This article describes why a constitutional test that relies exclusively on history and tradition for deciding modern firearm regulations is woefully inadequate when applied to modern technologies. It explains the unique advancements in firearm technology — specifically, ghost guns — that challenge the viability of a purely historical test, even if legal scholars or judges attempt to reason by analogy. This article argues that the prevailing, two-step approach, which incorporates both history and tradition, and requires a judicial examination of the (...) purposes and methods supporting a challenged firearm regulation, should apply nationwide. That a dissenting faction of conservative judges seeks to ignore the prevailing approach presents a potentially dangerous path for Second Amendment jurisprudence. This article draws from certain historical gun laws to illustrate the difficult legwork that analogies must do under a purely historical test. It uses the advent of ghost guns as a case study to offer guidance for judges in their rulemaking practices regarding Second Amendment cases. (shrink)

Talbot Brewer offers a new approach to ethical theory, founded on a far-reaching reconsideration of the nature and sources of human agency.

Translation of 'Are Lives Worth Creating?' into Japanese by Sho Yamaguchi. A critical discussion of Benatar's anti-natalism that originally appeared in Philosophical Papers (2011).

This chapter critically explores contemporary philosophical understandings of whether meaning in life might depend on the presence or absence of an afterlife. After distinguishing various kinds of afterlife, it focuses most on the potential relevance of an eternal one, and considers at length the extreme but common views amongst philosophers that an eternal afterlife would be either necessary for a meaningful life or, conversely, sufficient for a meaningless one. It concludes by considering the plausibility of a more moderate view, that (...) an eternal afterlife could substantially enhance the meaning of our lives, even if they would not be meaningless without it. The aim of the chapter is not to defend some overall thesis about these positions, but rather to acquaint the reader with recent English-speaking philosophical discussions of them. (shrink)

This issue’s “Legal Briefing” column covers recent legal developments involving medical decision making for unbefriended patients. These patients have neither decision-making capacity nor a reasonably available surrogate to make healthcare decisions on their behalf. This topic has been the subject of recent articles in JCE. It has been the subject of major policy reports. Indeed, caring for the unbefriended has even been described as the “single greatest category of problems” encountered in bioethics consultation. Moreover, the scope of the problem continues (...) to expand, especially with rapid growth in the elderly population and with an increased prevalence of dementia.Unfortunately, most U.S. jurisdictions have failed to adopt effective healthcare decision-making systems or procedures for the unbefriended. “Existing mechanisms to address the issue of decision making for the unbefriended are scant and not uniform.” Most providers are “muddling through on an ad hoc basis.” Still, over the past several months, a number of state legislatures have finally addressed the issue. These developments and a survey of the current landscape are grouped into the following 14 categories. The first two define the problem of medical decision making for the unbefriended. The remaining 12 categories describe different solutions to the problem. The first six of these solutions are discussed in this article (Part 1). The last eight solutions will be covered in the Summer 2012 issue of JCE (Part 2). 1. Who are the unbefriended?2. Risks and problems of the unbefriended3. Prevention: advance care planning, diligent searching, and careful capacity assessment4. Decision-making mechanisms and standards5. Emergency exception to informed consent6. Expanded default surrogate lists: close friends7. Private guardians8. Volunteer guardians9. Public guardians10. Temporary and emergency guardians11. Attending physicians12. Other clinicians, individuals, and entities13. Institutional committees14. External committees. (shrink)

Accuracy‐first epistemology is an approach to formal epistemology which takes accuracy to be a measure of epistemic utility and attempts to vindicate norms of epistemic rationality by showing how conformity with them is beneficial. If accuracy‐first epistemology can actually vindicate any epistemic norms, it must adopt a plausible account of epistemic value. Any such account must avoid the epistemic version of Derek Parfit's “repugnant conclusion.” I argue that the only plausible way of doing so is to say that accurate credences (...) in certain propositions have no, or almost no, epistemic value. I prove that this is incompatible with standard accuracy‐first arguments for probabilism, and argue that there is no way for accuracy‐first epistemology to show that all credences of all agents should be coherent. (shrink)

It is not clear whether to assess Robert Audi’s Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character as a collection of essays or a unified piece of theorizing. Seven of the book’s twelve essays have been published before, and at first blush they appear connected by little more than a common focus on ethics. These essays are framed, however, by an introduction and conclusion characterizing the book as the elaboration of a single, large-scale ethical theory. Perhaps a comprehensive theory can be disentangled from (...) these essays, but its contours and merits would be far clearer if Audi had presented it systematically, drawing selectively from previous essays rather than reproducing them wholesale. (shrink)

