Results for 'Truth and error'

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  1.  6
    False Truths: The Error of Relying on Authority.Edward C. Mendler - 2014 - Lanham, Maryland: Hamilton Books.
    Mendler contends that many of the beliefs, tenets, conclusions, and understandings that are widely accepted as “truths” are, in fact, not valid at all. He asserts that we should challenge them all — from Plato on to contemporary theorists in all of those fields — and analyze every element of their conclusions.
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  2.  98
    ‘Through thousands of errors we reach the truth’—but how? On the epistemic roles of error in scientific practice.Jutta Schickore - 2005 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 36 (3):539-556.
    This essay is concerned with the epistemic roles of error in scientific practice. Usually, error is regarded as something negative, as an impediment or obstacle for the advancement of science. However, we also frequently say that we are learning from error. This common expression suggests that the role of error is not—at least not always—negative but that errors can make a fruitful contribution to the scientific enterprise. My paper explores the latter possibility. Can errors play an (...)
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  3.  29
    Truth is An Error of fact. [REVIEW]K. B. L. - 1957 - Review of Metaphysics 11 (2):351-351.
    An etymological proof of the title; presented in a "spirit of fun" and to be taken in the same spirit.--L. K. B.
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  4. Error-statistical elimination of alternative hypotheses.Kent Staley - 2008 - Synthese 163 (3):397 - 408.
    I consider the error-statistical account as both a theory of evidence and as a theory of inference. I seek to show how inferences regarding the truth of hypotheses can be upheld by avoiding a certain kind of alternative hypothesis problem. In addition to the testing of assumptions behind the experimental model, I discuss the role of judgments of implausibility. A benefit of my analysis is that it reveals a continuity in the application of error-statistical assessment to low-level (...)
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  5.  92
    Error.Göran Sundholm - 2012 - Topoi 31 (1):87-92.
    The possibility of error is related to the existence a norm. Connections are spelled out to the notion of infallibility and to that of a modifying predicate, to traditional truth theories in connection with “truth of things”, as well as the primacy of the negative cases, for instance “ false friend”.
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  6. Moorean Arguments Against the Error Theory: A Defense.Eric Sampson - forthcoming - Oxford Studies in Metaethics.
    Moorean arguments are a popular and powerful way to engage highly revisionary philosophical views, such as nihilism about motion, time, truth, consciousness, causation, and various kinds of skepticism (e.g., external world, other minds, inductive, global). They take, as a premise, a highly plausible first-order claim (e.g., cars move, I ate breakfast before lunch, it’s true that some fish have gills) and conclude from it the falsity of the highly revisionary philosophical thesis. Moorean arguments can be used against nihilists in (...)
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  7. Unbelievable Errors: An Error Theory About All Normative Judgments.Bart Streumer - 2017 - Oxford, United Kingdom: Oxford University Press.
    Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false. -/- Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for (...)
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  8. Two-method errors: having it both ways.John Corcoran & Idris Samawi Hamid - forthcoming - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic.
    ►JOHN CORCORAN AND IDRIS SAMAWI HAMID, Two-method errors: having it both ways. Philosophy, University at Buffalo, Buffalo, NY 14260-4150, USA E-mail: corcoran@buffalo.edu Philosophy, Colorado State University, Fort Collins, CO 80523-1781 USA E-mail: ishamid@colostate.edu Where two methods produce similar results, mixing the two sometimes creates errors we call two-method errors, TMEs: in style, syntax, semantics, pragmatics, implicature, logic, or action. This lecture analyzes examples found in technical and in non-technical contexts. One can say “Abe knows whether Ben draws” in two other (...)
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  9.  51
    Error in Paul de Man.Stanley Corngold - 1982 - Critical Inquiry 8 (3):489-507.
