Pro lidské jednání je důležitý vztah volního a nevolního momentu, svobody a danosti. Ve své práci bych se chtěl zabývat vztahem volního a nevolního momentu v trilogii P. Ricoeura Filosofie vůle (především v jejím prvním dílu). Ricoeur ukazuje odkázanost a propojenost obou momentů ve třech fázích jednání, jimiž je rozhodování, čin a souhlas. Pokud nevolní moment převládne nad volním, propadá člověk zlu. Cílem člověka by mělo být dobro: ovládnutí nevolního momentu vůlí a vztah k druhému člověku. Problematičnost rozdělení světa na (...) dobro a zlo ukazují úvahy F. Nietzscheho v interpretaci P. Kouby. Pro Nietzscheho jsou dobro a zlo nejednoznačné a provázané. Jeho pohled interpretovaný P. Koubou nám ukazuje člověka zcela odkázaného na sebe sama, bez opory v jasném rozdělení světa. Pokusím se důkladněji vyložit Ricoeurův popis volního a nevolního momentu a ukázat, zda a nakolik na něj lze uplatnit Nietzscheho kritiku. Závěrem přiblížím alternativu vůči morálce na jedné straně a relativismu na druhé, kterou ve své interpretaci Nietzscheho nabízí P. Kouba. (shrink)

El presente artículo toma como objeto de análisis las implicancias políticas de la categoría psicoanalítica de identificación en la obra de Ernesto Laclau, a partir del establecimiento de un vínculo epistemológico entre teoría política y psicoanálisis. A tales efectos, abordaré la apropiación laclausiana de las contribuciones de Sigmund Freud y de Jacques Lacan sobre este fenómeno, para señalar la especificidad de la identificación en tanto mecanismo habilitante de toda constitución subjetiva, en general, así como de toda subjetividad política, en (...) particular. (shrink)

We show in ZFC that the existence of completely separable maximal almost disjoint families of subsets of $\omega $ implies that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4.1.2}$ is complete with respect to the Čech–Stone compactification of the natural numbers, the space $\beta \omega $. In the same fashion we prove that the modal logic $\mathbf {S4}$ is complete with respect to the space $\omega ^*=\beta \omega \setminus \omega $. This improves the results of G. Bezhanishvili and J. Harding in [4], where (...) the authors prove these theorems under stronger assumptions. Our proof is also somewhat simpler. (shrink)

Many philosophers believe that our ordinary English words man and woman are “gender terms,” and gender is distinct from biological sex. That is, they believe womanhood and manhood are not defined even partly by biological sex. This sex/gender distinction is one of the most influential ideas of the twentieth century on the broader culture, both popular and academic. Less well known are the reasons to think it’s true. My interest in this paper is to show that, upon investigation, the arguments (...) for the sex/gender distinction have feet of clay. In fact, they all fail. We will survey the literature and tour arguments in favor of the sex/gender distinction, and then we’ll critically evaluate those arguments. We’ll consider the argument from resisting biological determinism, the argument from biologically intersex people and vagueness, the argument from the normativity of gender, and some arguments from thought experiments. We’ll see that these arguments are not up to the task of supporting the sex/gender distinction; they simply don’t work. So, philosophers should either develop stronger arguments for the sex/gender distinction, or cultivate a variety of feminism that’s consistent with the traditional, biologically-based definitions of woman and man. (shrink)

Modalists think that knowledge requires forming your belief in a “modally stable” way: using a method that wouldn't easily go wrong, or using a method that wouldn't have given you this belief had it been false. Recent Modalist projects from Justin Clarke-Doane and Dan Baras defend a principle they call “Modal Security,” roughly: if evidence undermines your belief, then it must give you a reason to doubt the safety or sensitivity of your belief. Another recent Modalist project from Carlotta Pavese (...) and Bob Beddor defends “Modal Virtue Epistemology”: knowledge is a belief that is maximally modally robust across “normal” worlds. We'll offer new objections to these recent Modalist projects. We will then argue for a rival view, Explanationism: knowing something is believing it because it's true. We will show how Explanationism offers a better account of undermining defeaters than Modalism, and a better account of knowledge. (shrink)

