We present a type inference system for pure λ-calculus which includes, in addition to arrow types, also universal and existential type quantifiers, intersection and union types, and type recursion. The interest of this system lies in the fact that it offers a possibility to study in a unified framework a wide range of type constructors. We investigate the main syntactical properties of the system, including an analysis of the preservation of types under parallel reduction strategies, leading to a form of (...) the subject-reduction property. We describe a model for this system where types are special subsets of a D∞ model for λ-calculus, without imposing any formal contractiveness constraint on types of the kind considered for a closely related system by MacQueen, Plotkin and Sethi. (shrink)

En 1819, Arthur Schopenhauer fait paraître son grand ouvrage, Le Monde comme volonté et représentation, et s’attend à rencontrer un vif succès. Très vite, ses espoirs se dissipent devant l’indifférence qui entoure la réception de ce qui reste néanmoins à ses yeux un chef-d’œuvre. Il n’hésite pas d’ailleurs à voir derrière ce silence pesant le signe d’une cabale menée par les plus médiocres philosophes, c’est-à-dire ceux qui ne vivent pas, comme lui, pour la philosophie mais de la philosophie....

Cet article s’attache à comprendre si les cyrénaïques étaient susceptibles d’être attaqués moyennant l’objection d’inactivité et, si oui, comment ils auraient pu essayer d’y répondre et quel type de vision morale ils auraient pu essayer de défendre. En traitant de ces questions, j’évaluerai la légitimité de l’interprétation du scepticisme cyrénaïque offerte par Jules Vuillemin. Je confirmerai ainsi la plausibilité de son interprétation et développerai en même temps l’exploration de la nature et de la portée de la philosophie cyrénaïque.

No single moral theory can instruct us as to whether and to what extent we are confronted with legal loopholes, e.g. whether or not new legal rules should be added to the system in the criminal law field. This question on the primary rules of the law appears crucial for today’s debate on roboethics and still, goes beyond the expertise of robo-ethicists. On the other hand, attention should be drawn to the secondary rules of the law: The unpredictability of robotic (...) behaviour and the lack of data on the probability of events, their consequences and costs, make hard to determine the levels of risk and hence, the amount of insurance premiums and other mechanisms on which new forms of accountability for the behaviour of robots may hinge. By following Japanese thinking, the aim is to show why legally de-regulated, or special, zones for robotics, i.e. the secondary rules of the system, pave the way to understand what kind of primary rules we may want for our robots. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Internationales Jahrbuch für philosophische Anthropologie Jahrgang: 7 Heft: 1 Seiten: 293-308.

Die Hermeneutik setzt sich mit dem Subjekt auseinander, sie entdeckt dessen List und Tauschung, sie schafft es aber nicht ab. Sie uberlasst es vielmehr der geduldigen Arbeit der Interpretation den Faden der Ariadne zu probieren, der uns nicht aus dem Labyrinth der Welt herausfuhrt, sondern es in einen bewohnbaren Ort verwandelt. Um dies zu tun, muss man am Subjekt gesichert arbeiten und sich gleichzeitig zu seinen aussersten Grenzen vorstrecken: wieder das Subjekt denken aber, zur gleichen Zeit und trotz dem Subjekt, (...) uber das Subjekt hinaus denken. Das Buch verfolgt die Etappen, den Wechsel des Subjekts der Modernitat und kreuzt damit das Endliche und die Zeitlichkeit, den Wunsch und das Bedurfnis, die Erinnerung und das Zeugnis. Es entsteht die Moglichkeit eines neuen Subjekts, das nicht mehr verschlossen und selbstandig ist, sondern von einer Komplexitat und einer Andersheit durchquert ist, welche es grunden und bilden; ihm kann die Aufgabe der Philosophie als Suche nach der Wahrheit wieder anvertreut werden. (shrink)

The contribution describes the legal phenomenon as a playing field characterized by a progressive regression of the law, understood as a sovereign will from top to bottom, both in the vision of formalist legal positivisms in continental Europe and in realist terms, in the United States. Soft law represents the main strategy to subordinate the law to the interests of the economy, elasticizing environmental law, making it favorable to the market, reducing ecology to the simplistic metric of CO2 emissions. The (...) consequence is a retreat of the statist vertical normativity of law which is not replaced by a de facto power granted to those who control the technology, built by design to close spaces for pluralism and democratic action, in the interest of surveillance and concentrated power in private and government oligopolies. The author concludes by advocating the urgency for genuinely innovative categories, particularly in the legal education, such as the commons, capable of including sustainability into a “new ecological jurisprudence committed to inclusion and solidarity rather than exclusion and struggle”. (shrink)

The Jewish Law (Halakahh) is probably the older legal system working in our time. It is established on a hierarchy of different texts. The oldest and more authoritative is the Torah (the five books of Moshe), then come the Mishnah, the Talmud, the compilation as Maimonide’s Mishne Torah and Caro’s Shulchan Arukh, then the responsa of the rabbis. While the authorship of the later texts is more or less clear, the one of the Torah is highly problematic, also in the (...) self-understanding of Jewish hermeneutics. This question is discussed in the present paper not from a philological-historical point of view, but from a semiotic one, trying to understand what devices and regimes of enunciation are enacted by the text in order to establish its semiotic-juridical effects. A special double enunciation frame is proposed as the mark of the legislative power in the text, in correlation with another textual device, a sort of divine “signature”. The further evolution of the authorship of the Jewish Law is discussed in its relation with the question of the autonomy in the interpretation of the sacred text. (shrink)