    The power of literature to resist "totalization," to divide and oppose whole meaning, to separate Being from the word, or to name Being as itself divided—this is de Man's oldest and best-defended idea. Behind its deconstructionist and semiological variations in the recent work is a long genealogy of such insistence.6 This "genealogy" contains instructive continuities and aberrations. The continuities tend to show de Man to an extraordinary degree the captive of his beginnings. The aberrations pose a threat to the very (...)
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  10. (1 other version)Error theory.Richard Joyce - unknown
    To hold an error theory about morality is to endorse a kind of radical moral skepticism—a skepticism analogous to atheism in the religious domain. The atheist thinks that religious utterances, such as “God loves you,” really are truth-evaluable assertions (as opposed to being veiled commands or expressions of hope, etc.), but that the world just doesn’t contain the items (e.g., God) necessary to render such assertions true. Similarly, the moral error theorist maintains that moral judgments are (...)-evaluable assertions (thus contrasting with the noncognitivist), but that the world doesn’t contain the properties (e.g., moral goodness, evil, moral obligation) needed to render moral judgments true. In other words, moral discourse aims at the truth but systematically fails to secure it. If there is no such property as moral wrongness, for example, then no judgment of the form “X is morally wrong” will be true (where “X” denotes an actual action or state of affairs). Advocates of this position include Hinckfuss 1987; Joyce 2001; Mackie 1977 (see MACKIE, J. L.). Various forms of moral skepticism—some of which are arguably instances of the error theoretic stance—have been familiar to philosophers since ancient times. (See SKEPTICISM, MORAL.) Error theoretic views can be controversial—as in the case of religion and morality—or widely agreed upon—as in the case of ghosts and phlogiston. It is important to note that error theorists maintain that the judgments in question are erroneous not merely because of the absence of any objective moral facts sufficient to render them true, but also because of the absence of any non-objective moral facts sufficient to render them true. There is, for example, a kind of moral realist who maintains that moral properties are objective features of the universe (see REALISM, MORAL). There is also a family of metaethical views according to which moral properties are in some manner constituted by us—by our beliefs, attitudes, practices, etc.. (shrink)
     
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  11. (1 other version)Why Moral Error Theorists Should Become Revisionary Moral Expressivists.Toby Svoboda - 2015 - Journal of Moral Philosophy (1):1-25.
    Moral error theorists hold that morality is deeply mistaken, thus raising the question of whether and how moral judgments and utterances should continue to be employed. Proposals include simply abolishing morality, adopting some revisionary fictionalist stance toward morality, and conserving moral judgments and utterances unchanged. I defend a fourth proposal, namely revisionary moral expressivism, which recommends replacing cognitivist moral judgments and utterances with non-cognitivist ones. Given that non-cognitivist attitudes are not truth apt, revisionary expressivism does not involve moral (...)
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  12. Representation in the Prediction Error Minimization Framework.Alex Kiefer & Jakob Hohwy - 2009 - In Sarah Robins, John Symons & Paco Calvo, The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Psychology. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 384-409.
    This chapter focuses on what’s novel in the perspective that the prediction error minimization (PEM) framework affords on the cognitive-scientific project of explaining intelligence by appeal to internal representations. It shows how truth-conditional and resemblance-based approaches to representation in generative models may be integrated. The PEM framework in cognitive science is an approach to cognition and perception centered on a simple idea: organisms represent the world by constantly predicting their own internal states. PEM theories often stress the hierarchical (...)
     
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  13.  59
    An Expected Error: An Essay in Defence of Moral Emotionism.Justin J. Bartlett - 2022 - Axiomathes 32 (2):271-289.
    This work draws an analogical defence of strong emotionism—the metaethical claim that moral properties and concepts consist in the propensity of actions to elicit emotional responses from divergent emotional perspectives. I offer a theory that is in line with that of Prinz. I build an analogy between moral properties and what I call emotion-dispositional properties. These properties are picked out by predicates such as ‘annoying’, ‘frightening’ or ‘deplorable’ and appear to be uncontroversial and frequent cases of attribution error—the attributing (...)
