Roy discusses the validity of transcendent experiences and the reasons why they can be considered non-illusory.

The recognition of the other as subject has achieved a prominent place in contemporary psychoanalysis on both sides of the analytic relationship, but this development has tended to focus on the recognition of who the other is and has been. It is the purpose of this article to add the future, the transcendent experience of the other, to the recognition of the other in the analytic dyad. Heidegger's concept of the “ek-static” will be used to elucidate the human subject as (...) moving beyond him or herself in a continual process of becoming. The result of the peeling back of defenses is not a homunculus waiting to be unearthed, but affective dispositions and desires that have yet to become organized modes of being. It is the purpose of the analytic process to bring this potential to fruition. For this process to take place, the therapist must have a concept of not only who the patient is, but also who she or he is not but may be. It will be suggested that dispositional affects, desires, and passions that emerge when defenses give way provide clues to unformed possibilities that can become ways of being if perceived as such by the therapist. A clinical strategy is proposed in which the analytic space becomes a negative capability for the formation of new ways of being and relating. This idea is illustrated with a clinical example in which the patient's compliant pattern was transcended. (shrink)

How one transcends the self depends on the self that experiences it. Is it instigated or sought, does it happen by accident, or by an act of Grace? Is it common or rare? Is it brought on by the ingestion of psychedelic agents or by meditation or by being overcome by fear or merely by caring more about the welfare of others than oneself? Is it transcendence to experience a shift of perspective or dissolution of the self? In (...) the pages that follow, each of these paths is explored in nine ways, each unique unto itself. None of them deal with absolute self-transcendence, which should be no surprise, for, as I’ve indicated, there would no longer a self or person to record or communicate the event. Many of them deal the transcendence of self-consciousness, my own included, but only two describe the ingestion of mind-altering psychedelics to catalyze the event. One sees self-construction from the ground-up, as it were, as a form of transcending a previous self that has disintegrated. One looks to acts of kindness to sidestep the illusion of self-consciousness. Two, at least, look to creative experience in the arts as a way to connect with universal spontaneity, but in very different ways. The others refer to what might be called spiritual experiences that, though thirsted for or sought, arrive unexpectedly, almost like a gift. (shrink)

