I describe a realist, ontologically objective interpretation of probability, "far-flung frequency (FFF) mechanistic probability". FFF mechanistic probability is defined in terms of facts about the causal structure of devices and certain sets of frequencies in the actual world. Though defined partly in terms of frequencies, FFF mechanistic probability avoids many drawbacks of well-known frequency theories and helps causally explain stable frequencies, which will usually be close to the values of mechanistic probabilities. I also argue that it's a virtue rather than (...) a failing of FFF mechanistic probability that it does not define single-case chances, and compare some aspects of my interpretation to a recent interpretation proposed by Strevens. (shrink)

Historically, patients have deferred to physicians′ judgments about appropriate medical care, thereby limiting patient participation in treatment decisions. In this model of medical decision making, physicians typically decided upon the treatment plan. Communication with patients focused on securing their cooperation in accepting a treatment decision that essentially had already been made.

One controversy about the existence of so called evolutionary forces such as natural selection and random genetic drift concerns the sense in which such “forces” can be said to interact. In this paper I explain how natural selection and random drift can interact. In particular, I show how population-level probabilities can be derived from individual-level probabilities, and explain the sense in which natural selection and drift are embodied in these population-level probabilities. I argue that whatever causal character the individual-level probabilities (...) have is then shared by the population-level probabilities, and that natural selection and random drift then have that same causal character. Moreover, natural selection and drift can then be viewed as two aspects of probability distributions over frequencies in populations of organisms. My characterization of population-level probabilities is largely neutral about what interpretation of probability is required, allowing my approach to support various positions on biological probabilities, including those which give biological probabilities one or another sort of causal character. ‡This paper has benefited from feedback on and discussions of this and earlier work. I want to thank André Ariew, Matt Barker, Lindley Darden, Patrick Forber, Nancy Hall, Mohan Matthen, Samir Okasha, Jeremy Pober, Robert Richardson, Alex Rosenberg, Eric Seidel, Denis Walsh, and Bill Wimsatt. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama at Birmingham, HB 414A, 900 13th Street South, Birmingham, AL 35294-1260; e-mail: mabrams@uab.edu. (shrink)

We describe a case of parents refusing a tracheostomy for an otherwise healthy newborn. The refusal was not honored because permitting the refusal would have violated state law, which required a child to have a qualifying condition (e.g. a terminal diagnosis, permanent unconsciousness, incurable condition with severe suffering) to remove or withhold life-sustaining treatment. However, this case strained the relationship between the parents and medical staff, who worried about sending the newborn home with a tracheostomy where she was not wanted. (...) While many ethical issues arise in treatment refusal cases like this, we focus on the opportunity for ethicists to help the medical staff reflect on the technological alienation of the parents, which may help foster empathy, reduce moral distress, and strengthen the quality of the doctor-parent-patient triad. (shrink)

"In recent years, we have grown accustomed to philosophical language that is intensely self-conscious and rhetorically thick, often tragic in tone. It is enlivening to read Bergson, who exerts so little rhetorical pressure while exacting such a substantial effort of thought.... Bergson's texts teach the reader to let go of entrenched intellectual habits and to begin to think differently—to think in time.... Too much and too little have been said about Bergson. Too much, because of the various appropriations of his (...) thought. Too little, because the work itself has not been carefully studied in recent decades."—from Thinking in Time Henri Bergson, whose philosophical works emphasized motion, time, and change, won the Nobel Prize for Literature in 1927. His work remains influential, particularly in the realms of philosophy, cultural studies, and new media studies. In Thinking in Time, Suzanne Guerlac provides readers with the conceptual and contextual tools necessary for informed appreciation of Bergson's work. Guerlac's straightforward philosophical expositions of two Bergson texts, Time and Free Will and Matter and Memory, focus on the notions of duration and memory—concepts that are central to the philosopher's work. Thinking in Time makes plain that it is well worth learning how to read Bergson effectively: his era and our own share important concerns. Bergson's insistence on the opposition between the automatic and the voluntary and his engagement with the notions of "the living," affect, and embodiment are especially germane to discussions of electronic culture. (shrink)

