How many minds do you have? If you are a normal human, I think only one, but a number of dual-process theorists have disagreed. As an explanation of human irrationality, they divide human reasoning into two: Type-1 is fast, associative, and automatic, while Type-2 is slow, rule-based, and effortful. Some go further in arguing that these reasoning processes constitute (or are partly constitutive of) two minds. In this paper, I use the Star Trek ‘Trill’ species to illuminate the condition for (...) the existence of “two minds in one brain” (Evans 2010, 3). After carefully outlining the two dominate versions of dual-process theory (default-interventionism, espoused by Evans, Stanovich, and Kahneman, and parallel-competitive theory, espoused by Sloman, Frankish, and Carruthers) and contrasting each with a one-system alternative, I argue that these three views should be understood as existing on a continuum: there are some theories that could plausibly be characterized as either one-system or default-interventionist, and the distinction between default-interventionism and parallelcompetitive theory is not as clean-cut as usually assumed. I then argue, using the conceptual claims I defended using the science fiction cases, that default-interventionist dual-process theory is not compatible with the claim that humans have two minds (contra Evans and Stanovich). (shrink)

이 논문은 원효(元曉, 617-686)의 ‘한마음의 두 측면’[一心二門]과 주희(朱熹, 1130-1200)의 심통성정(心統性情)을 비교 고찰한 것이다. 원효의 ‘한마음’과 주희의 ‘마음’은 각각 참으로 그러한 ‘고요한 측면’[眞如門]과 ‘생겨나고 사라지는 측면’[生滅門], ‘본성’[性]과 ‘감정’[情]을 포괄하고 있다. 전자는 체상용의 구조이고, 후자는 체용의 구조다. 이는 마치 역(易) 철학시대의 고대 동아시아의 세계 이해를 담고 있는 이태극(二太極)과 삼태극(三太極)을 연상시킨다.BR 원효는 ‘한마음’에서 ‘하나’는 둘이 없는 하나로서 이해되기 어렵지만 ‘본성 스스로 신비롭게 이해하는 지각 기능’을 가지고 있고 그래서 ‘마음’이라고 한다. 한마음 두 측면에서 고요한 측면인 진여문은 마음의 본체(本體)를 가리키고, 생겨나고 사라지는 측면인 생멸문은 상용(相用)이라는 (...) 일심의 현상적 측면을 가리킨다. 생멸문 안에 자체(自體)를 가지고 있어 그 안에 불생불멸의 측면을 상정한다. 원효의 ‘한마음’과 주희의 ‘마음’을 비교할 때, 주희가 말하는 ‘성’이 갖고 있는 도덕본성을 원효가 말하는 심생멸문 안 자체(自體)가 진여문적인 요소로서 도덕본성의 가능성이 있다.BR 주희의 ‘심통성정’에서 ‘마음’은 ‘본성’과 ‘감정’을 주재하는 역할을 하는데, 이를 통해 도덕 본성의 현실적 구현을 목표로 한다. ‘심’은 도덕 형이상의 본체론적인 의미와 ‘성’에 대한 지각 기능으로서의 인식론적 기능을 갖는다. ‘성’은 도덕 행위의 규범적 당위성을 부여하는 이치다. 한편, ‘감정’은 ‘마음’의 작용으로서 이것이 현실에 드러날 때, 도덕 이치인 ‘본성’을 적절히 구현해야 한다.BR 원효와 주희 사상 사이에는 많은 차이가 있다. 그러나 그런 차이에도 불구하고 체상용의 구조적인 유사성뿐만 아니라 인식 기능과 도덕본성이라는 내용적 유사성도 있다. (shrink)

Most scholars who presently deal with the Mind-Body problem consider themselves monist materialists. Nevertheless, many of them also assume that there exist (in some sense of existence) mental entities. But since these two positions do not harmonize quite well, the literature is full of discussions about how to reconcile the positions. In this paper, I will defend a materialist theory that avoids all these problems by completely rejecting the existence of mental entities. This is Quine's repudiation theory. (...) According to the theory, there are no mental entities, and the behavioral or physiological phenomena that have been attributed to mental entities, or that point to the existence of these entities, are exclusively caused by physiological factors. To be sure, several objections have been raised to materialist theories that do not assign some role to mental entities. But we will see that Quine is able to give convincing replies to these objections. (shrink)