Having good moral character often involves shifting one’s focus of attention from the self to others and the world. Across three studies (N = 605 adults), we found converging evidence that self-transcendent experiences, specifically awe and flow, enabled the expression of wisdom, as captured by wise reasoning and epistemic humility measures. Study 1 found that dispositionally awe- and flow-prone people have stronger wise reasoning and epistemic humility abilities, over and above dispositional happiness. Consistent with Study 1, Study 2 found (...) that, across diverse recalled experiences, individuals who experienced more awe showed greater wise reasoning, and those who experienced more flow showed greater epistemic humility. In Study 3, using situated interventions, we induced awe (watching a video involving vast nature scenes) and flow (composing a song using an online music maker) and compared them with neutral and amusement experiences. Compared to these control conditions, eliciting awe and flow facilitated one’s (1) ability to address interpersonal conflicts with wise reasoning, (2) ability to acknowledge one’s epistemic gaps, and (3) willingness to improve those aspects and one’s general moral character. Altogether, these findings reveal the promising role of self-transcendent experiences in motivating people to appreciate others’ perspectives beyond one’s own. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:WAiINWRIGHT, MARI'.rAIN, AND AQUINAS ON TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES1 Lours RoY, O.:P. Boston College Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts WHAT COULD ALLOW thoo1ogiianis to s1ay that rbrtanJScendent expmiences we, exiplicitly or implicitly, expenienoos of God? To ooswieir tMs question fully, one would ihavie Ibo ooga;ge in :two d:iisltmot mqumi1es. Fiirsit, religious, moml, iand psyoho101 giical icristeci:a 1are required in the evtalurution of concrete oases. They ctan he found in rthe grerut spi:ritUJal wriitings (...) of humankind. Secood, one mustt have reOOUTISe to ep;iisttemo1ogiica:l :and thieo1ogiaa1 foru.ndmbions if one wianits 1to 1an.swer tb.ie questtion in. its generality. ln,thJi:s a:riticle, I shall not preserut 1tihe religious, moral, 1and psychofogica1 criteria, because I sihou1d Jrike to OOiilCelllb:iaJte on mrueillecrtUJal prohliems invohiimg tihe sooond kmd of ·consideration. I shiaill use ais 1a ISl'bar:bing-pomt 1a book on mys:ticism written by Wiilliiam J. W1ainwcight. Turr tihe purposes of ttihis ess:ay, "trlanJScenidelllt experiences" wiilil. mean whmt W1affin:WI"ight calls " mystical experienoos " or " uniJtM"Y srbrubeis." 2 The phvase wi:ll. ailso inclUJde Otito'1s " nu:minoUJs etpeirieinces," Mrusforw's " peak expeme:nces" and, vecy hrorudJy, wll experiences that do not :focus on 1a, specific tidea :but afiectively open up to the mySltery wll:uich enoompas1ses hruman li£e. 1 I am grateful to the members of the Boston Theological Society for their questions and comments on the initial version of this essay. 2See his definition, in Mysticism: A. Study of Its Nature, Cognitive Value and Moral Implications (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1981), IS. The rest of his first chapter offers a good discussion of problems of typology as well as of the distinction between descriptions and interpretations of mystical experiences. Unfortunately I cannot take account of this interesting discussion in the limits of this paper. 655 656 LOUIS ROY, O.P. In conrtending thrut my:stical experieTIJces ihav;e nnetic v:al,idity if they are ra speciiaI kind of perception, W ainw~igrhit tries to 'Settle an 1:epis1temo10-gicra1l is1sue; ill downplaying "doctrina1l con-.sideration:s" and iJn rejeobing ",a thieo1ogical op~nion whioh cannoit he esbaiblished ihy philosoplhi1oal rea1s10n," 3 he suggesit,s 1bhat his oolJJ!teTIJtiion can 1and should he 1supp01rted only by philosophioal a11gumelJJ!t1s. In thi'S esisay, I intend 1to ques1truon thi:s two.fo1d 1tlhesis of Wwinwrrtiight'1s 1and to explore an albernartive. Wa:inwright, whose manner of dea1ing wirbh iinitellectuaJ proh1ems 1acoo,rds with \the p11esent-day main lme in Ang1o-American philosophy of re1i§ion,4 non:ebheless pays metiiculou:s a.trbention Ito neoscho1a1s1tic theori!es of mys1tiioism in Chapter 4 of his hook. Such 1an a;t1t:empt 1at serious diJalogue is of specia,l :intel'es1t since :i:t illu:stria1tes the diffioulty of finding a mee1ting ground for three qUJite different scho1w1·Jy wo,rlds: the p0:s1t-rpie1t~st one, wihich I regard a,s W,ruinwr.ighit'·s, modern sohoilais1t1icrsm, and Thomas Aquinas. A1though W1a1inwr1igh1t does not refer 1 to the lat:ter's views on the.topic, these views nev:erthe1e:s,s de:serve examination bo1th 1a1s the sou11oe of neoscho:iJa,stic 1theorie1s and 1as conti :ia:sting in 1s1 evera1 111espects wiith,them. The first pa~t of my paper will sketch three of the intellec1tuaJ contexits in which triam:soendefll!t experi!enoes may be discussed. The second part will highlight some features of Aquinrus's episitmnology and theo1ogy of gmce which whll enable us fo dertel'ITl!iDJe 1 at whait levels of cogn:iition experienceis of 1t11amiscendence should be s]tua1ted 1 and in what 1s1ense they may rbe s1aid to he experielll!ceis of God. 'Iihe third rpart wm presie111t how Thomais envisages the role of love :in 1the affective knowledge tha1t rbe1ieviers i;eceiive of God. F1inailly, the fomlth pamt will indicrabe the modial~ty of such lmowledge, namely, the dimect a1iva:renerss of orur aets and fee1ings of 1ove. a Wainwright, 162-163 and 180. 4 Exemplified by such authors as John Hick, Stephen Katz, Ninian Smart, Walter T. Stace, R. C. Zaehner. TRANSCENDENT EXPERIENCES 657 I. Three lnterprretative Contexts Since Schleiermadher, moist German... (shrink)

Since the Romantic period, painters have no longer made use of traditional Christian iconography to express religious transcendence. Taking their cue from Schleiermacher's Reden Über die Religion, painters have sought for new, personal ways to express religious transcendence. One example is Caspar David Friedrich's Monk by the Sea. Rosenblum argues, in his Modern Painting and the Northern Romantic Tradition, that there is a parallel between Friedrich and the abstract expressionist Rothko with respect to the expression to religious (...) class='Hi'>transcendence. In this article I investigate how the experience of transcendence that Rothko's paintings want to evoke is to be described. Is it an experience of the sublime in the Romantic tradition? Is it the evocation of the ultimate in accordance with Tillich's broad concept of religion? Does it display affinity between Rothko and the first generation of abstract painters such as Kandinsky and Malevich? Or is it a transcendent experience that cannot be situated so easily within the options supplied? After determining Rothko's understanding of transcendence, some issues will be brought up that could be fruitful for Christian theology. (shrink)