Feminism has long grappled with its own demarcation problem—exactly what is it to be a woman?—and the rise of trans-inclusive feminism has made this problem more urgent. I will first consider Sally Haslanger’s “social and hierarchical” account of woman, resulting from “Ameliorative Inquiry”: she balances ordinary use of the term against the instrumental value of novel definitions in advancing the cause of feminism. Then, I will turn to Katharine Jenkins’ charge that Haslanger’s view suffers from an “Inclusion Problem”: it fails (...) to class many trans women as women. Jenkins offers a novel norm-relevancy account of woman to avoid the Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, Jenkins’ account has serious internal problems, i.e. problems by Jenkins’ own lights: it is unintelligible, or it suffers from an Inclusion Problem of its own. After that, I will develop novel arguments for the conclusion that the project of Ameliorative Inquiry is both incoherent and also impossible to complete—at least, impossible to complete in a trans-inclusive way. Trans-inclusive feminism, therefore, would do well to move beyond Ameliorative Inquiry. Insofar as that’s not possible, trans-inclusive feminism inherits the incoherence of Ameliorative Inquiry. (shrink)

What is a woman? The definition of this central concept of feminism has lately become especially controversial and politically charged. “Ameliorative Inquirists” have rolled up their sleeves to reengineer our ordinary concept of womanhood, with a goal of including in the definition all and only those who identify as women, both “cis” and “trans.” This has proven to be a formidable challenge. Every proposal so far has failed to draw the boundaries of womanhood in a way acceptable to the Ameliorative (...) Inquirists, since not all those who identify as women count as women on these proposals, and some who count as women on these proposals don’t identify as women. This is the Trans Inclusion Problem. Is there any solution? Can there be? Recently, Katharine Jenkins, pointing to the work of Mari Mikkola, suggests that the Trans Inclusion Problem can be “deflated” rather than solved. We will investigate this proposal, and show that, unfortunately, Jenkins is mistaken: Mikkola’s project will not help us answer the Trans Inclusion Problem. After that, we’ll look at Robin Dembroff’s suggestion that we “imitate” the linguistic practices of trans inclusive and queer communities, and we will evaluate whether this would help us solve the Trans Inclusion Problem. Unfortunately, this strategy also fails to solve the problem. By the end, we’ll have a better appreciation of the challenges faced by Ameliorative Inquirists in their project of redefining “woman,” and clearer view of why the Trans Inclusion Problem cannot, in fact, be solved. That’s primarily because, no matter what it means to be a woman, it’s one thing to be a woman, and another thing to identify as a woman. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other's assessment the same weight as her own. I first make the antecedent of this Equal-Weight View more precise, and then I motivate the View by describing cases in which it gives the intuitively correct verdict. Next I introduce some apparent counterexamples – cases of apparent peer disagreement in which, intuitively, one should not give equal weight to the other party's assessment. To defuse these apparent (...) counterexamples, an advocate of the View might try to explain how they are not genuine cases of peer disagreement. I examine David Christensen's and Adam Elga's explanations and find them wanting. I then offer a novel explanation, which turns on a distinction between knowledge from reports and knowledge from direct acquaintance. Finally, I extend my explanation to provide a handy and satisfying response to the charge of self-defeat. (shrink)

