Dharmakīrti argues that there is no pramāṇa (valid means of cognition or source of knowledge) for a thesis that is a self-contradiction (svavacanavirodha). That is, self-contradictions such as ‘everything said is false’ and ‘my mother is barren’ cannot be known to be true or false. The contemporary scholar Tillemans challenges Dharmakīrti by arguing that we can know that self-contradictions are false by means of a formal logical inference. The aims of the paper are to answer Tillemans’ challenge from what we (...) take to be Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian (someone who is like Dharmakīrti) perspective and to demonstrate the unique features of Dharmakīrti’s view of inference. By so doing, we show that the epistemology in relation to the formal conception of logic that underlies Tillemans’ challenge is problematic from Dharmakīrti’s or Dharmakīrtian perspective. The paper, thus, presents Dharmakīrti’s view of inference and logical reasoning as well as a Dharmakīrtian challenge to the formal conception of logic that is the dominant contemporary conception. (shrink)

This article considers the problem of how to elucidate the concept of nonsense. Viewed from a general philosophical standpoint this matters because the concept is used by certain philosophers in their criticism of philosophical questions and theses. I start with a presentation of examples of utterances considered nonsense, along with Baier's classification of kinds of nonsense. I then present various approaches, pointing out that none of them are completely satisfactory. I subsequently propose an approach that is a modification of the (...) austere conception: while consistent with the latter in that it treats nonsense as a lack of something, it differs by holding that a determination of the nature of various instances of nonsense can only be accomplished by examining how we show that some given utterance is nonsense. This approach places the emphasis on distinguishing the question of the meaninglessness of an utterance from the question of the incorrectness of linguistic expressions. The advantage of my conception is that on the one hand, it does not deny that there is an important non-psychological difference between philosophical nonsense and gibberish, while on the other it avoids the absurdity that philosophical utterances are nonsense because what they say is nonsensical. (shrink)

We define Kripke semantics for propositional intuitionistic logic with Suszko’s identity. We propose sequent calculus for ISCI along with cut-elimination theorem. We sketch a constructive interpretation of Suszko’s propositional identity connective.

We introduce a notion of ideal type such that any two ideals with the same ideal type are isomorphic. From this we infer, under the axiom t = h, that each ideal which consists of all nowhere Ramsey sets contained in some family of infinite subsets of natural numbers is isomorphic with the ideal of all nowhere Ramsey sets.

The aim of this text is to elucidate certain aspects of the use of expressions such as “is true” and “it is true that” (henceforth “truth-expressions”) and, through this, some features of the concept of truth. It focuses on addressing the question of whether truth-expressions play the role of a predicate or an operator. The investigations pursued are intended to be grammatical—in Wittgenstein’s sense of the term. I begin with a short presentation of a widely held view about the role (...) played by truth-expressions. I then contrast the Wittgensteinian conception of grammar with that of linguistics. I sketch Frege’s, Wittgenstein’s, Prior’s and Brandom’s central ideas regarding the issue under consideration. As a further step, I investigate the role of truth-expressions by examining several sentences in which they occur, and discuss objections to the proposed analysis. On my approach, truth expressions play the role of a predicate only when applied to sentences, and in all other cases function as operators. One advantage of such a position is that it enables a dissolution of the problem of truth-bearers: where truth-expressions are operators, the issue simply does not arise, and where they are predicates, it is sentences that are the truth-bearers. (shrink)

The aim of the article is to describe the myth of femme fatale. Starting from popular culture and ending with the representatives of archaic cultures, the author tries to indicate the women who are described in patriarchal narratives as those who bring men to defeat and ruin. An important figure for the whole argument is Lilith, who, according to Jewish legends, was the first wife of Adam. Lilith was erased from the biblical tradition because she opposed her partner and turned (...) away from God. She has become the female archetype of sin, the symbol of sexual vampirism and the rejection of motherhood. All these features make up the femme fatale syndrome. (shrink)

