In A Metaphysics for Freedom, Helen Steward proposes and defends a novel version of the libertarian account of free action. Amongst several objections that she considers to her view, one that looms particularly large is the Challenge from Chance: ‘the most powerful, widely-promulgated and important line of anti-libertarian reasoning’. This paper begins by arguing that Steward’s response to the Challenge is not fully convincing. It then goes on to explore a further possible libertarian line of defence against the Challenge, arguing (...) that it, too, ultimately fails. The conclusion is that the Challenge remains an important source of dialectical advantage for the compatibilist. (shrink)

It has been alleged that compatibilists are committed to the view that agents act freely and responsibly even when subject to certain forms of radical manipulation. In this paper I identify and elucidate a form of compatibilist freedom, social autonomy, that is essential to understanding what is wrong with ordinary indoctrination and argue that it also holds the key to understanding what goes wrong in more fanciful manipulation cases.

This paper argues that there are two irreducibly distinct negative concepts of liberty: freedom as non-prevention, and freedom as non-coercion. Contemporary proponents of the negative view, such as Matthew Kramer and Ian Carter, have sought to develop the Hobbesian idea that freedom is essentially a matter of physical non-prevention. Accordingly, they have sought to reduce the freedom-diminishing effect of coercion to that of prevention by arguing that coercive threats function to diminish freedom by preventing people from performing certain combinations of (...) actions. Against this, this paper argues that coercion diminishes people’s freedom in ways that cannot be fully captured in terms of prevention. Focusing on two types of case, those involving coercive threats and those involving coercive preference manipulation, it argues that non-coercion and physical non-prevention are importantly different goods. It concludes that a complete negative account of liberty must draw not only on the (Hobbesian) ‘non-prevention’ strand of the negative tradition but also on its (Hayekian) ‘non-coercion’ strand. (shrink)

I defend my pure social account of global autonomy from Steven Weimer's recent criticisms. In particular, I argue that it does not implicitly rely upon the very kind of nonsocial conception of autonomy that it hopes to replace.

Lists of species underpin many fields of human endeavour, but there are currently no universally accepted principles for deciding which biological species should be accepted when there are alternative taxonomic treatments (and, by extension, which scientific names should be applied to those species). As improvements in information technology make it easier to communicate, access, and aggregate biodiversity information, there is a need for a framework that helps taxonomists and the users of taxonomy decide which taxa and names should be used (...) by society whilst continuing to encourage taxonomic research that leads to new species discoveries, new knowledge of species relationships, and the refinement of existing species concepts. Here, we present 10 principles that can underpin such a governance framework, namely (i) the species list must be based on science and free from nontaxonomic considerations and interference, (ii) governance of the species list must aim for community support and use, (iii) all decisions about list composition must be transparent, (iv) the governance of validated lists of species is separate from the governance of the names of taxa, (v) governance of lists of accepted species must not constrain academic freedom, (vi) the set of criteria considered sufficient to recognise species boundaries may appropriately vary between different taxonomic groups but should be consistent when possible, (vii) a global list must balance conflicting needs for currency and stability by having archived versions, (viii) contributors need appropriate recognition, (ix) list content should be traceable, and (x) a global listing process needs both to encompass global diversity and to accommodate local knowledge of that diversity. We conclude by outlining issues that must be resolved if such a system of taxonomic list governance and a unified list of accepted scientific names generated are to be universally adopted. (shrink)

The idea that payment for research participation can be coercive appears widespread among research ethics committee members, researchers, and regulatory bodies. Yet analysis of the concept of coercion by philosophers and bioethicists has mostly concluded that payment does not coerce, because coercion necessarily involves threats, not offers. In this article we aim to resolve this disagreement by distinguishing between two distinct but overlapping concepts of coercion. Consent-undermining coercion marks out certain actions as impermissible and certain agreements as unenforceable. By contrast, (...) coercion as subjection indicates a way in which someone’s interests can be partially set back in virtue of being subject to another’s foreign will. While offers of payment do not normally constitute consent-undermining coercion, they do sometimes constitute coercion as subjection. We offer an analysis of coercion as subjection and propose three possible practical responses to worries about the coerciveness of payment. (shrink)

Regulated transport of the plant hormone auxin is central to many aspects of plant development. Directional transport, mediated by membrane transporters, produces patterns of auxin distribution in tissues that trigger developmental processes, such as vascular patterning or leaf formation. Experimentation has produced many, largely qualitative, data providing strong evidence for multiple feedback systems between auxin and its transport. However, the exact mechanisms concerned remain elusive and the experiments required to evaluate alternative hypotheses are challenging. Because of this, computational modelling now (...) plays an important role in auxin transport research. Here we review some current approaches and underlying assumptions of computational auxin transport models. We focus on self‐organising models for polar auxin transport and on recent attempts to unify conflicting mechanistic explanations. In addition, we discuss in general how these computer simulations are proving to be increasingly effective in hypothesis generation and testing, and how simulation can be used to direct future experiments.Editor's suggested further reading in BioEssays Local auxin production: a small contribution to a big field Abstract. (shrink)

A crucial, but often overlooked, dimension of the human and constitutional right to religious freedom is the autonomy of religious institutions, associations and societies with respect to matters of governance, doctrine, formation and membership. Although the Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed this autonomy in the context of American constitutional law, it is vulnerable, and even under threat, for a variety of reasons, including a general decline in the health of civil society and mediating associations and a crisis (...) of confidence and authority caused by clerical sexual abuse and churches’ failure to respond to it. (shrink)

This article focuses on Hazlitt's treatment of Thomas Hobbes, who emerges as one of the most important figures in the lectures. Besides its importance to an understanding of Hazlitt's own thought -- which still awaits authoritative exposition -- Hazlitt's attitude sheds light on the reception of Hobbes in the early nineteenth century, and on the general intellectual climate of a period in which theorists were struggling to absorb the lessons of the Revolution.

There seems now to be a wide agreement among contemporary philosophers that one can give good reasons why one ought to adhere to certain rules, but it is not so widely agreed that one ought to cultivate certain virtues which cannot be said to consist merely in the habit of adhering to rules—as probably can be said of justice, truthfulness, honesty and many others. The difference between these points of view may be described as the difference between a legalistic and (...) an idealistic ethics. In the one the moral life is conceived as a careful adherence to correct rules of conduct; in the other it is conceived as a striving toward an ideal of perfection. In the latter the virtues of keeping rules are a part but not the whole of moral virtue.. But in legalism the keeping of rules is the whole of moral virtue. There is no duty to cultivate any virtues beyond those involved in moral laws. The other virtues are praiseworthy but they are not obligatory, not duties; it is not wrong to neglect them, though they may be the occasions for citations, awards and honors for “conduct above and beyond the call of duty.”. (shrink)