A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on (...) variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In cooperative Cournot oligopoly games, it is known that the β-core is equal to the α-core, and both are non-empty if every individual profit function is continuous and concave (Zhao, Games Econ Behav 27:153–168, 1999b). Following Chander and Tulkens (Int J Game Theory 26:379–401, 1997), we assume that firms react to a deviating coalition by choosing individual best reply strategies. We deal with the problem of the non-emptiness of the induced core, the γ-core, by two different approaches. The first (...) establishes that the associated Cournot oligopoly Transferable Utility (TU)-games are balanced if the inverse demand function is differentiable and every individual profit function is continuous and concave on the set of strategy profiles, which is a step forward beyond Zhao’s core existence result for this class of games. The second approach, restricted to the class of Cournot oligopoly TU-games with linear cost functions, provides a single-valued allocation rule in the γ-core called Nash Pro rata (NP)-value. This result generalizes Funaki and Yamato’s (Int J Game Theory 28:157–171, 1999) core existence result from no capacity constraint to asymmetric capacity constraints. Moreover, we provide an axiomatic characterization of this solution by means of four properties: efficiency, null firm, monotonicity, and non-cooperative fairness. (shrink)

A new class of values combining marginalistic and egalitarian principles is introduced for cooperative TU-games. It includes some modes of solidarity among the players by taking the collective contribution of some coalitions to the grand coalition into account. Relationships with other class of values such as the Egalitarian Shapley values and the Procedural values are discussed. We propose a strategic implementation of our class of values in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Two axiomatic characterizations are provided: one of the whole class (...) of values, and one of each of its extreme points. (shrink)

We discuss a simple logic to describe one of our favourite games from childhood, hide and seek, and show how a simple addition of an equality constant to describe the winning condition of the seeker makes our logic undecidable. There are certain decidable fragments of first-order logic which behave in a similar fashion and we add a new modal variant to that class of logics. We also discuss the relative expressive power of the proposed logic in comparison to the standard (...) modal counterparts. (shrink)

We discuss a simple logic to describe one of our favourite games from childhood, hide and seek, and show how a simple addition of an equality constant to describe the winning condition of the seeker makes our logic undecidable. There are certain decidable fragments of first-order logic which behave in a similar fashion with respect to such a language extension, and we add a new modal variant to that class. We discuss the relative expressive power of the proposed logic in (...) comparison to the standard modal counterparts. We prove that the model checking problem for the resulting logic is \(\textsf{P}\) -complete. In addition, by exploring the connection with related product logics, we gain more insight towards having a better understanding of the subtleties of the proposed framework. (shrink)

Motivated by Hoff and Stiglitz’s :753–763, 2004) theory, we examine empirically how the creation of “rules of the game” affect the behavior of economic agents in a transition economy. Using a sample of Chinese state-owned enterprises in which controlling ownership was transferred to private acquirers between 1994 and 2006, we find that the post-privatization performance of firms depends on institutional factors. Before 2003, we observe severe post-privatization tunneling behaviors by acquirers and worse PPP. However, from 2003, when the State (...) issued regulations against tunneling and strengthened enforcement, the incidence of tunneling behaviors declined, and PPP improved. We find that better implementation of ownership transfer and longer prior experience of private acquirers are key factors that contribute to the improvement. (shrink)

A situation, in which a finite set of players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation can be described by a cooperative game with transferable utility, or simply a TU-game. A (point-valued) solution for TU-games assigns a payoff distribution to every TU-game. In this article we discuss a class of equal surplus sharing solutions consisting of all convex combinations of the CIS-value, the ENSC-value and the equal division solution. We provide several characterizations of this class of solutions on (...) variable and fixed player set. Specifications of several properties characterize specific solutions in this class. (shrink)

In the framework of transferable utility games, we modify the 2-person Davis–Maschler reduced game to ensure non-emptiness of the imputation set of the adapted 2-person reduced game. Based on the modification, we propose two new axioms: reduced game monotonicity and reduced dominance. Using RGM, RD, NE, Covariance under strategic equivalence, Equal treatment property and Pareto optimality, we are able to characterize the kernel.

