Among many reasons for which contemporary philosophers take coherentism in epistemology seriously, the most important is probably the perceived inadequacy of alternative accounts, most notably misgivings about foundationalism. But coherentism also receives straightforward support from cases in which beliefs are apparently justified by their coherence. From the perspective of those against coherentism, this means that an explanation is needed as to why in these cases coherence apparently justifies beliefs. Curiously, this task has not been carried out in a serious way (...) in the anti-coherentist literature although there is no scarcity of objections to coherentism. The traditional charge has been that justification by coherence is circular. More recently the isolation problem allegedly reveals that coherentism justifies beliefs that should not be justified. Questions have also been raised with respect to the basing relation and feasibility.1 However, these objections do not explain why some beliefs appear to be justified by their coherence. This paper fills this gap in the anti-coherentist literature by offering a noncoherentist account of justification by coherence. The paper proceeds as follows. Section I delineates the framework of discussion and develops some conceptual tools needed in later analyses. Section II argues that there are genuine cases of an increase in existing empirical justification by coherence, but that it does not require coherence to generate additional justification—coherence serves as a channel of justification among beliefs, which is no more problematic than channeling of justification from basic to derived beliefs in foundationalism. Section III makes a stronger case for justification by coherence, where each of the coherent beliefs has no independent empirical justification; but Section IV argues that even in these cases coherence need not generate justification—coherence licenses the channeling of justification from outside sources.. (shrink)

In response to a collection of essays in Jonathan Kvanvig's (1996) Warrant in Contemporary Epistemology: Essays in Honor of Plantinga's Theory of Knowledge, Alvin Plantinga notices that certain Gettier-style examples undermine his (1993b) canonical account of epistemic warrant as delineated in Warrant and Proper Function. In hopes to clarify how his account survives Gettier's purchase, he (1996; 2000) argues that a belief has warrant sufficient for knowledge only when produced in a favorable cognitive mini-environment. In Warranted Christian Belief Plantinga (2000) (...) specifies a condition required for a cognitive mini-environment's favorability. I argue that this condition falls prey to counterexample. Then I investigate a possible solution, which I reason fails as well. (shrink)

This paper develops a normative evaluation of the minimum wage in the light of recent evidence and theory about its effects. It argues that the minimum wage should be evaluated using a consequentialist criterion that gives priority to the jobs and incomes of the worst off. This criterion would be accepted by many different types of consequentialism, especially given the two major views about what the minimum wage does. One is that the minimum wage harms the jobs and incomes of (...) the worst off and the other is that it does neither much harm nor much good. The paper then argues at length that there are no important considerations besides jobs and incomes relevant to the assessment of the minimum wage. It criticizes exploitation arguments for the minimum wage. It is not clear that the minimum wage would reduce exploitation and the paper doubts that, if it did, it would do so in a morally significant way. The paper then criticizes freedom arguments against the minimum wage by rejecting appeals to self-ownership and freedom of contract and by arguing that no freedom of significance is lost by the minimum wage that is not already taken account of in the main consequentialist criterion. The conclusion is that, at worst, the minimum wage is a mistake and, at best, something to be half-hearted about. Footnotes1 My thanks to Paul Brown and Jerry Cohen for their written and verbal help, Andrew Williams for long discussions of this paper, two anonymous referees and the editors, and audiences at the Universities of Auckland, Newcastle, and Reading. (shrink)

Abū al-Ḥajj¿j Yūsuf b. Muḥammad Ibn Ṭumlūs (Alhagiag Bin Thalmus, d. 620/1223) was a philosopher, physician and direct disciple of Ibn Rushd (Averroes, d. 595/1198), who lived and practiced rational sciences in Alzira and Marrakesh, a quarter of a century after the demise of his teacher. Ibn Ṭumlūs was not Ibn Rushd's only student who engaged in work on logic, but one of dozens of disciples, suggesting that the supposed simultaneous death of the latter's philosophy is "grossly exaggerated". As a (...) valuable window into the practice of logic in 13th century al-Andalus and the Maghreb, Ibn Ṭumlūs' Compendium on Logic (Al-Mukhtaṣar fī al-manṭiq) covers all the parts of "the expanded Organon", as it was known since al-F¿r¿bī (d. 339/951). The present volume offers a complete critical Arabic edition of this work, with an English and Arabic introduction, notes and indices. (shrink)

In spite of their drastically different historical trajectories, the ongoing socio-political transition in the European Union (EU) and the Indian Republic (IR), two of the most complex polities in contemporary world, suggests that they aspire to combine political federalism and cultural pluralism. This is evident from their endorsing equality, identity and inclusivity as values; implementing political decentralization and facilitating differentiation between state, civil society and market. To meet the emerging challenges both the EU and the IR endorse the idea of (...) unity in diversity. The article suggests that two coping strategies, transforming cultural diversity (a fact) into cultural pluralism (a value) and decoupling the identities of citizenship and nationality are imperatives. (shrink)

I am not so insular and I hope not so presumptuous as to suppose that there is no contemporary philosophy apart from that empiricism which dominates very much of Great Britain, North America and Scandinavia. So let us notice that contemporary philosophy embraces broadly three points of view, though it will be part of my argument that they largely combine in the lessons they have to teach us, and in many of their implications for theology.