This paper argues that navigating insects and spiders possess a degree of mindedness that makes them appropriate (in the sense of “possible”) objects of sympathy and moral concern. For the evidence suggests that many invertebrates possess a belief-desire-planning psychology that is in basic respects similar to our own. The challenge for ethical theory is find some principled way of demonstrating that individual insects do not make moral claims on us, given the widely held belief that some other “higher” animals (...) do make such claims on us. (shrink)

The measurement problem of quantum theory is discussed, and the difficulty of trying to solve it within the confines of a local, Lorentz-invariant physics is emphasised. This leads to the obvious suggestion to seek a solution beyond physics, in particular, by introducing the concept of consciousness. The resulting dualistic model, in the natural form suggested by quantum theory, is shown to differ in several respects from the classical model of Descartes, and to suggest solutions to some of the (...) long-standing problems concerning the relation of consciousness to the physical world. (shrink)

Life satisfaction is the general evaluation of the individual’s life, which is of great significance to achieving a better life. The purpose of the present study was to investigate the mediating effect of core self-evaluation, positive affect, and negative affect in the relationship between trait mindfulness and life satisfaction based on the Mindfulness-to-Meaning theory. 991 Chinese undergraduates completed the Mindful Attention Awareness Scale, the Core Self-Evaluations Scale, the Positive Affect and Negative Affect Scale, and the Satisfaction with Life Scale. (...) The results indicated that core self-evaluation and negative affect mediated the effect of trait mindfulness on life satisfaction, consistent with the Mindfulness-to-Meaning theory. Furthermore, trait mindfulness affected life satisfaction by the mediation paths of “core self-evaluation→positive affect” and “core self-evaluation→negative affect,” which uncovered the underlying mechanism of promoting life satisfaction by combining the point of view of cognition and emotion. The present study not only contributes to a better theoretical understanding of how trait mindfulness links to life satisfaction but also provides valuable guidance for enhancing life satisfaction. (shrink)

We present a conservative extension of a Bayesian account of confirmation that can deal with the problem of old evidence and new theories. So-called open-minded Bayesianism challenges the assumption—implicit in standard Bayesianism—that the correct empirical hypothesis is among the ones currently under consideration. It requires the inclusion of a catch-all hypothesis, which is characterized by means of sets of probability assignments. Upon the introduction of a new theory, the former catch-all is decomposed into a new empirical hypothesis and a (...) new catch-all. As will be seen, this motivates a second update rule, besides Bayes’ rule, for updating probabilities in light of a new theory. This rule conserves probability ratios among the old hypotheses. This framework allows for old evidence to confirm a new hypothesis due to a shift in the theoretical context. The result is a version of Bayesianism that, in the words of Earman, “keep[s] an open mind, but not so open that your brain falls out”. (shrink)

Maladapting Minds discusses a number of reasons why philosophers of psychiatry should take an interest in evolutionary explanations of mental disorders and, more generally, in evolutionary thinking. First of all, there is the nascent field of evolutionary psychiatry. Unlike other psychiatrists, evolutionary psychiatrists engage with ultimate, rather than proximate, questions about mental illnesses. Being a young and youthful new discipline, evolutionary psychiatry allows for a nice case study in the philosophy of science. Secondly, philosophers of psychiatry have engaged with evolutionary (...) theory because evolutionary considerations are often said to play a role in defining the concept of mental disorder. The basic question here is: Can the concept of mental disorder be given an objective definition, or is it rather a normative concept? Thirdly and finally, evolutionary thinking in psychiatry has often been a source of inspiration for a philosophical view on human nature. Thus evolutionary psychiatrists have suggested, for example, that man's vulnerability to mental disorders may well be one of the defining features of our species. -/- Written by leading authors in philosophy, psychiatry, biology and psychology, this volume illustrates that many debates in contemporary philosophy of psychiatry are profoundly influenced by evolutionary approaches to mental disorders. Conversely, it also reveals how philosophers can help contribute to the burgeoning field of evolutionary psychiatry. It is important reading for a wide range of readers interested in mental health care and philosophy. (shrink)

Psychophysical supervenience requires that the mental properties of a system cannot change without the change of its physical properties. In this paper, I argue that the Everett interpretation of quantum mechanics or Everett's theory seems to violate the principle of psychophysical supervenience. In order to be consistent with our experience, the theory assumes psychophysical supervenience in each world, including our world. However, this permits the possibility that under certain unitary time evolution which does not lead to world branching, (...) the wave function of each world changes and correspondingly the mental states of the observers in the world also change, while the wave function of the total worlds does not change, which violates the principle of psychophysical supervenience for all worlds. It seems that one must go beyond Everett's theory such as denying multiplicity in order to avoid the failure of psychophysical supervenience. (shrink)

