosystems than to humans from marginalized or stigmatized groups, while others (“human‐lovers”) would ascribe greater moral worth to outgroup (...) members than to the natural world. Additionally, because moral valuation is often treated as being zero‐sum, we hypothesized that there would be no difference in aggregate levels of moral concern between tree‐huggers and human‐lovers. Finally, because attributions of mental capacities substantially contribute to moral valuation, we predicted that tree‐huggers and human‐lovers would show different patterns of mind attribution for animals versus humans. Three studies (N = 985) yielded evidence in support of our hypotheses. First, over one‐third of participants valued nature over outgroups. Second, extending moral value to animals and nature was not indicative of more expansive moral concern overall; instead, tree‐huggers and human‐lovers were identical in their aggregate ascriptions of moral worth. Third, tree‐huggers had relatively amplified tendencies to attribute mental capacities to animals and relatively reduced tendencies to attribute mental capacities to outgroup members—thus having elevated rates of both anthropomorphism and dehumanization. These findings necessitate a reconceptualization of both the extension of moral worth and the attribution of minds. (shrink)

According to LAMPAKIS (L.), the main purpose of this book is to offer a detailed biography of Georgios Pachymeres as well as an assessment of his works (p. 9). Unfortunately, it falls far short of achieving either of these objectives. First, the choice of wording – “Introductory essay” – in the title is somewhat infelicitous. The meaning of “essay” in modern Greek is vague, to say the least, and few would apply this term to a book which, in essence, is (...) an unnecessarily long compilation of the known facts about Pachymeres' life and works. Only an attempt by the author to interpret the thought of Pachymeres or to place his work in the broader historical context of his times would have convincingly justified the term “essay” for this particular monograph. (shrink)

The present contribution engages with two representative examples of middle-Byzantine ekphraseis, Photios’ description of the Virgin of the Pharos and Leo VI’s account of the church founded by Stylianos Zautzes. It aims at showing how these texts suggest modes of viewing the sacred space and decoration that pose, more than settle, questions about images and pictures, their intended function, significance and impact within their specific cultural frames of reference. Far from being neutral and disengaged, these verbal representations have a (...) specific agenda, which inflects the audience’s perception and interpretation of the decorated church space. Comparisons with coeval monumental evidence are also offered, in order to analyze textual and visual developments in parallel. (shrink)