Este artículo estudia cómo, desde la cima del Estado argentino, la “cultura emprendedora” operó como un valor de gestión para legitimar las prácticas político-técnicas de un conjunto de individuos que ocuparon cargos políticos en la Secretaría de Economía Social de la Nación entre 2015 y 2019. Allí desembarcaron profesionales provenientes del mundo empresario y de sus ONG’s afines, donde incorporaron concepciones, destrezas y valores que buscaron reproducir en la organización del trabajo ministerial y en distintas políticas de Desarrollo Social durante (...) el gobierno de Cambiemos. Complementamos el análisis de trayectorias sociales, políticas y profesionales de los funcionarios con el estudio de un conjunto de políticas que se consolidaron en la Secretaría de Economía Social durante el gobierno de Cambiemos. Los cuadros sociales de esta nueva derecha gestionaron a partir de discursos empresariales, anclados también en la vida cotidiana de distintas ONG’s, que los diferenciaron de los cuadros católicos de los 60, pero también de las redes expertas de los 90. Utilizaron un nuevo saber managerial, recuperaron valores de la cultura emprendedora y construyeron objetivos de gestión como la inclusión financiera de los sectores populares en la Argentina. (shrink)

Some philosophers believe that, when epistemic peers disagree, each has an obligation to accord the other’s assessment equal weight as her own. Other philosophers worry that this Equal-Weight View is vulnerable to straightforward counterexamples, and that it requires an unacceptable degree of spinelessness with respect to our most treasured philosophical, political, and religious beliefs. I think that both of these allegations are false. To show this, I carefully state the Equal-Weight View, motivate it, describe apparent counterexamples to it, and then (...) explain away the apparent counterexamples. Finally, I adapt those explanations to cases of religious disagreement. In the end, we reach the surprising conclusion that—even if the Equal-Weight View is true—in very many cases of religious disagreement between apparent epistemic peers, the parties to the disagreement need not be conciliatory. And what goes for religious beliefs goes for political and philosophical beliefs as well. This strongly suggests that the View does not demand an unacceptable degree of spinelessness. (shrink)

We argue that prediction success maximization is a basic objective of cognition and cortex, that it is compatible with but distinct from prediction error minimization, that neither objective requires subtractive coding, that there is clear neurobiological evidence for the amplification of predicted signals, and that we are unconvinced by evidence proposed in support of subtractive coding. We outline recent discoveries showing that pyramidal cells on which our cognitive capabilities depend usually transmit information about input to their basal dendrites and amplify (...) that transmission when input to their distal apical dendrites provides a context that agrees with the feedforward basal input in that both are depolarizing, i.e., both are excitatory rather than inhibitory. Though these intracellular discoveries require a level of technical expertise that is beyond the current abilities of most neuroscience labs, they are not controversial and acclaimed as groundbreaking. We note that this cellular cooperative context-sensitivity greatly enhances the cognitive capabilities of the mammalian neocortex, and that much remains to be discovered concerning its evolution, development, and pathology. (shrink)

In the recent literature on the nature of knowledge, a rivalry has emerged between modalism and explanationism. According to modalism, knowledge requires that our beliefs track the truth across some appropriate set of possible worlds. Modalists tend to focus on two modal conditions: sensitivity and safety. According to explanationism, knowledge requires only that beliefs bear the right sort of explanatory relation to the truth. In slogan form: knowledge is believing something because it’s true. In this paper, we aim to vindicate (...) explanationism from some recent objections offered by Gualtiero Piccinini, Dario Mortini, and Kenneth Boyce and Andrew Moon. Together, these authors present five purported counterexamples to the sufficiency of the explanationist analysis for knowledge. In addition, Mortini devises a clever argument that explanationism entails the violation of a plausible closure principle on knowledge. We will argue that explanationism is innocent of all these charges against it, and we hope that the strength of the defense we offer of explanationism is evidence in its favor, and a reason to investigate explanationism further as the long-elusive truth about the nature of knowledge. (shrink)

This article introduces the Special Issue on cameraless photography and the translation of Georg Christoph Lichtenberg’s treatise on electrical figures. It summarizes previous discussions on cameraless photography, namely those by Geoffrey Batchen and suggests relating the photogram to current post-lenticular technologies such as radiography, digital scanning or machine vision. It outlines the emergence of cameraless imaging in late eighteenth- and early nineteenth-century scientific research, taking Lichtenberg’s figures as an emblem of automatically generated images situated between duration and instantaneity, between image (...) making and measurement, between nature and culture. (shrink)