It has been claimed that quantum mechanics, unlike classical mechanics, allows for free will. In this paper I articulate that claim and explain how a complex physical system possessing fractal-like self similarity could exhibitboth self consciousness and self determination. I use complexity theory to show how quantum mechanical indeterminacies at the neural level could “percolate up” to the levels of scale within the brain at which sensory-motor information transformations occur. Finally, I explain how macro level indeterminacy could be coupled (...) with self determination to provide a physical system with the capacity for radically free willing. (shrink)

이항로(李恒老)의 심설(心說)은 기정진(奇正鎭), 이진상(李震相), 전우(田愚) 등의 심설과 비견되는 중요한 학설이다. 본 연구에서는 이항로 심설이 형성되는 과정에서 서학(西學)의 영향을 고찰하였다. 서학은 17세기 초부터 유입되었으며, 18세기에는 사회 안정과 함께 유교지식인들의 연구대상이었다. 그러나 19세기로 들면서 동아시아 국제질서의 혼란과 더불어 서학 역시 배척되었다. 이항로에게 서학은 서세동점(西勢東漸)의 원인을 분석하는 도구였다. 그는 서학을 주로 기독교의 입장에서 보았다. 특히 기독교를 인간보다는 신을 중시하는 종교로 인식했다. 이와 대조적으로 유교 즉 성리학은 신이 아닌 인간의 도덕 주체성을 중시하는 사고체계로 이해했다. 이 과정에서 心은 인간의 주체성으로 확장되어 갔다. 하지만 이항로는 기존 (...) 유교 질서의 묵수를 강조하여 서학의 합리성을 도외시하였다. 즉, 서구 문명을 주체적으로 수용하지도, 당대 세계질서에 적절하게 대응하지도 못하였다. 한편, 현재 우리는 4차 산업혁명이라는 새로운 문명의 시대로 들어가고 있다. 이에 이항로의 심설에서 서학과 관련한 부분은 이 새로운 문명을 주체적으로 수용하는데 중요한 방법적 시사점을 제공할 것이다. (shrink)

This book presents an overview of contemporary information-processing approaches to second language acquisition. This theoretical approach proposes that people learn languages by applying the brain's general information-processing abilities to language input. This contrasts with generative (Chomskian) theory, which sees the brain as having a dedicated language-processing faculty, not a multipurpose one. This volume brings together in one place an integrated picture of ideas about processing approaches today and applications for language instruction. Designed to be a textbook for graduate-level courses (...) in language learning, second language acquisition, (it grew out of one Sanz herself offered), cognitive/psycholinguistic, and possibly language teacher preparation, it will also be of use to scholars and researchers in second language acquistion and cognitive psychology. (shrink)

From the Preface: This book represents the implementation of a decision adopted by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences relating to the celebration of the 500th anniversary of the birth of Nicholas Copernicus. From the outset it was intended that this Copernican volume would describe a number of Copernican-type intellectual revolutions that have taken place in recent centuries. Such revolutions are characterized by the abandonment of widely held concepts and replacement by dramatically new conceptualizations that resulted in deepened (...) understanding of natural processes.It was the original intention of the Academy's Council that the essays would be addressed to the general educated public, including teaching staffs of colleges and high schools and college students. The combination of the intended broad coverage and the contemplated readership presented considerable difficulties and affected the choice of incidents in the history of modern science which could be discussed. As it has turned out, the material presented is quite rich and, while there is an unavoidable variation in the amount of specialized knowledge expected from the reader, we hope that the summaries preceding particular chapters are sufficient to create a broad perspective and make the whole understandable. To the extent that our goals have been approached, the help of numerous scientists is gratefully acknowledged.The introductory chapter describes the circumstances and the essence of the initial intellectual revolution due to Copernicus himself. The subsequent six parts present in turn: several revolutions in astronomy-cosmology, all in the twentieth century and one of them still in progress; a number of deep revolutionary changes in the biological sciences, one of them made twenty years ago by an inspired contribution of a graduate student; several revolutionary changes in the physical sciences; revolutions in the thinking of mathematicians; the emergence of a "pluralistic" point of view in scientific research; and revolutions in technology.The epoch when it was possible for individuals to acquire a reasonably detailed view of practically all of science is now far behind us. It was followed by a prolonged period of compartmentalization of research, with specialists in one domain becoming increasingly ignorant of developments in another. In the present epoch the pendulum appears to be moving in the opposite direction. The many problems faced by modern society depend for their solution on interdisciplinary studies and on participation of individuals with wide horizons. It is hoped that the publication of the present volume will serve not only to commemorate the achievements of Nicholas Copernicus but also to stimulate and accelerate this trend. (shrink)

