Criamos uma sociedade amparada na ideia de desenvolvimento e dominação da natureza. Vivemos sob as ameaças do poder nuclear, da degradação da biosfera, da extinção de múltiplas formas de vida e, talvez, do próprio planeta. Frente à devastação dos ecossistemas, assistimos nas últimas décadas o desabrochar da consciência ecológica, dos grupos ambientalistas e da economia sustentável; ainda assim ineficazes para lidar com a crise ecológica do presente. Superar a agonia planetária requer da humanidade um pensamento ecologizado. Podemos observar na obra (...) de Michel Serres os argumentos filosóficos adequados à formulação de uma ecopolítica global em contraponto à política de desenvolvimento, mesmo que sustentável. Em diálogo com o pensamento complexo de Edgar Morin, ecologizar implica ultrapassar as limitações redutoras e disjuntoras do paradigma de simplificação que coloniza o pensamento contemporâneo. O pensamento ecologizado se abre para as vias regeneradoras do conhecimento sobre o homem na relação consigo, com a sociedade, com a natureza e o cosmos. (shrink)

Dr Sydney Brenner has played a major, and unique, role in biology during the past 40 years. His contributions have ranged from key work on the structure of the genetic code and the existence of mRNA through the development of Caenorhabditis elegans as a key model system in developmental biology to genomic analysis and function in vertebrates. BioEssays went to interview Dr Brenner at his home in the cathedral city of Ely, England, on the significance of the genome projects (...) for human biology, in particular, and for biology, in general. (shrink)

A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the properties ascribed by (...) these predicates, with the result that the physical properties that determine the person's mental states will belong to the person and not to the human animal. (shrink)

Sydney Shoemaker is one of the most influential philosophers currently writing on philosophy of mind and metaphysics. The essays in this collection deal with the way in which we know our own minds, and with the nature of those mental states of which we have our most direct conscious awareness. Professor Shoemaker opposes the 'inner sense' conception of introspective self-knowledge. He defends the view that perceptual and sensory states have non-representational features - 'qualia' - that determine what it is (...) like to have them. Amongst the other topics covered are the unity of consciousness, and the idea that the 'first-person perspective' gives a privileged route to philosophical understanding of the nature of mind. This major collection is sure to prove invaluable to all advanced students of the philosophy of mind and cognitive science. (shrink)

Since the appearance of a widely influential book, Self-Knowledge and Self-ldentity, Sydney Shoemaker has continued to work on a series of interrelated issues in the philosophy of mind and metaphysics. This volume contains a collection of the most important essays he has published since then. The topics that he deals with here include, among others, the nature of personal and other forms of identity, the relation of time to change, the nature of properties and causality and the relation between (...) the two, dualism and immortality, and the nature of mental states. All the essays show the same care and precision in argument as the earlier book, but they also reveal a substantial shift in Professor Shoemaker's position to a form of materialism. In fact, a number of papers together constitute what is probably the most subtle and rigourous defence yet of a sophisticated functionalism in the account of the mind. (shrink)

A common conception of what it is for one property to “realize” another suggests that it is the realizer property that does the causal work, and that the realized property is epiphenomenal. The same conception underlies George Bealer’s argument that functionalism leads to the absurd conclusion that what we take to be self-ascriptions of a mental state are really self-ascriptions of “first-order” properties that realize that state. This paper argues for a different concept of realization. A property realizes another if (...) its “forward looking” causal features are a subset of those of the property realized. The instantiation of the realizer property will include the instantiation of the property realized; and when the effects produced are due to the causal features of the latter, it is the instantiation of it that is appropriately regarded as their cause. Epiphenomenalism is avoided, and so is Bealer’s absurd conclusion. (shrink)

Fleshing out Ramsey-sentence functionalism; against Lewis's "mad pain" mixed theory; relating functionalism to the causal theory of properties. Empirical functionalism is chauvinistic so probably false. A terrific, in-depth paper.