Faces of liberalism: formation of a Christian liberal community in Krakow: The aim of the essay is to show the birth of the Kraków liberal community in the years 1977–1980. An attempt is made to reconstruct the main ideological assumptions of the liberal entourage in the context of the opposition activities of Robert Kaczmarek and Mirosław Dzielski. The author refers to the main events occurring in this period, such as the establishment of the Prywatna Inicjatywa Krakowska and the magazine Merkuryusz (...) Krakowski i Światowy, as well as paying special attention to the program texts that were published in it. The article also contains a reconstruction of the debate aimed at classifying the views presented by Mirosław Dzielski. (shrink)

p-consequence (plausible consequence; see [2]) allows for a formulation of non-deductive reasonings, i.e., such where the conclusion has weaker justification then assumptions and thus when added to the set of assumptions results in its extension. But theoretical modesty of p-consequence operation does not tell the difference between “good” and “worse” conclusions. Therefore the bisconsequence is introduced.

p-consequence is intended as a formalization of non-deductive reasoning. So far semantical or general properties have been presented more thoroughly ([2]–[5]). In the present paper we would like to focus on its syntactic properties.

Freedom of contract and corrective justice are considered to be the basic principles governing contract law. However, many contemporary legal orders implement various policy goals into private law. The regulatory private law of the European Union is the most striking example of such a trend. This article aims at reconciling the corrective justice theory of private law and the principle of freedom of contract with the regulatory dimension of the EU law. The main argument is that the meaning of the (...) concept of harm, one that is crucial to the principle of corrective justice, should be understood broadly so that it can transform the corrective justice theory from a monistic one into a pluralistic one. (shrink)

The use of assisted reproductive technology is becoming more and more common nowadays and the procedures that a few years ago would be seen as experimental have now become basic benefits. The present text covers the issues of risks and conflicts faced by family members and related with the use of technology in the process of conceiving and giving birth to a child. The authors pay special attention to the possible use of foreign germ cells in the conception of a (...) child. The article aims to demonstrate that the use of modern and advanced medical technology in health care in the field of medically assisted procreation may be seen as a benefit for the family, which satisfies the desire to have a child, but in the long run it may give rise to legal or psychological problems as well. The authors examine the draft on the infertility treatment. (shrink)

The topic of the article is the distinction between descriptions of facts and their evaluation. This distinction is of interest to both in philosophy and in the theory of journalism. The article considers one of the assumptions supporting the view that journalists should clearly separate descriptions of facts from their assessment - the assumption that descriptions of facts can be separated from their evaluation. I present various interpretations of this assumption. I point out the existence of a relationship between the (...) thesis of the possibility of separating descriptions from assessments and the belief that descriptions of facts are by their very nature objective, while assessments or valuations are subjective, and then I proceed to criticize the latter conviction. These arguments are not intended to undermine the distinction between descriptions of facts and their evaluation. What I am trying to undermine are the metaphysical justifications and interpretations of this distinction. (shrink)

One of the awesome things about Avatar: The Last Airbender ( ATLA ) is the attention given to non‐human animals in their different relationships to humans. This chapter focuses broadly on what interactions with animals in ATLA can tell us about humans. Character development and personal growth are key features of ATLA, and the best example of constant learning is definitely Sokka, though Aang has something to teach us too. Sokka's relation to animals here is simple: he's a hunter and (...) animals are food. In short, we can learn from ATLA that when it comes to human–animal relations we should think more critically about our interactions with animals. Sokka demonstrates how contact with animals can encourage one to develop such empathy and thereby re‐think how “natural” it really is to use animals as we please. (shrink)

In this paper I want to point out the multifaceted impact of utilitarianism as well as pragmatism, applied as the unified philosophy of environmental protection. Special attention is paid to the utilitarian aspect of Marxism, and a continuous, comprehensive case study from Poland – in the context of European economic realities – serves as an example of social receptionof the utilitarian paradigm in contemporary environmental protection policy.