A popular view holds that religion necessarily involves a strong, 'non-rational' element. According to this view, which the present study calls the 'transcendent' interpretation of religion, in the heart of religion is the unknowable Transcendent which is ineffable . This view holds that transcendence and ineffability are the key characteristics of any religious experience. ;The problem with this interpretation of religion is that, it undermines the uniqueness of individual religions, and it attributes a uniform philosophy of reality and language (...) to all religions. The present study suggests that such a universal characterization of religion is fundamentally flawed. ;The study develops what may be called the Buddhist 'naturalist' explanation of reality which is based on the Buddhist non-theism and the doctrine of dependent origination, and shows that early Buddhism explains naturalistically not only reality in general but also the religious reality or nirvana. Subsequently, with the assumption that one's conception of reality precedes one's philosophy of language, the study develops what can be called a non-transcendent philosophy of language in early Buddhism. The absence of ineffability is one of the most outstanding characteristics of this philosophy of language. ;This study does not neglect the strong, transcendent interpretation of the Buddhist religious experience that has been proposed by some of the eminent Buddhist scholars on the basis of such matters as the Buddhist four-cornered logic , the 'unanswered questions' and the 'direct and indirect' discourses . But this study questions the soundness of that interpretation and shows how these selfsame issues allow a non-transcendent interpretation. (shrink)

This volume consists of several contributions to a refined understanding of religious experience in view of contemporary theological epistemology.

The wilderness is one of the most widely recognized sources of transcendent emotion. Various recent studies have demonstrated nature’s power to induce intense emotions. The study at hand will generate conceptual and operational definitions of sublime emotion toward nature. Taking into consideration the recent research on feelings of awe, an instrument is devised to measure sublime emotion toward nature. The proposed scale’s reliability and validity is tested in a sample of 280 participants from the general population of Madrid. Results show (...) that sublime emotion was defined by two conceptual components: awe, and inspiring energy, both obtained using the computer program FACTOR. After reliability and validity analysis, the Sublime Emotion toward Nature (SEN) scale included 18 items, distributed into awe (6 items, α =.881) and inspiring energy (12 items, α=.933). Awe was defined by feelings of fear, threat, vulnerability, fragility, and respect for nature, which is perceived as vast, powerful, and mysterious. Inspiring energy was defined by feelings of vitality, joy, energy, oneness, freedom, eternity, and harmony with the universe. The SEN is an adequate instrument to measure transcendent emotions provoked by direct wilderness exposure or memory thereof. (shrink)

The aim of this book is to set a limit to thought, or rather - not to thought, but to the expression of thoughts: for in order to be able to set a limit to thought, we should have to find both sides of the limit thinkable.

The neuroscientists Eugene d'Aquili and Andrew Newberg, in addition to defending an empirically fruitful model of mystical experiences, argue that such experiences constitute evidence for the existence of a transcendent reality, which they call "Absolute Unitary Being." D'Aquili and Newberg point out that mystical experiences carry with them a vivid sense of reality, and that they involve characteristic forms of brain activity, just like perceptions of objects in ordinary waking consciousness. Their argument for Absolute Unitary Being fails, (...) however, since the vivid sense of reality of an experience is not the sole criterion by which to judge its veridicality, since the object of mystical experiences cannot be confirmed by independent observers, and since there is no evidence for a mechanism by which mystics experience a transcendent reality. (shrink)

Yoga, together with other so-called holistic spiritual practices such as reiki or meditation, is one of the most popular spiritual disciplines in our contemporary society. The success of yoga crosses the boundaries between health, sport, religion, and popular culture. However, from a sociological point of view, this is a largely under-researched field. Aiming to fill this gap, this article analyzes the impact, meaning, and implications of the practice of yoga by taking prisons as the institutional context of the study. The (...) growth of yoga in penitentiary settings is a recent trend in many countries and raises new questions concerning its potential to foster well-being and self-transformation. The research presented here applies Schutz’s concepts of “finite province of meaning” and “stock of knowledge” to understand yoga’s role in inmates’ lives. The main argument of the article is that yoga is a body technique that affords inmates the possibility to enter into a “finite province of meaning” and transcend their everyday prison lives. However, the impact of yoga upon inmates’ lives is not limited just to its physical effects as learning yoga also involves the acquisition of a “spiritual stock of knowledge” made up of Eastern philosophy, holistic concepts, and self-help therapeutic narratives. Indeed, physical movements and spiritual accounts constitute one another in the practice of yoga, thus opening up a pathway into a different reality; movement and spiritual discourse inform one another—and it is precisely in this reflexivity that “transcendent experiences” are created and yoga is made meaningful and important in the improvement-setting of the prison. This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork developed carried out in two different penitentiary institutions. (shrink)