AimIf we want to understand people’s satisfaction in their relationships, it is essential to have a valid and reliable measure of relational needs satisfaction. The aim of this study was to test the factor structure of the Czech version of the Relational Needs Satisfaction Scale as well as the scale’s measurement invariance and convergent validity.MethodIn total, 419 adults answered a battery of measures, including the RNSS, in an online survey. Confirmatory factor analysis was conducted to test the factor structure and (...) the measurement invariance of the RNSS across gender and age. A correlational analysis was conducted to assess the convergent validity.ResultsThe five-factor structure of the RNSS was confirmed. Furthermore, support for a second-order global relationship satisfaction factor was found. The hierarchical model was strictly invariant with respect to gender and age. Furthermore, the RNSS demonstrated an expected pattern of correlations with the reference instruments.ConclusionThe Czech version of the RNSS can be considered a valid and reliable method. (shrink)

I begin by retracing an argument from Aristotle for final causes in science. Then, I advance this ancient thought, and defend an argument for a stronger conclusion: that no scientific explanation can succeed, if Naturalism is true. The argument goes like this: (1) Any scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity. Next, I argue that (2) any explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves no element that calls out for explanation but lacks (...) one. From (1) and (2) it follows that (3) a scientific explanation can be successful only if it crucially involves a natural regularity, and this regularity does not call out for explanation while lacking one. I then argue that (4) if Naturalism is true, then all natural regularities call out for explanation but lack them. From (3) and (4) it follows that (5) if Naturalism is true, then no scientific explanation can be successful. If you believe that scientific explanation can be (indeed, often has been) successful, as I do, then this is a reason to reject Naturalism. (shrink)

This article examines the very atypical case of epagoge in Prior Analytics II, 23, aiming to situate it in the general framework of Aristotle’s conception of induction and in his epistemology. Besides offering a translation and a detailed commentary of the chapter, I have reassembled some of the main theories that support its character of exception – as if the philosopher were defending the existence of a “complete induction” – and then I close the article by refuting such theories, supported (...) by other texts, such as Topics I, 8, and Posterior Analytics I, 5. (shrink)

Muchos de los comentaristas de Gómez Dávila han notado que el carácter de su obra es intertextual, es decir, que no es un sistema cerrado: siempre está conectado implíci-tamente con otros libros y pensadores. El mismo Gómez Dávila nos indica en sus Escolios que Montaigne y Burckhardt tienen un rol central en esta intertextualidad. De tal manera, el siguiente artículo se propone interpretar la conexión entre los dos pen-sadores anteriores y la obra del colombiano. En el caso de Burckhardt, se (...) mostrará có-mo su pesimismo antropológico basado en una idea del pecado original, su escepti-cismo sobre la posibilidad humana de construir utopías, su negación de la idea de progreso y su concepción del tamaño y el papel del Estado aparecen y se desarrollan en el pensamiento del colombiano. En el caso de Montaigne, se mostrará su cercanía con Gómez Dávila a partir de sus similitudes biográficas, su alejamiento del espíritu académico de sus propios tiempos, su concepción de la filosofía, su escepticismo como arma para defender la fe y su fuerte conservatismo. Finalmente, se concluirá que esta intertextualidad que el autor mismo señala en su confesión sobre Montaigne y Bur-ckhardt nos ayuda a darle orden y sentido a sus posiciones políticas en los Escolios. En efecto, se intentará mostrar que Gómez Dávila articula las influencias de sus maestros para concluir en una visión de mundo reaccionaria. (shrink)