The contour of a family of filters along a filter is a set-theoretic lower limit. Topologicity and regularity of convergences can be characterized with the aid of the contour operation. Contour inversion is studied, in particular, for iterated contours of sequential cascades. A related problem of continuous extension of maps between maximal elements of sequential cascades to full subcascades is solved in full generality.

An erotetic calculus for a given logic constitutes a sequent-style proof-theoretical formalization of the logic grounded in Inferential Erotetic Logic ). In this paper, a new erotetic calculus for Classical Propositional Logic ), dual with respect to the existing ones, is given. We modify the calculus to obtain complete proof systems for the propositional part of paraconsistent logic CLuN and its extensions CLuNs and mbC. The method is based on dual resolution. Moreover, the resolution rule is non-clausal. According to the (...) authors knowledge, this is the first account of resolution for mbC. Last but not least, as the method is grounded in IEL, it constitutes an important tool for the so-called question-processing. (shrink)

Assume that there is no quasi-measurable cardinal not greater than 2ω. We show that for a c. c. c. σ -ideal [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I] with a Borel base of subsets of an uncountable Polish space, if [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A] is a point-finite family of subsets from [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I], then there is a subfamily of [MATHEMATICAL SCRIPT CAPITAL A] whose union is completely nonmeasurable, i.e. its intersection with every non-small Borel set does not belong to the σ (...) -field generated by Borel sets and the ideal [MATHEMATICAL DOUBLE-STRUCK CAPITAL I]. This result is a generalization of the Four Poles Theorem and a result from [3]. (shrink)

The COVID-19 pandemic caused university education to transition from face-to-face contacts to virtual learning environments. Young adults were forced to live an entirely new life online, without valuable and enjoyable social interaction. We examined subjective perspectives towards life online during the pandemic. We identified four viewpoints about life mediated by computers. Two viewpoints express “struggling”: Viewpoint 1 (Angry, Depressed and Overwhelmed), and Viewpoint 3 (Restricted to and Overwhelmed by Virtuality). A third feeling-state conveys experiences of “surviving”: Viewpoint 4 (Isolated and (...) Powerless in Convenience). Surprisingly, Viewpoint 2 is about “thriving” (Comfortable and Convenient Routine with Computers). The research shows that virtualization, confinement, and anxiety are taking a toll on the mental health of some members of the younger generation, while at the same time other members feel they are thriving in a situation of limited resources, virtuality, and reduced face-to-face human interaction. (shrink)

Stereotype accuracy is a contentious topic. Part of the problem is that typically stereotypes are generic statements whose truth status is unclear due to the fact that they are ill-defined quantitatively. The article focuses on the epistemic aspect of stereotypical beliefs. In the ongoing debate, I side with those who argue against stereotypes being wrong or inaccurate by virtue of definition alone. I propose that, when possible, stereotype accuracy should be assessed in probabilistic terms by inspecting how likely a generic (...) statement is to be true when applied to individual representative of the relevant group. This approach applies equally well to investigating the actual and the perceived accuracy of stereotypes. (shrink)

Recenzja książki: J. Fodor, M. Piattelli-Palmarini, _Błąd Darwina_, Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN 2018.

In one of his papers, Moti Mizrahi argues that arguments from an expert opinion are weak arguments. His thesis may seem controversial due to the consensus on this topic in the field of informal logic. I argue that its controversy is framework-dependent, and if translated into a different framework, it appears to be a correct, however trivial, claim. I will use a framework based on Douglas Walton’s argumentation scheme theory and his conception of examination dialogue to demonstrate that it is (...) so. It appears that Mizrahi’s idiosyncratic framework provides an excessively restrictive conception of an argument from expert opinion than Walton’s scheme does. There is no quarrel between both frameworks, as they yield analogous, almost identical, outcomes of argument evaluation. The actual and crucial disagreement is on the topic of argument classification. Mizrahi’s conception of arguments from an expert opinion imposes exact conditions that such argument must fulfil: an expert’s opinion o truth-value must be unknown; o must be unsupported by any evidence; an expert’s peers neither accept o nor reject it. These exclude, by definition, every possible strong, in Walton’s terms, variant of such an argument. Therefore, if rephrased with the notions of the examination dialogue framework, Mizrahi’s thesis sounds as follows: weak arguments from expert opinion are weak arguments. (shrink)

