Twentieth century philosophers introduced the distinction between “objective rightness” and “subjective rightness” to achieve two primary goals. The first goal is to reduce the paradoxical tension between our judgments of (i) what is best for an agent to do in light of the actual circumstances in which she acts and (ii) what is wisest for her to do in light of her mistaken or uncertain beliefs about her circumstances. The second goal is to provide moral guidance to an agent (...) who may be uncertain about the circumstances in which she acts, and hence is unable to use her standard moral principle directly in deciding what to do. This paper distinguishes two important senses of “moral guidance”; proposes criteria of adequacy for accounts of subjective rightness; canvasses existing definitions for “subjective rightness”; finds them all deficient; and proposes a new and more successful account. It argues that each comprehensive moral theory must include multiple principles of subjective rightness to address the epistemic situations of the full range of moral decision-makers, and shows that accounts of subjective rightness formulated in terms of what it would reasonable for the agent to believe cannot provide that guidance. -/- . (shrink)

Systems theory and deconstruction alike conceive of modern law as self-reflective: Modern law entails in itself its own other; from this follows its paradoxical structure which is exemplified by the concept of legal person as a “two-sides-form” (Zwei-Seiten-Form: Luhmann) of “social person” and “concrete individuality”. Systems theory and deconstruction differ, however, in how they conceive of modern law’s paradoxical self-reflection: Systems theory grants it the power of form-constitution. This is shown by Luhmann’s interpretation of the figure of subjective right; (...) in it, law’s paradoxical self-relation has become legal form. Deconstruction instead consists in unfolding the undecidable ambiguity in the relation between paradox and form: Modern law’s paradoxical self-reflection as much constitutes as dissolves legal form. This may be called the “paradox of paradox” of self-reflective law in which Derrida sees its essentially political character. (shrink)

Data subject rights provide data controllers with obligations that can help with transparency, giving data subjects some control over their personal data. To date, a growing number of researchers have used these data subject rights as a methodology for data collection in research studies. No one, however, has gathered and analysed different academic research studies that use data subject rights as a methodology for data collection. To this end, we conducted a systematic literature review that searched, compiled, (...) and analysed 32 academic studies that use data subject rights as a data collection method. We find that the right of access is the most commonly-used data subject right by researchers, most studies are interested in measuring data subject rights compliance, and that a variety of difficulties exist in conducting research studies with data subject rights. We conclude that researchers should explore other data subject rights for alternative purposes, ease the process of exercising data subject rights, and improve the scalability of these studies. (shrink)

It has become increasingly common for philosophers to distinguish between objective and subjective rightness, and there has been much discussion recently about what an adequate theory of subjective rightness looks like. In this article, I propose a new theory of subjective rightness. According to it, an action is subjectively right if and only if it minimizes expected objective wrongness. I explain this theory in detail and argue that it avoids many of the problems that other theories of (...) subjective rightness face. I end by responding to some objections. (shrink)

This book critically investigates the notion of democracy without demos by unravelling the link that modern history has established between the concepts of democracy and the sovereignty of the people. This task is imposed on us by globalization. The individualization of the subject of rights is the result of the destruction of regimes of special rights of ancient societies by the centralizing action of a territorial power. This individualization, because it implies equality, has created a new form of (...) political subjectivity that has been the driving force of the democratization of democracies during the 19th and 20th centuries. Democracy and subjective rights discusses how asserting itself as the only guarantor of rights, the modern state has also nationalized citizenship. However, the author argues, the legal and judicial monopoly of the nation-state is weakened today by the multiplication and heterogeneity of the powers on which the rights of individuals depend. This situation forces us to denationalize citizenship without sacrificing, however, the specific form of political subjectivity that the individualization of rights has made possible. (shrink)

