The integration of embodied and computational approaches to cognition requires that non-neural body parts be described as parts of a computing system, which realizes cognitive processing. In this paper, based on research about morphological computations and the ecology of vision, I argue that nonneural body parts could be described as parts of a computational system, but they do not realize computation autonomously, only in connection with some kind of—even in the simplest form—central control system. Finally, I integrate the proposal defended (...) in the paper with the contemporary mechanistic approach to wide computation. (shrink)

The book presents a collection of articles authored by several members of the Warsaw School of Political Theory, affiliated with the University of Warsaw. The team of scholars, first founded in the 1970s by professor Artur Bodnar, has been conducting research under the leadership of professor Miroslaw Karwat.

This collection of articles offers an in-depth ex-ploration of explanatory, non-normative political theory, moving beyond the simple mechanics of governance and power struggles. The chapters investigate the boundaries and forms of political phenomena, including the transformation of non-political matters into political issues. The analysis distinguishes between political actions driven by ideas and interests, efforts to harmo-nize conflicting forces for social stability, and the principles that underpin the political framework. Moreover, the book delves into the socio-technical mechanisms of enemy creation, polari-zation, (...) and dehumanization, as well as the con-tradictions of political pluralism, deliberation, and the emergence of antipolitics. (shrink)

This paper discusses the resources for deconstruction offered by cognitive science, drawing inspiration from David Gunkel’s work on the topic (Deconstruction, MIT Press 2021). The gesture of deconstruction is seen as having a positive impact on the development of this interdisciplinary field by challenging misleading dichotomies and examining its underlying assumptions, such as the symmetry of integration.

In this article, I show the role that the philosopher of cognitive science can cur-rently play in cognitive science research. I argue for the important, and not yet considered, role of the philosophy of cognitive science in cognitive science, that is, the importance of cooperation between philosophers of science with cogni-tive scientists in investigating the research methods and theoretical assump-tions of cognitive science. At the beginning of the paper I point out, how the philosopher of science, here, the philosopher of (...) cognitive science, can participate in interdisciplinary research. I am opting of the cooperation in investigating the so-called reflective problems. Then, I discuss four examples of issues important for the cognitive science, in which the competences possessed by the philosopher are useful. At the ending I point out wider landscape of possible cooperation of philosophers with cognitive scientists. (shrink)

The body is a highly complex, coordinated system engaged in coping with many environmental problems. It can be considered as some sort of opportunity or obstacle, with which internal processing must deal. Internal processing must take into account the possibilities and limitations of the particular body. In other words, even if the body is not involved in the realization of some cognitive explicit task, it is not a neutral factor of our understanding of why a system solves a task in (...) one way or another. Therefore, when conducting research on embodiment and the body’s cognitive system we should not neglect internal, cognitive processing. I appeal to Goldman’s research on embodied cognition to sketch the broader framework for internal processing in embodied cognition. I believe that even if we don’t accept Goldman’s approach as the viable proposal for embodied cognition in general, it’s a quite natural starting point for our analysis. Goldman (2012; 2014, and with de Vignemont 2009) argue for the essential role of the bodily formats or bodily codes (respectively: B-formats and B-codes) in embodied cognition. B-codes are here described as the processing of regions or sub-regions of the central nervous system. They are primarily employed for body control or monitoring, and reused for cognitive tasks. Beyond doubt, this conception provides an excellent starting point for analyzing the internal (mostly neural) processing in cases of embodied cognition. At the end of this paper, I will argue that the embodiment of cognition needs a conceptual twist. Following Keijzer’s (2015) interest in the evolution of the nervous system, and the minimal forms of cognition, I argue that in investigating embodied cognition, we should investigate the role played by cognitive processing for specific kinds of organisms, meaning organisms with a body of a particular morphology (size, shape, kinds, and distribution of sensors and effectors). Doing that, I refer to some conceptual and empirical considerations. I will also try to show that research on embodied cognition is still not sufficiently anchored in evolutionary and comparative studies on cognition, nor on the nervous system and body morphology. Bigger reliance on these kinds of studies, will make it make possible to gain a deeper understanding of internal processing in embodied cognition. (shrink)

