Suárez distingue entre cuatro formas diferentes de intentar un fin de acción: con una intención actual, virtual, habitual o interpretativa. Esta distinción se repite en muchos libros y artículos en siglos posteriores como una parte estándar de la teoría de la acción, y Suárez es evidentemente la fuente de muchos de los autores posteriores. Este artículo examina el tratamiento de Suárez de la distinción. La intención interpretativa recibe la mayor atención, ya que Suárez parece dar varias caracterizaciones inconsistentes de ella (...) en diferentes obras. El artículo concluye con algunas notas sobre la posterior recepción de la distinción y comenta brevemente las lecciones que se deben aprender sobre cómo rastrear la influencia de Suárez. (shrink)

This article addresses the problematic relation between Michel Henry’s phenomenology of life and ethics. More specifically, it asks whether Henry’s account of the self’s transcendental birth in the immanent self-generation of life allows for a sense of individual responsibility. I begin by discussing Henry’s generation of the self and show how the historical essence of the self is structured according to the antinomy of affectivity. I then show how, for Henry, this history of life is full and yet incomplete. Accordingly, (...) life is attracted to growth and this growth happens insofar as living beings proceed through a series of stages of despair. I develop these stages by looking at Henry’s analyses of anxiety, desire, and humility in relation to Kierkegaard. I argue that even though there is already an initial sense of responsibility at work in the earliest stirrings of anxiety, it is only in humility that the self comes to know who it truly is and how it ought to relate to others. Cet article se penche sur la relation problématique entre la phéno-ménologie de la vie et l’éthique de Michel Henry. Plus spécifiquement, nous nous demandons si l’explication de la naissance trans-cendantale du soi dans l’auto-génération immanente de la vie que propose Henry permet de rendre compte d’un sens de la responsabilité personnelle. Nous débutons avec une analyse de la génération du soi chez Henry et montrons comment l’essence historique du soi est structurée selon l’antinomie de l’affectivité. Nous montrons en-suite comment, pour Henry, cette histoire du soi est pleine bien qu’incomplète. En conséquence, la vie est attirée par la croissance, et cette croissance se produit dans la mesure où les êtres vivants passent à travers une série de stades du désespoir. Nous dévelop-pons ces divers stades en nous tournant vers les analyses que fait Henry de l’angoisse, du désir, et de l’humilité en relation avec Kierkegaard. Nous soutenons que même s’il y a déjà un sens initial de la responsabilité à l’oeuvre dans le premier éveil de l’angoisse, c’est seulement en atteignant le stade de l’humilité que le soi en vient à savoir qui il est vraiment et comment il doit se rapporter aux autres. (shrink)

On 5 August 1968, publication of the Harvard Committee’s report on the subject of “irreversible coma” established a standard for diagnosing death on neurological grounds. On the same day, the 22nd World Medical Assembly met in Sydney, Australia, and announced the Declaration of Sydney, a pronouncement on death, which is less often quoted because it was overshadowed by the impact of the Harvard Report. To put those events into present-day perspective, the authors reviewed all papers published on this (...) subject and the World Medical Association web page and documents, and corresponded with Dr A G Romualdez, the son of Dr A Z Romualdez. There was vast neurological expertise among some of the Harvard Committee members, leading to a comprehensible and practical clinical description of the brain death syndrome and the way to diagnose it. This landmark account had a global medical and social impact on the issue of human death, which simultaneously lessened reception of the Declaration of Sydney. Nonetheless, the Declaration of Sydney faced the main conceptual and philosophical issues on human death in a bold and forthright manner. This statement differentiated the meaning of death at the cellular and tissue levels from the death of the person. This was a pioneering view on the discussion of human death, published as early as in 1968, that should be recognised by current and future generations. (shrink)

Although it is commonly believed that the concept of brain death was developed to benefit organ transplants, it evolved independently. Transplantation owed its development to advances in surgery and immunosuppressive treatment; BD owed its origin to the development of intensive care. The first autotransplant was achieved in the early 1900s, when studies of increased intracranial pressure causing respiratory arrest with preserved heartbeat were reported. Between 1902 and 1950, the BD concept was supported by the discovery of EEG, Crile’s definition of (...) death, the use of EEG to demonstrate abolition of brain potentials after ischaemia, and Crafoord’s statement that death was due to cessation of blood flow. Transplantation saw the first xenotransplant in humans and the first unsuccessful kidney transplant from a cadaver. In the 1950s, circulatory arrest in coma was identified by angiography, and the death of the nervous system and coma dépassé were described. Murray performed the first successful kidney transplant. In the 1960s, the BD concept and organ transplants were instantly linked when the first kidney transplant using a brain-dead donor was performed; Schwab proposed to use EEG in BD; the Harvard Committee report and the Sydney Declaration appeared; the first successful kidney, lung and pancreas transplants using cadaveric donors were achieved; Barnard performed the first human heart transplant. This historical review demonstrates that the BD concept and organ transplantation arose separately and advanced in parallel, and only began to progress together in the late 1960s. Therefore, the BD concept did not evolve to benefit transplantation. (shrink)