This is the introductory installment in a projected series of articles in which I shall be advancing the positive case for the "intrinsic" kind of explanatory account of "consciousness4." "Consciousness4" has reference to a property of individual mental-occurrence instances wherein there takes place an immediate awareness of them either upon their occurrence or as part of their very occurrence. The immediacy or directness of such inner awareness amounts to the absence of mental mediation by any other occurrent awareness. An account (...) of consciousness4 that properly comes under the heading of "intrinsic theory" is distinguished by the thesis that a mental-occurrence instance’s being conscious4 is an intrinsic property, rather than an external-relational property of that mental-occurrence instance. My hope for the present series of articles is that, by the end, the case for intrinsic theory will he so evidently strong, or at least so vivid, that all psychologists of consciousness will have to address intrinsic theory and its explanandum of consciousness4. In this article, I set the stage by rendering some of the relevant meanings explicit, spelling out my purpose and approach to making the case for intrinsic theory, providing some context for the discussions to follow, and mentioning important objections to intrinsic theory that have been voiced in the literature. (shrink)

A platitude that took hold with Kuhn is that there can be several equally good ways of balancing theoretical virtues for theory choice. Okasha recently modelled theory choice using technical apparatus from the domain of social choice: famously, Arrow showed that no method of social choice can jointly satisfy four desiderata, and each of the desiderata in social choice has an analogue in theory choice. Okasha suggested that one can avoid the Arrow analogue for theory choice (...) by employing a strategy used by Sen in social choice, namely, to enhance the information made available to the choice algorithms. I argue here that, despite Okasha’s claims to the contrary, the information-enhancing strategy is not compelling in the domain of theory choice. (shrink)

Bohm and Hiley suggest that a certain new type of active information plays a key objective role in quantum processes. This paper discusses the implications of this suggestion to our understanding of the relation between the mental and the physical aspects of reality.

PAUL OPPENHEIM and HILARY PUTNAM Unity of Science as a Working Hypothesis 1. Introduction 1.1. The expression "Unity of Science" is often encountered, ...

Chapter One The most plausible arguments for the identity of mind and body that have been advanced in this century have been for the identity of mental ...

Fara and Williamson (Mind, 2005) argue that counterpart theory is unable to account for modal claims that use an actuality operator. This paper argues otherwise. Rather than provide a different counterpart translation of the actuality operator itself, the solution presented here starts out with a quantified modal logic in which the actuality operator is redundant, and then translates the sentences of this logic into claims of counterpart theory.

Carruthers, P. (2006). The architecture of the mind. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. 462 pp. ISBN 0-19-92708-9, £55/$99 (hbk); 0-19-920707-0, £25/$45 (pbk).There is much to admire about this b...

The theory-theory is not supported by evidence in the everyday actions of infants and toddlers whose lives a Theory of Mind is meant radically to transform. This paper reviews some of these challenges to the theory-theory, particularly from communication and deception. We argue that the theory’s disconnection from action is both inevitable and paradoxical. The mind–behaviour dualism upon which it is premised requires a conceptual route to knowing minds and disallows a real (...) test of the theory through the study of action. Taking engagement seriously avoids these problems and requires that both lay people and psychologists be participants rather than observers in order to know, and indeed to create, minds. (shrink)

I explore the ways that the debate between Herbert Marcuse and Erich Fromm relates to the possibility of informing both a critical psychoanalysis as well as how psychoanalysis can fit into critical social theory. I argue that Fromm’s emphasis on the social nature of the mind and the self is a more attractive template that Marcuse’s more anachronistic reading of Freud and his metapsychology. Fromm grants centrality to the issue of praxis as central to the nature of critique, (...) both in terms of one’s relation to oneself in psychoanalytic terms as well as to the dynamics and structures of the social world of which we are a part. (shrink)

This paper proposes that neurodynamic system theory may be used to connect structural and functional aspects of neural organization. The paper claims that generalized causal dynamic models are proper tools for describing the self-organizing mechanism of the nervous system. In particular, it is pointed out that ontogeny, development, normal performance, learning, and plasticity, can be treated by coherent concepts and formalism. Taking into account the self-referential character of the brain, autopoiesis, endophysics and hermeneutics are offered as elements of a (...) poststructuralist brain (-mind-computer) theory. (shrink)