The Bertrand oligopoly situation with Shubik’s demand functions is modeled as a cooperative transferable utility game in $$\beta$$ -characteristic function form. To achieve this, two sequential optimization problems are solved to describe the worth of each coalition in the associated Bertrand oligopoly transferable utility game. First, we show that these games are convex, indicating strong incentives for large-scale cooperation between firms. Second, the Shapley value of these games is fully determined by applying the linearity to a decomposition that (...) involves the difference between two convex games and two non-essential games. (shrink)

Inspired by Scarf, Zhao, Sandholm and Yang and Zhang, we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.

Digraph games are cooperative TU-games associated to domination structures which can be modeled by directed graphs. Examples come from sports competitions or from simple majority win digraphs corresponding to preference profiles in social choice theory. The Shapley value, core, marginal vectors and selectope vectors of digraph games are characterized in terms of so-called simple score vectors. A general characterization of the class of (almost positive) TU-games where each selectope vector is a marginal vector is provided in terms of game (...) semi-circuits. Finally, applications to the ranking of teams in sports competitions and of alternatives in social choice theory are discussed. (shrink)

A cooperative game with transferable utility–or simply a TU-game– describes a situation in which players can obtain certain payoffs by cooperation. A value function for these games assigns to every TU-game a distribution of payoffs over the players. Well-known solutions for TU-games are the Shapley and the Banzhaf value. An alternative type of solution is the concept of share function, which assigns to every player in a TU-game its share in the worth of the grand coalition. In (...) this paper we consider TU-games in which the players are organized into a coalition structure being a finite partition of the set of players. The Shapley value has been generalized by Owen to TU-games in coalition structure. We redefine this value function as a share function and show that this solution satisfies the multiplication property that the share of a player in some coalition is equal to the product of the Shapley share of the coalition in a game between the coalitions and the Shapley share of the player in a game between the players within the coalition. Analogously we introduce a Banzhaf coalition structure share function. Application of these share functions to simple majority games show some appealing properties. (shrink)

It is known that peer group games are a special class of games with a permission structure. However, peer group games are also a special class of digraph games. To be specific, they are digraph games in which the digraph is the transitive closure of a rooted tree. In this paper we first argue that some known results on solutions for peer group games hold more general for digraph games. Second, we generalize both digraph games as well as games with (...) a permission structure into a model called games with a local permission structure, where every player needs permission from its predecessors only to generate worth, but does not need its predecessors to give permission to its own successors. We introduce and axiomatize a Shapley value-type solution for these games, generalizing the conjunctive permission value for games with a permission structure and the β\documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$\beta $$\end{document}-measure for weighted digraphs. (shrink)

The Shapley value is a well-known solution concept for TU games. The Maschler–Owen value and the NTU Shapley value are two well-known extensions of the Shapley value to NTU games. A hyperplane game is an NTU game in which the feasible set for each coalition is a hyperplane. On the domain of monotonic hyperplane games, the Maschler–Owen value is axiomatized. Although the domain of hyperplane game is a very interesting class of games to study, unfortunately, on this (...) domain, the NTU Shapley value is not well-defined, namely, it assigns an empty set to some hyperplane games. A prize game is an NTU game that can be obtained by “truncating” a hyperplane game. As such, a prize game describes essentially the same situation as the corresponding hyperplane game. It turns out that, on the domain of monotonic prize games, the NTU Shapley value is well-defined. Thus, one can define a value which is well-defined on the domain of monotonic hyperplane games as follows: given a monotonic hyperplane game, first, transform it into a prize game, and then apply the NTU Shapley value to it. We refer to the resulting value as the “generalized Shapley value” and compare the axiomatic properties of it with those of the Maschler–Owen value on the union of the class of monotonic hyperplane games and that of monotonic prize games. We also provide axiomatizations of the Maschler–Owen value and the generalized Shapley value on that domain. (shrink)

We introduce values for rooted-tree and sink-tree digraph games axiomatically and provide their explicit formula representation. These values may be considered as natural extensions of the lower equivalent and upper equivalent solutions for line-graph games studied in van den Brink et al. (Econ Theory 33:349–349, 2007). We study the distribution of Harsanyi dividends. We show that the problem of sharing a river with a delta or with multiple sources among different agents located at different levels along the riverbed can be (...) embedded into the framework of a rooted-tree or sink-tree digraph game correspondingly. (shrink)