Someone may ask what the reasons are for putting religious experience and transcendence together. My answer is the following. My general philosophical position is empirical by nature. I am of the opinion that everything that is said about reality must in some way or other, in order to be true or probable, be related to or grounded in reality. If God is thought to be real in some sense of the word and if he is said to have the (...) quality of being transcendent, there must be some sort of empirical reasons for it. Experience is generally - at least in its objective variant - a usual way of motivating propositions about reality. There is therefore reason to ask: Is there anything in religious experience that motivates giving God the predicate of transcendence? And on the other hand: What conditions would there have to be in our world of experience to justify a consideration of a theory of Transcendence? (shrink)

This article examines the relationship between religion, transcendence and social bonding. I speculate that the capacity to undergo transcendent experiences facilitated social bonding. Following a discussion of Gorelik’s typology of transcendence, it examines the relationship between ritual, transcendence and bonding with an emphasis on singing, dancing and synchrony. It then moves on to explore theory of mind and transcendence. Finally, transcendent emotions like compassion, admiration, gratitude, love and awe will be discussed. I conclude by arguing (...) that transcendence originates from group-level selection. (shrink)

Phenomenology, understood as a philosophy of immanence, has had an ambiguous, uneasy relationship with transcendence, with the wholly other, with the numinous. If phenomenology restricts its evidence to givenness and to what has phenomenality, what becomes of that which is withheld or cannot in principle come to givenness? In this paper I examine attempts to acknowledge the transcendent in the writings of two phenomenologists, Edmund Husserl and Edith Stein (who attempted to fuse phenomenology with Neo-Thomism), and also consider the (...) influence of the existentialist Karl Jaspers, who made transcendence an explicit theme of his writing. I argue that Husserl does recognize the essential experience of transcendence within immanence; even the idea of a physical thinghas “dimensions of infinity” included within it. Similarly, he asserts profoundly that every “outside” is what it is only as understood from the inside. Jaspers toomakes the experience of transcendence central to human existence; it is the very measure of my own depth. For Edith Stein, everything temporal points towardthe timeless structural ground which makes it what it is. Transcendence is an intrinsic part of being itself. Furthermore, the very lack of self-sufficiency of my own self shows that the self requires a ground outside itself, in the transcendent. There is strong convergence between the three thinkers studied on the concept of transcendence, which is indeed a central, if largely unacknowledged, concept in phenomenology both in Husserl and his followers (Stein), but also, throughJaspers, in Heidegger. (shrink)

Thought experiments are ordinary argumentation disguised in a vivid pictorial or narrative form. This account of their nature will allow me to show that empiricism has nothing to fear from thought experiments. They perform no epistemic magic. In so far as they tell us about the world, thought experiments draw upon what we already know of it, either explicitly or tacitly; they then transform that knowledge by disguised argumentation. They can do nothing more epistemically than can argumentation. I defend my (...) account of thought experiments in Section 3 by urging that the epistemic reach of thought experiments turns out to coincide with that of argumentation and that this coincidence is best explained by the simple view that thought experiments just are arguments. Thought experiments can err—-a fact to be displayed by the thought experiment - anti thought experiment pairs of Section 2. Nonetheless thought experiments can be used reliably and, I urge in Section 4., this is only possible if they are governed by some very generalized logic. I will suggest on evolutionary considerations that their logics are most likely the familiar logics of induction and deduction, recovering the view that thought experiment is argumentation. Finally in Section 5 I defend this argument based epistemology of thought experiments against competing accounts. I suggest that these other accounts can offer a viable epistemology only insofar as they already incorporate the notion that thought experimentation is governed by a logic, possibly of very generalized form. (shrink)

A broad pattern of correlations between mechanisms of brain function impairment and self-transcendence is shown. The pattern includes such mechanisms as cerebral hypoxia, physiological stress, transcranial magnetic stimulation, trance-induced physiological effects, the action of psychoactive substances and even physical trauma to the brain. In all these cases, subjects report self-transcending experiences o en described as ‘mystical’ and ‘awareness-expanding,’ as well as self-transcending skills o en described as ‘savant.’ The idea that these correlations could be rather trivially accounted for (...) on the basis of disruptions to inhibitory neural processes is reviewed and shown to be implausible. Instead, this paper suggests that an as-of-yet unrecognized causal principle underlying the entire pattern might be at work, whose further elucidation through systematic research could hold great promise. (shrink)

