Quelle fonction aidante le couple sollicite-t-il du thérapeute? Demande-t-il une aide à la réparation, une aide à la séparation? Qu’est-ce qu’un couple vient nouer ou dénouer avec le thérapeute? Comment se dénoue une thérapie? Une thérapie conjugale se termine quand s’atteint l’objectif contractualisé. La fin est impliquée dans le commencement. D’où l’intérêt pour le thérapeute de ne pas imposer ses propres finalités, sa propre idée du dénouement.

Schürmann a conçu son projet philosophique comme un sauvetage des phénomènes. Car ceux-ci sont menacés à la fois par les principes logiques qui les déterminent et par leur propre précarité ontologique. Toutefois le principe n’a-t-il pas en lui-même un pouvoir phénoménalisant? Le phénomène lui-même en sa singularité n’est-il pas si intimement marqué par la négativité qu’il peine à apparaître? On propose donc d’interroger le diasozein ta phainomena de Schürmann en sauvant le sauvetage lui-même du risque d’une dissolution des phénomènes par (...) eux-mêmes et sous les principes. (shrink)

Myth and the spatial organization of the City: The case of Tanagra. How does Myth participate in the shaping of the different kinds of space constituing a city, whether it be in the definition of its eschatiai or in the determination of the many internal relations that link together its centre, its chora and its limits? I propose here a case study focussed on Pausanias’ description of Tanagra in Boiotia, locating the descriptive content of the text within its wider generic (...) logic. Pausanias’ panhellenic, if not “oikoumenic”, understanding of Myth is active in producing specific memorial topographies. In the case of Tanagra, the text reconstructs the space of the city from a selection of schematized epichoric traditions, outlining the ways in which local myths embody the city’s cohesion on the grounds of the diverse categories of space implied in the narratives. The discrepancies between what the myths are telling and the effective ritual practices call into question the partaking of Myth and Rite in the structuring of civic space.Comment le mythe contribue-t-il à organiser les espaces différenciés d’une cité, le statut de ses eschatia, les rapports entre centres, chora et limites ? L’œuvre de Pausa­nias, entre témoignage et logique périégétique, propose une certaine pratique du mythe, panhellénique sinon « oikouménique », qui produit des topographies mémorielles spécifi­ques. Elle reconstruit l’espace d’une petite cité béotienne, Tanagra, à partir de traditions épicho­riques dont elle schématise les structures, laissant transparaître les manières dont le mythe articule la relation entre la cité, ses dieux et son territoire, dont il définit les qualités des espaces qu’il met en jeu, montagne, littoral, remparts… Entre ce que « disent » les mythes – l’aition d’une fête par exemple – et ce qu’opère la pratique rituelle, des écarts se font jour qui obligent à interroger la part respective du mythe et du rite dans la structuration de l’espace. Cette étude de cas vise à montrer la valeur opératoire de la notion de mythe au sein des processus par lesquels une cité grecque, communauté d’hommes et de dieux liés par des rites, s’approprie symboliquement l’espace sur lequel elle est établie. (shrink)

La loi, dans la pensée politique de Rousseau, engage nécessairement une détermination du citoyen et de la démocratie. Cette caractéristique ne repose pas seulement sur l'affirmation de la souveraineté du peuple, mais bien plutôt sur une double définition paradoxale de la citoyenneté. En effet, Rousseau fonde la loi sur la nécessité de citoyens silencieux. Sous cet aspect, l'État rousseauiste se présente sous le trait d'une communauté de promeneurs solitaires, où la vie et l'opinion publiques semblent être absentes. Mais Rousseau dégage, (...) notamment dans les Lettres écrites de la montagne , une autre caractéristique du citoyen fondée sur la nécessité d'une communication des citoyens, devant former, comme l'affirme Rousseau « la voix du public ». A partir de cette détermination d'un citoyen à la fois silencieux et loquace, notre problème est : pourquoi Rousseau sollicite-t-il ces deux déterminations de la citoyenneté pour caractériser la loi ?The law, in Rousseau's political thought necessarily involves a definition of the citizen and of democracy. This isn't only founded on the assertion of the sovereignty of the people, but also on the double paradoxical definition of citizenship. Indeed, Rousseau founds the law on the necessity of silent citizens. In this regard, Rousseau's State takes the shape of a community of solitary walkers who seem to be devoid of any public life and opinion. But Rousseau draws, notably in the Lettres écrites de la montagne another characteristic of the citizen, founded on the necessity for citizen to communicate. And this communication is for Rousseau “the voice of the public”. From this definition of the citizen as both silent and loquacious, our problem is now why Rousseau solicits these two determinations of citizenship to found the law? (shrink)