I draw on ideas salient in contemporary literate African philosophy to construct two new theoretical ways of capturing the essence of duties to oneself. According to one theory, a person has a foundational duty to “relate” to herself in ways similar to how the African field has often thought that a person should relate with others, viz., harmoniously. According to the second, one has a foundational duty to produce liveliness in oneself. In addition to articulating these novel attempts to capture (...) what all duties to oneself might have in common and showing that each one captures several intuitions about them, I offer some reasons to think that the harmony theory is more attractive than the vitality one. I conclude that there are values prominent in the African tradition that, upon some reformulation, ground comprehensive accounts of what one owes oneself that merit consideration by a global audience as rivals to, say, Kantian-rationalist approaches common in the West. (shrink)

The legal doctrine of informed consent has overwhelmingly failed to assure that the medical treatment patients get is the treatment patients want. This Article describes and defends an ongoing shift toward shared decision making processes incorporating the use of certified patient decision aids.

According to The Debunking Argument, evidence from the cognitive science of religion suggests that it is epistemically inappropriate to persist in believing in the theistic God. In this paper, I focus on a reply to this argument according to which the evidence from cognitive science says nothing about the epistemic propriety of belief in the theistic God, since God may have chosen to create human beliefs in God by means of precisely the systems identified by cognitive scientists. I argue that (...) this reply can be extended to a variety of non-theistic contexts, and consequently that if the reply is sound, then the scope of The Debunking Argument is surprisingly limited. (shrink)

According to Fleck, a fact is not something objectively given but rather a social event. Scientific facts are no exception, as can be seen through the annals of medicine. Fleck argues that if the physical sciences initially appear to be immune to such social conditioning, this misconception can be corrected by recognizing the similarities between the natural sciences and medicine both historically and epistemologically. Fleck's ideas are not new, having been presented by him in 1935, but it is only recently (...) that they have begun to strike a responsive chord. Kuhn was aware of Fleck's work when he began to promulgate his own ideas in the 1960s. But there are important differences as well as similarities which can only be appreciated once Fleck's own work has had a proper hearing. To this end the University of Chicago Press has published a translation-edition of the full monograph in 1979. In ‘On the question of the foundations of medical knowledge’, Fleck's own precis to this major work, he correctly foretold the dawning of the sociology of cognition. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

For the theist, human knowledge of God’s nature is, at best, partial, and this implies that there are characteristics of God beyond our ken which I call ‘the unknown attributes’. However, this confessed ignorance, I argue, has largely unappreciated skeptical consequences for determining the scope of God’s power. Consider some mundane future state of affairs normally considered to be within the scope of God’s power. If it lies within the scope of God’s power, then it is consistent with God’s nature, (...) and hence the unknown attributes. However, what grounds does the theist have for making this claim? More generally, we can ask: how do we know what God can do, if we don’t know what God is? I call this question The Problem of the Unknown Attributes, and take up and evaluate four plausible answers. I argue that the each of these answers fails, but close the paper by gesturing toward a partial reply. The overall aim of the paper is to draw out some of the skeptical consequences of human ignorance of God’s nature, and to thereby highlight an unrecognized tension in theistic thought. (shrink)

In his book Better Never to Have Been, David Benatar argues that it is generally all things considered wrong to procreate, such that if everyone acted in a morally ideal way, humanity would elect to extinguish the species. I aim to carefully question the premises and inferences that lead Benatar to draw this anti-natalist conclusion, indicating several places where one could sensibly elect to disembark from the train of argument heading toward such a radical view.

De Dreu and Gross's distinction between attack and defense is complicated in real-world conflicts because competing leaders construe their position as one of defense, and power imbalances place status quo challengers in a defensive position. Their account of defense as vigilant avoidance is incomplete because it avoids a reference to anger which transforms anxious avoidance into collective and unified action.

