Methionine aminopeptidases with a universal specificity have been revealed from the sequences of the amino‐terminal region of mutant forms of yeast iso‐1‐cytochrome c and from a systematic examination of the literature for amino‐terminal sequences formed at initiation sites. The aminopeptidase removes amino‐terminal residues of methionine when they precede certain amino acids, with a specificity that appears to be determined mainly by the residue adjacent to the methionine residue at the amino terminus. The result with the mutationally altered iso‐1‐cytochromes c and (...) the results from published sequences of other proteins from a wide range of prokaryotes and eukaryotes suggest that the aminopeptidase usually cleaves amino‐terminal methionine when it precedes residues of alanine, cysteine, glycine, proline, serine, threonine and valine but not when it precedes residues of arginine, asparagine, aspartic acid, glutamine, glutamic acid, isoleucine, leucine, lysine or methionine. We suggest that the specificity is almost always determined simply by the size of the side chain of the penultimate residue; methionine is usually cleaved from residues with a side chain having a radius of gyration of 1·29 Å or less, but is not cleaved from residues with larger side chains. (shrink)

慶応義塾大学法学部のゼミナール「伊東乾民事訴訟法研究会」の卒業生の会「乾会」による論文集。今回はテーマを民事訴訟法に限ることなく、現在関心を持っている法律分野について執筆した。.

I CATEGORIES AND PRINCIPLES ii Introductory Remarks The value of linguistics as a cognitive science lies largely in its potential for providing insights ...

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 4, Page 445-452, May 2022.

On March 16, 2020, the Director-General of the World Health Organization said: “We have a simple message to all countries—test, test, test.” This seems like sound advice, but what if limiting the number of tests has a positive effect on infection control? Although this may rarely be the case, the possibility raises an important ethical question that is closely related to a central tension between deontological and consequentialist approaches to ethics. In this paper, we first argue that early during the (...) COVID-19 pandemic, Japan offers an interesting case because it experienced few deaths due to COVID while the number of tests was limited, suggesting that there may be cases in which low testing contributes to infection control indeed. After that, we examine deontological constraints on such a “low-testing” policy, focusing on issues related to a supposed “right to know,” which is a central issue in medical ethics in general. (shrink)

The purpose of this study is to investigate a relationship between egalitarian equivalence and envy-freeness in a continuum-agent economy, where tastes vary continuously across individuals. Under efficiency, the two criteria of equity are not compatible, except in the knife-edge case. In particular, when individual utility functions are restricted to the class of Cobb–Douglas-type functions, there exists an efficient, egalitarian-equivalent, and envy-free allocation if and only if all individuals have the same taste over commodities.

In this study, we propose a new direction of research on the axiomatic analysis of approval voting, which is a common democratic decision method. Its novelty is to examine an infinite population setting, which includes an application to intergenerational problems. In particular, we assume that the set of the population is countably infinite. We provide several extensions of the method of approval voting for this setting. As our main result, axiomatic characterizations of the extensions are offered by revealing a direct (...) link between approval voting and the Borda rule. The characterized methods are natural extensions of the standard approval voting method for the finite-population case and are regarded as minimum requirements for other possible infinite-population extensions, which are reasonably democratic. (shrink)

L’imposition est l’un des principaux sujets de la théorie de la propriété des droits, mais il a pourtant été assez négligé jusque récemment. La communauté académique des philosophes avance de nos jours des arguments pour discuter avec ardeur des types d’imposition qui sont légitimes, s’il en est, et l’on doit beaucoup en ce domaine à l’ouvrage de Liam Murphy et Thomas Nagel The Myth of Ownership. Dans leur ouvrage polémique, les auteurs soutiennent qu’il n’existe pas de droit légitime permettant d’imposer (...) par préemption ni la propriété ni les droits naturels à la propriété et que le processus d’imposition n’empiète certes jamais sur les droits de propriété, qui sont le fruit d’une institution par décret gouvernemental. Murphy et Nagel prennent pour cible principale Richard Epstein qui prône une vue libertarienne ou « libérale classique » contraire à ce propos. Epstein compare l’imposition à une expropriation publique et argumente en faveur de l’impôt sur le revenu. Nous discutons ici la thèse d’Epstein sur la propriété privée, avec laquelle nous nous trouvons en accord quoique moyennant des nuances notables. Nous examinons la théorie étatiste de la propriété de Murphy et Nagel et nous soutenons que leur égalitarisme est surtout le fait d’un présupposé. Nous concluons que l’impôt sur la propriété foncière est la forme d’imposition la plus apte à être légitimée à partir de la perspective libertarienne sur les droits naturels, plus en tous cas que l’impôt sur le revenu et que la taxe sur la valeur ajoutée, formes d’impôt qui sont les plus habituelles. Surtout, nous soutenons qu’il y a là une forme d’imposition que la Constitution du Japon autorise. (shrink)