In the article, I propose that the body phantom is a phenomenal and functional model of one’s own body. This model has two aspects. On the one hand, it functions as a tacit sensory representation of the body that is at the same time related to the motor aspects of body functioning. On the other hand, it also has a phenomenal aspect as it constitutes the content of conscious bodily experience. This sort of tacit, functional and sensory model is related (...) to the spatial parameters of the physical body. In the article, I postulate that this functional model or map is of crucial importance to the felt ownership parameters of the body (de Vignemont 2007), which are themselves considered as constituting the phenomenal aspect of the aforementioned model. (shrink)

Wollen (Libertarianism and conjoined twins) argues that libertarianism premised on absolute property rights founders where physical boundaries between two persons cannot be discerned, as is the case with conjoined twins. In this rejoinder, we make a three-pronged argument against Wollen’s claim. First, it is demonstrated that even if conjoined twins really do not hold self-ownership rights against one another, they still have one bodily ownership right against the rest of the world. Second, two alternative resolutions of Wollen’s hypothetical dispute between (...) conjoined twins that derive from two different versions of libertarianism are set forth. Third, it is shown that the quandaries engendered by the existence of conjoined twins not only are not specific for libertarianism but there also are political philosophies to which conjoined twins pose even greater a challenge. (shrink)

One of the leading and central figures in research on delusions, Max Coltheart, presents and summarises his heretofore work in a short text. Miyazono and Bortolotti present an interesting argument aimed at the charges against the doxastic concept of delusions. Adams, Brown and Friston showcase a predictive-Bayesian concept of delusions. Young criticizes the current changes in the two-factor account of delusions and argues that the role of experience should not be dismissed within it. Kapusta presents an interesting, phenomenological approach to (...) delusions, rooted in the classic works of Karl Jaspers. In the last article, Carruthers takes a look at delusions from a different perspective. He uses them in order to show the weakness of the sense of agency concept as proposed by Wegner. The issue also contains an interview with Jakob Hohwy. In Hohwy’s still-recent book, we can find an interesting, predictive approach to delusions. Hohwy points towards the unobvious connections between delusions and illusions. (shrink)

This paper is a loose commentary on Marcinów’s book (2017). The commentary is focused on the objects of psychopathological investigations and the role of psychology / psychiatry tension in the process of singling out, tracking, and describing them. As a consequence, there are limitations of collaborative and integrative efforts between psychologists and psychiatrists where questions of psychopathology are concerned.

One of the most common questions in today’s cognitive studies is the one regarding embodied cognition. The answer to this question draws our attention to many factors, including bodily actions, which also work to embody cognition. With this in mind, enactivism is included in discussions of embodiment.

This paper examines the role of doubt in the classification of inferential reasons in Dharmottara’s Nyāyabinduṭīkā, and in the works of his Nyāya rivals Keśavamiśra and Jayantabhaṭṭa. As deeply systematic thinkers, larger themes in these philosophers’ metaphysics directly determine the more local issues in epistemology and inferential theory, helping to explain, and show the significance of, the differences in their accounts of inferential reasons. For Keśava, an ontology which includes real universals allows for an externalist, reliabilist epistemology, on which the (...) conditions for a genuine inferential reason can be stated in an absolute manner. For Dharmottara, on the other hand, an ontology in which mentally constructed universals are imposed upon real particulars leads to greater dependency on the cognising agent, such that the triple conditions for the inferential reason are formulated in a cogniser-relative way. These differences lead to a more restrictive list of acceptable reasons on Dharmottara’s part, which excludes cases involving doubt. (shrink)