In the last twenty years a critique of the idea of a right as the property of an individual subject has been articulated by some influential Anglican theologians – Joan Lockwood O’Donovan, Oliver O’Donovan and John Milbank. Their objections are considerably based on an argument about intellectual history. Broadly pursuing an intellectual trajectory first set by Leo Strauss and C. B. Macpherson, these theologians think that the very concept of a ‘subjective right’ is tied, certainly historically but perhaps also (...) logically, to modern, Hobbesian social contract theory, and therefore to radical individualism and moral subjectivism. Therefore, they think that to affirm individual subjective rights is to exclude a larger objective order of moral right, and to undermine the authority of the claim of social obligation. Against this critique, this article, first, argues that a morally realist conception of subjective rights prevailed before Hobbes, and continued to prevail long afterwards. Second, the article proceeds to refute Ernest Fortin’s thesis that Hobbes came to dominate modern rights-talk through John Locke. Finally, it suggests that the contemporary detachment of the concept of subjective rights from a larger context of objective moral right has more plausible and more proximate roots in twentieth century philosophical and cultural developments. (shrink)

This paper is a contribution to the conceptual history of subjective rights. The subjective right is generally understood as an individual right in contradistinction to the system of legal rules, which are named the ‘objective right.’ These notions have enjoyed immense popularity among Continental legal scholars and historians. This article gives an explanation of how the terms “subjective” and “objective” right came into usage in Germany, and it shows how these terms were elaborated within a metaphysical (...) context. This paper suggests that the origin of this terminology is to be found in the philosophy of Christian Wolff and in particular in that of one of his pupils, Joachim Georg Darjes. The notion of a subjective right thus has its origin in an intellectualistic and perfectionist philosophy, where rights in a primary sense are at the same time conceived as duties. (shrink)

This article refers to the issues associated with the crucial significance of the interpretation of tax law provisions made by administrative courts in the course of the judicial inspection of tax decisions, within the context of protecting the subjective rights of taxpayers. The analysis in that regard has been prepared based on the provisions of art. 153 of the Act of 25 July 2002 on Proceedings before Administrative Courts, which expresses the important rule of binding the court and (...) the administrative authority, whose act was the subject of an appeal, with a legal assessment and instructions regarding the further proceedings described in the decision of the administrative court. As a result of this rule, a decision of an administrative court exerts the results exceeding the scope of judicial administrative proceedings, while its effect also covers the future tax proceedings. If the legal assessment made by the court refers to the regulations that affect the subjective rights of a taxpayer, it means that the administrative court imposes the effects of “its” interpretation of those provisions on a tax authority. In turn, the tax authority is obliged to respect those rights in accordance with the opinions of the court, which usually affects the final resolution of a tax case. It should be borne in mind that a taxpayer, by submitting an appeal against a tax decision to an administrative court, demands not only an inspection of the acts of tax administration, but also - which should be emphasized - demands the execution of its rights, including its subjective rights. Therefore, we should not forget the crucial role of the administrative courts in the protection of the substantive rights of taxpayers. The instrument that allows the administrative courts to guard the subjective rights of taxpayers, consists in the procedural regulations included in the provisions on proceedings before administrative courts, and in particular art. 153 of the Act on Proceedings before Administrative Courts in Poland. (shrink)

Hobbes says a great deal about the rights of subjects, particularly in Leviathan, and yet, despite his apparent insistence on the importance of the rights of the subject, the prevailing view amongst modern Hobbes scholars has been that rights of Hobbesian subjects are weak. The dominant view of Hobbesian rights as weak and insignificant is the view of modern Hobbes scholarship, which analyses Hobbes's political theory at great distance from his intellectual milieu and from the dramatic (...) political events of the time. Hobbesian absolutism is understood to rule out rights of any strength or significance on the part of Hobbesian subjects and particularly, any rights held against the sovereign. The significance of defining subjects' rights as Hohfeldian liberty rights is that liberty rights lack any correlative duties on the part of others. The sovereign's authority and right to rule are made dependent on his ability and willingness to protect the subjects' aggregate right to self‐preservation. (shrink)

States are in the process of creating controversial legislation aimed at subjecting ‘harmful’ online communication on social media and search engines to new regulatory regimes. Critics argue that these measures are serious threats to the right to freedom of expression and freedom from surveillance. This article first draws on elements of systems theory to reframe the right to freedom of expression in democracy as a means of protecting the value of generalised second-order observation. Taking the UK’s Online Safety bill as (...) the paradigm example of the new laws, the article analyses the concept of harmful communication at three levels: society, organisation, and subject. It identifies a shift in the law’s epistemic approach to communication, by which individuals are reconfigured from agential subjects into contingent users, whose capacities are determined by the structure of online communication platforms. In this configuration, norms previously considered indispensible are relegated to second-order effects of the affordances of media. Arguing that it is insufficient to merely reaffirm subjective rights in light of this shift, the article suggests systems theoretical analysis as a means of identifying lines of critique. (shrink)