We introduce a new allocation rule, called the sequential equal surplus division for rooted forest TU-games. We provide two axiomatic characterizations for this allocation rule. The first one uses the classical property of component efficiency plus an edge deletion property. The second characterization uses standardness, an edge deletion property applied to specific rooted trees, a consistency property, and an amalgamation property. We also provide an extension of the sequential equal surplus division applied to the problem of sharing a river with (...) bifurcations. (shrink)

Cet article interroge l’originalité ludique du dispositif sociotechnique conçu par les réseaux socionumériques autour du profil pour organiser les différentes activités en ligne. Alors que les jeux constituent une des activités les plus prisées par les membres du réseau à laquelle ils consacrent un temps important, peu de recherches se sont focalisées sur l’analyse des activités ludiques sur les réseaux socionumériques. Par l’application de cadres conceptuels éprouvés pour analyser les jeux et activités ludiques, il est possible d’interroger la spécificité des (...) modalités de jeux qui sont proposées sur les réseaux socionumériques. Une analyse centrée sur les fonctionnalités offertes par Facebook conduit à interroger de façon critique la nature même de l’activité ludique menée dans le contexte particulier des réseaux socionumériques.This article looks into the distinctively “playful” nature of the socio-technical system that social networking sites construct around user profiles in order to organize different online activities. Although games some of the most popular activities among network members, to which they devote a considerable amount of time, there have been few analyses to date of game-playing on social networking sites. A number of proven conceptual frameworks can be used to analyze online games and game-playing and to examine the particular patterns found on the social networking sites. Based on an analysis of Facebook features, we offer an in-depth discussion of the nature of the game-playing that takes place in the particular context of social networking sites. (shrink)

We revisit the characterization of the Shapley value by van den Brink (Int J Game Theory, 2001, 30:309–319) via efficiency, the Null player axiom, and some fairness axiom. In particular, we show that this characterization also works within certain classes of TU games, including the classes of superadditive and of convex games. Further, we advocate some differential version of the marginality axiom (Young, Int J Game Theory, 1985, 14: 65–72), which turns out to be equivalent to the van (...) den Brink fairness axiom on large classes of games. (shrink)

This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a (...) description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set. (shrink)

We present experimental data on a simple market game. Several solution concepts from cooperative game theory are applied to predict the observed payoff distributions. Notably, a recently introduced solution concept meant to capture the influence of outside options on the payoff distribution within groups fares better than most other solution concepts under consideration. Our results shed some light on the effects of scarcity relations on markets on bargaining outcomes within negotiating dyads.

For any TU game and any ranking of players, the set of all preimputations compatible with the ranking, equipped with the Lorenz order, is a bounded join semi-lattice. Furthermore, the set admits as sublattice the S-Lorenz core intersected with the region compatible with the ranking. This result uncovers a new property about the structure of the S-Lorenz core. As immediate corollaries, we obtain complementary results to the findings of Dutta and Ray :403–422, 1991), by showing that any S-constrained egalitarian (...) allocation is the Lorenz greatest element of the S-Lorenz core on the rank-preserving region the allocation belongs to. Besides, our results suggest that the comparison between W- and S-constrained egalitarian allocations is more puzzling than what is usually admitted in the literature. (shrink)

We introduce a family of proportional surplus division values for TU-games. Each value first assigns to each player a compromise between her stand-alone worth and the average stand-alone worths over all players, and then allocates the remaining worth among the players in proportion to their stand-alone worths. This family contains the proportional division value and the new egalitarian proportional surplus division value as two special cases. We provide characterizations for this family of values, as well as for each single value (...) in this family. (shrink)

This article discusses the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors of a cooperative TU-game, also known as the Selectope. We reconsider some results on Harsanyi payoff vectors within a more general framework. First, an intuitive approach is used, showing that the set of Harsanyi payoff vectors is the core of an associated convex game. Next, the set of individual rational Harsanyi payoff vectors, the Harsanyi imputations in short, is considered. Existence conditions are provided, and if non-empty, we provide a (...) description as the core of a well-defined convex game, and show that it is an externally stable set. (shrink)