Nussbaum argues for a (limited) transcendence through contemplation which is compatible with practical reasoning and aspiration towards other human goods. This paper raises difficulties for this account based on a) the relation of thinking to human freedom, and b) the self‐constitutive nature of human thinking. It explores connections Thomas Aquinas makes between contemplation, transcendence and happiness, and explains the relation between (unlimited) transcendent experience and rationality by considering individuals who lack rational judgement but do seem capable of contemplation (...) (young children, certain mentally disordered persons). What contemplation by these individuals and by rational, mature adults have in common is awareness (by the less than perfectly rational) of the possibility of a life of unlimited rationality. I claim this awareness does not come naturally to us but is made possible by some super‐natural cause acting in a way that does not violate human nature but rather perfects our contemplative faculty and enables our happiness. (shrink)

This is the first major response to the new challenge of neuroscience to religion. There have been limited responses from a purely Christian point of view, but this takes account of eastern as well as western forms of religious experience. It challenges the prevailing naturalistic assumption of our culture, including the idea that the mind is either identical with or a temporary by-product of brain activity. It also discusses religion as institutions and religion as inner experience of the Transcendent, and (...) suggests a form of spirituality for today. (shrink)

In psycho-clinical research the notion of spirituality acquires a semantic plurality. This equivocal and ambiguous connotation that characterizes this term represents an obstacle to the epistemic and methodological validity of research designs, recognized as the threat to construct validity. In order to overcome this difficulty, we introduce, from Dietrich von Hildebrand's phenomenology, the notions of intentionality and transcendence insofar as these are capable of accounting for the specific element of the spiritual-religious phenomenon and discriminating it from the other phenomena (...) or variables that may be included under the notion of spirituality. This conceptual elucidation task allows evaluating the legitimacy of the variable selection process and establishing why they are or are not representatives of the phenomenon of spiritual-religious experience. (shrink)

Metaphysics in discussion : the medieval context -- The degrees of abstraction and the metaphysical Separatio -- From physics to metaphysics : the way of Resolutio -- The transcendental focus of metaphysics -- The place of analogy in metaphysics -- From experience to transcendence -- The double challenge to metaphysics in the present-day world.