In response to critiques of rights as moralistic and depoliticising, a literature on the political nature and contestability of rights has emerged. In this view, rights are not merely formal, liberal and moralistic imperatives, but can also be invoked by the excluded in a struggle against domination. This article examines the limits to this practice of rights-claiming and its implication in forms of domination. It does this by returning to Marx’s blueprint for the critique of (...) class='Hi'>subjective rights. This engagement with Marx will, however, take a particular form. I will read Marx first through the eyes of Claude Lefort and thereafter against Lefort. The latter’s critique of Marx still constitutes the strongest case against the dismissal of subjective rights. Introducing a reading of Lefort into the argument allows us to discover what is dead and what is well alive in the Marxist theory of rights. What is dead, I will argue, is Marx’s early conception of subjective rights as ideology and illusion. However, the more mature Marx developed a theory and critique of the legal form that is able to explain why the politics of rights—despite its undeniable advances—has not been able to overcome certain forms of domination. (shrink)

This multidisciplinary volume explores the relationship between human rights and the subject. Each chapter considers how human rights norms and practices affect the way we relate to ourselves, to other people, and to the non-human world, drawing on the best work on human rights in political theory, cultural studies, history, law, anthropology, literary studies, and philosophy.

Social media data hold considerable potential for predicting health-related conditions. Recent studies suggest that machine-learning models may accurately predict depression and other mental health-related conditions based on Instagram photos and Tweets. In this article, it is argued that individuals should have a sui generis right not to be subjected to AI profiling based on publicly available data without their explicit informed consent. The article (1) develops three basic arguments for a right to protection of personal data trading on the notions (...) of social control and stigmatization, (2) argues that a number of features of AI profiling make individuals more exposed to social control and stigmatization than other types of data processing (the exceptionalism of AI profiling), (3) considers a series of other reasons for and against protecting individuals against AI profiling based on publicly available data, and finally (4) argues that the EU General Data Protection Regulation does not ensure that individuals have a right not to be AI profiled based on publicly available data. (shrink)

What is commonly called a right has since about 1980 increasingly come to be called a subjective right. In this paper the origin and rise of this solecism is investigated. Its use can result in a lack of clarity and even confusion. Some aspects of rights-concepts and their history are also discussed. A brief postscript introduces Leibniz's Razor.

This article focuses on the transformation of the female reproductive body with the use of assisted reproduction technologies under neo-liberal economic globalisation, wherein the ideology of trade without borders is central, as well as under liberal feminist ideals, wherein the right to self-determination is central. Two aspects of the body in western medicine—the fragmented body and the commodified body, and the integral relation between these two—are highlighted. This is done in order to analyse the implications of local and global transactions (...) in women’s reproductive body parts for their right to self-determination and individual agency and what this means for their embodiment. We conclude by exploring whether women can become embodied subjects by exercising their proprietary right to their bodies through directing technology to achieve their own goals, while at the same time being fragmented into parts and losing their personhood and bodily integrity. (shrink)

'There are no substantive rights for subjects in Hobbes's political theory, only bare freedoms without correlated duties to protect them'. This orthodoxy of Hobbes scholarship and its Hohfeldian assumptions are challenged by Curran who develops an argument that Hobbes provides claim rights for subjects against each other and (indirect) protection of the right to self-preservation by sovereign duties. The underlying theory, she argues, is not a theory of natural rights but rather, a modern, secular theory of (...) class='Hi'>rights, with something to offer current discussions in rights theory. (shrink)