The book covers scientific and philosophical topics by bringing them closer to literature. Some topics are scientific explanation, the concept of cause, rational argumentation, pseudoscience, language, ethics, philosophy of mind, posthumanism, and democracy. Summary Prefazione di Severino Saccardi. Introduzione. Capitolo 1: Le scrivanie di Eddington. 1.1. Il vecchio Qfwfq (I. Calvino. Le cosmicomiche). 1.2. L’assassino invisibile (L.F. Celine, Il dottor Semmelweis). 1.3. Gli gnommeri di Ingravallo (C.E. Gadda, Quer pasticciaccio brutto de via Merulana). 1.4. I sergenti di Napoleone (L. Tolstoj, (...) Guerra e pace). 1.5. Tex e il Coyote nero (G. Bonelli, Il Coyote nero). 1.6. “Elementare Watson!” (A.C. Doyle, Il segno dei quattro). Capitolo 2. Non saranno mai delusi. 2.1. L’albero di Natale. (V. Perrin, Cambiare l’acqua ai fiori). 2.2. Il dagherrotipo di Buendia. (G.G. Marquez, Cent’anni di solitudine). 2.3. Don Ferrante e la peste. (A. Manzoni, I promessi sposi). Capitolo 3. Capitolo puffo. 3.1. L’Accademia di Lagado. (J. Swift, I viaggi di Gulliver). 3.2. Bruto è uomo d’onore. (W. Shakespeare, Giulio Cesare). 3.3. Le oche mute. (G. Orwell, 1984). Capitolo 4. “Quarantadue!” 4.1. Lo zio N’Ba N’Ga. (I. Calvino, Le cosmicomiche). 4.2. La mosca cocchiera. (J. de La Fontaine, Favole). 4.3. Il fiore del dr. Dek. (E. Salgari, Le meraviglie del Duemila). Capitolo 5. L’ultimo uomo. 5.1. La pernice accusatrice. (Cyrano de Bergerac, Gli stati e gli imperi del Sole). 5.2. Pallino in via Mjasnickaja. (M.A. Bulgakov, Cuore di cane). Capitolo 6. Scenari perturbanti. 6.1. Dissipatio. (G. Morselli, Dissipatio H.G.). 6.2. Un mammifero meccanizzato. (S. Butler, Erewhon). 6.3. Mlle Olimpia. (E.T.A. Hoffmann, Racconti notturni). Capitolo 7. La gente perbene. 7.1. La balena bianca. (H. Melville, Moby Dick). 7.2. Betsabea Everdeene. (T. Hardy, Via dalla pazza folla). 7.3. Un’idea francese. (C. McCarthy, Cavalli selvaggi). 7.4. Le montagne del Montana. (D. Delillo, Rumore bianco). (shrink)

En allant sur les traces sublimes des paysages de Nietzsche à Sils-Maria, Michel Onfray propose une généalogie géologique de sa pensée : les montagnes et les lacs sont, entre les avalanches, les lieux où naît le surhomme qui n'est pas une figure politique mais une figure éthique. Chacun, et chacune, peut être surhomme, il suffit pour ce faire de savoir ce qu'est le réel, de le vouloir et de l'aimer, ce qui conduit à une joie à la portée de tous. (...) Contre les usages fascistes ou gauchistes de Nietzsche, Michel Onfray propose la sagesse antique réactualisée par le philosophe allemand pour nos temps postchrétiens."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Abū al-Ḥajj¿j Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Ibn Ṭumlūs (Alhagiag Bin Thalmus, d. 620/1223) was a philosopher, physician and direct disciple of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198), who lived and practiced rational sciences in Alzira and Marrakesh, a quarter of a century after the demise of his teacher. Ibn Ṭumlūs was not Ibn Rushd's only student who engaged in work on logic, but one of dozens of disciples, suggesting that the supposed simultaneous death of the latter's philosophy is "grossly exaggerated". As a (...) valuable window into the practice of logic in 13th century al-Andalus and the Maghreb, Ibn Ṭumlūs' Compendium on Logic (Al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-manṭiq) covers all the parts of "the expanded Organon", as it was known since al-F¿r¿bī (d. 339/951). The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of this work, with an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices. (shrink)

In spite of their drastically different historical trajectories, the ongoing socio-political transition in the European Union (EU) and the Indian Republic (IR), two of the most complex polities in contemporary world, suggests that they aspire to combine political federalism and cultural pluralism. This is evident from their endorsing equality, identity and inclusivity as values; implementing political decentralization and facilitating differentiation between state, civil society and market. To meet the emerging challenges both the EU and the IR endorse the idea of (...) unity in diversity. The article suggests that two coping strategies, transforming cultural diversity (a fact) into cultural pluralism (a value) and decoupling the identities of citizenship and nationality are imperatives. (shrink)

In this book we provide a collection of writing by eminent scholars in our field, in which we asked them to engage with the thoughts of many of the philosophers and theorists who have influenced thinking and practice about young children and their care and education. Some readers may feel their favourite philosopher or theorist has been omitted or been given little space but we do not claim the Handbook is comprehensive – there is always more to say, more to (...) write about. Further, it would be impossible to provide a real introduction to the vast and exciting discipline of Philosophy, which includes a number of different areas of study. (shrink)

I am not so insular and I hope not so presumptuous as to suppose that there is no contemporary philosophy apart from that empiricism which dominates very much of Great Britain, North America and Scandinavia. So let us notice that contemporary philosophy embraces broadly three points of view, though it will be part of my argument that they largely combine in the lessons they have to teach us, and in many of their implications for theology.