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  14. The Conceptual Impossibility of Free Will Error Theory.Andrew J. Latham - 2019 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 15 (2):99-120.
    This paper argues for a view of free will that I will call the conceptual impossibility of the truth of free will error theory - the conceptual impossibility thesis. I will argue that given the concept of free will we in fact deploy, it is impossible for our free will judgements - judgements regarding whether some action is free or not - to be systematically false. Since we do judge many of our actions to be free, it follows (...)
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  15.  99
    The Ramifications of Error Theories about the Deontic.Vuko Andrić - 2015 - Acta Analytica 30 (4):429-445.
    Error theories about practical deontic judgements claim that no substantive practical deontic judgement is true. Practical deontic judgements are practical in the sense that they concern actions, and they are deontic in the sense that they are about reasons, rightness, wrongness, and obligations. This paper assumes the truth of an error theory about practical deontic judgements in order to examine its ramifications. I defend three contentions. The first is that, if so-called fitting-attitude analyses of value fail, the (...)
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  16. On Contingently Error-theoretic Concepts.Kristie Miller - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (2):181-190.
    An error theorist about a particular discourse combines the cognitivist thesis that the discourse is truth-apt with the thesis that core statements asserted by the discourse are false. For instance, one is an error theorist about witch discourse if one thinks that witch discourse is truth-apt and that some of the entities and properties quantified over by core statements in the discourse, namely witches and magical powers, do not exist and hence that certain core statements of (...)
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  17.  51
    Believable Normative Error Theory.Gerald K. Harrison - 2022 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 8 (2):208-223.
    Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline (...)
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  18.  42
    Hume as an Error Theorist.Rafael Graebin Vogelmann - 2020 - Analytica. Revista de Filosofia 22 (2):84-113.
    Neste artigo considero e rejeito uma leitura não-cognitivista do sentimentalismo moral de Hume (segundo a qual ele identifica convicções morais com impressões de um tipo particular) bem como uma leitura disposicionalista (segundo a qual Hume concebe convicções morais como crenças causais a respeito do poder de traços de caráter de produzir certos sentimentos em espectadores apropriados). Sustento que as falhas dessas leituras mostram que Hume é mais bem compreendido como um teórico do erro, de acordo com quem embora convicções morais (...)
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  19. Margins for error: A reply.Timothy Williamson - 2000 - Philosophical Quarterly 50 (198):76-81.
    I address Peter Mott's 'Margins for Error and the Sorites Paradox' , pp. 494–503). Mott criticizes my account of inexact knowledge, on which it satisfies margin for error principles of the form 'If one knows in a given case, one avoids false belief in sufficiently similar cases'. Mott's arguments are shown to be fallacious because they ignore the fact that our knowledge of inexact knowledge is itself inexact. In the examples discussed, the first-level inexact knowledge is perceptual. Since (...)
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  20.  48
    Text without Context: Some Errors of Stanley Fish.Gregory Currie - 1991 - Philosophy and Literature 15 (2):212-228.
    In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Gregory Currie TEXT WITHOUT CONTEXT: SOME ERRORS OF STANLEY FISH "Intuition told him that the vast ineptitude of the venture would serve as proof that no fraud was afoot." —Jorge Luis Borges, "Tom Castro, the Implausible Imposter," in A Universal History ofInfamy There are those of us who seek unity, universality, patterns of invariance in any diverse multitude of particulars. With the interpretation of texts, the diversity is evident, (...)
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  21.  12
    The Pseudo-Problem of Error.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Reflections on meaning. New York : Oxford University Press,: Clarendon Press ;.
    It is widely held, following Kripke, that no theory of ‘meaning as dispositions of use’ could accommodate the relationship between meaning and truth, e.g., that if a word means DOG then it is true of all dogs and only of dogs. This chapter makes explicit and criticizes the assumptions on which Kripke’s position is founded. First, that in order for the meaning of a given word to be constituted by its having a given use, we would have to be (...)
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  22.  42
    Leibniz's account of error.Keya Maitra - 2002 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 10 (1):63 – 73.