Yoga, together with other so-called holistic spiritual practices such as reiki or meditation, is one of the most popular spiritual disciplines in our contemporary society. The success of yoga crosses the boundaries between health, sport, religion, and popular culture. However, from a sociological point of view, this is a largely under-researched field. Aiming to fill this gap, this article analyzes the impact, meaning, and implications of the practice of yoga by taking prisons as the institutional context of the study. The (...) growth of yoga in penitentiary settings is a recent trend in many countries and raises new questions concerning its potential to foster well-being and self-transformation. The research presented here applies Schutz’s concepts of “finite province of meaning” and “stock of knowledge” to understand yoga’s role in inmates’ lives. The main argument of the article is that yoga is a body technique that affords inmates the possibility to enter into a “finite province of meaning” and transcend their everyday prison lives. However, the impact of yoga upon inmates’ lives is not limited just to its physical effects as learning yoga also involves the acquisition of a “spiritual stock of knowledge” made up of Eastern philosophy, holistic concepts, and self-help therapeutic narratives. Indeed, physical movements and spiritual accounts constitute one another in the practice of yoga, thus opening up a pathway into a different reality; movement and spiritual discourse inform one another—and it is precisely in this reflexivity that “transcendent experiences” are created and yoga is made meaningful and important in the improvement-setting of the prison. This article is based on ethnographic fieldwork developed carried out in two different penitentiary institutions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Metaphysics between Experience and Transcendence: Thomas Aquinas on Metaphysics as a Science by Rudi A. te VeldeO.P. Philip-Neri ReeseVELDE, Rudi A. te. Metaphysics between Experience and Transcendence: Thomas Aquinas on Metaphysics as a Science. Münster: Aschendorff Verlag, 2021. vii + 246 pp. 38,00€In the opening chapter of Metaphysics 4, Aristotle states not only that there is a science of being as being and its per se (...) properties but also that it is the task of the metaphysician to investigate the principles and causes of such being. Does this mean that metaphysics comes in two parts—namely, an ontology that investigates being and its properties, followed by a theology that investigates the first principle of being? Or does it mean that the very investigation into being and its properties involves an investigation into the first principle of being—that is, that ontology in some sense is theology? The central purpose of Rudi A. te Velde's newest book is to show that, at least for Thomas Aquinas and those who would follow him, the answer is emphatically the latter: Thomistic metaphysics is essentially the resolutio, or tracing-back, of common being (ens commune) to divine being (ens divinum). This process of resolution situates Aquinas's metaphysics "between experience and transcendence." Unlike natural philosophy, metaphysics is not focused on reality as it is given to us in and through sensory experience. Unlike Christian theology, metaphysics is not focused on God as revealed to us in and through supernatural faith. Rather, it is focused on what both of these—experience and transcendence—presuppose, namely, the fundamental truth that all of reality comes from, and points back to, God as its principle and source. For te Velde, Aquinas's metaphysics is etiology or, as he puts it, "the science of presuppositions."Chapter 1 offers the reader a synoptic view of the basic outlines and contours of Aquinas's metaphysics, both positively and negatively. Positively, te Velde points out that Aquinas understands metaphysics to be an Aristotelian science, that is, a discipline unified around its subject. For the properties of a subject are what we aim to demonstrate when we engage in Aristotelian science, and its principles are what we appeal to when doing so. Negatively, te Velde contrasts Aquinas's view of metaphysics with that of his contemporary, Siger of Brabant, and that of our contemporary, John Haldane. Unlike the former, Aquinas's metaphysics takes common being, which is participated and created (and so does not include God), as its subject. Unlike the latter, Aquinas's [End Page 162] metaphysics is unified by the intelligibility of being in light of its principles.In chapters 2 through 5, te Velde focuses in on particular themes that are of central importance to Aquinas's account of metaphysics. Chapter 2 examines the role of separatio in distinguishing metaphysics from physics and mathematics. Where physics considers things that require matter both to be and to be understood, and mathematics considers things that require matter to be but not to be understood, metaphysics considers things that require matter neither to be nor to be understood. It does so by means of a judgment of separation—a judgment that something (for example, substance, form, and so on) can be without matter. Chapter 3 turns to the topic of resolutio, wherein the mind moves "from the concrete particular to its intelligible ground." Aquinas's metaphysics is marked by a twofold resolution: one in which being and its attributes are grasped as the intrinsic principles of all things, and a second in which God and separate substances are grasped as the extrinsic principles of all things. Chapter 4 then investigates the notion of transcendentality, which arises in the first of those two resolutive processes—for insofar as being and its attributes are common to all things, they are not limited to just one of the ten categories (that is, they are transcendental). Nevertheless, the way in which predicates like "one," "true," and "good" cut across the categories that divide common being is different from the way that they cut across the divide between God and creatures. This difference ushers in chapter 5's discussion... (shrink)

Transcending Postmodernism: Performatism 2.0 is an ambitious attempt to expand and deepen the theory of performatism. Its main thesis is that, beginning in the mid-1990s, the strategies and norms of postmodernism have been displaced by ones that force readers or viewers to experience effects of aesthetically mediated transcendence. These effects include specific temporal strategies ("chunking"), stylizing separated subjectivity (the genius and the fool being its two main poles) and orienting ethics toward actions taken by centered agents bearing a sacral (...) charge. The book provides a critical overview of other theories of post-postmodernism, and suggests that among five text-oriented theories there is basic agreement on its techniques and strategies. (shrink)

Much of the discussion had focussed on the question of whether religious experiences are veridical, but then Richard M. Gale asked a more fundamental question: Are they even cognitive? An experience is cognitive if it takes an intentional accusative, such as “red cube” in “I see a red cube,” as opposed to the cognate accusative exemplified by the use of the word “waltz” in “I am dancing a waltz” which is synonymous with “I am dancing waltzily.” Cognitive experiences (...) are objective in the sense that they purport the existence of an object whose.. (shrink)

According to Max Weber, the “fate of our times” is characterized by a “disenchantment of the world.” The scientific ambition of rationalization and intellectualization, as well as the attempt to master nature through technology, will greatly limit experiences of and openness for the transcendent, i.e. that which is beyond our control. Insofar as transcendence is a central aspect of virtually every religion and all religious experiences, the development of science and technology will, according to the Weberian assertion, (...) also limit the scope of religion. In this paper, we will reflect on the relations between technology and transcendence from the perspective of technological mediation theory. We will show that the fact that we are able to technologically intervene in the world and ourselves does not imply that we can completely control the rules of life. Technological interference in nature is only possible if the structures and laws that enable us to do that are recognized and to a certain extent obeyed, which indicates that technological power cannot exist without accepting a transcendent order in which one operates. Rather than excluding transcendence, technology mediates our relation to it. (shrink)

