[Under contract with CUP, in preparation] What is a mind? Is it possible for a computer or other machine to have a mind? And how would we know? Mental fictionalism offers a new approach to these timely questions. Its central idea is that mental states (thoughts, beliefs, desires) are useful fictions. When we talk about mental states, we should be seen as merely speaking “as if” humans (and perhaps other creatures or even artifacts) had such states, in order to make (...) sense of their behavior. -/- This book is unique in presenting and defending three versions of mental fictionalism in a single volume (prefix-semantical mental fictionalism, pretense mental fictionalism, and affective storyism). The authors are three of the world’s most prominent proponents (respectively) of each variety: T. Parent (Nazarbayev University), Adam Toon (University of Exeter), and Tamás Demeter (Corvinus University of Budapest). The book essentially pits these different varieties of mental fictionalism against each other, allowing the reader to size them up. In the process, fresh perspectives are offered on foundational matters in the philosophy of mind, such as the nature of mental states and folk psychology, as well as hot topics such as embodied cognition, animal cognition, consciousness, and AI. -/- UPDATE: The chapter on prefix-semantical mental fictionalism is available upon request; write to nontology "at" gmail. (shrink)

This paper introduces a logical analysis of convex combinations within the framework of Łukasiewicz real-valued logic. This provides a natural link between the fields of many-valued logics and decision theory under uncertainty, where the notion of convexity plays a central role. We set out to explore such a link by defining convex operators on MV-algebras, which are the equivalent algebraic semantics of Łukasiewicz logic. This gives us a formal language to reason about the expected value of bounded random variables. As (...) an illustration of the applicability of our framework we present a logical version of the Anscombe–Aumann representation result. (shrink)

In an attempt to provide some clarification in the abortion issue it has recently been proposed that since 'brain death' is used to define the end of life, 'brain life' would be a logical demarcation for life's beginning. This paper argues in support of this position, not on empirical grounds, but because of what it reflects of what is valuable about the term 'life'. It is pointed out that 'life' is an ambiguous concept as it is used in English, obscuring (...) the differences between being alive and having a life, a crucial distinction for bioethical questions. The implications of this distinction for the moral debate about abortion are discussed. (shrink)

We characterize, in syntactic terms, the ranges of epimorphisms in an arbitrary class of similar first-order structures. This allows us to strengthen a result of Bacsich, as follows: in any prevariety having at most \ non-logical symbols and an axiomatization requiring at most \ variables, if the epimorphisms into structures with at most \ elements are surjective, then so are all of the epimorphisms. Using these facts, we formulate and prove manageable ‘bridge theorems’, matching the surjectivity of all epimorphisms in (...) the algebraic counterpart of a logic \ with suitable infinitary definability properties of \, while not making the standard but awkward assumption that \ comes furnished with a proper class of variables. (shrink)

It was shown recently that epimorphisms need not be surjective in a variety K of Heyting algebras, but only one counter-example was exhibited in the literature until now. Here, a continuum of such examples is identified, viz. the variety generated by the Rieger-Nishimura lattice, and all of its (locally finite) subvarieties that contain the original counter-example K . It is known that, whenever a variety of Heyting algebras has finite depth, then it has surjective epimorphisms. In contrast, we show that (...) for every integer $n \geq 2$ , the variety of all Heyting algebras of width at most n has a non-surjective epimorphism. Within the so-called Kuznetsov-Gerčiu variety (i.e., the variety generated by finite linear sums of one-generated Heyting algebras), we describe exactly the subvarieties that have surjective epimorphisms. This yields new positive examples, and an alternative proof of epimorphism surjectivity for all varieties of Gödel algebras. The results settle natural questions about Beth-style definability for a range of intermediate logics. (shrink)

Humans and other animals communicate a large quantity of information vocally through nonverbal means. Here, we review the domains of animal vocalizations, human nonverbal vocal communication and computer-mediated communication (CMC), under the common thread of emotion, which, we suggest, connects them as a dimension of all these types of communication. After reviewing the use of emotions across domains, we focus on two concepts that have often been opposed to emotion in the animal versus human communication literature: control and meaning. Non-human (...) vocal communication is commonly described as emotional, preventing either control or meaning; in contrast, the emotional dimension of human nonverbal signals does not prevent them from being perceived as both intentionally produced and meaningful. Amongst others, we disagree with this position, highlighting here that emotions should be integrated across species and modalities such as the written modality. We conclude by delineating ways in which each of these domains can meaningfully influence each other, and debates in their respective fields, and more generally the debate on the evolution of communication. (shrink)