[Sydney Shoemaker] A major objection to the view that the relation of persons to human animals is coincidence rather than identity is that on this view the human animal will share the coincident person's physical properties, and so should (contrary to the view) share its mental properties. But while the same physical predicates are true of the person and the human animal, the difference in the persistence conditions of these entities implies that there will be a difference in the (...) properties ascribed by these predicates, with the result that the physical properties that determine the person's mental states will belong to the person and not to the human animal. /// [Galen Strawson] What are the grounds of self-consciousness? I consider 29 proposals and reject 22, including a number of proposals that experience of body (or bodies) is necessary for self-consciousness. A popular strategy in debates of this sort is to argue that one cannot be said to have some concept C (e.g. the concept ONESELF, necessary for self-consciousness) unless one has a need or a use for C given the character of one's experience considered independently of the character that it has given that one possesses C. I suggest that such arguments are invalid. (shrink)

This authoritative biography addresses the life and work of the quantum physicist David Bohm. Although quantum physics is considered the soundest physical theory, its strange and paradoxical features have challenged - and continue to challenge - even the brightest thinkers. David Bohm dedicated his entire life to enhancing our understanding of quantum mysteries, in particular quantum nonlocality. His work took place at the height of the cultural/political upheaval in the 1950's, which led him to become the most notable American scientist (...) to seek exile in the last century. The story of his life is as fascinating as his ideas on the quantum world are appealing. (shrink)

I am grateful to Michael Tye for his discussion of my book, and to the editor for offering me the opportunity to respond to Tye's criticisms of my account of the phenomenal character of perceptual experience—especially since this prompted reflections that led me to see a way of removing one unattractive feature of the account.

The paper defends the view that there is a constitutive relation between believing something and believing that one believes it. This view is supported by the incoherence of affirming something while denying that one believes it, and by the role awareness of the contents one’s belief system plays in the rational regulation of that system. Not all standing beliefs are accompanied by higher-order beliefs that self-ascribe them; those that are so accompanied are ones that are “available” in the sense that (...) their subjects are poised to assent to their contents, to use them as premises in reasoning, and to be guided by them in their behavior. The account is compatible with the possibility of negative self-deception—mistakenly believing that one does not believe something—but the closest thing to positive self-deception it allows is believing falsely that a belief with a certain content is one’s dominant belief on a certain matter through failure to realize that one has a stronger belief that contradicts it. The view has implications about Moore’s paradox that contradict widely held views. On this view self-ascriptions of beliefs can be warranted and grounded on reasons—but the reasons are not phenomenally conscious mental states (as held by Christopher Peacocke) but rather available beliefs. (shrink)

In Physical Realization, Sydney Shoemaker considers the question of how physicalism can be true: how can all facts about the world, including mental ones, be constituted by facts about the distribution in the world of physical properties? Physicalism requires that the mental properties of a person are 'realized in' the physical properties of that person, and that all instantiations of properties in macroscopic objects are realized in microphysical states of affairs. Shoemaker offers an account of both these sorts of (...) realization, one which allows the realized properties to be causally efficacious. He also explores the implications of this account for a wide range of metaphysical issues, including the nature of persistence through time, the problem of material constitution, the possibility of emergent properties, and the nature of phenomenal consciousness. (shrink)

Adultcentrism is an inherent feature of the social fabrics comprising most resource-rich countries in the twenty-first century that undermines the capacities, value, and voices of young people in various ways. In the context of COVID-19, we are confronted with the question of whose voice matters and must ask: is adultcentrism ethically permissible during a pandemic? This Critical Controversy examines this question in relation to evolving concepts of childhood, children’s rights, and the capacities of young people, to highlight areas of tension, (...) future research, and potential for critical dialogue. (shrink)

O presente texto é oriundo da disciplina “Ontologia e Ciências Humanas: O Kant de Heidegger”, ministrada pelos professores Gustavo Silvano Batista e Eduardo José Marandola Junior entre janeiro e fevereiro de 2024, no Programa de Pós-Graduação Interdisciplinar (ICHSA) da Faculdade de Ciências Aplicadas (FCA) da Unicamp no campus de Limeira-SP. Nele procuro analisar no segundo Heidegger em sua crítica pós-metafísica, portanto após a sua discussão sobre a metafísica kantiana, a maturação da ideia do Dasein. Nessa leitura específica de Heidegger (...) destaco o momento, apesar de não conclusivo, em que o Ser aparece como um ser-com, no qual vislumbro a possibilidade de diálogo, de encontro com outras percepções de mundo, entre elas, a oralidade na perspectiva de Amadou Hampaté Bâ. Com isso indico que apesar dos nítidos distanciamentos existem campos proximais, nos quais para a tradição oral ocorre o interesse pelo outro, o que estabelece a base necessária para que a palavra aconteça. (shrink)