Organisms' environments are thought to play a fundamental role in determining their fitness and hence in natural selection. Existing intuitive conceptions of environment are sufficient for biological practice. I argue, however, that attempts to produce a general characterization of fitness and natural selection are incomplete without the help of general conceptions of what conditions are included in the environment. Thus there is a "problem of the reference environment"—more particularly, problems of specifying principles which pick out those environmental conditions which determine (...) fitness. I distinguish various reference environment problems and propose solutions to some of them. While there has been a limited amount of work on problems concerning what I call "subenvironments", there appears to be no earlier work on problems of what I call the "whole environment". The first solution I propose for a whole environment problem specifies the overall environment for natural selection on a set of biological types present in a population over a specified period of time. The second specifies an environment relevant to extinction of types in a population; this kind of environment is especially relevant to certain kinds of long-term evolution. (shrink)

Ecologists and environmental theorists have paid little attention to our direct, sensory experience of the enveloping world. In this paper I discuss the importance of such experience for ecological philosophy. Merleau-Ponty’s careful phenomenology of perceptual experience shows perception to be an inherently creative, participatory activity-a sort of conversation, carried on underneath our spoken discourse, between the living body and its world. His later work discloses the character of language itself as a medium born of the body’s participation with a world (...) experienced as alive. That living world is none other than the Earth. (shrink)

Legal precedent, professional‐society statements, and even many medical ethicists agree that some situations may call for a clinician to engage in an act of lying or nonlying deception of a patient or patient's family member. Still, the moral terrain of clinical deception is largely uncharted, and when it comes to practical guidance for clinicians, many might think that ethicists offer nothing more than the rule never to deceive. This guidance is insufficient to meet the real‐world demands of clinical practice, and (...) this article endeavors to articulate a framework to help clinicians better navigate the ethics of clinical deceit. The framework articulates four morally relevant dimensions of a potential deceptive act that should be examined to better determine the moral justification that might be required: the target of the act, the nature of the information, the nature of the act, and the context of the act. (shrink)

The target article by Kyle Fritz draws attention to the asymmetry debate, an under-analyzed issue within the broader debate over the proper role of physician conscience in healthcare. The as...

Evolutionary discussions regarding the relationship between social status and fertility in the contemporary U.S. typically claim that the relationship is either negative or absent entirely. The published data on recent generations of Americans upon which such statements rest, however, are solid with respect to women but sparse and equivocal for men. In the current study, we investigate education and income in relation to age at first child, childlessness, and number of children for men and women in two samples—one of the (...) general American population and one of graduates of an elite American university. We find that increased education is strongly associated with delayed childbearing in both sexes and is also moderately associated with decreased completed or near-completed fertility. Women in the general population with higher adult income have fewer children, but this relationship does not hold within all educational groups, including our sample with elite educations. Higher-income men, however, do not have fewer children in the general population and in fact have lower childlessness rates. Further, higher income in men is positively associated with fertility among our sample with elite educations as well as within the general population among those with college educations. Such findings undermine simple statements on the relationship between status and fertility. (shrink)

Moral pluralism poses a foundational problem for secular clinical ethics: How can ethical dilemmas be resolved in a context where there is disagreement not only on particular cases, but further, on...

Individuals are faced with the many opportunities to pirate. The decision to pirate or not may be related to an individual''s attitudes toward other ethical issues. A person''s ethical and moral predispositions and the judgments that they use to make decisions may be consistent across various ethical dilemmas and may indicate their likelihood to pirate software. This paper investigates the relationship between religion and a theoretical ethical decision making process that an individual uses when evaluating ethical or unethical situations. An (...) ethical decision making model was studied for general unethical scenarios and for the unethical behavior of software piracy. The research model was tested via path analysis using structural equation modeling and was found to be appropriate for the sample data. The results suggest that there is a relationship between religion and the stages of an ethical decision making process regarding general ethical situations and software piracy. (shrink)