    In the Discourse on Metaphysics Leibniz writes, 'Our perceptions are always true, it is our judgments that come from ourselves that deceive us' (section 14). Leroy Loemker in his 'Leibniz's Doctrine of Ideas' criticizes this account of error. His main worry can be presented in the form of the following syllogistic argument, which he derives from Leibniz's doctrine of ideas: (a) There cannot be a false perception; (b) All judgments are perceptions; and therefore (c) There cannot be a false (...)
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  23. On The Validity of a Simple Argument for Moral Error Theory.Kasper Højbjerg Christensen - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):508-517.
    In The Myth of Morality Richard Joyce presents a simple and very influential argument for the truth of moral error theory. In this paper I point out that the argument does not have the form Joyce attributes to it, the argument is not valid in an extensional propositional logic and on the most natural way of explicating the meanings of the involved terms, it remains invalid. I conclude that more explanation is needed if we are to accept this (...)
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  24. On the Possibility of Wholesale Moral Error.Farbod Akhlaghi - 2021 - Ratio 34 (3):236-247.
    The moral error theory, it seems, could be true. The mere possibility of its truth might also seem inconsequential. But it is not. For, I argue, there is a sense in which the moral error theory is possible that generates an argument against both non‐cognitivism and moral naturalism. I argue that it is an epistemic possibility that morality is subject to some form of wholesale error of the kind that would make the moral error theory (...)
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  25.  1
    Respeto, verdad y eliminación del error en el proceso: un balance de la contribución de Levanon a la teoría general de la prueba.Edgar Aguilera Garcia - forthcoming - Problema. Anuario de Filosofía y Teoria Del Derecho:e19527.
    El objetivo del trabajo es debatir los argumentos de la obra de Liat Levanon (2022), Evidence, respect, and truth. La primera parte presenta estos argumentos con un grado considerable de detalle; en la segunda, se hace un balance de su contribución a la teoría general de la prueba jurídica actual. En el balance se identifican sus aspectos positivos y negativos. Entre los primeros destaca que tener en cuenta el modelo de Levanon permite trazar mejor la distinción entre concepciones (subjetivistas (...)
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  26. The 'Now What' Problem for error theory.Matt Lutz - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 171 (2):351-371.
    Error theorists hold that, although our first-order moral thought and discourse commits us to the existence of moral truths, there are no such truths. Holding this position in metaethics puts the error theorist in an uncomfortable position regarding first-order morality. When it comes to our pre-theoretic moral commitments, what should the error theorist think? What should she say? What should she do? I call this the ‘Now What’ Problem for error theory. This paper suggests a framework (...)
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  27. The Most Dangerous Error: Malebranche on the Experience of Causation.Colin Chamberlain - 2021 - Philosophers' Imprint 21 (10).
    Do the senses represent causation? Many commentators read Nicolas Malebranche as anticipating David Hume’s negative answer to this question. I disagree with this assessment. When a yellow billiard ball strikes a red billiard ball, Malebranche holds that we see the yellow ball as causing the red ball to move. Given Malebranche’s occasionalism, he insists that the visual experience of causal interaction is illusory. Nevertheless, Malebranche holds that the senses represent finite things as causally efficacious. This experience of creaturely causality explains (...)
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  28.  62
    'Errors of Judgment': The Case of Pain Sensations.F. Loonat - 2009 - South African Journal of Philosophy 28 (2):146-159.
    Errors of judgment regarding pain sensations are not possible. Christopher Hill, in his paper ‘Introspective Awareness of Sensations’, argues that we do sometimes commit ‘errors of judgment’ and he draws on an example that involves the perception of pain to illustrate his point. I analyze Hill’s example and draw on other examples of pain sensations to show how errors of judgment are not possible. I argue that pain sensations appear to be causally shaped and in some cases generated solely by (...)
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  29.  48
    On Kepler's awareness of the problem of experimental error.Giora Hon - 1987 - Annals of Science 44 (6):545-591.