One aim of this chapter is to acquaint a reader unfamiliar with African philosophy with some of its more prominent ethical perspectives, especially those pertaining to ubuntu, as they bear on work. However, I undertake this discussion with some sympathy towards these implications, such that another aim is to point out that the prescriptions for the workplace that moral philosophers working in the African tradition have made (or would sensibly make given their more basic commitments) are worth taking seriously regardless (...) of the reader’s background. The vitalist and communalist strains of ethical thought prominent amongst African philosophers are relatively unknown in globally influential discourses, but are revealing in the context of work. Central topics include: what the point of work is; how to distribute jobs; why there might be a right to work; and how to organize the production process. For each question, I emphasize respects in which African ethical thought offers answers that are both different from and plausible relative to what is dominant in English-speaking theory or practice. (shrink)

When we hear the word logic, we tend to think of arguments, premises and conclusions, claims and evidence for claims. But this is only half of it. Arguments are made of words, and words are symbols or signs of concepts, the building blocks of human thought. The study of the concept, the most fundamental aspect of logic, was once an essential part of liberal education, and to aid in its recovery is the goal of this book. This is a must-have (...) for any introductory logic course. (shrink)

Reprint of an article that initially appeared in the Journal of Moral Education (2010).

This issue’s “Legal Briefing” column covers recent legal developments involving futile or non-beneficial medical treatment. This topic has been the subject of recent articles in JCE. Indeed, it was the subject of a “Legal Briefing” in fall 2009. Accordingly, this column focuses on legal developments from the past two years. These developments are usefully grouped into the following 11 categories: 1. Texas Advance Directives Act2. Ontario Consent and Capacity Board3. Surrogate selection4. Ex post cases for damages5. Ex ante cases for (...) injunctions6. Coercion and duress7. Assent and transparency8. Brain-death cases9. Criminal and administrative sanctions10. Conscientious objection11. Penalties for providing futile treatment. (shrink)

In contrast to their western medievalist counterparts, scholars of Byzantine studies are at a disadvantage with regard to surviving primary source materials. I cannot but regard with envy the documents available to my colleagues in the Academy who research the lands of western Europe: to mention a few random examples, the three thousand coroner's inquests analyzed by Barbara Hanawalt and used to inform her remarkably detailed picture of peasant life in fourteenth- and fifteenth-century England, the local customs accounts for the (...) port of Exeter that enabled Maryanne Kowaleski to reconstruct the trading operations of this coastal town, the extraordinary cartularies and other documents from the county of Champagne so ably edited and explicated by Theodore Evergates. (shrink)

This issue’s “Legal Briefing” column covers recent legal developments involving POLST (physician orders for lifesustaining treatment.) POLST has been the subject of recent articles in JCE. It has been the subject of major policy reports and a recent New York Times editorial. And POLST has been the subject of significant legislative, regulatory, and policy attention over the past several months. These developments and a survey of the current landscape are usefully grouped into the following 14 categories: 1. Terminology2. Purpose, function, (...) and success3. Status in the states4. Four legal routes of implementation5. Which professionals can authorize POLST?6. Is the patient’s signature required?7. Can surrogates consent to for incapacitated patients?8. If a POLST conflicts with an advance directive, which prevails?9. Is offering POLST mandatory?10. What are the duties of healthcare providers?11. What is the role of electronic registries?12. What is the role of the federal government?13. International adoption14. Court cases. (shrink)

In Revering God, author and scholar Thaddeus Williams bridges the gap between abstract theology and awe-inspired devotion, helping readers better understand God and drawing them into a deeper state of joy and reverence for their Creator.

In an article previously published in this journal, Phillip Montague critically surveys and rejects a handful of contemporary attempts to explain why state punishment is morally justified. Among those targeted is one of my defences of the censure theory of punishment, according to which state punishment is justified because the political community has a duty to express disapproval of those guilty of injustice. My defence of censure theory supposes, per argumentum, that there is always some defeasible moral reason for the (...) state to proportionately punish the guilty, and then demonstrates that censure theory best entails and explains this intuition. Montague does not question the intuition, but instead argues that three rival theories of punishment, including his societal-defence view, account for it to no worse a degree than my censure theory. In this article I defend my initial argument, noting resources for its defence that Montague does not appreciate and that, I maintain, provide those who believe that there is always pro tanto injustice in the state failing to proportionately punish the guilty reason to adopt censure theory over all competitors, including Montague’s societal-defence theory. (shrink)