We introduce a new class of values for TU-games with a level structure, called LS-games. A level structure is a hierarchical structure where each level corresponds to a partition of the player set, which becomes increasingly coarse from the trivial partition containing only singletons to the partition containing only the grand coalition. The new values, called Harsanyi support levels solutions, extend the Harsanyi solutions for LS-games. As an important subset of the class of these values, we present the class of (...) weighted Shapley support levels values as a further result. The values from this class extend the weighted Shapley values for LS-games and contain the Shapley levels value as a special case. Axiomatizations of the studied classes are provided. (shrink)

Sengupta and Sengupta consider a payoff configuration of a TU game as a viable proposal if it challenges each legitimate contender. Lauwers prove that the set of viable proposals is nonempty for every game. In the present paper, we prove that the set of viable proposals coincides with the coalition structure core if there exists an undominated proposal; otherwise, it coincides with the set of accessible proposals. This characterization result implies that a proposal is a viable proposal if (...) and only if it is undominated or accessible. Moreover, we prove that the set of viable proposals includes the minimal dominant set, which is another nonempty extension of the coalition structure core introduced by Kóczy and Lauwers. In particular, we prove that the set of viable proposals of a cohesive game coincides with the minimal dominant set. (shrink)

We provide another characterization of the Owen value for TU games with a coalition structure without the additivity axiom.

More and more people around the world are using computer (video) games. The development of the gaming industry means increasing of its complexity in all aspects. Not only is the content represented in games continuously differentiating, but we also see the increasing diversity among their creators, users, researchers and the public. This article aims to draw attention to the possibility of using the concept of social capital in ludologists’ research as well as in improving the quality of games and of (...) the cooperation between social environments related with games. Social capital is understood here as a potential of interactions embedded in interpersonal ties and social norms, which can bring advantages for individuals, groups and societies. The author takes a closer look on: the main features of this multi-dimensional category; significant differences between human, social and cultural capital; as well as the positive and negative influences of social capital. ** Z gier komputerowych (wideo) korzysta coraz więcej ludzi na całym świecie. Rozwój branży gier oznacza wzrastającą jej złożoność we wszystkich płaszczyznach. Nie tylko stale różnicują się treści przedstawiane w grach, ale też rośnie zróżnicowanie ich twórców, użytkowników, badaczy i opinii publicznej. Celem artykułu jest zwrócenie uwagi na możliwość wykorzystania koncepcji kapitału społecznego w badaniach ludologów oraz w podnoszeniu jakości gier i współpracy między środowiskami związanymi z grami. Kapitał społeczny jest tu rozumiany jako potencjał współdziałania osadzony w powiązaniach międzyludzkich i normach społecznych, który może przynosić korzyści osobom, grupom i społeczeństwom. Przybliżone zostały: główne cechy tej wielowymiarowej kategorii; istotne różnice między kapitałem ludzkim, społecznym i kulturowym; oraz pozytywne i negatywne skutki oddziaływania kapitału społecznego. (shrink)