    SummaryThis paper is an account of Kepler's explicit awareness of the problem of experimental error. As a study of the Astronomia nova shows, Kepler exploited his awareness of the occurrences of experimental errors to guide him to the right conclusion. Errors were thus employed, so to speak, perhaps for the first time, to bring about a major physical discovery: Kepler's laws of planetary motion. ‘Know then’, to use Kepler's own words, ‘that errors show us the way to truth.’ (...)
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  30. A normative aspect of imagining: taking on a (quasi-)doxastic role.Alon Chasid - 2024 - In Íngrid Vendrell Ferran & Christiana Werner, Imagination and Experience: Philosophical Explorations. New York, NY: Routledge.
    This chapter explores a noteworthy, as-yet-unanalysed normative aspect of imagining. It begins by examining cases where imaginings are deemed erroneous, showing that imaginings can “go wrong” not only by failing to represent that which the imaginer intends to imagine, or is asked to imagine by an external source (e.g. a work of fiction), but also when imaginings arise unbidden. That unintended, non-deliberate imaginings can be erroneous shows that there must be a norm or commitment that is inherent to imagining, a (...)
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  31. Modeling the interaction of computer errors by four-valued contaminating logics.Roberto Ciuni, Thomas Macaulay Ferguson & Damian Szmuc - 2019 - In Rosalie Iemhoff, Michael Moortgat & Ruy de Queiroz, Logic, Language, Information, and Computation. Folli Publications on Logic, Language and Information. pp. 119-139.
    Logics based on weak Kleene algebra (WKA) and related structures have been recently proposed as a tool for reasoning about flaws in computer programs. The key element of this proposal is the presence, in WKA and related structures, of a non-classical truth-value that is “contaminating” in the sense that whenever the value is assigned to a formula ϕ, any complex formula in which ϕ appears is assigned that value as well. Under such interpretations, the contaminating states represent occurrences of (...)
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  32.  45
    The “reign of error” in social psychology: On the real versus imagined consequences of problem-focused research.Justin Kruger & Kenneth Savitsky - 2004 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 27 (3):349-350.
    Krueger & Funder (K&F) make the familiar accusation that social psychologists focus too much on what people do wrong, rather than on what they do right. Although there is some truth to their charge, their accusations are overstated and their conclusions are incorrect. The field is far less problem-focused than they suggest, and the proposed consequences of this approach are more imagined than real.
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  33.  88
    Subtracting insult from injury: addressing cultural expectations in the disclosure of medical error.N. Berlinger - 2005 - Journal of Medical Ethics 31 (2):106-108.
    Next SectionThis article proposes that knowledge of cultural expectations concerning ethical responses to unintentional harm can help students and physicians better to understand patients’ distress when physicians fail to disclose, apologise for, and make amends for harmful medical errors. While not universal, the Judeo-Christian traditions of confession, repentance, and forgiveness inform the cultural expectations of many individuals within secular western societies. Physicians’ professional obligations concerning truth telling reflect these expectations and are inclusive of the disclosure of medical error, (...)
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  34.  46
    Why the Heck Would You Do Philosophy?Jimmy Alfonso Licon - 2023 - Logos and Episteme 14 (2):163-177.
    Philosophy plausibly aims at knowledge; it would thus be tempting to hold that much of the value of doing philosophy turns on securing knowledge. Enter the agnostic challenge: suppose that a philosophical agnostic (named 'Betsy‘) wants to discover only fundamental philosophical truths. However, the intractable disagreement among philosophical experts gives her pause. After reflecting on expert disagreement, she decides that doing philosophy, for her truth-seeking error-avoiding purposes, is irrational. In this paper, I argue that the agnostic challenge isn‘t (...)
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  35.  99
    On the art of being wrong: An essay on the dialectic of errors.Sverre Wide - 2009 - Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (4):573-588.