Este trabajo profundiza en la legitimación teológica perversa que el falso místico hace de sus actos sexuales. Con tal propósito, se hace una introducción histórica a las prácticas sexuales de carácter gnóstico y se considera el juego discursivo ambiguo entre lo exotérico y esotérico. Como ejemplo, se analizan algunas ambigüedades textuales en la obra de Javier Garrido OFM (condenado canónicamente por “falso misticismo”), a la luz de la investigación sobre los abusos sexuales de los hermanos Philippe OP y Jean Vanier. (...) Asimismo, se exploran tres coincidencias con ideas ajenas al cristianismo que divinizan la pulsión sexual. Y se concluye apelando al discernimiento y la prudencia sobre el lenguaje místico-esponsal, y a la claridad en la moral sexual. (shrink)

In this article, the concept of moralistic fallacy introduced by B. D. Davis is elaborated on in more detail. The main features of this fallacy are discussed, and its general form is presented. The moralistic fallacy might have some undesirable outcomes. Some of them might even be in direct conflict to the original moral position. If this occurs, it is possible to characterize it as a paradox of moralistic fallacy. The possibility of this paradox provides a further reason not to (...) prevent any scientific inquiries and not to depict any knowledge as dangerous. (shrink)

Se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas son análogos. Pero, ¿qué es la analogía? Varios filósofos han pensado que la analogía debe ser considerada como una forma de ambigüedad. Argumentamos aquí que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas no son ambiguos o vagos. Siguiendo algunas sugerencias de McDaniel, proponemos una concepción de la analogía donde el fenómeno semántico está asociado con el carácter más o menos natural de la propiedad o (...) propiedades que instancian las entidades que satisfacen el predicado análogo. Un predicado "θ" es análogo si y sólo si, la propiedad Θ, que algo instancia, si y sólo si es θ, es menos natural que cualquier propiedad Ξ tal que todo lo que instancie Ξ, instancia Θ. Además, se requiere que las entidades de las cuales el término análogo es predicado deban ser ontológica o epistémicamente dependientes unas de otras. || It has been traditionally sustained that predicates attributed to God and to the creatures are analogical predicates. But, what is analogy? Several philosophers have thought that analogy should be taken as a form of ambiguity. Here we argue that predicates attributed to God and to creatures are neither ambiguous nor vague. Following some suggestions given by McDaniel, we propose a view of analogy in which the semantic phenomenon is associated with the more or less natural character of the property or properties that the entities that satisfy the analogous predicate instantiate. A predicate "θ" is analogous if and only if the property Θ, which something instantiates, if and only if it is θ, is less natural that any property Ξ so that anything that instantiates Ξ, instantiates Θ. Furthermore, it is required that the entities of which the analogous term is predicated should be either ontologically or epistemically dependent on each other. (shrink)

El presente texto acompaña la traducción de los apuntes de Walter Benjamin sobre la literatura de la Rusia Soviética hacia finales de la década de 1920. En este sentido, se intentará reponer el contexto de producción de estos apuntes con el fin de proponer una lectura que recorra aquellos rasgos de la incipiente cultura soviética que suscitaron estas impresiones en el pensador alemán.

In 2012, the international PISA survey reinforced the observation that the French educational system is one of the most unequal among OECD countries. The observation of serious inequalities in access to educational success for pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds could lead to a pessimistic vision suggesting that any possibility of transformation of the system is doomed to failure. Thus, the fight against inequalities in access to educational success is a form of runaway object which constitutes a challenge for research which treats (...) the social context as evolving and susceptible to significant and novel transformations. Developmental work research aims to support the work of professionals in the re-elaboration of their practices by seeking to go beyond the status quo of an unequal school. Drawing on this framework within an institutional network of schools, we seek to show how the intervention has highlighted power issues inscribed in the structures and how the actors, through their commitment in the research collaborative process, seek to go beyond the power issues inscribed in their work routines and enacted during the research process by different kinds of antagonism. We will argue that the fight against educational inequality involves overcoming systemic power relations crystallized in institution. This systemic power is expressed by a form of episodic power. Our results show restrictive and constructive effect on the expansive learning process and on the construction of a collective in the formative interventions. The restrictive side of epistemic power should be linked to systemic power which is historically inherited. We discuss the results in the light of the emergence of a fourth generation of activity theory. Our research makes it possible to make conceptual and methodological progress in the construction of a fourth generation of activity theory by showing the need for analysis and expansively learn about problematic power relations in heterogeneous collectives. (shrink)

Trabajo intelectual y trabajo manual -- La historia de la filosofía en la enseñanza de la filosofía -- Sobre el estoicismo -- La concepción de tiempo en el libro XI de las Confesiones de San Agustín -- Sobre la muerte.