That brings me to the crux of my disagreement with Hillis Miller. The central contention is not simply that I am sometimes, or always, wrong in my interpretation, but instead that I—like other traditional historians—can never be right in my interpretation. For Miller assents to Nietzsche's challenge of "the concept of 'rightness' in interpretation," and to Nietzsche's assertion that "the same text authorizes innumerable interpretations : there is no 'correct' interpretation."1 Nietzsche's views of interpretation, as Miller says, are relevant to (...) the recent deconstructive theorists, including Jacques Derrida and himself, who have "reinterpreted Nietzsche" or have written "directly or indirectly under his aegis." He goes on to quote a number of statements from Nietzsche's The Will to Power to the effect, as Miller puts it, "that reading is never the objective identifying of a sense but the importation of meaning into a text which had no meaning 'in itself.'" For example: "Ultimately, man finds in things nothing but what he himself has imported into them." "In fact interpretation is itself a means of becoming master of something."2 On the face of it, such sweeping deconstructive claims might suggest those of Lewis Carroll's linguistic philosopher, who asserted that meaning is imported into a text by the interpreter's will to power: "The question is," said Alice, "whether you can make words mean so many different things.""The question is," said Humpty Dumpty, "which is to be master—that's all." But of course I don't believe that such deconstructive claims are, in Humpty Dumpty fashion, simply dogmatic assertions. Instead, they are conclusions which are derived from particular linguistic premises. I want, in the time remaining, to present what I make out to be the elected linguistic premises, first of Jacques Derrida, then of Hillis Miller, in the confidence that if I misinterpret these theories, my errors will soon be challenged and corrected. Let me eliminate suspense by saying at the beginning that I don't think that their radically skeptical conclusions from these premises are wrong. On the contrary, I believe that their conclusions are right—in fact, they are infallibly right, and that's where the trouble lies. · 1. "Tradition and Difference," Diacritics 2 : 8, 12.· 2. Ibid. M. H. Abrams’s contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Rationality and Imagination in Cultural History: A Reply to Wayne Booth" and "Behaviorism and Deconstruction: A Comment on Morse Peckham's 'The Infinitude of Pluralism'". (shrink)

Truity reveals the fundamental law: no subject possesses truth as every subject represents truth. Man has yet to learn this basic rule of grammar. To be born in ignorance is understandable but to stand in ignorance is to insult The Creator.

Con el proyecto rawlsiano de una teorí­a de la justicia resumida en dos principios básicos y la prioridad de las libertades, la filosofí­a moral volví­a a surgir como una materia digna de reflexión rigurosa y capaz de contribuir al debate público. Rawls presentaba una defensa racional de principios normativos de justicia susceptibles de reconocimiento público como base moral para las democracias contemporáneas. A treinta años de Teorí­a de la justicia, pueden destacarse del legado rawlsiano los siguientes temas y perspectivas: la (...) cuestión de la justicia como un problema moral-filosófico, la reconsideración de ideas y autores clásicos para la reflexión filosófica contemporánea, la filosofí­a como defensa razonable de un orden constitucional democrático y justo, el carácter prioritario que tiene la justicia en la cooperación social, la idea de la prioridad de las libertades, la relación de las libertades con la economí­a de mercado, el tema de la estabilidad de una sociedad con base en una concepción pública de la justicia y la defensa del liberalismo desde una perspectiva moral y en las condiciones actuales de vida. De alguna forma sigue siendo cierto lo que Nozick afirmó al señalar que, luego de Teorí­a de la justicia, los filósofos polí­ticos debí­an trabajar según la teorí­a de Rawls o bien explicar por qué no lo hacen."œThirty years of A Theory of Justice"With Rawls "™ project of a theory of justice summarized in two basic principles and the priority of freedom, moral philosophy reemerged as a subject matter worthy of rigorous reflection and able to contribute to the public debate. Rawls presented a rational defence of normative principle of justice capable of public recognition as a moral basis for contemporary democracies. Thirty years after the publication of A Theory of Justice, the following topics and perspectives stand out from Rawls"™ legacy: the question of justice as a moral-philosophical problem, the reconsideration of classical ideas and authors for contemporary philosophical reflection, philosophy as a reasonable defence of a constitutional, democratic and just order and the top priority that justice has in social cooperation, the idea of the priority of freedom, the relationship between freedom and the market economy, the theme of the stability of a society based on a political conception of justice and the defence of liberalism from a moral perspective and in the current conditions of life. In a sense what Nozick stated on pointing out that after the publication of A Theory of Justice political philosophers should work according to Rawls "™ theory and if not explain why not, continues to be true. (shrink)