Nawet jeżeli integrację poznania rozproszonego z mechanistycznymi koncepcjami wyjaśniania można uznać za ruch interesujący, a w przypadku powodzenia prowadzący do niebanalnego rozszerzenia kognitywistycznych badań nad poznaniem, to z perspektywy teoretyka poznania rozproszonego należy uznać ten ruch za ryzykowny. W poniższej pracy, w dyskusji z propozycją Witolda Wachowskiego (2022), postaram się przedstawić ryzyko, z jakim wiąże się wspomniana integracja i zaproponuję rozwiązanie alternatywne, polegające na połączeniu rozproszenia poznania z teorią sieci. Teoria ta, w mojej opinii, pozwala na bardziej owocne badanie wzorców (...) rozproszenia poznania. ----------------------------------------- Zgłoszono: 26/09/2023. Zrecenzowano: 26/03/2024. Zaakceptowano do publikacji: 10/06/2024. (shrink)

The present paper aims to study the issue of the value of life in Murray N. Rothbard’s work, and to examine his argument for the contention that “life _should_ be an objective ultimate value” and that “the preservation and furtherance of one’s life takes on the stature of an incontestable axiom.” Rothbard’s assumptions and presuppositions are investigated and critically assessed. Using conceptual and logical analysis rooted mostly in the praxeological method of economics (as developed by Mises and Rothbard himself) and (...) the theory of value (Scheffler, Raz, Elzenberg), it is demonstrated that Rothbard’s account is fallacious both on its own as well as on broader theoretical grounds. It is argued that what Rothbard could—under his specific assumptions about valuing—correctly claim is only that an actor values life _to some extent_, rather than that life has an objective ultimate value or preservation and furtherance of one’s life has an axiomatic status. The theoretical argument is supported by empirical illustration from suicide terrorism. The paper submits that Rothbard’s position on the value of life is unsound, and that using his argumentation as it stands cannot succeed. (shrink)

Dowód pierwszej tezy Gorgiasza jest dedukcyjnym wnioskowaniem nie wprost, skon-struowanym przez wielokrotne użycie schematu modus tollens. Te z jego przesłanek, które przyjęte są bez dowodów, są łudząco podobne do niektórych prawd logicznych lub analitycznych. Gdyby rzeczywiście nimi były, w dowodzie musiałyby pojawić się sprzeczności. W czasach Gorgiasza dowód mógł uchodzić za poprawny; możliwość jasnego wskazania i opisania jego defektów poja-wiła się dopiero z wynalezieniem logiki formalnej. Gorgiasz mógł ogłosić swą tezę serio –jako tezę skrajnego nihilizmu metafizycznego –nie obawiając się kompromitacji. (...) Jeżeli dowód jest sofizma-tem, to wśród sofizmatów jest arcydziełem, najwybitniejszym osiągnięciem sofistów w tej dziedzi-nie. (shrink)

This article is an attempt of representing St. Augustine's struggle against the greatest problems of Christian ethics, namely, the problem of evil. After the introduction of the philosophical grounds of the problem, we will turn to the outline of the way the Bishop of Hippo has gone through in the quest of the rational explanations for the existence of evil. An analysis of Augustine's works has shown that he lost his hope to find any sensible answer to this question with (...) the lapse of time, and abandoned himself to an almost blind faith. The Saint leaves us all by ourselves with this anxious question about evil. (shrink)

Tomasz Ignacy Szpot Dunin SJ w swoim dziele poświęconym historii Chin nie ominął postaw znaczących chińskich dowódców w okresie przełomu historycznego jakim był upadek dynastii Ming i jej zastąpienie przez mandżurską dynastię Qing. Jednym z nich był Wu Sangui, który początkowo wspierał Mingów w walce z zewnętrznymi i wewnętrznymi wrogami, by w kluczowym momencie przyczynić się do powodzenia najazdu mandżurskiego, a po niemal trzech dekadach działania pod zwierzchnością nowej dynastii wypowiedzieć jej posłuszeństwo i stanąć na czele tzw. Rebelii Trzech Lenników. (...) Sprawa ta była znana w Europie i stała się nawet przedmiotem zainteresowania literackiego w XVIII w. Szpot Dunin nie poddaje się w swoim opisie skrajnym tendencjom, umiejętnie rozważa okoliczności decyzji i przedstawia zniuansowany, ale jednocześnie wyrazisty obraz postaci Wu Sangui, jego zamiarów i niepowodzeń. (shrink)