As terms, “Yoga” and “Zen” are as ubiquitous as they are banal. They float, freely, empty of any real meaning. Just about anything could be, Zen; in the same way that, just about anything could be, Yoga. In a closed loop, one might even define “Yoga” as “like Zen” or “Zen” to be a form of “Yoga.” However, in various ways, they are forged into a new hybrid. The marketing of syncretic, yoga-inflected Buddhist temple tourist options in and around Kyoto, (...) Japan, demonstrates how “Zen+Yoga” hybrids have become trans-glocal phenomena stretching between London and Sydney. Why does the Zen+Yoga hybrid seem to receive less criticism than other X+Yoga hybrids, such as Goat+Yoga, Beer+Yoga, SUP+Yoga, Death Metal+Yoga, Dog+Yoga, and, to a lesser extent, Hot+Yoga? A significant part of the Zen+Yoga hybrid’s ability to heretically seal itself from criticism is due to the institutionalized religious capital that schools of Zen Buddhism have. Even though the other X+Yoga hybrids rely on similar discursive and haptic logics, they are unconstrained by tradition and institution, unlike Zen. While all hybrids are novel branding attempts for attention from within a thoroughly saturated wellness tourism market, syncretic X+Yoga hybrids are not new. Neither are they universally accepted as heretical cultural appropriations. The common assumption regarding the commensurability of Zen and Yoga practices at epistemological, ontological, and soteriological levels is challenged. As well as, the social, political, and economic realities of tourism and temples are analyzed. This is based on 2 years of ethnographic and specific media content analysis regarding Japan’s yogascapes. This paper focuses the discussion on Tera Yoga. (shrink)

Comment les objets matériels persistent-ils à travers le temps ? Qu'est-ce que cela veut dire qu'un objet change tout en étant un et le même ? Peut-il y avoir un monde sans temps ? Le temps s'écoule-t-il même si rien ne change ? Et, le temps lui-même, qu'est-ce que c'est ? Consiste-t-il seulement en l'instant présent, ou le passé et le futur existent-ils également ? Est-il possible de voyager dans le temps ? Quelles propriétés le temps doit-il avoir pour permettre (...) le voyage dans le temps ? Est-il possible de changer le passé ? Ce volume recueille des traductions inédites de textes issus de la philosophie du temps des XXe et XXIe siècles. Ces contributions de R. M. Adams, Jiri Benovsky, David Braddon-Mitchell, Michael Dummett, Graeme Forbes, Mark Heller, Paul Horwich, Robin Le Poidevin, David Lewis, D. H. Mellor, Sydney Shoemaker, Theodore Sider, J. J. C. Smart, W. V. O. Quine, et Peter Van Inwagen offrent des manières différentes de réagir à ces interrogations (et bien d'autres encore). Elles permettent ainsi au lecteur de découvrir la richesse des débats contemporains en philosophie du temps. On découvre ici une variété de notions, d'arguments et de théories, telles que l'endurantisme, le perdurantisme, le relationnisme et le substantialisme, mais également d'importantes considérations en ce qui concerne la causalité, l'identité, le changement, ou encore l'analyse de similarités entre le temps et l'espace. Le problème du voyage dans le temps se voit consacrer une section spéciale dans ce volume, car il a ceci de particulièrement intéressant : il sert de cas limite offrant la possibilité de tester les théories et de soulever de nombreuses questions philosophiques sur la nature du temps et du monde. (shrink)

Foundational issues in statistical mechanics and the more general question of how probability is to be understood in the context of physical theories are both areas that have been neglected by philosophers of physics. This book fills an important gap in the literature by providing a most systematic study of how to interpret probabilistic assertions in the context of statistical mechanics. The book explores both subjectivist and objectivist accounts of probability, and takes full measure of work in the foundations of (...) probability theory, in statistical mechanics, and in mathematical theory. It will be of particular interest to philosophers of science, physicists and mathematicians interested in foundational issues, and also to historians of science. (shrink)

One day, Matthew Eaton was walking through an impromptu animal shelter display at his local pet store when suddenly an eight-month-old kitten dug his claws into Eaton’s flesh. Eaton recognized that the “eyes of this cat and the curve of his claw” compelled a response analogous to those found in the writings of Buber, Levinas, and Derrida. And not just Eaton but a whole community of theologians have found themselves in an encounter with particular places and animals that demands rich (...) theological reflection. Eaton enlisted fellow editors Harvie and Bechtel to collect the essays in this volume, in which theologians listen to horses, rats, snakes, cats, dogs, and the earth itself, who become new theological voices demanding a response. In this volume, the voice of the more-than-human world is heard as making theology possible. These essays suggest that what we say theologically represents not simply ideas of our own making subsequently superimposed onto the natural world through our own discovery, but rather flow from an expressive Earth. With additional contributions from: Kimberly Carfore Lisa E. Dahill Celia Deane-Drummond Heather Eaton Nathan Kowalsky Abigail Lofte Jame Schaefer Cristina D. Vanin Mark Wallace Grace Y. Kao Chris Carter John Berkman Laura Hobgood. (shrink)