While the legal concept of a subject of rights is eminently an abstraction, Ricoeur’s philosophical challenge seeks to rethink its identity within the philosophy of action, in correlation with the ideas of capacity, attestation, and recognition. The terminology Ricoeur employs presents some significant marks of this theoretical stance, as he speaks of a “veritable” or a “real” subject of rights as distinguished from the purely formal one. I argue that Ricoeur’s approach to the legal subject attains its highest (...) meaning in connection with the renewal of the semantics of responsibility in a prospective sense. In particular, I contend that Ricoeur’s idea of a “veritable” subject of rights deploys its full theoretical potential in relation to a prospective idea of responsibility in contrast to the “static” perspective of the ascription of rights and duties. Reciprocally, a prospective idea of responsibility deploys its full meaning in relation to a subject of rights not reduced to a legal abstraction since, as far as narrative identity is implied, this subject is and has to be an embodied one. I shall show that the thesis advocating a projection of responsibility towards the future may have some significant theoretical implications, in particular in relation to the effect of techno-scientific development in areas such as Artificial Intelligence. (shrink)

It is often pointed out that Agamben’s most profound disagreement with Hannah Arendt is his rejection of anything like a “right to have rights” that would guarantee the belonging to a political space. I want to suggest, however, that the subject of rights in Agamben’s thought is more complicated, arguing in this essay that Agamben’s critique is not with the concept of human rights per se, but with the declaration of modern rights. In other words, this (...) essay will explore how Agamben’s analysis of language, especially vis-à-vis the figure standing outside the gates of the city, allows for rethinking the subject of rights. This analysis suggests that when thinking the notion of right, we must move from the declaration of right rooted in logos to the material dimension of language that makes such a declaration possible. Calling into question Aristotle’s claim that the human being is political because the human being is zoon logon echon, Agamben’s analysis shows that there is no place where the “I” can transform itself into speech. There is always a “non-place” of articulation that is not something outside the polis, but at the very heart of the polis itself. This non-place marks the exposure of the human as such. Following Agamben, I argue that human rights are not declared, but are exposed in our very appearance, our very being-manifest. I argue that our being-manifest provides for a new notion of human rights, rooted in the ontological condition of appearance that carries with it the right of exposure, without identity, to appear. In conclusion, I consider the relation of language and law in Agamben’s thought, asking whether Agamben’s critique of the juridical and his call for a politics without law preclude any resurrection of human rights? (shrink)

Several studies have documented that when presented with data from social media platforms machine learning (ML) models can make accurate predictions about users, e.g., about whether they are likely to suffer health-related conditions such as depression, mental disorders, and risk of suicide. In a recent article, Ploug (Philos Technol 36:14, 2023) defends a right not to be subjected to AI profiling based on publicly available data. In this comment, I raise some questions in relation to Ploug’s argument that I think (...) deserves further discussion. (shrink)

Recent philosophical criticisms of individual rights and the postmodern deconstruction of the sovereign subject raise serious questions for the defense of universal human rights. This paper critically examines Paul Ricoeur's effort to reconstruct a viable notion of the human subject as the bearer of human rights. Ricoeur's analysis of the narrative structure of human experiences and action takes account of the recent philosophical criticisms of sovereign subjectivity; it avoids both the fiction of the atomistic individual of liberal (...) political philosophy and the fragility of a completely relativized and decentered subject. By extending Ricoeur's work on narrative identity and by developing a humanism based on the ethical primacy of the other-than-self, this paper aims to provide new insights into the complexity of implementing and defending universal human rights. Key Words: deconstruction • human rights • narrative • Ricoeur • subject • subjectivity. (shrink)

In this “global information age” accessing, disseminating, and controlling information is an increasingly important aspect of human life. Often these interests are expressed in the language of human rights—e.g., rights to expression, privacy, and intellectual property. As the discipline concerned with, “Facilitating the effective communication of desired information between human generator and human user” (Belkin, 1975, 22), Library and Information Science (LIS) has a central role in facilitating communication about human rights and ensuring the respect for human (...) rights in information services and systems. This paper surveys the literature at the intersection of LIS and human rights. To begin, an overview of human rights conventions and an introduction to human rights theory is provided. Then the intersections between LIS and human rights are considered. Three central areas of informational human rights—communication, privacy, and intellectual property—are discussed in detail. It is argued that communication rights in particular serve as a central linchpin in the system of human rights. (shrink)

This pathbreaking collection of thirteen original essays examines the moral rights of the subjects of documentary film, photography, and television.