One finds intertwined with ideas at the core of evolutionary theory claims about frequencies in counterfactual and infinitely large populations of organisms, as well as in sets of populations of organisms. One also finds claims about frequencies in counterfactual and infinitely large populations—of events—at the core of an answer to a question concerning the foundations of evolutionary theory. The question is this: To what do the numerical probabilities found throughout evolutionary theory correspond? The answer in question says that evolutionary probabilities (...) are “hypothetical frequencies” (including what are sometimes called “long-run frequencies” and “long-run propensities”). In this paper, I review two arguments against hypothetical frequencies. The arguments have implications for the interpretation of evolutionary probabilities, but more importantly, they seem to raise problems for biologists’ claims about frequencies in counterfactual or infinite populations of organisms and sets of populations of organisms. I argue that when properly understood, claims about frequencies in large and infinite populations of organisms and sets of populations are not threatened by the arguments. Seeing why gives us a clearer understanding of the nature of counterfactual and infinite population claims and probability in evolutionary theory. (shrink)

In the debate over clinicians’ conscience, there is a greater ethical, legal, and scholarly focus on negative, rather than positive, claims of conscience. This asymmetry produces a seemingly unjustified double standard with respect to clinicians’ conscience under the law. For example, a Roman Catholic physician working at a secular institution may refuse to provide physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience, but a secular physician working at a Roman Catholic institution may not insist on providing physician-aid-in-dying on the basis of conscience. (...) This article outlines arguments against this asymmetry and critiques them for failing to distinguish between positive claims of conscience as positive or negative rights. I suggest the asymmetry debate should be focused on whether positive claims of conscience as positive rights ought to enjoy the same protections as negative claims of conscience. Clarifying the debate in this way helps elucidate some of the best reasons for the asymmetry, which these arguments have not addressed. This article does not take a definitive position on whether the asymmetry is justified, but attempts to bring some focus to the debate by directing arguments against the asymmetry to address the significant differences between positive claims of conscience as positive rights and negative claims of conscience. (shrink)

I take issue with several themes in Ted Toadvine’s lively paper, “Limits of the Flesh,” suggesting that he has significantly misread many of the arguments in The Spell of the Sensuous. I first engage his contention that I disparage reflection and denigrate the written word. Then I take up the assertion that I exclude the symbolic dimension of experience from my account, and indeed that I seek to eliminate the symbolic from our interactions with others. Finally, I refute his claim (...) that my ecophenomenological stance leaves no room for resistance, contradiction, and alterity—elements that are, in fact, central to my understanding of ethics. My reply leads directly into a discussion of one of the crucial concerns of my work: the manner in which the very style of our discourse—our way of wielding words—tacitly works to either enhance, or to stifle, the solidarity between the human community and the more-than-human earth. (shrink)