The spectrum of religious experience and spirituality in contemporary postmodern, postsecular and religiously pluralized Western culture is extremely broad. Is it possible to trace the development, the shifts, breaches and patterns of religious and spiritual transcendence in this deeply diversified context? In this volume, a heuristic model of four types of transcendence is proposed and discussed. The four types are immanent transcendence, radical transcendence, radical immanence and transcendence as alterity. Of each type two examples from (...) contemporary cultural discourses, ranging from theology and philosophy to popular culture are presented and the viability of the model as such is critically assessed. The pairs of examples show how different kinds of content are given to the same type. By illuminating this dialectic between formal categories of notions of transcendence and their specific content in various areas of culture, the book can aid further exploration of the preconditions, possibilities, difficulties and limitations of relating to and expressing (a) sense(s) of transcendence within a postmodern world. (shrink)

Many of us experience the activities which fill our everyday lives as meaningful, and to do so we must (and do) hold them to be important. However, reflection undercuts this confidence: our activities are aimed at ends which are arbitrary, in that we have reason to regard our taking them so seriously as lacking justification; they are comparatively insignificant; and they leave little of any real permanence. Even though we take our activities seriously, and our everyday lives to be important, (...) on reflection they seem less meaningful than we suppose. Thomas Nagel claims that this discrepancy is inevitable, and thus that our lives are absurd and to be approached with irony. The aim of this paper is to explore whether it is inevitable, and in particular to examine recent formulations (of Peter Singer, Robert Nozick, and others) of the old idea that we can transcend this absurdity by forming attachments less susceptible to being undercut. (shrink)

Many people believe in angels and evil spirits, and popular culture abounds in talk about encounters with such entities. Yet the question of the existence of such spirits is ignored in the academy. Even the Christian Church, which one might expect to show keen interest in transcendent realities, does not appear to be paying much attention. In this book Phillip Wiebe defends the plausibility of the traditional Christian claim that spirits are real. Wiebe examines descriptions of encounters with both good (...) and evil transcendent beings in biblical times and in later Christian history, along with recent accounts of similar experiences. He argues that invisible beings can be postulated to explain events just as unobservable objects are postulated in many scientific theories. Beyond supporting claims for the existence of lesser spirits such as demons and angels, this empirical approach yields important results for assessing common arguments surrounding the existence of God - a question that has become artificially separated from the question of spirits as such. Grounding his argument in a wide range of phenomena - from near death experiences to demonic possession - Wiebe offers a sophisticated case for belief in God on philosophical and epistemological grounds. (shrink)

Atheism as a belief does not have to present intellectual credentials within academia. Yet to hold beliefs means giving reasons for doing so, ones which may be found wanting. Instead, atheism is the automatic default setting within the academic world. Conversely, religious belief confronts a double standard. Religious believers are not permitted to make truth claims but are instead forced to present their beliefs as part of one language game amongst many. Religious truth claims are expected to satisfy empiricist criteria (...) of evidence but when they fail, as they must, religious belief becomes subject to the hermeneutics of suspicion. This book explores religious experience as a justifiable reason for religious belief. It uniquely demonstrates that the three pillars of critical realism --ontological intransitivity, epistemic relativity and judgemental rationality -- can be applied to religion as to any other beliefs or theories. The three authors are critical realists by philosophical position. They seek to establish a level playing field between religion and secular ideas, which has not existed in the academic world for some generations, in order for reasoned debate to be conducted. (shrink)

It is the goal of this essay to challenge the belief that one never transcends language — that all one knows, indeed all one can meaningfully experience, is defined within language. My challenge lies not in words, but in the use of words to evoke what is beyond language and to invite a lived experience of it. If one accepts this use of language as not only possible, but primary, we ultimately see meaning not within language, but through it. Under (...) the 'rule of evocation' language need not in any way within itself express, reproduce, re-present, or capture what it evokes. It need simply evoke it, and such an evocation is not a re-presentation in language of what is evoked. It is a presentation of the thing itself. (shrink)