Electoral support for right-wing populist parties is typically explained either by economic deprivation or cultural grievances. Attempting to bring economic and cultural explanations together, recent approaches have suggested to conceptualize right-wing populist support as a problem of social integration. Applying this perspective to the German case, this article investigates whether weak subjective social integration-or subjective social marginalization, respectively-is associated with the intention to vote for the AfD. Furthermore, it asks whether the strength of this association varies across income (...) groups. Based on original survey data from 2017, the results show that indicators of weak subjective social integration-feeling socially excluded, being anxious about one’s status, and distrusting others-increase the likelihood of voting for the AfD. Moreover, weak subjective social integration increases right-wing party support particularly among the middle-class. Thus, next to fears of downward mobility, feelings of subjective social marginalization emerge as a pathway to right-wing populism for the middle-class. (shrink)

In this paper I compare different criteria for moral status, and assess Regan's notion of a "subject of a life".

As Next Generation Sequencing technologies are increasingly implemented in biomedical research and care, the number of study participants and patients who ask for release of their genomic raw data is set to increase. This raises the question whether research participants and patients have a legal and moral right to receive their genomic raw data and, if so, how this right should be implemented into practice. In a first step we clarify some central concepts such as “raw data”; in a second (...) step we sketch the international legal framework. The third step provides an extensive ethical analysis which comprehends two parts: an evaluation of whether there is a prima facie moral right to receive one’s raw data, and a contextualization and discussion of the right in light of potentially conflicting interests and rights of the data subject herself and third parties; in a last fourth step we emphasize the main practical consequences of the ethical analyses and propose recommendations for the release of raw data. In several legislations like the new European General Data Protection Regulation, patients do in principle have the right to receive their raw data. However, the procedural implementation of this right and whether it involves genetic counselling is at the discretion of the Member States. Even more questions remain with respect to the research context. The ethical analysis suggests that patients and research subjects have a moral right to receive their genomic raw data and addresses aspects which are also of relevance for the legal discussion such as the costs of release of raw data and its impact on academic freedom. Taking into account the specific nature and implications of genomic raw data and the contexts of research and health care, several concerns and potentially conflicting interests of the data subjects themselves and involved researchers, physicians, biomedical institutions and relatives arise. Instead of using them to argue in favor of restrictions of the data subjects’ legal and moral right to genomic raw data, the concerns should be addressed through provision of information and other measures. To this end, we propose relevant recommendations. (shrink)

In The Case for Animal Rights, Tom Regan defends the view that all animals who are “subjects of a life” have an equal moral right to life. In this chapter, I consider whether it makes sense to think that animals have an equal right to life in light of the challenge that life has less value for animals than humans. This challenge raises two central questions: (1) does life have less value for animals than humans and (2) if it (...) does, does this fact justify the view that animals do not have an equal right to life. I argue, first, that life has greater value for most humans than animals because most humans are capable of experiencing higher qualities of enjoyment in life, in the form of creative, intellectual pleasures. However, this does not justify denying that animals have an equal right to life. Whether beings’ lives deserve strong respect depends on whether the value of life for those beings meets a certain threshold. I argue that the value of life for many animals meets this threshold because it is compatible with the virtue of compassion. (shrink)

While fundamental individual rights are unquestionably taken as subjective rights, the same does not happen with fundamental social rights (health, education, work and housing – all of them guided by the idea of human dignity). If they are subjective rights, they are justiciable. The main argument in favor of this understanding is based on liberty. The main argument against is the so called formal argument. In relation to the pro argument, liberty can be juridical (...) or factual. Juridical liberty has no value without factual liberty, because the right to liberty is only put into practice if one has the factual preconditions for its exercise. The argument against is that their justiciability displaces the competence of the elaboration of public politics from Legislative and Executive to Judiciary Power, what violates the principles of separation of powers and democracy. In fact, they are subjective rights, but special ones: they are prima facie subjective rights, so that their rules present exceeding content and the determination of the definitive right is only possible in the concrete case. There is only one subjective right that is a priori considered definitive: the right to Existenzminimum. Its content is not settled, but it is quite unequivocal that the rights to simple housing, fundamental education and minimum level of medical assistance are part of it. So Existenzminimum represents what is essential to assure human dignity. It is then related to the minimum necessary for factual liberty. Against the justiciability of fundamental social rights, besides the arguments referred above, the following ones have also arisen: (a) Juridification of politics; (b) Legal permission of administrative discretion; (c) Possible reserve clause. These are the counter-arguments: (a) Legislative and Executive Powers have the original competence, but Judiciary has the exceptional one; (b) It is not enough to state economical incapability of the State. It is necessary to prove it objectively; (c) Powers have discretion, but State’s will is not allowed; (d) Public administration is under the principles of legality and of non-obviation of Judiciary jurisdiction; (e) The Existenzminimun guarantee is untouchable, prevailing over any opposite allegation. (shrink)