Walton's book is a study of several fallacies in informal logic. Focusing on question-answer dialogues, and committed to a pragmatic rather than a semantic approach, he attempts to generate criteria for evaluating good and bad questions and answers. The book contains a discussion of such well-recognized fallacies as many questions, black-or-white questions, loaded questions, circular arguments, question-begging assertions and epithets, ad hominem and tu quoque arguments, ignoratio elenchi, and replying to a question with a question. In addition, Walton develops several (...) artificial dialogue games and has an excellent discussion of burden of proof in nonlegal contexts. The discussion is for the most part nontechnical and does not presuppose any training in formal logic. It is illustrated with many (sometimes overlong) examples of fallacies drawn from real life--mostly debates in the Canadian House of Commons. . . . Walton's book breaks new ground on a number of issues. Choice This first full-length study of logical fallacies, errors, faults, illicit attacks, blunders, and other critical deficiencies in interrogation and reply has been written in the tradition of informal fallacies in logic. It is especially valuable, readable, and interesting because of the 139 case studies it presents, many of these case studies come from political debates and some from interviews, legal cross-examinations, and other sources. Walton uses these challenging examples of tricky, aggressive, argumentative, or fallacious questions to develop coherent and pragmatic guidelines for criticizing questionable questions (and in some cases their replies) on logical grounds. Among the types of problematic questions analyzed are: the traditional so-called fallacy of many questions, illustrated by the famous Have you stopped beating your wife?; black and white questions; terminologically loaded questions; and questions containing personal attacks. These and other types of problematic questions as well as evasive replies and replying to a question with a question are studied. Critical errors of reasoning are identified and analyzed by developing context-based, normative models of reasonable dialogue in which a questioner must have freedom to ask informative and probing questions, and the respondent must be constrained to give reasonably direct, not overly evasive answers. In this era of negative and evasive political campaigning, with candidates employing skillful tactics of manipulating public opinion to assure election rather than taking clear stands and seriously debating issues in an informed and sincere manner, Question-Reply Argumentation is especially relevant reading for those who take democracy seriously. The methods used reflect a significant shift from earlier semantically based theories to current pragmatic, dialogue-based models, and will be of interest to logicians and linguists. The volume's conclusions should challenge some current preconceptions. Recommended reading for courses in logic, speech communications, linguistics, philosophy of language, areas of political science relating to political discourse and debate, courses on questioning in cognitive psychology, and courses on critical thinking in education. (shrink)

S razvitkom kapitalizma sve više se govori i piše o slobodnom vremenu, a njegovim komercijaliziranjem razvile su se unosne gospodarske grane: »industrija zabave«, turizam i sport. Kapital, međutim, slobodno vrijeme najprije prepoznaje kao vrijeme slobodno od rada, tj. kao besposlicu, a tek u najnovije doba – kada je naučio kako od njega profitirati – i kao vrijeme slobodno za učenje i stvaralaštvo, tj. kao dokolicu.Razlika između besposlice koja teži potrošnji i dokolice koja se ispunjava samodjelatnošću mnogima je još nejasna. A (...) tu se razliku često i namjerno prikriva da bi se slobodno vrijeme, s jedne strane, lakše komercijaliziralo i da bi se, s druge strane, poništio njegov društveno revolucionarni naboj. Tome služi i prikrivanje razlike između rada i samodjelatnosti, pa se postavlja pitanje: jesu li sportska natjecanja igra ili rad? Ili za primjer: igra li se nogomet, ili se nogomet radi?With the development of capitalism free time is more and more the subject of spoken and written word, and with its commercialization three profitable economy branches have developed: “entertainment industry”, tourism and sport. Capital, meanwhile, identifies free time as time free from work, or idleness, and only in recent time – when it learnt to make profit out of free time- time free for learning and creativeness, or as leisure.Difference between idleness, which leans towards consumption, and leisure, which fulfils itself with self-activity, to a great many is still obscure. And that difference is often and purposely concealed meaning to, on one side, commercialize free time more easily and, on the other hand, to quash its socially revolutionary surge. For that purpose is also the concealing of difference between work and self-activity, and the question is asked: are the sport competitions a game or a work? Or precisely: “Does one play football, or does one do football?”. (shrink)