Leach asks, what would Collingwood have thought of archaeological theory, a sub-discipline of archaeology that has developed since the 1960s? He argues that Collingwood would have welcomed it for it has developed out of respect for the principle that in any investigation, in examining the evidence, one must always have some question in mind. Nonetheless, although Collingwood would have welcomed recent developments in archaeological theory, and would have urged metaphysicians to take notice of such developments, he is (...) not himself an archaeological theorist: he is, primarily, a metaphysician. (shrink)

The prevailing view that there is significant cognitive continuity between humans and other animals is a result of misinterpretations of the role of evolution, combined with anthropomorphism. This combination has often resulted in an over-interpretation of data from animal experiments. Comparative psychology should do what the name indicates: study the cognitive capacities of different species empirically, without naive evolutionary presuppositions.

An historical overview and evaluation of modern psychology's theoretical foundations, Mind ranges from Descartes to dynamics in its discussion of such topics as introspectionism, psychoanalysis, behaviorism, and the varieties of contemporary cognitive science. Throughout, these theories are examined and assessed as attempts to construct an overall conception of the perso--as general theories of human nature.

Many-minds arguments are flooding into legal theory. Such arguments claim that in some way or another, many heads are better than one; the genus includes many species, such as arguments about how legal and political institutions aggregate information, evolutionary analyses of those institutions, claims about the benefits of tradition as a source of law, and analyses of the virtues and vices of deliberation. This essay offers grounds for skepticism about many-minds arguments. I provide an intellectual zoology of such arguments (...) and suggest that they are of low utility for legal theory. Four general and recurring problems with many-minds arguments are as follows: (1) Whose minds?: The group or population whose minds are at issue is often equivocal or ill-defined. (2) Many minds, worse minds: The quality of minds is not independent of their number; rather, number endogenously influences quality, often for the worse. More minds can be systematically worse than fewer because of selection effects, incentives for epistemic free-riding, and emotional and social influences. (3) Epistemic bottlenecks: In the legal system, the epistemic benefits of many minds are often diluted or eliminated because the structure of institutions funnels decisions through an individual decisionmaker, or a small group of decisionmakers, who occupy a kind of epistemic bottleneck or chokepoint. (4) Many minds vs. many minds: The insight that many heads can be better than one gets little purchase on the institutional comparisons that pervade legal theory, which are typically many-to-many comparisons rather than one-to-many. (shrink)

What is the conscious mind? What is experience? In 1968, David Armstrong asked “What is a man?” and replied that a man is “a certain sort of material object”. This book starts from his question but proceeds along a different path. The traditional mind-brain identity theory is set aside, and a mind-object identity theory is proposed in its place: to be conscious of an object is simply to be made of that object. Consciousness is physical (...) but not neural. This groundbreaking hypothesis is supported by recent empirical findings in both perception and neuroscience, and is herein tested against a series of objections of both conceptual and empirical nature: the traditional mind-brain identity arguments from illusion, hallucinations, dreams, and mental imagery. The theory is then compared with existing externalist approaches including disjunctivism, realism, embodied cognition, enactivism, and the extended mind. Can experience and objects be one and the same? (shrink)

Agency and representation are viewed as preconditions for democratic action. The dominant understanding of agency and representation is defined in terms of certain capacities and abilities that are considered to constitute the basis of personhood. The article will put into question this understanding and the assumptions that underpin it and argue that it rests on a mistaken conception of human animality – one that reduces the self to an autonomous and disembodied rational mind. The article will also suggest that (...) it is problematic because it marginalizes more than human forms of life – as well as those of us who are differently human – and excludes their points of view from the political processes of world making. In contrast, I will put forward an understanding of agency and representation that is attuned to the relational dimensions of all life on earth. By paying attention to the semiotic propensities that all forms of life share – which entails considering nonlinguistic forms of communication – this article responds to the need for more radically democratic ways of listening, giving voice, and caring for the earth’s beings and the relations that form the conditions for life to flourish. (shrink)

Stephen and Van Orden (this issue) propose that there is a complex system approach to cognitive science, and collectively the authors of the papers presented in this issue believe that this approach provides the means to drive a revolution in the science of the mind. Unfortunately, however illuminating, this explanation is absent and hyperbole is all too extensive. In contrast, I argue (1) that dynamic systems theory is not new to cognitive science and does not provide a basis (...) for a revolution, (2) it is not necessary to reject cognitive science in order to explain the constraints imposed by the body and the environment, (3) it is not necessary, as Silberstein and Chemero (this issue) appear to do, to reject cognitive science in order to explain consciousness, and (4) our understanding of pragmatics is not advanced by Gibbs and Van Orden‘s (this issue) “self-organized criticality”.? Any debate about the future of cognitive science could usefully focus on predictive adequacy. Unfortunately, this is not the approach taken by the authors of this issue. (shrink)

Global development, diffusion and implementation of the human-centredness paradigm can be performed at best when supported by a study of our mental activity. By analysing our mental operations, we can understand how human needs, interests, values and creativity take form, what each consists of, how it is possible to expand, modify and generate them. The proposed model of mental activity is based on attentional movement. The new opportunities, both ethical and social, offered by such a study are presented.