Hobbes, in his political writing, is generally understood to be arguing for absolutism. I argue that despite apparently supporting absolutism, Hobbes, in Leviathan, also undermines that absolutism in at least two and possibly three ways. First, he makes sovereignty conditional upon the sovereign’s ability to ensure the safety of the people. Second and crucially, he argues that subjects have inalienable rights, rights that are held even against the sovereign. When the subjects’ preservation is threatened they are no longer (...) obliged to obey the sovereign. Third, there is also a possible limitation on the absolute power of the sovereign in the form of restrictions Hobbes puts in place on what laws he may legitimately make. Finally, Hobbesian absolutism is compared to the absolutism of Carl Schmitt. This exercise demonstrates the limitations that Hobbes places on the power and authority of the sovereign. (shrink)

Studies suggest that machine learning models may accurately predict depression and other mental health-related conditions based on social media data. I have recently argued that individuals should have sui generis right not to be subjected to AI profiling based on publicly available data without their explicit informed consent. In a comment, Holm claims that there are scenarios in which individuals have a reason to prefer attempts of social control exercised on the basis of accurate AI predictions and that the suggested (...) right burdens individuals unfairly by allowing for those individuals to consent to AI profiling. In this reply, I address both of these alleged problems and their underlying assumptions and show why they fail to provide any reasons not to introduce the suggested right. (shrink)

This paper sketches the emergence of, and shifts within, the social, legal, and political figurations of sex workers in Poland. By adopting a genealogical perspective, I investigate how sex workers have been (re)constituted as subjects of governance and unimaginable social justice claimants in legislation, political debates, and law enforcement strategies. With a broad temporal scope, this article traces continuities, transformations, and disruptions within modes of sex work governance in Poland from the adoption of the first laws relating to sex work (...) enacted during the early 19th century to the present day. Through analysis of policy documents, scholarly work on the history of sex work policies in Poland, and personal accounts by sex workers, I identify and examine two dominant discursive and legal figurations of a sex worker: as a threat, and as a victim in need of rescue and protection. While analysing the emergence of and interplay between these two figurations, this article demonstrates how these seemingly contradictory frames of recognition gradually conjoined within 20th-century Polish sex work governance strategies, rendering sex workers unimaginable subjects of rights and social justice claimants. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Introduction Tradition and Modernity: Culture, Works and Others Record Collection and Salvage Paradigms Preserving Indigenous ‘Music’: Rights and Responsibilities The Harms of Appropriation Information Society Rights‐Based Arguments for Restitution and Limited Properties Repatriation and Recollection Conclusion Acknowledgments References.

Conceptualizing the nature of reality and the way the world functions, Ekaterina Yahyaoui Krivenko analyzes the foundations of human rights law in the strict subject/object dichotomy. Seeking to dismantle this dichotomy using topo-logic, a concept developed by Japanese philosopher Nishida Kitaro, this topical book formulates ways to operationalize alternative visions of human rights practice. Subject/object dichotomy, Yahyaoui Krivenko demonstrates, emerges from and reflects a particular Western worldview through a quest for rationality and formal logic. Taking a metaphysical and (...) epistemological perspective, this book explores the alternative views of reality and logic, developed by Kitaro, to demonstrate how topo-logic can enable both a theoretical and a practical renewal of human rights and overcome the subject/object dichotomy. Examining the recent growth of social movements, decolonization and diversification of discourses about human rights, and substantive equality, the book identifies these developments in contemporary human rights as indications of a movement towards a topo-logical view beyond the subject/object dichotomy. Students and scholars of critical legal studies, legal theory and philosophy, and international human rights law will find this book to be an invigorating read. Laying ground for the possible renewal and enhancement of human rights law, it will also be a useful resource for practitioners of human rights law. (shrink)