Antes de qualquer coisa, o leitor do presente artigo encontrará uma grande preocupação de David Asher em transmitir o pensamento filosófico de Schopenhauer para o leitor britânico da época (1871), isso fica claro, pois esse empreendimento por vezes levou o autor a fazer citações ultra extensas de Schopenhauer (das quais ele mesmo traduzia da língua alemã para o inglês). Nessas longas citações/traduções que o autor faz do filósofo, tratei de copiá-las da tradução brasileira de Jair Barboza d’O mundo como vontade (...) e como representação. Sempre especifico essas cópias em notas, por isso, meu trabalho foi de fazer uma tradução parcial: traduzir o próprio Asher e não o texto de Schopenhauer traduzido por ele. Outro ponto muitíssimo importante a ser levado em consideração é que o presente texto foi comprovadamente lido pelo próprio Charles Darwin, tal como devidamente mostro na nota de rodapé número 16. (shrink)

This paper aims to address when the wise person should participate in politics. The question is addressed through engagement with the Analects. Rather than provide interpretations of key terms in the Analects, we provide an account of wisdom that draws from themes in the Analects. The case is made that the wise person is committed to participating in politics primarily because of the connection between wisdom and benevolence (ren 仁 in the Analects). We address challenges to the Confucian approach from (...) the Zhuangzi concerning the potential harms of political participation. General political disengagement is not considered exemplary on the Confucian approach to wisdom, although when political engagement may be eschewed is explored. Finally, the case is made that while ren motivates the wise to participate politically, the wise also have a sense of timeliness that provides guidance as to when to refrain or withdraw from political participation. (shrink)

Neste artigo, colocamos a questão sobre o estatuto da Física no pensamento de René Descartes em meio a duas leituras divergentes. De um lado, apresentamos e criticamos a interpretação idealista de Martial Gueroult em torno do problema e, noutra perspectiva, apresentamos e defendemos a interpretação realista-pragmática, de Zeljko Loparic e Érico Andrade, como sendo a mais adequada para se compreender a natureza da física no pensamento cartesiano. O objetivo central é saber como Descartes concebe a sua própria ciência hipotética frente (...) às exigências metodológicas que ele mesmo extrai da matemática. Após entendermos em que medida a relação entre metafísica, matemática e física não ocorre de modo pacífico no interior do sistema cartesiano, passamos ao tratamento específico das duas interpretações, destacando seus respectivos compromissos filosóficos e suas diferentes escolhas textuais. Apesar da vasta literatura especializada sobre a obra de Descartes, no Brasil, o debate em torno da ciência cartesiana ainda é incipiente quando comparamos com a quantidade de artigos e livros que priorizam os temas clássicos da sua metafísica. Com o intuito de diminuir tal lacuna, retomamos este tema específico do pensamento de Descartes, explicitando as mediações e problematizações que lhe são inerentes. (shrink)

Law - Introduction, History, Philosophy And Sociology of Law. Philosophy. Politics. Democracy. Unger, Roberto Mangabeira, 1947-.

O artigo pretende investigar o papel fundamental da violência na genealogia dasinstituições sociais e suas conseqüências, visando refletir sobre problemas cardeais dafilosofia política contemporânea, como por exemplo, a fundação e a justificação do poderde comando, contrato social, estado democrático de direito, controle constitucional, estadode exceção e a possibilidade de compreensão de políticas que não se referem ao Estado.