    This essay attempts to distinguish and discuss the importance and limitations of different ways of being wrong. At first it is argued that strictly falsifiable knowledge is concerned with simple (instrumental) mistakes only, and thus is incapable of understanding more complex errors (and truths). In order to gain a deeper understanding of mistakes (and to understand a deeper kind of mistake), it is argued that communicative aspects have to be taken into account. This is done in the theory of communicative (...)
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  36.  74
    Approximate truth.Thomas Weston - 1987 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 16 (2):203 - 227.
    The technical results presented here on continuity and approximate implication are obviously incomplete. In particular, a syntactic characterization of approximate implication is highly desirable. Nevertheless, I believe the results above do show that the theory has considerable promise for application to the areas mentioned at the top of the paper.Formulation and defense of realist interpretations of science, for example, require approximate truth because we hardly ever have evidence that a particular scientific theory corresponds perfectly with a portion of the (...)
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  37. Fundamental Errors of the New Natural Law Theory.Steven A. Long - 2013 - The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 13 (1):105-131.
    This essay argues that the new natural law theory (NNLT) propounds five errors that place it on a collision course with the traditional Thomistic understanding central to the moral magisterium of the Roman Catholic Church. These root errors are argued to be (1) the denial of the primacy of speculative over practical truth, (2) the negation of unified normative natural teleology expressed in the NNLT doctrine of the putative “incommensurability” of basic goods prior to choice, (3) failure to affirm (...)
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  38.  23
    (1 other version)Truth‐Telling.Roger Higgs - 1998 - In Helga Kuhse & Peter Singer, A Companion to Bioethics. Malden, Mass., USA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 520–529.
    This chapter contains sections titled: The Clinical Encounter Medical Paternalism Re‐examined Ethical Frameworks The Temptation to Deceive Different Forms of Deception Communicating Outside Medicine Character, Context, and Care References Further reading.
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  39.  52
    The Ethical Health Lawyer: To Tell or Not to Tell: Disclosing Medical Error.William Winslade & E. Bernadette McKinney - 2006 - Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 34 (4):813-816.
    When a health care professional contacts a health care attorney for advice about how to deal with a medical error involving a patient, what is the most ethically appropriate response? Honesty is the best policy; the ethical health lawyer should advise the client to tell the patient the truth. This advice is neither naïve nor impractical, as we will show. More importantly, it is without question the right thing to do for a number of sound reasons. It may (...)
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  40. Truth as a Pretense.James A. Woodbridge - 2005 - In Mark Eli Kalderon, Fictionalism in Metaphysics. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 134.
    Truth-talk exhibits certain features that render it philosophically suspect and motivate a deflationary account. I offer a new formulation of deflationism that explains truth-talk in terms of semantic pretense. This amounts to a fictionalist account of truth-talk but avoids an error-theoretic interpretation and its resulting incoherence. The pretense analysis fits especially well with deflationism’s central commitment, and it handles truth-talk’s unusual features effectively. In particular, this approach suggests an interesting strategy for dealing with the Liar (...)
     
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  41.  25
    The concept of truth.Richard Campbell - 2011 - New York: Palgrave-Macmillan.
    This book addresses the contemporary disillusion with truth, manifest in sceptical relativism. Contending that all contemporary theories of truth are too narrow, it argues for a novel conception of truth, by showing how error is implicated in the actions of all living things; and by analyzing uses of 'true' in non-linguistic contexts.
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  42. 18/religious truth.I. Truth - 1981 - In Stephen Skousgaard, Phenomenology and the understanding of human destiny. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America. pp. 271.
     
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  43.  91
    Umberto Eco On Truth A Fiction.On Truth - 1988 - In Umberto Eco, Marco Santambrogio & Patrizia Violi, Meaning and Mental Representations. Indiana University Press. pp. 496--41.
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  44.  98
    (1 other version)Modeling Truth.Paul Teller - 2017 - Philosophia 45 (1):143-161.