Pico was generally perceived as a representative of the Pelagian heresy and a supporter of absolute freedom of man. However, more detailed analysis of his works reveals that in his views he was much more traditional than it used to be judged. Although Pico does not negate human freedom, he has consistently stressed the necessity of grace in salvation. So, in the question of free will Pico represents traditional post-Augustinian school and advocates, also present at the Thomas’, graduated concept of (...) grace. (shrink)

The recent studies on the relations between humanism or humanists and jurisprudence convince that Reneaissance, especially in XVIth century, when the national states began to raise, belonged to the periods of increased interest in the issue of law. Although Erasmus was not a layer, nor he introduced in any of his works a complete theory of law, he maintained close relations with many leading theoreticians of the law and jurists and sometimes spoke in the legal discussions of his age. Among (...) hist most important works concerning the matter of law were: Institutio principis Christiani, Ratio seu Methodus verae theologiae, Christiani matrimonii institutio, De interdicto esu carnium and Ecclesiastes. In the paper I’m going to concentrate on this latter work, in which Erasmus discusses the significance of preaching, preacher and widely understood Christian rhetoric. In the Ecclesiastes Erasmus touches the law subject with the special emphasis on historical character of law and relations between the divine law, the law of Christ and the law of Nature. After a short discussion about his understaning of law I will concentrate on the essential differentiation between the letter of law and the spirit of law, and I will point at proposed by Erasmus ways of introduction of law into human life. Erasmus, on the one hand, escaped a rigidity and abstraction of law and, on the other, he neutralised an aspect of the coercion of law. In his solution Erasmus appreciated the political dimension of preaching and acknowledged preacher as a more important guide of the people, than ruler. I’m going to interpret the Erasmian concept of preaching as an rhetorical mean of introduction of law in analogical way to “introduction” proposed by Plato in his Nomoi. (shrink)

Summary: This volume is interesting and worth reading as an introduction to the philosophical and cognitive neuroscience research on volition.

[Does my body embody cognition?] The works published in this section address the question of embodied cognition in an inspiring manner. In her article written ten years ago, Natika Newton deals with the notion of the relation between mental representation and embodiment. Frederique de Vignemont in his text written five years prior begins a strictly philosophical debate regarding the sense of ownership of one’s own body. Claire Petitmengin’s article is a kind of counterpoint to the previous texts. She attempts to (...) explain and demonstrate the profound dimension of experience which she characterizes as affective, transmodal and gestural. (shrink)

The equivalence principle, being one of the building blocks of general relativity, seems to be crucial for analysis of quantum effects in gravity. In this paper we consider the relation between the equivalence principle and the consistency of quantum information processing in gravitational field. We propose an analysis with a looped evolution consisting of steps both in the gravitational field and in the accelerated reference frame. We show that without the equivalence principle the looped quantum evolution cannot be unitary and (...) looses its consistency. For this reasoning the equivalence principle is formulated in terms of the gauge transformations and is analyzed for particles acquiring an appropriate phase associated with the action over the looped path. In consequence, to keep consistency of quantum operations in gravitational field, it is required to keep a quantum variant of the equivalence principle. This proves importance of the quantized version of this fundamental gravitational principle for quantum information processing. (shrink)

According to Peter Halligan, […] it is important to consider that the experience of our body is largely the product of a continuously updated „phantom” generated by the brain. (Halligan 2002, 266). Next, he adds: I will argue (not withstanding pathology to the physical body) that the prevalent common sense assumption of phantom experience as pathological is wrongheaded and largely based on a long-standing and pernicious folk assumption that the physical body is necessary for experience of a body. (Halligan 2002, (...) 252). These two remarks can serve as a backdrop for a discussion of the problem of bodily self-consciousness presented in the article. If experiencing a phantom of an amputated limb is indeed not pathological, and if normal bodily experience is de facto based on the body phantom constructed by the brain, then our conception of this very phantom should prove relevant when trying to explain bodily self-consciousness. (shrink)

Introduction to interview with Frederique de Vignemont.