En este artículo se analiza el concepto de imperativo metanoético que Peter Sloterdijk presenta en ¡Has de cambiar tu vida! Nuestro objetivo es iluminar la naturaleza de lo que, en trabajos anteriores, hemos denominado -a raíz de la obra de Bernard Suits-: razón lúdica. Para ello, primero, expondremos y analizaremos el sentido del imperativo metanoético en Sloterdijk, así como los elementos principales de su razón ascética. Segundo, mostraremos cómo ambos son consecuencia del análisis ontológico de corte heideggeriano en la que (...) Sloterdijk basa su propuesta de filosofía moral. Tercero, presentaremos en términos sloterdijkianos tanto el análisis ontológico de Suits, como el posible imperativo metanoético que se desprendería de su razón lúdica. Por último, centrándonos en el papel que Sloterdijk otorga a la figura del «ocioso», mostraremos las posibles conexiones entre Suits y Sloterdijk. Mostraremos la relación que existe entre los imperativos lúdicos y ascéticos donde, además, el acto «jugar» recibe un papel central en la «respuesta a la pregunta por el ser». In this article, we analyze Peter Sloterdijk’s concept of “metanoethical imperative” in You Must Change Your Life. Our goal is to shed light on what, by drawing on Bernard Suits, we call “ludic reason.” To do so, we will present and examine in depth the meaning of Sloterdijk’s metanoethical imperative, as well as the main features of his concept of “askesis.” Second, we will argue that both concepts are the result of the Heideggerian ontological principles underlying Sloterdijk’s moral philosophy. Third, we will provide a “Sloterdijkean” interpretation of Suits’ account of games by focusing on the metanoethical imperative that could be derived from the notion of the ludic reason. To conclude, we will focus on the role that the figure of the “Good-for-Nothing” plays in Sloterdijk’s account, showing connections between Suits’ and Sloterdijk’s approaches. We will argue that, in the philosophical approaches of both philosophers, the idea of game playing is closely tied to the “question on Being.”. (shrink)

National identity is dynamic and dialogic, and its maintenance and reproduction have become increasingly fragmented and fractured. Although recent studies have discerned different modes of articulating national identity, very few studies have focused on youth culture and the maintenance and reproduction of national identity in China. Therefore, this study analyses metaphors, discursive practices and ideologies in the Chinese animation Na nian na tu na xie shi er (Year Hare Affair) using a coherent theoretical framework of multimodal metaphor and critical discourse (...) analysis. First, four genres of multimodal metaphors are identified in animation. Next, this study analyses the ideologies and discursive practices of metaphors and argues that elements of what is called ‘ACG subculture’ – due to its focus on animation, comics and games – articulate elements of dominant culture by raising semantic conflicts in metaphor scenarios. The practice of articulation-produced national identity is informed by the conceptual metaphor CHINA IS A HARE. This metaphor, suggesting historic endurance and the lineage of the Chinese spirit, is an ideologically vested euphemism for national identity that embraces a dual notion of identity that is both national and individual. Finally, the novel reproduction of an endogenous and heterogeneous national identity in animation provides us with space to re-imagine the interplay between national identity, dominant ideology and Chinese youth. (shrink)

This article offers comprehensive criticism of the Turing test and develops quality criteria for new artificial general intelligence (AGI) assessment tests. It is shown that the prerequisites A. Turing drew upon when reducing personality and human consciousness to “suitable branches of thought” re-flected the engineering level of his time. In fact, the Turing “imitation game” employed only symbolic communication and ignored the physical world. This paper suggests that by restricting thinking ability to symbolic systems alone Turing unknowingly constructed “the (...) wall” that excludes any possi-bility of transition from a complex observable phenomenon to an abstract image or concept. It is, therefore, sensible to factor in new requirements for AI (artificial intelligence) maturity assessment when approaching the Tu-ring test. Such AI must support all forms of communication with a human being, and it should be able to comprehend abstract images and specify con-cepts as well as participate in social practices. (shrink)

Perché quella faccia triste, lettore? Non sapere ti rende infelice. Non sai nulla di quello che ti circonda: non sai come fa a volare l'aereo che ti porterà a Londra, non sai quante zampe ha una Pseudoiulia cambriensis, come funziona il wi-fi, quanta acqua c'è nell'Oceano Atlantico. Sai cosa vuol dire entelechìa? Quanti capelli abbiamo in testa? Hai mai provato a contare tutte le stelle? No, ma l'ha già fatto l'astronomo Ipparco, e le notizie non sono buone: non potremo saperlo (...) mai. Più cerchi di trovare risposte più si formulano ulteriori domande. Ogni informazione è superata nel momento in cui la ricevi, ogni novità è storia vecchia. Grazie a Internet puoi sapere dove sono i tuoi amici in questo momento, con chi sono, cosa fanno. Ma ti interessa davvero? Se digiti parole a caso su Google (“kefYDl9”) qualche risultato verrà fuori di sicuro. Ma saperlo potrà farti vivere meglio? Hai uno sguardo sconsolato, lettore. Non sai che potresti vivere anche senza tutte queste conoscenze. Tu sei Prometeo, prigioniero del fuoco. Sei il fratello spirituale di Friedrich Nietzsche. Se fossi un personaggio di Game of Thrones saresti il Guardiano della Notte Jon Snow, il paladino che lotta trafitto dal dolore di non conoscere né il suo passato né il suo destino. Non lo conosci, ma forse non hai mai voluto saperlo. Anche sapere ti rende infelice: sai benissimo che più cose riuscirai a conoscere più diventerai ignorante. È il paradosso dell'ignoranza: non sapremo mai cosa esattamente sappiamo, e sappiamo solamente ciò che pensiamo di sapere. (shrink)