Putting the mangle to the test Content Type Journal Article DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9516-y Authors Stephen Healy, School of History and Philosophy, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

Abrogation (naskh) is one of the controversial themes of Islamic studies, especially in later period that of principle of exegesis (uṣūl al-tafsīr). However, the recent studies on abrogation (naskh) do not offer a comprehensive analysis on the concept. In fact, the problem of naskh (abrogation) is in need of a systematic and holistic approach, which would only be possible with a detailed study on how the concept of abrogation (naskh) is understood in Islamic interpretive tradition (tafsīr). With this purpose in (...) mind, this article intends to examine two points regarding the term abrogation: first, the article will offer a analytical reflection on the diverse views of naskh, and then it will highlight how Ibn Kathīr (d. 1373) understood and applied this term to his hermeneutical framework. By doing so, the present study aims to show Ibn Kathīr’s position in Islamic interpretive tradition on the matter of naskh. The key conclusion of this study is that although Ibn Kathīr is one of the representatives of the traditional riwayah (sound transmission through a chain of exegetes) exegesis, he advances his interpretive hermeneutics with multiple aspects that also involves dirayah (personal opinion) exegesis (tafsīr). SUMMARY The problem of naskh (abrogation) is one of the most important and controversial themes of science and principle of exegesis (ʿilm wan a-l uṣūl al-tafsīr) in Islamic tradition. In order to understand naskh, which is claimed to be occurred in the Qur’ānic text, it is necessary to involve the time of the revelation of the Qur’ān. An analysis of this period reveals that first Muslims regard the naskh as a natural process of the revelation and do not dispute over this matter. In other words, the controversial theme naskh is perceived by first addresses of the Qur’ān as a hermeneutical characteristic of the Qur’ānic revelation. Therefore, naskh was not considered as a controversial concept and debated its origins based on the question whether it organically belonged to the revelation. It will be clear that the different views on naskh (abrogation), particularly after the time of the Companions is not a conceptual problem; rather Muslim scholars differed in their methodological approaches to naksh. Naskh has not been questioned as a concept in early Islamic tradition. Rather it has gradually developed over the centuries. Naskh has been elaborated with the terms of uṣūl al-fiqh (principles of Law), such as takhṣīṣ (specification) and taqyīd (restriction) and its conceptual meaning has been extended after, particularly Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad b. Idris b. ʿAbbas al-Shāfiʿī (d. 820). To sum up, naskh is regarded with a methodological perspective. However, in the field of Turkish Islamic studies, especially after the Cumhuriyet, the term naskh is not regarded as a natural consequence of the process of tanzīl (revelation of the Qur’ān) neglecting the gradual aspect of revelation and the disputes over the term has been concluded either rejecting or simply accepting this concept without providing a satisfactory result on the matter. This article examines one of the most prominent Muslim exegete Ibn Kathīr’s (d. 1373) approach to the problem of naskh in the context of previous modern scholarship on naskh (abrogation). However, the analysis of Ibn Kathīr’s perception of naskh does not claim to be exhaustive on the matter. This requires a more comprehensive study on the concept of naskh, which is clearly beyond the scope of this article. Therefore, the present study intends to specifically focus on general aspect of Ibn Kathīr’s understanding of naskh and how his perception is presented in modern studies. When Ibn Kathīr’s commentary is analysed, it becomes clear that his understanding of naskh is significant and not necessarily in line with his riwayah (sound transmission through a chain of exegetes) tafsīr (exegesis). For example, he notes the dates between abrogating and abrogated Qur’ānic verses and claims that it is necessary to find certain proofs to validate the claim of abrogation (naskh) for particular legal judgments and verses, which clearly shows that Ibn Kathīr approaches to the problem of naskh with a methodological perspective. Ibn Kathīr’s interpretation of the well known Qur’ānic verse Q 2.106 in a different sense and most importantly his consideration of the matter only in the Qur’ānic context are clear examples of his methodological approach. His interpretation of Q 2.106 simply shows that he meticulously distinguish between the acceptance of naskh as a concept and as an interpretive method. The modern studies on naskh, on the contrary, consider the matter only on the base of a conceptual analysis. Ibn Kathīr prefers to transmit the traditional opinions based on personal interpretation and interprets some Qur’ānic verses. This is clearly his method of re-interpretation based on rational thinking (taʾwīl). His way of rational reasoning leads Ibn Kathīr to the rejection of naskh (abrogation) and the restriction of Qur’ānic verses that are related to the theory of abrogating and abrogated verses (nāsikh-mansūkh). This clearly proves that Ibn Kathīr does not merely adopts and employs the method of riwayah, which is contrary to the supposition that he is the exegete of a commentary that heavily draws on hadith reports and transmitted traditional reports. In fact, this most importantly shows that Ibn Kathīr’s Qur’ān commentary can also be regarded as a dirayah (personal opinion) tafsīr (exegesis) and that there are enough material in traditional Muslim Qur’ānic exegesis to re-analyse the problem of naskh (abrogation). Relying on this last point, this article argues that a comprehensive analysis of naskh requires a research on the traditional interpretive sources. Therefore, it might be helpful to reconsider the matter of naskh with its conceptual background in the works of traditional Muslim exegetes rather than focusing only on whether the concept naskh exits or not in the origins of the Qur’ānic revelation. At this point, an analysis of Ibn Kathīr’s perception of naskh and his rational reasoning that is employed in his commentary will contribute to the understanding of the theory of naskh (abrogation) in the tradition of Qur’ānic exegesis. (shrink)