The article presents a collection of seventeen previously unpublished inscriptions on stone and small objects from Bithynia. The majority of them belong to the middle Byzantine period and comes from the area of Nikaia and Nikomedeia. First of all, the inscription from a boundary stone of a monastery of Theotokos near Niketiaton is discussed, in which the bridge of a certain Eustathios and the monastery of Johannes Kranbas are mentioned. The building inscription of a refectory attests to the existence of (...) a splendid monastic complex near Kanlıçay, to the east of the Sangarios River. The inscription from a column offered by Leon lists several saints. In addition to clerics and monks, the funerary inscriptions also mention one Basil who came from the Diocese of Ikonion. This is followed by an epigraphical attestation of the koinonikon σῶμα Χριστοῦ (an Easter hymn), a fragment of an inscription mentioning the city of Joannina, a reliquary cross of Saint Damian, and two processional or blessing crosses. A clay seal with the monogram probably of a certain Photios closes the collection. (shrink)

The Nyāya philosopher Udayana devotes the first chapter of his Ātmatattvaviveka to refuting the Buddhist thesis of universal momentariness—the view that nothing which exists can persist through time—and to establishing the contrary view that things can and do persist. In the course of his critique of the Buddhists' "inference from existence" which purports to establish the momentariness thesis, Udayana is forced to consider the problem of how, if at all, it is possible to meaningfully and reliably think and talk about (...) things which do not exist.In this paper, I offer a close reading of this section of the ĀTV, taking seriously both the philosophical context and commitments of Udayana's work in general, and the... (shrink)

[The subject and his world in statu nascendi.] Similarly to other works created in the context of enactivism, the works presented in this section refer to the permanently emerging subject as well as, simultaneously, the world of this subject. In the article entitled “The Mind-Body-Body Problem” an animal becomes the basic element of the mind-body-body relation, while in “Living ways of sense-making” the author makes a callback to the research he performed together with Varela in the context of phenomenology and (...) biology. (shrink)

Eviatar Shulman’s Rethinking the Buddha: Early Buddhist Philosophy as Meditative Perception offers an important reminder to take early Buddhist texts seriously as meaning what they say, with regard to the four noble truths, dependent origination, and selflessness. Shulman’s book ably makes this interpretive point, but is frustratingly unclear in its more general discussion of the relationship between philosophy and meditation. Shulman’s main thesis is that the four noble truths, as they are customarily taught today, are a...

In the course of his critique of the Buddhist doctrine of universal momentariness, Udayana argues for an isomorphism between our understandings of space and time, which is meant to undercut the Buddhists’ well-known “inference from existence.” The present paper examines these arguments from Udayana’s Ātmatattvaviveka, together with Ratnakīrti’s treatment of them in his Kṣaṇabhaṅgasiddhi Anvayātmikā. As an historical study, the paper aims to elucidate the connections between Udayana and Ratnakīrti, and the implications of those connections for the dependence of the (...) inference from existence upon various arguments which appear elsewhere in Ratnakīrti’s corpus. As a work of philosophical interpretation, the paper will clarify what is at stake in the local debate over the space–time isomorphism. Ratnakīrti’s position will best be understood as an account on which different simple causal properties are ascribed, or indexed, to an allegedly persisting entity at different times, while Udayana will prefer an account on which complex properties indexed to the place and/or time of the effect—for instance, “generating a sprout in this particular place” or “producing a visual awareness at a certain time”—will belong to a persisting thing throughout its entire existence. Furthermore, the acceptance or rejection of space and time as substantial entities in their own right, as distinct from the entities which are conventionally said to exist in space and time, will have important implications for the accounts of causality that each thinker can accept. (shrink)