In his investigation of the concept of "Being", Aristotle relates the question of "existence" to the question "essence" and considers essence as "whatness" and quiddity. Although in his logical discussions he treats the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" separately and makes a distinction between them, but does not extend this distinction to the area of philosophical topics. But in the prepatetic Islamic system of Philosophy, explanation and distinction between "Being" and "quidity" is without doubt one of the most fundamental philosophical (...) doctrines and beliefs. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the theory of metaphysical distinction between being and essence has been attributed to Ibn Sina, but it is Farabi who for the first time has propounded clearly and decisively a two – part division between "being" and "quiddity" and has prepared the way for Avecinian philosophy. In addition to his logical distinction between "existence" and "whatness" of things he has stressed on a metaphysical distinction between them and has made this distinction the foundation of his metaphysical system. From Farabi's view, being is an inherent accident of quiddity. In this article we try to explain the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" of things and their relation as one of the most fundamental topics in prepatetic philosophy in the philosophical thought of these two great prepatetic philosophers, ie Aristotle and Farabi, with specific stress on comparing their views. (shrink)

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

T. A. Roberts; III—Morality and Divine Commands, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 June 1968, Pages 49–62, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tiny Person, Big ImpactT.S. MoranI met J on a Tuesday, the second day of my new job as the pediatric oncology social worker. Five days later, he died.Although J was 8 months old, he seemed tiny, like a preemie. When I saw him, he was snuggled into the shoulder of the attending physician. It was evident that one of his diagnoses was failure to thrive. He also had what (...) was thought to be a low-grade glioma of the optic pathway, and despite months of treatment, he was declining. It was clear that the team cared for J very much. They visited him, held him, played with him, and sang lullabies to him in Spanish. I was so impressed by their compassion.J had spent about half of his short life at the hospital. He was born prematurely to a young mother, herself in foster care. His mother had numerous obstacles preventing her from visiting often and it did not seem that she bonded well with him. J's mother stated that her boyfriend discouraged her from visiting. She did not have transportation and declined offers of hospital-funded Uber rides. She had little prenatal care or education about becoming a mother.J's mother seemed guarded in her interactions; hesitant to reveal anything that might show her vulnerability. The team was frustrated as it seemed she was not receptive to their efforts. The team was also concerned that she did not fully understand J's condition due to her poor health literacy, despite the use of a certified language interpreter. Still, when she did visit, she was kind and caring and stated that she did not want her foster mother involved in providing J's care.Part of my job was to help prepare the family for discharge to home. I had been speaking to their caseworker from Child Protective Services. She was a strong advocate for both mother and baby. After several meetings with the team that included J's mother and the caseworker, J's mother accepted his prognosis. She was willing to provide care at home with hospice support. She came to the unit several times that week to receive training about his care needs. The hospice nursing visit was scheduled, and J and his mother left the hospital on a Friday.The caseworker called on Monday to tell us that J had passed away peacefully on Sunday. The reaction on the unit was palpable. New residents and seasoned chiefs were teary-eyed and sighing. To some, it seemed like a relief. Given the team's extraordinary care and concern shown to this family, I was not surprised by their emotions.What surprised me was my level of grief. I had spent the 12 years prior serving adult hospice patients; I understood end-of-life care and death's eventuality. I thought I was well prepared. This experience was different from my past. I was able to cope with an adult patient's passing without much distress, accepting that most adults had lived a full life.I felt grief for the team who had invested in J, and for his short life filled with illness and pain. I felt grief for his mother, who had experienced a horrific childhood, had lost her innocence too young, and had been robbed of the opportunity to experience joyful parenting. [End Page 82]The chief recognized the team's need for support and quickly organized a "debriefing." A lot of the team participated, even those who only had brief contact with J. Everyone had a chance to reflect on their experience in caring for this child. Because of my hospice training, I was included. I validated their loss, their efforts, and their love for J. I provided basic grief education, enumerating their possible reactions of sadness, anger, frustration, fatigue, confusion, or numbness, and this helped me to feel like I also contributed to his care. I encouraged self-care—from taking time off, to lingering over an extra cup of tea, to speaking about their experience with me or another social worker.When I spoke about my feelings to my coworkers, they were understanding and acknowledged... (shrink)

Dada continues to attract a small following among scholars, but has perhaps not yet been recognized as providing invaluable insight into the underlying functions and potentials of culture generally. This article explores the nature and theoretical import of Dada, and two radically different visions of culture as they might try to accommodate and explain Dada. Models of culture taken from Bourdieu and Nietzsche are brought to bear, first on Dada, and then on each other, with the aim of developing a (...) theoretically informed understanding of Dada, and also demonstrating the practical, political and philosophical difficulties involved in choosing between a conflict model of culture and an `existential' model. Ultimately, both models are found to be helpful but insufficient at providing an adequate account of Dada, and it is suggested that present models of cultural analysis can benefit by revisiting both Dada and Nietzsche, trying to incorporate their insights and critically evaluate their visions of culture. (shrink)