This paper aims to present how logic may undermine a parliamentary assault on democratic institutions based on the analysis conducted with reference to the so-called Polish constitutional crisis. I analyse whether a law can be reviewed on the basis of this law itself. The Polish Constitutional Tribunal faced such a problem while passing the verdict of 9th March, 2016, regarding the constitutionality of the amendment to the Statute on the Constitutional Tribunal from 22nd December, 2015. This problem, called a ‘verdict (...) paradox’, was claimed to be a type of the Liar paradox. I argue that, contrary to the common view, the problem of the verdict paradox is not based on the Liar paradox; for this purpose, a logical analysis is applied to four variants of a reasoning with regard to the constitutionality of the said amendment. The distinction between two levels of analysis concerning emerging reasonings, namely an abstract level and a concrete level placed in the context of the legal system, is also introduced. This paper demonstrates that although only two variants of the reasoning concerning a law’s judicial review based on the law itself involve logical contradiction, the possibility of employing reasonings from other variants must be excluded, albeit due to alternative reasons. Therefore, the Constitutional Tribunal’s decision to avoid the verdict paradox by passing over the reviewed provisions in the review process was correct and might be perceived as an example of how logic and reason can defend the institutional guarantees of political freedom. (shrink)

In my paper I present David Hume's philosophy from the perspective of Charles Sanders Peirce's theory of signs. I argue that by interpreting impressions and ideas as iconic signs it is possible to avoid many inconsistencies in Hume's philosophy. Apart from that it makes possible to avoid Hume's scepticism about the existence of the external world by introducing Peirce's concept of the dynamic and immediate object. What is more, the generative structure of signs helps us to deal with the "gmissing (...) shade of blue" problem. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to present two natural deduction systems for Intuitionistic Sentential Calculus with Identity ( ISCI ); a syntactically motivated \(\mathsf {ND}^1_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\) and a semantically motivated \(\mathsf {ND}^2_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\). The formulation of \(\mathsf {ND}^1_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\) is based on the axiomatic formulation of ISCI. Its rules cannot be straightforwardly classified as introduction or elimination rules; ISCI -specific rules are based on axioms characterizing the identity connective. The system does not enjoy the standard subformula property, but due (...) to the normalization procedure non-subformulas can label only leaves of proofs. In \(\mathsf {ND}^2_{\mathsf {ISCI}}\), we propose only two general identity-related rules, in reference to the treatment of the identity connective in First-Order Logic. (shrink)

Using “big data” from sensors worn continuously outside the lab, researchers have observed patterns of objective physiology that challenge some of the long-standing theoretical concepts of emotion and its measurement. One challenge is that emotional arousal, when measured as sympathetic nervous system activation through electrodermal activity, can sometimes differ significantly across the two halves of the upper body. We show that traditional measures on only one side may lead to misjudgment of arousal. This article presents daily life and controlled study (...) data, as well as existing evidence from neuroscience, supporting the influence of multiple emotional substrates in the brain causing innervation on different sides of the body. We describe how a theory of multiple arousals explains the asymmetric EDA findings. (shrink)

The liar paradox is still an open philosophical problem. Most contemporary answers to the paradox target the logical principles underlying the reasoning from the liar sentence to the paradoxical conclusion that the liar sentence is both true and false. In contrast to these answers, Buddhist epistemology offers resources to devise a distinctively epistemological approach to the liar paradox. In this paper, I mobilise these resources and argue that the liar sentence is what Buddhist epistemologists call a contradiction with one’s own (...) words. I situate my argument in the works of Dignāga and Dharmakīrti and show how Buddhist epistemology answers the paradox. (shrink)