Originally published in German in 1935, this monograph anticipated solutions to problems of scientific progress, the truth of scientific fact and the role of error in science now associated with the work of Thomas Kuhn and others. Arguing that every scientific concept and theory—including his own—is culturally conditioned, Fleck was appreciably ahead of his time. And as Kuhn observes in his foreword, "Though much has occurred since its publication, it remains a brilliant and largely unexploited resource." "To many scientists just (...) as to many historians and philosophers of science facts are things that simply are the case: they are discovered through properly passive observation of natural reality. To such views Fleck replies that facts are invented, not discovered. Moreover, the appearance of scientific facts as discovered things is itself a social construction, a _made_ thing. A work of transparent brilliance, one of the most significant contributions toward a thoroughly sociological account of scientific knowledge."—Steven Shapin, _Science_. (shrink)

In this article I articulate and defend an African moral theory, i.e., a basic and general principle grounding all particular duties that is informed by sub-Saharan values commonly associated with talk of "ubuntu" and cognate terms that signify personhood or humanness. The favoured interpretation of ubuntu (as of 2007) is the principle that an action is right insofar as it respects harmonious relationships, ones in which people identify with, and exhibit solidarity toward, one another. I maintain that this is the (...) most defensible moral theory with an African pedigree at the time, and that it should be developed further with an eye to rivalling dominant Western theories such as utilitarianism and Kantianism. (NB: a mildly revised version, avoiding some typos and phrases that invite misinterpretation, appeared as a chapter in Isaac Ukpokolo, ed., _Themes, Issues and Problems in African Philosophy_ London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, pp. 97-119.). (shrink)

Arabic translation by Ahmed Al-Ansari of 'Happiness and Meaningfulness' (a chapter first published in 2009).

In the literature on African moral philosophy, it is common to find normative conclusions about the way we ought to act directly drawn from purported metaphysical facts about the nature of ourselves and the world. For example, Kwame Gyekye, the most influential sub-Saharan political philosopher, attempts to defend moderate communitarianism, roughly the view that agents have strong duties to support others in ways that do not violate human rights, by contending that it follows from the dual nature of the self (...) as both social and individual. In this article, I critically analyze this sort of rationale, and contend that it is unsound. I propose several reconstructions, but conclude that they cannot plausibly bridge the ‘is-ought gap’, and that similar arguments found in the field of African ethics, such as the frequent claim we must treat nature with respect since everything in the universe is interdependent, also fail to do so. (shrink)

Patients in the United States have been subject to an evergrowing “avalanche” of unwanted medical treatment. This is economically, ethically, and legally wrong. As one advocacy campaign puts it: “Patients should receive the medical treatments they want. Nothing less. Nothing more.” First, unwanted medical treatment constitutes waste (and often fraud or abuse) of scarce healthcare resources. Second, it is a serious violation of patients’ autonomy and self-determination. Third, but for a few rare exceptions, administering unwanted medical treatment contravenes settled legal (...) rules and principles. This “Legal Briefing” describes a central and growing role for the law. Specifically, courts and agencies have increasingly imposed penalties on healthcare providers who deliberately or negligently disregard advance directives and DNR (donot-resuscitate) orders. I group these legal developments into the following five categories: 1. Five Types of Unwanted Medical Treatment2. State and Federal Duties to Follow Advance Directives3. Doctors Hospital of Augusta v. Alicea4. Other Lawsuits for Ignoring Advance Directives5. Administrative Penalties for Ignoring Advance Directives. (shrink)

A collection of several articles on African moral and political philosophy by Thaddeus Metz, translated into French by Emmanuel Fopa, and edited and introduced by Pius Mosima of the University of Bamenda, Cameroon.

Unlike the Chinese, Indian, and Western ethical traditions, the African one had not been text-based until as recently as the 1960s. Since a very large majority of indigenous sub-Saharan societies had oral cultures, there are no classic texts in the field of African ethics and hence also no Big Names; there's nothing comparable to, say, Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Confucius’ Analects. However, some names and texts have been more influential than others in shaping ethical reflection, particularly over the past 30 (...) years or so with the development of a decent cohort of Africans lecturing in universities. In my contribution, I engage with those contemporary African philosophers whose writings have made some of the most difference to field, favouring those whose views are particularly distinct from salient Western approaches to ethics and should be taken seriously as rivals to them. The main figures critically discussed are I. Menkiti and D. Tutu regarding good character and B. Bujo and K. Gyekye in respect of right action. (shrink)