In my research published last year, i.e. Homo homini deus. Per un'introduzione al pensiero giuridico di Francis Bacon, I have analytically presented the Aphorismi de Jure gentium maiore sive de fontibus justiciae et iuris and I have closely studied the relationship between the legal and political philosophy of the Lord Chancellor and the civil science of Thomas Hobbes1. In the present essay I will try to summarize some of the main reasons why I think that manuscript of Chatsworth House, discovered (...) to be Bacon's only in 1980, is so important. It clarifies, with its twenty aphorisms, some crucial principles of Bacon's civil philosophy that would probably remain otherwise shadowed. So, here I will take as an excellent example that concept of sovereignty which is presented in the Aphorismi. His famous silences - for which the Lord Chancellor has been often considered the worthy, English heir of Machiavelli: 'We're much beholden...'2, - will be better understood at the light of this 'new' text. However, there is not only this sort of silence that Baconian scholars have to face and to understand, also a historiographical tradition has been consolidated in the twentieth century that has almost forgotten Bacon's civil philosophy. Those Bacon's legal and political texts that have been still considered and analyzed by philosophical critique, have been generally misunderstood. So, in order to avoid as far as possible such a fate for the Aphorismi de Jure gentium maiore either, it is necessary to consider that historical context which, as we shall see, depends very much on separating Bacon as a political thinker from his younger contemporary, Thomas Hobbes. (shrink)

Often perceived by its contradictors as the main fragility of its system, analogy constitutes however a driving element of the development of Schopenhauerian metaphysics, and makes it possible to avoid the pitfall of theoretical egoism in which any idealistic philosophy can sink. We will try to show, in accordance with the indications of paragraph 19 of The World as Will and Representation, how Schopenhauer understands the totality of the phenomena "by analogy with our body" and establishes the structure of his (...) masterpiece from this analogical dynamic that puts in motion the primitive intuition of his thought. (shrink)

The political does not exist. What exists is individual and collective life; there is nature, with its inexhaustible cycles; there is the world, the (blind and astute) interlacement of the actions, conflicts and visions that will become history. The political exists only as an invention: the invention of a specific space of the relation that intercepts life, modifies nature, and is a curvature of the world. I would like to dwell on this invention, not without warning that the political of (...) which one speaks precedes and constitutes specific kinds of politics, since it is the condition of their possibility. (shrink)

The following remarks try to trace a scenario of twentieth-century philosophy, which in my opinion shows a new interest in the issue of time. Many have underscored that nineteenth-century philosophy replaces the paradigm of Nature with that of History as an historical a priori in Foucault’s sense, that is, as the horizon within which the problems are to be located and solved. The issue of identifying the dominant nineteenth-century paradigm—further complicated by thedeclining resort to the great narratives of this “short (...) century”—is still open, so I do not believe it improper to point out that many twentiethcentury philosophers suddenly reconsidered the issue of time as a way of defining the nineteenth-century paradigm of time in a new manner. (shrink)

The future is not a new idea. The philosophers of the Enlightenment freed it of the historic wrappings of Christian eschatology and the notion of Providence itself by rationalising the idea of progress, the possible improvement of Mankind and the terrestrial city that stemmed from it. Making use of the Renaissance, the utopian authors transformed spiritual preparation for the end of time into a view of material, earthly delight made possible by science and scientific research. This ideal was certainly embodied (...) in Francis Bacon’s New Atlantis, although Thomas More was the first of all. In passing from work on consciousness to that of the spirit, the utopians of the eighteenth century espoused Reason and soon turned the future into something much more than critical discourse: It became social opportunity, a new political framework. Audaciously shifting the utopia of “elsewhere” to “the future” in the manner of Louis-Sébastien Mercier or Marquis de Condorcet, the utopians pursued a programme relying on scientific promise: Identify the technological processes of the transformation of reality and spread the word, an aim which would give birth to a new, less discursive, more popular genre—science fiction. (shrink)

parte prima, Dalla Modernità al compimento dell'Idealismo : il forse minore e il forse maggiore: Il forse minore radicale : René Descartes -- Il forse maggiore della scommessa : Blaise Pascal -- Il forse maggiore teoretico e pratico : Immanuel Kant -- Davanti al forse il "salto mortale" : F.H. Jacobi -- L'altro forse della "filosofia positiva" : F.W.J. Schelling -- Soglia : L'emergenza della libertà -- Parte seconda, Dopo Heidegger : declinazioni di un forse rivelativo : L'indecidibile forse : (...) Jacques Derrida -- Il forse rivelativo : Luigi Pareyson -- Il debolismo rivelativo debole : Umberto Eco -- Il debolismo rivelativo forte : Gianni Vattimo -- Il forse tensivo : Ugo Perone -- Il forse paradossale : Claudio Ciancio -- La radicalizzazione speculativa del forse : Massimo Cacciari -- Invece di una conclusione : "Forse che si, forse che no" -- Postilla non scientifica. (shrink)