In the article the author rejects traditional, logical interpretation of the famous “Is-Ought Paragraph” from David Hume’s A Treatise of Human Nature. He argues that most of the interpreters failed to grasp the wide philosophical background of the IsOP, which is, generally speaking, a passionate discussion between ethical rationalists and ethical anti-rationalists in the 17th and 18th century British philosophy. The author shows that the Hume’s main aim in the IsOP is to strengthen his previous arguments against ethical rationalism and (...) to reinforce (and not subvert at all) the common-sense (vulgar) systems of morality, likewise he did in the first book of the Treatise… in case of the theory of knowledge. The author argues that there is no putative thesis of logic in the IsOP, which some scholars call “Hume’s Law”. (shrink)

Despite the general agreement that the interdisciplinary model of physical education (PE), based on the incorporation of core academic subjects into the PE curriculum, stimulates the holistic development of students, there is still a lack of methods for its implementation. Therefore, Eduball was created, i.e., a method that uses educational balls with printed letters, numbers, and other signs. Numerous studies have shown that children participating in activities with Eduballs can develop their physical fitness while simultaneously improving their academic performance, particularly (...) in math and language, including some writing skills. However, little is known about the effects of Eduball on children’s graphomotor skills, which are key for the academic performance of students throughout the entire schooling process. Here, we investigate whether 6-month participation in PE with Eduball stimulates graphomotor skills in primary school students, such as drawing prehandwriting letter patterns on unlined or lined paper and rewriting text on unlined or lined paper. Our results show that the Eduball class (N= 28) significantly improved these skills compared to the control class (N= 26) participating in traditional PE. For example, students from the experimental group wrote with a lower pen pressure and better stability of the line, in contrast to those from the control group. Therefore, this study demonstrates that the Eduball method successfully supports teachers in developing graphomotor skills in children. More broadly, our findings make clear once again that there is the need to integrate physical and cognitive development in education, which can be achieved by using an interdisciplinary model of PE. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to compare the role played by logical analysis in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus logico-philosophicus and Russell’s On Denoting. Whereas in Russell’s work it is an important element of his argument in support of description theory, in his pupil’s it does not function this way. Russell, while analysing various propositions, including descriptions translates them into formal language, indicating that those propositions, despite the appearances, in fact do not denote. Logical analysis shall be a tool decisive in favour (...) of Russell’s thesis. Wittgenstein similarly analyses some troublesome propositions and claims that they are meaningless. The difference is that Russell’s final conclusion is derived from logical analysis, whereas Wittgenstein’s from pure speculation. In Tractatus logico-philosophicus logical analysis is not a method thanks to which the author gets certain result, just as it was the case with his teacher and his On Denoting. In Wittgenstein’s early philosophy logical analysis concerns just a few technical problems connected only to some ideas from Principia mathematica, and not to the main subject of his work, which is the analysis of philosophical theses. (shrink)

Wittgenstein introduced his claim about colour incompatibility originally in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus , where he stated that there could be only one colour in one place and time. It is commonly believed that Wittgenstein abandoned his conception of logical atomism when he realized the consequences of this claim. The aim of this article is to provide an interpretation of the colour incompatibility claim in terms of Wittgenstein’s phenomenology. I will focus on two works of great significance for the claim: Some (...) Remarks on Logical Form and Philosophical Remarks . These two works were written between 1929 and 1930, which is the beginning of the “middle period” in Wittgenstein’s philosophy. I will focus not only on Wittgenstein’s formulation of the colour incompatibility claim, but also on how this claim was justified. The explanation of Wittgenstein’s justification of this claim will help to understand his phenomenology and theory of philosophical grammar. (shrink)