Spirituality has mostly been studied in psychology as implied in the process of overcoming adversity, being triggered by negative experiences, and providing positive outcomes. By reversing this pathway, we investigated whether spirituality may also be triggered by self-transcendent positive emotions, which are elicited by stimuli appraised as demonstrating higher good and beauty. In two studies, elevation and/or admiration were induced using different methods. These emotions were compared to two control groups, a neutral state and a positive emotion (mirth). Self-transcendent (...) positive emotions increased participants' spirituality (Studies 1 and 2), especially for the non-religious participants (Study 1). Two basic world assumptions, i.e., belief in life as meaningful (Study 1) and in the benevolence of others and the world (Study 2) mediated the effect of these emotions on spirituality. Spirituality should be understood not only as a coping strategy, but also as an upward spiralling pathway to and from self-transcendent positive emotions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology by Ramon HarveyArnold Yasin Mol (bio)Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology. By Ramon Harvey. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021. Pp. xiv + 280, Hardcover £90.00, isbn 978-1-4744-5164-2.When can it be claimed that a certain discipline is doing something so new and innovative, that it can be labeled as such? Or when is something so new and innovative that it can (...) no longer bear its original label? Either case signifies a level of discontinuity or rupture with the old ways of doing things. This is the fate of modern Islamic theology, which goes by the name kalām jadīd, New Theology.The discipline of Islamic philosophical or dialectical theology, ʿilm al-kalām, acquired its distinct methodology and themes in the first two centuries of Islam, becoming the defining intellectual voice of the Islamic worldview. Responding both to the developed theologies of Christianity and Zoroastrianism and other religions and philosophies, as well as responding to inner theological disputes, it combined comparative theology, philosophy of religion, and dogmatics. It developed its own indigenous rationalism, and integrated and adapted other philosophical ideas and methods, especially those of Aristotle and Neoplatonism. Islamicate civilization generated many native philosophers, like al-Kindī (d. 873) and al-Fārābī (d. 951), but it was Ibn Sīnā (Latin: Avicenna, d. 1037) who literally overturned metaphysical thought in such a radical way that theologians, including Jewish and Christian, speak of theology as before and after his influence.During the 750 years after the "Avicennian turn" many new philosophies have arisen, but none challenged the metaphysics of the Abrahamic theologies as much as Kant. Kalām can, similar to Christian Neo-Scholasticism, ignore the Kantian turn by restating their confidence in Peripatetic and Avicennian/Thomistic metaphysics, or it can integrate and adapt to it. The Muslim voices that have tried the latter are few but they have garnered more attention over the years. One of the biggest challenges of Kantian thought are towards retaining the classical proofs of God's existence, but also the possibility of speaking meaningfully of any type of metaphysical existence apart from empirical experience. The Ottoman theologian Muṣtafā Ṣabrī (d. 1954) emphasized that the Islamic ideas of prophethood and the unseen spiritual realm (ʿālam al-ghayb) would not fit the minimalistic metaphysics of Kant, as many Muslim modernists started to reject the idea of miracles, angels, and life after death. [End Page 1]Kalām jadīd, or (post-)Kantian kalām, has therefore the interesting challenge to either reconfigure Kantian metaphysics so that it can sustain traditional Islamic ideas to a certain degree, or the other way around. This challenge is not new as, although Peripatetic and Avicennian metaphysics provided the basis for proofs of God's existence, it also problematized Abrahamic theism, prophethood and resurrection of the body. Kalām jadīd can therefore learn much from its discursive tradition on how to deal with those challenges, if one's intent is to salvage the classical Islamic worldview.To this end, Ramon Harvey's Transcendent God, Rational World: A Maturidi Theology presents itself as a work of kalām jadīd but also as challenging important aspects of the discursive tradition it is using. When a discipline crystalizes into a certain epistemology and critical method, it attains a level of foundationalism whereby it becomes a tradition which is self-explanatory. This gives it a reasoning and stability which can be passed on over the centuries through certain core ideas and texts. Harvey sees this as the main problem explaining "why the kalām jadīd movement has been underwhelming." The Kantian turn upends the post-Avicennian foundationalism of kalam, forcing it to become an "open theology" that is "characterised by a receptiveness to diverse sources in its theological structure, prioritising meaning above systematic, foundationalist proof" (p. 5). The challenges for which a new theology has to be constructed are, according to Harvey, the developments in mathematics, logic, analytical philosophy, the phenomenological movement, and quantum mechanics (p. 2). Reality, and thinking about reality, are not the same anymore.The function of kalām is... (shrink)

Making sense of our human existence can be difficult, but we may experience particular moments that prompt us to search for something deeper. Os Guinness tells stories of people who experienced these "signals of transcendence" and followed them to find new meaning and purpose in life-and the same can be true for us.

Can transcendence be both philosophical and religious? Do philosophers and theologians conceive of the same thing when they think and talk about transcendence? Philosophy and religion have understood transcendence and other matters of faith differently, but both the language and concepts of religion, including transcendence, reside at the core of postmodern philosophy. Transcendence in Philosophy and Religion considers whether it is possible to analyze religious transcendence in a philosophical manner, and if so, whether there (...) is a way for phenomenology to think transcendence directly. Attention is devoted to the role of French philosophy, particularly the work of Levinas, Ricoeur, Derrida, and Marion, in defining recent debates in the philosophy of religion and posing new ways of thinking about religious experience in a postmodern world. (shrink)