Kam-por Yu, Julia Tao, and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds.), Taking Confucian Ethics Seriously: Contemporary Theories and Applications Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11712-011-9253-y Authors Karyn Lai, School of History of Philosophy, The University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia Journal Dao Online ISSN 1569-7274 Print ISSN 1540-3009.

Responsibility is a central juridical, moral and social concept that calls on individuals to act in ways that are necessary and morally right. It represents a fundamental normative relationship that bridges abstract philosophical ideas with empirical social realities. Despite its everyday importance, the derivation and application of responsibility are complex and often contested. This article explores the meaning and conditions under which responsibility can be justifiably demanded, as well as its practical enforceability. Responsibility is understood as a normative relationship with (...) both moral and legal dimensions, constructed through social interactions. A responsible practice requires intersubjective agreement on the reasons and motives for actions, enabling the formulation and implementation of ethical justifications. (shrink)

There is significant potential for machine learning (ML) models and systems to enhance prognostic, diagnostic, and therapeutic decision-making in the healthcare context. When used in clinical setti...

The aim of this article is to investigate and discuss the notions of difference and representation in Emmanuel Levinas and Gilles Deleuze, articulating such notions through the example of a university extension project involving the formation of a musical ensemble composed of autistic children. Our research involved a review of four major philosophical works—Emmanuel Levinas’ Totality and Infinity; Among Us: Essays On Alterity; and “The Concept Of Difference In Bergson”; and Gilles Deleuze’s Difference and Repetition--in addition to secondary references. The (...) main articulations of the investigation carried out in the project consist of aspects such as: taking responsibility for the autistic child through cultivating asymmetrical relationships, a process that takes place through sensibility, below any representation; and not totalizing the alterity involved while maintaining, at the same time, its radical difference. In addition, there is an emphasis in the work on the difference of each child, beyond his or her diagnostic identity, understanding that all participants are undergoing unique processes of differentiation, and that some differences are not more privileged than others, in that that such hierarchies are determined by power relations. Another contribution of this research is the emphasis on the intensive affective flows of children, and the construction of relationships of mutual affection, which increases the circulation of vital energy in each one. Finally, the results of the project are offered as guidelines for clinical practice, and for the cultivation of a politics of difference, as an alternative to hegemonic practices in autism studies in contemporary times. (shrink)

A work powerful and pervading in its implications not only for metaphysics but also for art, political science, and the philosophy of history.

Offers practical advice on how to make your way in a chaotic world, and how to make it well. The 300 aphorisms contained here remain remarkably relevant today, addressing us today as practical guides for civility in an often uncivil world, and may serve as invitations to participate in making an uncivil world as civil as possible.

L. T. Hobhouse (1864–1929) is most familiar today as a leading theorist of British new liberalism. This article recovers and examines his overlooked commentary on the concept and rhetoric of race, which constituted part of his better-known project of advancing an authoritative account of liberal doctrine. His writings during and after the South African War, I argue, represent a prominent effort to cast liberalism as compatible with both imperial rule and what he called ‘the idea of racial equality’. A properly (...) liberal empire, he asserted, would dissolve the colour line. This article traces the arguments Hobhouse advanced to make this claim, and explores his motivations for doing so. I contend that Hobhouse drew on the idiom of race as a form of exclusionary rhetoric, to delegitimise rival accounts of liberal empire and to cast his own as properly cosmopolitan. This recovery, I suggest, offers payoffs for our understanding of both Hobhouse's political thought and, more broadly, the uses of ‘race’ in twentieth-century liberalism. (shrink)