seek to answer questions about work-based education (WBE) that have been rarely posed, ethical ones such as: Is there reason to believe that WBE would tend to make better people (as opposed to make people better off)? That is, can we reasonably expect characteristic WBE learners to exhibit good character to a greater degree relative to non-WBE ones? On a social level, would systematic use of WBE noticeably promote justice, say, by effecting the right sort of reparation to those who (...) have suffered from colonialism or exploitation? I begin to answer these questions first by presenting an overview of traditional black African societies, noting that WBE has been the dominant mode of learning in them. Then, to show that WBE has relevance for contemporary societies, I articulate a communitarian moral theory grounded in mores that have been salient among sub-Saharan peoples, differentiating it from the Western theories more familiar to international readers and motivating them to take it seriously as relevant to moral enquiry in today’s world. Next, I apply this Afro-communitarianism to WBE, enquiring into its prospects for fostering individual character and social justice, particularly in the Global South. (shrink)

Le mode infini immédiat de l’étendue (MIIE) est l’un des éléments les plus mystérieux de l’ontologie de Spinoza. Malgré son importance pour le système métaphysique de Spinoza, ce dernier nous dit très peu à propos de ce mode. Dans un effort pour faire progresser l’étude de cette question, j’examine trois hypothèses bien acceptées qui traitent de l’identité de ce mode : l’interprétation de la force, l’interprétation nomique et l’interprétation cinétique. J’affirme premièrement que l’interprétation de la force et l’interprétation nomique doivent (...) faire face à de sérieuses objections. Deuxièmement, je soutiens que malgré les affirmations contraires des spécialistes, l’interprétation cinétique du MIIE est une option valable. (shrink)

This article introduces a special issue of Philosophical Papers devoted to the topic of meaning in life. In the paper, I engage with articles by Robert Audi, David Velleman, John Martin Fischer, Laurence Thomas, Berit Brogaard, Barry Smith and Larry James, laying out their central views, criticizing them, and suggesting ways they could be developed.

Alasdair MacIntyre is one of the foremost critics of liberalism. As an alternative to the abstract utilitarianism and emotivist relativism of liberal moral theory, he has proposed virtue-ethics and “tradition-constituted rationality.” As an alternative to the individualism and bureaucratization of liberal moral practice, he has proposed the practices and politics of local community. He has presented his anti-liberal moral and political vision in his great trilogy, After Virtue, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? and Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, in later (...) works such as Dependent Rational Animals, and in numerous articles, lectures, and interviews, and he has done so with…. (shrink)

This book examines three notable philosophers' attempts to solve the political problem of religious pluralism: John Rawls, Jacques Maritain, and Alasdair MacIntyre. Although many philosophers have grappled with this problem, what has not been sufficiently explored is the reciprocal relationship of foundational belief to political theory and political theory to political practice. Kozinski, using thorough research and a high level of philosophical discourse, deals with these issues directly and astutely demonstrates how any solution that does not incorporate both political philosophy (...) and political theology is doomed to fail. (shrink)

Reprint of a chapter that first appeared in Contemporary Philosophical Proposals for the University: Toward a Philosophy of Higher Education (Palgrave 2018).

A discussion of respects in which climate change is likely to affect health in Africa and the Middle East with some reference to moral values, such as ubuntu and Islam, salient in the respective regions.

Reprint of an article that initially appeared in Ratio (2003).

This article outlines current safe harbors in the law for healthcare practitioners who work in a disaster setting. It reviews available legal protection in crisis situations with respect to the Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act (EMTALA), criminal liability, and licensure.

This issue’s “Legal Briefing” column, one product of a Greenwall Foundation grant, reviews recent developments concerning compulsory reporting duties.1 Most licensed clinicians in the United States are “mandated reporters.” When these clinicians discover certain threats to the safety of patients or the public, they are legally required to report that information to specified government officials. Over the past year, several states have legislatively expanded the scope of these reporting duties. In other states, new court cases illustrate the vigorous enforcement of (...) already existing duties. I have organized all these legal developments into the following eight categories: 1. Overview of Mandatory Reporting Duties 2. Controversy over the Benefits of Mandatory Reporting 3. New and Expanded Duties to Report 4. Criminal Penalties for Failing to Report 5. Civil Liability for Failing to Report 6. Disciplinary Penalties for Failing to Report 7. Legal Immunity for Good-Faith Reporting 8. Protection against Employers’ Retaliation. (shrink)