Another sort of thing resembles works of art in combining existence, message and a kind of presentation, namely, symbols. Hence it seems reasonable to take works of art as symbols. And yet works of art are a special kind of symbol, because in them presentation has a double function. All symbols directly present their meaning; indeed the essential function of symbols is to serve as vehicles for conveying us into the immediate presence of what they mean. But works of art (...) have a second presentational mode of functioning. They also present themselves; and this is true both for abstract and for representational art. (shrink)

Despite the importance of Suárez’s defense of the freedom of the will at the threshold of early modern philosophy, his account has received scant recent attention. This paper aims partially to redress that neglect. Suárez’s position can be understood as a balancing act between desiring to attribute libertarian freedom to agents and desiring to maintain the will’s status as a rational appetite. Hence, he rejects an intellectualism that says that choices are necessitated by the intellect’s judgements (since he does not (...) think that the judgements themselves can be directly free), but affirms that only what is judged good can be chosen. (shrink)

Charles Taylor em suas abordagens sobre o fenômeno da secularização nos oferece uma descrição, analítico-genealógica, das atuais condições de crença e ceticismo radical das sociedades modernas. Buscamos a partir disto, fazer um estudo que vise entender algumas das motivações referentes ao lugar e uso da razão pública pelas religiões na vida social democrática. Para tanto, abordamos a noção de redefinição do significado político da secularização. É inegável que as crenças religiosas e laicas estão vivas e atuantes na esfera pública. Por (...) esta razão, temos que averiguar algo do fenômeno da secularização como projeto de expansão dos axiomas revolucionários da liberdade, igualdade e fraternidade modernas. Logo, vamos seguir nossa argumentação dando atenção para alguns elementos referentes ao pano de fundo histórico-filosófico que contribuíram para a redefinição do significado político deste fenômeno. Todavia, temos que fazer uma articulação teleológica em termos do que seja a soberania popular da ação dos novos sujeitos no limiar das modernas democracias. Ademais, o dado relevante da comunicação e das tensões que envolve o estabelecimento dos consensos sobrepostos, refletem no influxo moral das religiões na esfera pública democrática como um problema conflitivo. Por fim, cotejamos algo referente as epistemologias da suspeição diante da facticidade aporética dos conteúdos religiosos. Isto tem sérias implicações para a construção da identidade do agente humano no devir histórico desta era chamada secular. (shrink)

One does not have to agree with the main conclusions of David Chalmers’s book in order to find it stimulating, instructive, and frequently brilliant. If Chalmers’s arguments succeed, his achievement will of course be enormous; he will have overthrown the materialist orthodoxy that has reigned in philosophy of mind and cognitive science for the last half century. If, as I think, they fail, his achievement is nevertheless considerable. For his arguments draw on, and give forceful and eloquent expression to, widely (...) held intuitions; seeing how they go astray, if they do, cannot help but deepen our understanding of the issues he is addressing. (shrink)

Thanks to Barbeyrac, Pufendorf and others, there is a long-familiar picture of Grotius as offering a groundbreaking account of natural law. By now there is also a familiar observation that there is no agreement what makes Grotius’s account innovative. Sometimes this leads to skepticism about how innovative Grotius’s account of natural law really is. Some scholars suggest that Grotius’s account of natural law resembles Suárez’s account. But others continue to argue that Barbeyrac is right to see Grotius as breaking the (...) ice of previous philosophy and laying the groundwork for a distinctively modern moral philosophy. I plan to contribute to the debate by arguing that, properly understood, Grotius’s position is similar to Suárez’s on a range of fundamental questions, and, furthermore, that seeing Grotius as making a radical break with the past violates his own self-conception. 1. (shrink)

This chapter contains section titled: “Personal Identity: a Materialist's Account”.

This paper is about the relation between two metaphysical topics: the nature of properties, and way the instantiation of a property is sometimes “realized in” something more fundamental. It is partly an attempt to develop further, but also to correct, my earlier treatments of these topics. In my published work on realization, including my book Physical Realization, I was at pains to insist that acceptance of my view about this does not commit one to the causal theory of properties I (...) have defended in several places. I held that it commits one to the claim that within any given world, properties with the same causal profile are identical, but not to the requirement that a property must have the same causal profile in any world in which it can be instantiated. I now think that this was a mistake. There is an argument from the account of realization I have offered to the conclusion that, if physicalism is true, properties of macroscopic objects have their causal profiles essentially. In what follows I will present that argument.Along the way I will correct what now seem to me mistakes in my earlier presentationsof the account of realization. And I will conclude with an additional argument for the causal theory of properties, one that does not tie it to the assumption that physicalism is true or to my account of realization. (shrink)

Review of Flores-Júnior, O. La vie facile. Une lecture du cynisme ancien, Paris, Librairie philosophique J. Vrin. (2021).