In this article, we highlight three questions: (1) Does human cognition rely on structured internal representations? (2) How should theories, models and data relate? (3) In what ways might embodiment, action and dynamics matter for understanding the mind and the brain?

In light of the close connection between the ontological hierarchy of set theory and the ideological hierarchy of type theory, Øystein Linnebo and Agustín Rayo have recently offered an argument in favour of the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended. In this paper, we argue that, since the connection between the two hierarchies is indeed tight, any philosophical conclusions cut both ways. One should either hold that both the ontological hierarchy and the ideological hierarchy are open-ended, or (...) that neither is. If there is reason to accept the view that the set-theoretic universe is open-ended, that will be because such a view is the most compelling one to adopt on the purely ontological front. (shrink)

This paper offers a solution to Laura Valentini’s paradox of ideal theory. A reason for idealizing assumptions is because otherwise the theory would be too complicated to be action guiding.

The model of mind and body in Tibetan medical practice is based on Buddhist theory, and is neither dualistic in a Cartesian sense, nor monistic. Rather, it represents a genuine alternative to these positions by presenting mind/body interaction as a dynamic process that is situated within the context of the individual’s relationships with others and the environment. Due to the distinctiveness, yet interdependence, of mind and body, the physician’s task is to heal the patient’s mind (...) (blo-gso) as well as body. This in turn emphasizes the central importance of ‘compassion’ in the physician/patient relationship. This article investigates how Tibetan medical practitioners understand and enact the mind/ body and physician/patient relationships, and how this relates to theoretical explications of these relationships in Tibetan medical and Buddhist teachings. Furthermore, Tibetan medicine provides an interesting model for comparison with embodied theories of cognition, which see consciousness, the body and its environment as integral parts of a complex, dynamical cognitive system. (shrink)

Bringing a fresh contemporary Freudian view to a number of current issues in psychoanalysis, this book is about a psychoanalytic method that has been evolved by _Fred Busch_ over the past 40 years called _Creating a Psychoanalytic Mind_. It is based on the essential curative process basic to most psychoanalytic theories - the need for a shift in the patient's relationship with their own mind. _Busch_ shows that with the development of a psychoanalytic mind the patient can acquire (...) the capacity to shift the inevitability of action to the possibility of reflection. _Creating a Psychoanalytic Mind _is derived from an increasing clarification of how the mind works that has led to certain paradigm changes in the psychoanalytic method. While the methods of understanding the human condition have evolved since Freud, the means of _bringing this understanding to patients in a way that is meaningful_ have not always followed. Throughout, _Fred_ _Busch_ illustrates that while the analyst's expertise is crucial to the process, the analyst's stance, rather than mainly being an expert in the content of the patient's mind, is primarily one of helping the patient to find his own mind. _Creating a Psychoanalytic Mind _will appeal to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists interested in learning a theory and technique where psychoanalytic meaning and meaningfulness are integrated. It will enable professionals to work differently and more successfully with their patients. (shrink)

In 1972, Kurt Flasch broke new ground with his contentious thesis that Dietrich von Freiberg, as early as 1300, had formulated a theory of productive subjectivity. Flasch argues that Dietrich recognized the object-constituting function of the mind conceived in transcendental terms, much in the same vein as Immanuel Kant’s so-called Copernican Revolution. Despite the ongoing controversy surrounding this thesis, Kant has been noticeably neglected in the relevant scholarly discussion. The following paper will address this oversight through a comparative (...) analysis of Dietrich’s and Kant’s theories on mental constitution and intellect. While there are general similarities between the two philosophers, closer inspection reveals critical discrepancies in their core theoretical constructs. Additionally, their respective methodologies are fundamentally incompatible. Dietrich’s approach does offer a reorientation in medieval thinking, yet its underpinnings of metaphysics and theocentricism clash with the experimental nature of Kant’s transcendental refl ections. (shrink)