The intersection approach is a common method of overcoming a conflict among multiple values. Under this approach, a state is more desirable than another if it is so for all criteria in question. A fundamental difficulty is that judgment under the intersection approach lacks completeness in too many cases. We propose alternative methods that extend the intersection approach: the union and union-intersection approaches. Our methods generate a (quasi-)coherence judgment which is more completed and can be applied to most problems of (...) ethical indices. (shrink)

Suzumura consistency is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a weak-order extension. This paper provides some remarks on collective choice rules that generate Suzumura consistent social preferences. We examine the properties of such collective choice rules by introducing a procedural condition on collective choice rules. As applications of the procedural condition, we first investigate the decisive structure of a Paretian collective choice rule, and then consider the assignment of individual rights. In our analysis, the concept of semi-decisiveness (...) works effectively. (shrink)

This paper proposes a sufficientarian theory with an interval of sufficiency levels. I assume that there are upper and lower bounds of sufficiency and that all well-being levels in between can be considered sufficiency levels. This interval reflects the vagueness of the concept of sufficiency. According to the proposed principle, a distribution is morally better than another if and only if, for each threshold within the interval, the headcount of those below the threshold under the former distribution is smaller than (...) that under the latter distribution. This necessarily leads to incommensurability in moral relations. I argue that such incommensurability makes sufficientarian principles invulnerable to some fundamental objections. (shrink)

The aim of the present paper is to provide an axiomatic analysis of incomplete social judgments. In particular, we clarify the underlying power structure of Arrovian collective choice rules when social preferences are allowed to be incomplete. We propose the concept of quasi-decisiveness and investigate the properties of the collection of quasi-decisive sets associated with an Arrovian collective choice rule. In the course of this, we offer a series of applications.

This paper offers a new insight on the Condorcet Jury Theorem (CJT) in the theory of epistemic democracy. This theorem states that democratic decision-making leads us to correct outcomes under certain assumptions. One key assumption is the ‘independence condition’, which requires that voters form their beliefs independently when they vote. This paper examines the role of an opinion leader as an informational source, which potentially violates independence. We demonstrate that voters’ beliefs may be correlated in the presence of the leader, (...) and that the CJT can fail if the leader’s opinions are reliable. This leads us to the following paradoxical observation: for epistemic democracy, good leaders may be bad, while bad leaders may be good. (shrink)

This paper examines the incompleteness of collective preference. We provide a series of Arrovian impossibility theorems without completeness. First, we consider the notion of regularity introduced by Eliaz and Ok (2006, Games and Economic Behavior 56, 61–86); it is an appropriate richness property for strict preference when preference is allowed to be incomplete. We examine the implication of imposing regularity on collective preference. Second, we propose responsiveness, a variation of positive responsiveness. This axiom requires that some changes in individual preferences (...) make an alternative weakly better than another. Third, we consider coherency conditions for collective preferences; this conditionally requires the existence of comparable pairs in a certain manner. We prove an impossibility result for each condition using Arrovian axioms. (shrink)

This paper addresses the Arrovian social choice problem. Our focus is the role of positive responsiveness, which requires social judgments to be strongly monotonic with respect to individual judgments. We clarify the structure of decisive coalitions associated with collective choice rules that satisfy positive responsiveness and Arrow's axioms. Transitivity of social preferences is relaxed to quasi‐transitivity or acyclicity.

This paper is concerned with the problem of group decision making. We introduce the notion of a collective system rule. A collective system rule maps each preference profile to a group-preference system, which is a collection of social preferences on the subsets of the alternatives. By formulating the Arrovian conditions, we show the Arrow-type impossibility theorems. We also discuss how our approach is related to the standard group decision-making process.

The Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study found that even though children from all East Asian countries outperformed American children, American students reported higher self-evaluation of their math and science abilities than did students from East Asian countries such as China, Korea, and Japan (Mullis, Martin, Gonzalez, & Chrostowski, 2004). Such cross-cultural differences in self-appraisal fit the stereotype of the modest East Asian and contribute to the received view that East Asians have less positive self-concepts than Americans. This view (...) was summarized recently by Heine, Lehman, Markus, and Kitayama (1999) as follows: ‘‘The need for positive self-regard, as it is currently conceptualized, is not a universal, but rather is rooted in significant aspects of North American culture’’ (p. 766; but cf. Sedikides, Gaertner, & Vevea. (shrink)