The author considers the most interesting arguments and objections, which various scholars have raised against his latest work, Art and Forgery: Monism and Dualism in Aesthetics.

The film Nosferatu (1922) has graffiti created by the character of the madman Knock on the walls of his cell. This motif, which I call the ‘madman’s wall’, has accompanied depictions of lunatics since the beginning of the eighteenth century. This article examines the origin, transformations and functions of this motif. The popularisation of the motif originates with the longitude diagram in the last plate of A Rake’s Progress (1735) by William Hogarth, which subsequently found its way into the works (...) of Hogarth’s plagiarists and influenced illustrations of asylum interiors in the first half of the nineteenth century. The madman’s wall also appears in literature, such as the popular novel The Father and Daughter (1801) by Amelia Opie, which was plagiarised and dramatised, and the legend of the poet Charles Smart, who allegedly wrote his poem on the walls of his cell. The main prerequisite for the madman’s wall is the dungeon-like image of the asylum—presenting it as a prison. It is usually the author of the graffiti who displays the signs of madness, not the wall itself. As society distanced itself from the image of the asylum as a dungeon, the madman’s wall disappeared after the 1850s. Paradoxically, many reports about the authentic wall art of asylum patients emerged in the press after the 1850s. The madman’s wall in Nosferatu is the first example after an approximately seventy-year absence and could be a product of the period interest of avant-garde artists in the art of the mentally ill. (shrink)

While it represents a common form of gender-based violence, misogyny is an often-overlooked concept within academia and the queer community. Drawing on queer and feminist scholarship on gay male misogyny, this article presents a theoretical challenge to the myth that the oppressed cannot oppress, arguing that specific forms of gay male subjectivities can be proponents of misogyny in ways that are unrecognised because of their sexually marginalised status. The authors’ interest in the doing of misogyny, and its effects on specific (...) bodies and subjectivities, leads them to discuss the extent to which white gay male misogyny can function to reinforce a particular gender and racial hierarchy that continually confines queer femininities to the status of the abject other, for failing to exhibit their feminine credentials and for making gender trouble. The study also addresses how specific markers of femininity are depoliticised through the workings of this misogyny, exploring what femininity does when it is conceptualised outside a heteronormative framework. To address these ideas, the authors firstly propose a theoretical account of misogyny in order to understand its analytical status as a cultural mechanism within the psychic economy of patriarchy. Secondly, they use queer approaches to effeminacy and subject formation for making the case for gay male misogyny and its connections to femininity within white gay cultures, asking how misogyny might become an essential component of the performance of hegemonic masculinity. The article concludes with a discussion of the ways in which gay male misogyny reinforces white male dominance over women and queer femininities specifically, advocating for resistance to the reproduction of such patriarchal arrangements. (shrink)

The aim of the paper is to introduce the concept of adaptive logics (AL) or rather adaptive logical approach. In the introduction, a motivation and an emergence of AL are briefly discussed. In the second part of the paper, specifics of AL are analysed – especially nonmonotonic character, internal and external dynamics, as well as the structure of AL, namely the distinction between upper limit logic and lower limit logic. In this part, the dynamic proof is also described. Applications of (...) AL are presented in the third part. Three illustrations from three different branches of philosophy are presented. First one is an illustration of description of science – a traditional application of AL. Second one is an illustration of solving a deontic conflict – this is a new direction within in AL which has recently been researched. Third one is an illustration of analyses of metaphors – an example of an unusual application of AL. In the conclusion of the paper, contemporary results of AL are critically evaluated with respect to some problems of the project of AL. (shrink)