We present new axiomatic characterizations of the proportional Shapley value, a weighted TU-value with the worths of the singletons as weights. The presented characterizations are proportional counterparts to the famous characterizations of the Shapley value by Shapley and Young. We introduce two new axioms, called proportionality and player splitting, respectively. Each of them makes a main difference between the proportional Shapley value and the Shapley value. If the stand-alone worths are plausible weights, the proportional Shapley value is a convincing alternative (...) to the Shapley value, for example in cost allocation. Especially, the player splitting property, which states that players’ payoffs do not change if another player splits into two new players who have the same impact to the game as the original player, justifies the use of the proportional Shapley value in many economic situations. (shrink)

I. The "Moral Universal" from the Perspectives of East Asian Thought jl\ defining characteristic of East Asian thought is the widely accepted proposition ...

Tu (Chinese history and philosophy, Harvard U.) offers a panoramic view of the core values of Confucian intellectual thought that have kept it vital for more than two millennia, and underlie the recent resurgence in eastern Asia. Of interest to students of either China or religion and ethics. Paper edition (unseen), $14.95. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR.

On Islamic philosophy with special reference to logic in Islamic philosophy.

BackgroundPhysical activity has a significant health impact worldwide and has been linked to a lower risk of the common cold.ObjectiveThe aim of this study was to estimate the form of PA among Chinese adults and the correlation between PA and number of the common cold in China's eastern, central, and western areas.DesignA cross-sectional study.SettingChina's eastern, central, and western regions from 30 November 2020 to 30 March 2021.PatientsA total of 1,920 healthy participants, who aged over 18 years old, with Internet access, (...) were enrolled, and then self-reported PA behaviors and number of the common cold were collected.MeasurementsThe authors calculated preference, intensity, frequency, and duration of PA in Chinese based on gender, age, and broad occupational categories and explored the potential effect between these factors and the common cold.ResultsApproximately 20.4% of participants reported not participating in sports regularly. Except for gender, there were significant differences in PA preference and intensity among the remaining individuals. However, intensity shows a U-shaped dose-response relationship with colds, whereas the frequency and duration have an inverse dose-response relationship. High intensity combined with high frequency increased colds the most. Nevertheless, non-exercise groups always have the most colds in each comparison.LimitationsThe result may be vulnerable to recall bias.ConclusionIntensity showed that U-shape, frequency, and duration showed inverse response to the number of colds last year, but age, sex, and occupation had no significant effects. High intensity and high frequency mixed increased colds the most, regardless of duration. (shrink)

本书从哲学、历史和文学多个视角，重新梳理了先秦儒家思想形态，还原了思孟学派的渊源与传承。.

This study explores how and when ethical leadership predicts three forms of team-level creativity, namely team creativity, average of member creativity, and dispersion of member creativity. The results, based on 230 members of 44 knowledge work teams from Chinese organizations, showed that ethical leadership was positively related to team creativity and average of member creativity but was negatively related to dispersion of member creativity. Consistent with the predictions of uncertainty reduction theory, psychological safety climate mediated the relationship between ethical leadership (...) and the three forms of team-level creativity. Furthermore, supervisor support for creativity positively moderated the effect of ethical leadership on psychological safety climate and the indirect effects of ethical leadership on the three forms of team-level creativity through psychological safety climate. The analysis offers significant theoretical and practical implications on ethical leadership and creativity in organizations. (shrink)