In this paper I introduce the ‘changing the subject’ problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from the capacity to suffer and the moral significance of causing animals pain. To avoid this problem and ensure that debate proceeds in the familiar terms of the established welfare paradigm, I present (...) an expressivist analysis of animal rights vocabulary. When terms such as dignity and respect are understood in line with the theory of moral language use known as expressivism, proponents of animal protection that use these terms can escape the charge of changing the subject. Drawing upon Helm’s theory of love, I show how the usage of rights vocabulary can be respectable way for people to register their concern for the welfare of animals, even at times when it is unlikely that the animals concerned are suffering. Tying rights vocabulary to welfare via expressivism aligns the aims of animal rights with welfare without the theoretical problems associated with attempts to ‘reduce’ dignity or respect to natural behaviour or inherent value. (shrink)

A particularly significant criticism of utilitarian and consequentialist moral theories is that they are overly demanding. According to the epistemic variant of this critique, it is overly demanding to have to determine which of one's possible actions would promote the good in the best possible way. A particularly striking articulation of this concern was put forward by James Lenman, who argued that not only is it difficult to predict the consequences of actions, but it is often outright impossible. The reason, (...) according to Lenman, is that we are simply ignorant of what the consequences of an action will be—especially in the distant future, after long and highly complex causal chains. In From Value to Rightness, Vuko Andrić defends an act-consequentialism with a subjective decision criterion designed to avoid these objections. According to this position, agents should decide based on the outcomes they can reasonably expect to occur, rather than the outcomes that actually occur. -/- ----- Eine besonders einschlägige Kritik an utilitaristischen und konsequentialistischen Moraltheorien besagt, dass sie überfordernd sind. Der epistemischen Variante dieser Kritik zufolge ist es überfordernd, wenn man grundsätzlich herausfinden muss, welche der eigenen Handlungsmöglichkeiten das Gute auf die bestmögliche Weise befördern würde. Eine besonders einschlägige Zuspitzung dieser Sorge wurde von James Lenman vorgebracht, demzufolge es nicht nur schwierig ist, Handlungsfolgen abzuschätzen, sondern regelmäßig unmöglich. Der Grund dafür ist laut Lenman, dass wir schlicht ahnungslos sind, welche Folgen eine Handlung haben wird – besonders in der fernen Zukunft nach langen und sehr komplexen Kausalketten. In From Value to Rightness verteidigt Vuko Andrić einen Handlungskonsequentialismus mit subjektivem Entscheidungskriterium, der diesen Vorwürfen entgehen soll. Dieser Position zufolge sollen Handelnde auf Grundlage derjenigen Handlungsfolgen entscheiden, mit deren Eintreten sie vernünftigerweise rechnen können und nicht auf Grundlage der tatsächlich eintretenden Folgen. (shrink)

Hegel associates 'subjective' freedom with various rights, all of which concern the subject's particularity, and with the demand that this particularity be accorded proper recognition within the modern state. I show that Hegel's account of subjective freedom can be assimilated to the 'positive' model of freedom that is often attributed to him because of the way in which the objective determinations of right recognise the subject's particularity in the form of individual welfare. To this extent, the practical (...) constraints to which individuals are subject in the modern state are not purely external ones, and the freedom which they enjoy within it is not merely subjective in kind. In exploring the role of certain practical forms of necessity in Hegel's account of civil society I show, however, that Hegel points to the existence of a group of people, the poor, who must be thought to lack subjective freedom, because they will experience the constraints to which they are subject as purely external ones. He also suggests the existence of a form of freedom that is merely subjective in kind, because it consists in a sense of absence of constraint that fails to reflect fully the practical forms of necessity that underlie civil society and constrain an individual's actions. The importance of the concept of necessity in Hegel's Philosophy of Right, as highlighted in the paper, demonstrates, moreover, that the emphasis on freedom found in recent interpretations of Hegel's social and political philosophy needs to be counterbalanced by greater recognition of the role played in it by this concept. (shrink)