    Many in philosophy understand truth in terms of precise semantic values, true propositions. Following Braun and Sider, I say that in this sense almost nothing we say is, literally, true. I take the stand that this account of truth nonetheless constitutes a vitally useful idealization in understanding many features of the structure of language. The Fregean problem discussed by Braun and Sider concerns issues about application of language to the world. In understanding these issues I propose an alternative (...)
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  45.  95
    A semantics for moral error theory.Singa Behrens - 2024 - Analysis 84 (2):221-230.
    Moral error theory has been criticized on formal grounds for lacking a coherent semantics of moral sentences. In this paper, I provide a truthmaker-based semantics of moral sentences that is compatible with moral error theory. The hyperintensional account draws attention to the exact truth- and falsemakers of moral propositions. Error theorists must assume that propositions that have only moral truthmakers have at least one non-moral falsemaker. A central consequence of the discussion is that moral error (...)
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  46.  80
    Concerning the Problem of Error in Kant.Edgard José Jorge Filho - 2008 - Proceedings of the Xxii World Congress of Philosophy 16:67-76.
    In the Introduction to the Transcendental Dialectic, of the Critique of Pure Reason, Kant presents a conception of error. In the (Jäsche) Logic, he also deals with the problem of error, albeit in a different way. This paper aims to highlight this difference and arguing that, in the (Jäsche) Logic, error is explained more consistently and suitably than it is in the Transcendental Dialectic. It begins by considering judgment as the place of truth, falsehood and (...), and inquiring into the cognitive faculties that take part in its framing. These faculties, whose roles cannot be interchanged, are the sensibility, passive and receptive, and the understanding, active and spontaneous. Erroneous judgment springs from the unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding, which makes the understanding hold merely subjective grounds of judgment to be objective ones. In the Transcendental Dialectic, this unnoticed influence is conceived in such a way that sensibility is, in a certain sense, held to be the determining ground of error, as if it were an active faculty, whereas in the (Jäsche) Logic that influence is conceived in such a way that the understanding itself is regarded as the source and author of error. This author agrees with the conception of the understanding as submitted to prescriptive laws, which is contained in the very definition of Pure General Logic, as a science of the a priori laws of how the understanding ought to think. (shrink)
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  47.  57
    Truth-Tracking by Belief Revision.Alexandru Baltag, Nina Gierasimczuk & Sonja Smets - 2019 - Studia Logica 107 (5):917-947.
    We study the learning power of iterated belief revision methods. Successful learning is understood as convergence to correct, i.e., true, beliefs. We focus on the issue of universality: whether or not a particular belief revision method is able to learn everything that in principle is learnable. We provide a general framework for interpreting belief revision policies as learning methods. We focus on three popular cases: conditioning, lexicographic revision, and minimal revision. Our main result is that conditioning and lexicographic revision can (...)
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  48. Relaxing about Moral Truths.Christine Tiefensee - 2019 - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy 6:869-890.
    As with all other moral realists, so-called relaxed moral realists believe that there are moral truths. Unlike metaphysical moral realists, they do not take themselves to be defending a substantively metaphysical position when espousing this view, but to be putting forward a moral thesis from within moral discourse. In this paper, I employ minimalism about truth to examine whether or not there is a semantic analysis of the claim ‘There are moral truths’ which can support this moral interpretation of (...)
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  49. Are the Moral Fixed Points Conceptual Truths?Daan Evers & Bart Streumer - 2016 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy (1):1-9.
    Terence Cuneo and Russ Shafer-Landau have recently proposed a new version of moral nonnaturalism, according to which there are nonnatural moral concepts and truths but no nonnatural moral facts. This view entails that moral error theorists are conceptually deficient. We explain why moral error theorists are not conceptually deficient. We then argue that this explanation reveals what is wrong with Cuneo and Shafer-Landau’s view.
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  50. Maker theory?Propertied Objects as Truth-Makers - 2006 - In Paolo Valore, Topics on General and Formal Ontology. Polimetrica International Scientific Publisher.
     
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