In his investigation of the concept of "Being", Aristotle relates the question of "existence" to the question "essence" and considers essence as "whatness" and quiddity. Although in his logical discussions he treats the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" separately and makes a distinction between them, but does not extend this distinction to the area of philosophical topics. But in the prepatetic Islamic system of Philosophy, explanation and distinction between "Being" and "quidity" is without doubt one of the most fundamental philosophical (...) doctrines and beliefs. In the history of Islamic philosophy, the theory of metaphysical distinction between being and essence has been attributed to Ibn Sina, but it is Farabi who for the first time has propounded clearly and decisively a two – part division between "being" and "quiddity" and has prepared the way for Avecinian philosophy. In addition to his logical distinction between "existence" and "whatness" of things he has stressed on a metaphysical distinction between them and has made this distinction the foundation of his metaphysical system. From Farabi's view, being is an inherent accident of quiddity. In this article we try to explain the concepts of "existence" and "whatness" of things and their relation as one of the most fundamental topics in prepatetic philosophy in the philosophical thought of these two great prepatetic philosophers, ie Aristotle and Farabi, with specific stress on comparing their views. (shrink)

Byzantine Empire; economic and social conditions; history.

T. A. Roberts; III—Morality and Divine Commands, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 June 1968, Pages 49–62, https://doi.org/10.1093/.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Tiny Person, Big ImpactT.S. MoranI met J on a Tuesday, the second day of my new job as the pediatric oncology social worker. Five days later, he died.Although J was 8 months old, he seemed tiny, like a preemie. When I saw him, he was snuggled into the shoulder of the attending physician. It was evident that one of his diagnoses was failure to thrive. He also had what (...) was thought to be a low-grade glioma of the optic pathway, and despite months of treatment, he was declining. It was clear that the team cared for J very much. They visited him, held him, played with him, and sang lullabies to him in Spanish. I was so impressed by their compassion.J had spent about half of his short life at the hospital. He was born prematurely to a young mother, herself in foster care. His mother had numerous obstacles preventing her from visiting often and it did not seem that she bonded well with him. J's mother stated that her boyfriend discouraged her from visiting. She did not have transportation and declined offers of hospital-funded Uber rides. She had little prenatal care or education about becoming a mother.J's mother seemed guarded in her interactions; hesitant to reveal anything that might show her vulnerability. The team was frustrated as it seemed she was not receptive to their efforts. The team was also concerned that she did not fully understand J's condition due to her poor health literacy, despite the use of a certified language interpreter. Still, when she did visit, she was kind and caring and stated that she did not want her foster mother involved in providing J's care.Part of my job was to help prepare the family for discharge to home. I had been speaking to their caseworker from Child Protective Services. She was a strong advocate for both mother and baby. After several meetings with the team that included J's mother and the caseworker, J's mother accepted his prognosis. She was willing to provide care at home with hospice support. She came to the unit several times that week to receive training about his care needs. The hospice nursing visit was scheduled, and J and his mother left the hospital on a Friday.The caseworker called on Monday to tell us that J had passed away peacefully on Sunday. The reaction on the unit was palpable. New residents and seasoned chiefs were teary-eyed and sighing. To some, it seemed like a relief. Given the team's extraordinary care and concern shown to this family, I was not surprised by their emotions.What surprised me was my level of grief. I had spent the 12 years prior serving adult hospice patients; I understood end-of-life care and death's eventuality. I thought I was well prepared. This experience was different from my past. I was able to cope with an adult patient's passing without much distress, accepting that most adults had lived a full life.I felt grief for the team who had invested in J, and for his short life filled with illness and pain. I felt grief for his mother, who had experienced a horrific childhood, had lost her innocence too young, and had been robbed of the opportunity to experience joyful parenting. [End Page 82]The chief recognized the team's need for support and quickly organized a "debriefing." A lot of the team participated, even those who only had brief contact with J. Everyone had a chance to reflect on their experience in caring for this child. Because of my hospice training, I was included. I validated their loss, their efforts, and their love for J. I provided basic grief education, enumerating their possible reactions of sadness, anger, frustration, fatigue, confusion, or numbness, and this helped me to feel like I also contributed to his care. I encouraged self-care—from taking time off, to lingering over an extra cup of tea, to speaking about their experience with me or another social worker.When I spoke about my feelings to my coworkers, they were understanding and acknowledged... (shrink)