This article examines a handful of recent creative works that reflect speculatively on transgender pasts. I argue that each of these creative texts uses ontological interventions to reimagine moments in trans activist history that scholars have narrated only in terms of the attenuation of sociality and of political participation. These works do this by ratifying trans activists’ relations of reciprocity with extraordinary entities that are not often supported by secular and anthropocentric historiographies. Instead of engaging accounts of coalition work with (...) extraterrestrials, nonhuman animals, and magical powers mainly as sites of “subjugated knowledges”, these creative works all consider the political capacitations afforded by trans collaborations with other-than-human agencies. In order to make this argument, I draw from the recent body of anthropological scholarship known as the “new animism,” and consider the absence of commentary on religion and secularism within the Anglo-American posthuman turn. Ultimately, beyond offering alternatives to historical declension narratives about trans activism, these works urge scholars to consider how relations with “subaltern” agentive forces have become increasingly important to disenfranchised communities’ efforts to negotiate the political debilitations of a post-neoliberal world. (shrink)

Abstract“Conscientious provision” refers to situations in which clinicians wish to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments prohibited within their (usually Catholic) health care institutions. It mirrors “conscientious objection,” which refers to situations in which clinicians refuse to provide legal and professionally accepted treatments offered within their (usually secular) health care institutions. Conscientious provision is not protected by law, but conscientious objection is. In practice, this asymmetry privileges conservative religious or moral values (usually associated with objection) over secular moral values (usually (...) associated with provision). In this article, we first argue for a legal right to one kind of conscientious provision: referral for procedures prohibited at Catholic hospitals. We then argue that a premise in that argument—the principle of comparably trivial institutional burdens—justifies legal protections for some additional forms of conscientious provision that include, for example, writing prescriptions for contraception or medical abortions. However, this principle cannot justify legal protections for other forms of conscientious provision, for instance, the right to perform surgical abortions or gender-affirming hysterectomies at Catholic hospitals. (shrink)

This paper reports of a case where a physician conscientiously objected to prescribing PrEP to a bisexual patient so as not to “enable immoral sexual behavior.” The case represents an instance of conscience creep, a phenomenon whereby clinicians invoke conscientious objection in sometimes objectionable ways that extend beyond the traditional contexts of abortion, sterilization, or physician aid in dying. This essay uses a reasonability view of conscientious objection to argue that the above case represents a discriminatory instance of conscience creep (...) that should not be permitted. (shrink)

Scientists and decision makers rely on climate models for predictions concerning future climate change. Traditionally, physical processes that are key to predicting extreme events are either directly represented or indirectly represented. Scientists are now replacing physically based parameterizations with neural networks that do not represent physical processes directly or indirectly. I analyze the epistemic implications of this method and argue that it undermines the reliability of model predictions. I attribute the widespread failure in neural network generalizability to the lack of (...) process representation. The representation of climate processes adds significant and irreducible value to the reliability of climate model predictions. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 7, Page 783-793, September 2022.

In the essay “‘Please baptize my son’: The Case against Baptizing a Dying, Unconscious Atheist,” in the same issue of this journal, Tate Shepherd and Michael Redinger describe a case in which a clinical ethicist is consulted when a mother requests that someone from the hospital's spiritual care services baptize her dying, unconscious, atheist adult son. The mother's request produces a moral conflict between providing emotional benefits to the patient's mother from seeing her son baptized at the end of his (...) life and a concern about inflicting dignitary harm on the patient by violating a preference related to a deeply held belief. In this essay, we argue that, in these tragic circumstances, some atheists would be agreeable to being baptized to bring some measure of emotional comfort to their family. We suggest that the clinical ethicist should not respond with a categorical rejection of this possibility but take time with the family to reflect on whether there are good reasons to conclude that the patient would have been receptive to his mother's request. (shrink)

In response to reports on embryonic stem cell research in the AMWA Journal, the official publication of the American Medical Writers Association, the author submitted a brief article discussing ethical objections to such research. The Journal editor rejected the article, saying the Journal was not an appropriate place to discuss the ethics of stem cell research. The author challenged this reasoning because the Journal is committed to informing members about relevant ethical issues, ethics were mentioned in one of the original (...) reports, and related ethical concerns were discussed in a previous issue. Further efforts to secure balanced reporting failed. Concerned professionals should be aware of the AMWA bias. National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 8.4 (Winter 2008): 639–654. (shrink)