Since Condorcet discovered the voting paradox in the simple majority rule, many scholars have tried to investigate conditions that yield “social-preference cycles”. The paradox can be extended to two main approaches. On the one hand, Kenneth Arrow developed a general framework of social choice theory; on the other hand, direct generalizations of the paradox were offered. The motivation and surface meaning of the two approaches are different, as are the assumed background conditions. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between (...) the two approaches by taking a close look at two works, Ferejohn and Fishburn and Schwartz. (shrink)

This paper considers the trade-off between unanimity and anonymity in collective decision-making with an infinite population. This efficiency-equity trade-off is a fundamental difficulty in making a normative judgment in a conflict between generations. In particular, it is known that this trade-off is quite sensitive in the formulation of unanimity axioms. In this study, we consider the trade-off in a preference-aggregation framework instead of the standard utility-aggregation framework. We show that there exists a social welfare function that satisfies I-strong Pareto, independence (...) of irrelevant alternatives, and finite anonymity. This contrasts with an impossibility result in the standard utility-aggregation framework, and this means that the trade-off is also sensitive for background frameworks of aggregations. (shrink)

いかなる方向に臨めば日本が文化的小児病から脱することができるのか、そしてその果てに日本文明の成熟をすら望みうるのか(「西欧の自己懐疑と日本の自己放棄」より)―保守的自由主義の源流、エドマンド・バーク、 「大衆」に関して、それを「奇怪」なる存在と捉えていたキルケゴール、民主主義批判をしたニーチェ...など十五人の思想家たちの言説を、私たちが今を生き抜くための精神的な糧にしようとする画期的な書、待望の文 庫化。.

仏教には本来、社会倫理的な実践が大きな要素として備わっていた。近代的な宗教観のもとで見落とされがちだった日本仏教の倫理性・社会性の側面が、現代社会の中で再び顕わになりつつある。本書は、「正法」理念に着 目しながら、日本仏教の実践思想の系譜を捉え直し、宗派主義の枠を超えた新しい日本仏教史像を描く試みである。.

「語の意味」とは何か?『類語大辞典』の編集・執筆に関わってきた著者が、「意味の本質」「同義・類義・多義」「意味記述の方法」「辞書と意味記述」の4部に渡って、これまで深めてきた考察を明らかにする、「こと ばの意味」の研究に大きく資する一冊。.

Since Kenneth Arrow showed the general possibility theorem, a number of social choice theorists have provided alternative proofs of it. In a recent article, Geanakoplos (Econ Theory 26:211–215, 2005) has constructed a new proof of the theorem. The present article provides alternative proofs of various Arrovian impossibility results from the 1960s to the 1970s by utilizing Geanakoplos’s method. We prove semi-order impossibility theorems, the quasi-transitive veto theorem, the quasi-transitive dictatorship theorem, the triple acyclic veto theorem, and the impossibility theorem without (...) the Pareto principle. (shrink)

This paper shows that weak Pareto and strong Pareto are equivalent under continuity and strong quasi-concavity. We use a framework that incorporates welfare as well as non-welfare information.

This study addresses the problem of Arrovian preference aggregation. Social rationality plays a crucial role in the standard Arrovian framework. However, no assumptions on social rationality are imposed here. Social preferences are allowed to be any binary relation (possibly incomplete and intransitive). We introduce the axiom of hybrid invariance, which requires that if social preferences under two preference profiles make the same judgment, then a social preference under a “hybrid” of the two profiles must extend the original judgment in a (...) certain way. Then, we characterize the structure of decisive coalitions under hybrid invariance. (shrink)

This article investigates the relationship among the weak Pareto principle, the strong Pareto principle, and positive responsiveness in the context of voting. First, it is shown that under a mild domain condition, if an anonymous and neutral collective choice rule (CCR) is complete and transitive, then the weak Pareto principle and the strong Pareto principle are equivalent. Next, it is shown that under another mild domain condition, if a neutral CCR is transitive, then the strong Pareto principle and positive responsiveness (...) are equivalent. By applying these results, we obtain a new characterization of the method of majority decision. (shrink)

Schwartz [A Procedural Condition Necessary and Sufficient for Cyclic Social Preference, J. Econ. Theory 137 (2007), 688–695] provides a generalization of the voting paradox by using the impotence‐partition condition. This paper aims to clarify his result by providing several remarks. We show that a main result of Schwartz can be strengthened by replacing strong Pareto by weak Pareto. We also discuss how the impotence partition is related to the standard concept of decisiveness, which is widely employed in the literature on (...) social choice. (shrink)

This paper examines social choice theory with the strong Pareto principle. The notion of conditional decisiveness is introduced to clarify the underlying power structure behind strongly Paretian aggregation rules satisfying binary independence. We discuss the various degrees of social rationality: transitivity, semi-transitivity, the interval-order property, quasi-transitivity, and acyclicity.