The paper offers a critical response to the proposed “dis/analogy” between the restriction of Jehovah's Witness parental right to refuse life‐saving blood transfusions for their minor children and a “general” and “permanent” ban on “unnecessary” pediatric intersex surgery. The main argument of the analogy is “securing the patient's future autonomy.” Feinberg's theory of rights is used to demonstrate that the proposed analogy is untenable. A new category of developmental rights‐in‐trust is introduced to address specific needs of gender development in DSD (...) situations. Both premises are disputed. First, it is shown that the case of overriding Jehovah's Witness parental rights is not based on securing the patient's future autonomy, but a simple dependency right in Feinberg's theory. Second, it is demonstrated that pediatric intersex surgery is not in the same situation in all morally relevant respects as the Jehovah's Witness case because it represents a special type of developmental right‐in‐trust. In conclusion, the arguments based on the proposed analogy do not justify a “general and permanent” on pediatric intersex surgery. (shrink)

The Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency found in Wonderful Life can be dissected into three premises: palaeontological, macro-evolutionary, and developmental. Discussions of evolutionary contingency have revolved primarily around the developmental. However, a shift in methodological practice and new palaeontological evidence subsequent to the book’s publication appears to threaten the palaeontological premise that asserts high Cambrian disparity, or, roughly, that morphological differences between the Cambrian species were high. This presents a prima facie problem: Did the Cambrian consist of enough anatomical variety (...) to fuel a different outcome upon a replay of the tape of life? I investigate the role that disparity plays in the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency and conclude that the reduced disparity view does not undermine the argument, per se. As for the macro-evolutionary premise, Gould never offers any explicit justification for the idea that species sorting was indiscriminate or ‘lottery-like’ (though he certainly gestures at it). Putting aside the exegetical, I consider certain empirical avenues for underwriting the macro-evolutionary premise and argue that the most plausible route is to appeal to the special status of mass extinctions, a move that is not entirely unfamiliar to macro-evolutionists. That is, mass extinctions can be good sources of contingency due to their being ‘chancy’ in at least three respects. In sum, I update the palaeontological and macro-evolutionary premises as to reconstrue the Gouldian argument for evolutionary contingency in its strongest form. (shrink)

Recently, in Found. Phys. 53: 64 (2023), it has been argued that there is no reality to the PBR theorem. In Found. Phys. 54: 36 (2024), Hofer-Szabó has commented that the argument is flawed and that PBR theorem remains in tact. Here we reply to Hofer-Szabó by showing that his counterargument does not hold up, concluding that the PBR theorem has been disproved.

Hui-yüan was born in Tai hsien of Shansi Province in A. D. 334 and died in A. D. 416.

This paper demonstrates the undecidability of a number of logics with quantification over public announcements: arbitrary public announcement logic, group announcement logic, and coalition announcement logic. In APAL we consider the informative consequences of any announcement, in GAL we consider the informative consequences of a group of agents all of which are simultaneously making known announcements. So this is more restrictive than APAL. Finally, CAL is as GAL except that we now quantify over anything the agents not in that group (...) may announce simultaneously as well. The logic CAL therefore has some features of game logic and of ATL. We show that when there are multiple agents in the language, the satisfiability problem is undecidable for APAL, GAL, and CAL. In the single agent case, the satisfiability problem is decidable for all three logics. (shrink)

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Summary and ConclusionMinutes before the jury would have returned a decision in Kaufman's favor, assessing damages of almost a half-million dollars against the physicians who treated her, she settled out of court for approximately half that sum. I would argue that responsibility in medicine, that liability for malpractice, should be restricted to cases of negligence in which there is no question concerning the proximate causality of the physician's proven negligence to the harm which resulted. It is clear that “negligence” covers (...) a wide range of actions. The solution to this problem lies in the definition of the physician's duties—not in the use of malpractice settlements for the compensation of tragic but accidental consequences whose risks were realistically inevitable or else willfully assumed by the patient as well as the physician. In medicine, there is a strict prima facie duty to know as much as possible. In practice, this approaches an ideal duty. The distinction between an ideal duty and a realistic duty emphasizes the importance of having the patient assume as full responsibility for the risks attendant to inevitable and unforeseeable consequences as the physician. In assessing fault for such consequences, it is essential to recollect that an agent cannot be said to have caused every happenstance which occurs while he acts; moreover, he certainly cannot be held strictly responsible for the cause of every event which succeeds his act. Thus, the primary problem in medical ethics is epistemological rather than normative. (shrink)

The action for a massive particle in special relativity can be expressed as the invariant proper length between the end points. In principle, one should be able to construct the quantum theory for such a system by the path integral approach using this action. On the other hand, it is well known that the dynamics of a free, relativistic, spinless massive particle is best described by a scalar field which is equivalent to an infinite number of harmonic oscillators. We clarify (...) the connection between these two—apparently dissimilar—approaches by obtaining the Green function for the system of oscillators from that of the relativistic particle. This is achieved through defining the path integral for a relativistic particle rigorously by two separate approaches. This analysis also shows a connection between square root Lagrangians and the system of harmonic oscillators which is likely to be of value in more general context. (shrink)