In reply to H. Bußhoff's paper I give another outline of Lakatos' approach to normative theories in order to reduce the misunderstandings Bußhoff seems to have fallen victim to. . In particular, I try to show that he is wrong in claiming there is a vicious circle in this approach or my interpretation of it . Finally, I expose for criticism his alternative methodology of political science which propagates a theory of a "third type", suggesting that he takes too little (...) seriously problems he calls academical although their importance has been shown not only by Lakatos but by political philosophers as Rawls and Nozick. (shrink)

Summary I try to apply Lakatos's metacriterion of the rationality of normative philosophies of science to normative political theories, stressing that Lakatos's metacriterion is not only an extension of Popper's idea of tests by potentially falsifyingdescriptive basic judgments to tests by potentially falsifyingnormative judgments. Rather, its application is a test by demonstrating the tested theory's capability of reconstructing its own history as rational. Finally I argue that the tradition of utilitarian political theories is fittest to be confirmed by a Lakatosian (...) test. (shrink)

The paper reformulates empirical naturalism by 4 theses, points out a Popperian trend to its resuscitation, argues for its central thesis by rejecting formal objections that the good cannot be defined by any, any descriptive, or any empirical, concept, and material objections that the good is something different from happiness, esp, that it is justice, and conjectures about a motive for rejecting naturalism.

How much help are third countries morally allowed or obliged to provide for a state unjustly attacked by a state that might widen a local war into a nuclear world war? This question leads to the Ukraine dilemma. It faces states that deliberate their obligations to the Ukraine unjustly attacked by Russia that might use nuclear weapons. To clarify the question, I examine the two most important evaluations of wars, the just war doctrine (D) and pacifism (P). My theses are: (...) (1) D is a moral theory, but P is not. P is a practical metaphysics, so they do not exclude one another. (2) Augustine shaped D and directed it against P, interpreting P and tendentially Christianity as moral theories, losing the distinction between practical metaphysics and morality, followed suit by the Enlightenment and current normative theory. (3) To solve the Ukraine dilemma, we must rely on an uninterpreted morality and prudence. (shrink)

Hillel Steiner is a libertarian who takes the equal right to natural resources seriously. Though there are objections to some of the conclusions he draws from this right, his approach might avoid the vices of liberalism and socialism and combine their virtues.

I distinguish between freedom of action, which is incompatible with determinism, and freedom of the will, which is not, following the Spanish scholastic Molina who defined freedom of the will as the power of affirming a proposition as well as of denying it. Reviewing the arguments for and against man's having this power I argue myself that man's capacity of acting for the sake of liberty shows that we must attribute freedom of the will to man, that it does not (...) imply indeterminism, is compatible with the laws of physics but not with determinism. (shrink)

In this small book, Ulrich Steinvorth describes the reasons why analytic philosophy, which started as an anti-metaphysical project, has become a strong advocate of metaphysics, and why it must become synthetic, normative, and naturalistic. Steinvorth argues that self-regulation is the common property of all being, that we can talk of an increase or escalation of self-regulation in the evolution of being, and that self-regulation becomes self-determination in man. Considering objections to this view related to questions of free will, (...) consciousness, the naturalistic fallacy, and teleology, he draws on cybernetics, dual process theory, physical cosmology, and Leibniz’s idea of measuring the goodness of a world by the number of possibilities opened up by the world. To test his approach and show its political relevance, he applies it to political liberalism. (shrink)

This book answers questions about secularization: Does it dissolve religion, or transform it into faith in a universally valid value? Is it restricted to the west or can it occur everywhere? Using ideas of Max Weber, the book conceives secularization as a process comparable to the rational development of science and production. What is the value secularization propagates? Sifting historical texts, Steinvorth argues the value is authenticity, to be understood as being true to one's talents developed in activities that (...) are done for their own sake and provide life with meaning, and as unconditionally commanded. How can a value be unconditionally demanded? This question leads to an investigation of the self that combines Kant's ideas on the conditions of the possibility of experience with modern brain science, and to the metaphysical deliberation whether to prefer a world with creatures able to do both good and evil to one without them. It is not enough, however, to point to facts. We rather need to understand what secularization, religion and their possible rationality consist inches Max Weber's sociology of religion has provided us with the conceptual means to do so, which this book develops. Secularization is rediscovered as the same progress of rationality in the sphere of religion that we find in the development of the spheres of science, art, the economy and politics or public affairs. It proves to be the perfection rather than the dissolution of religion - a perfection that consists in recognizing authenticity as the successor of the absolute of religion. (shrink)

Ulrich Steinvorth offers a fresh analysis and critique of rationality as a defining element in Western thinking. Steinvorth argues that Descartes' understanding of the self offers a more plausible and realistic alternative to the prevailing understanding of the self formed by the Lockean conception and utilitarianism. When freed from Cartesian dualism, such a conceptualization enables us to distinguish between self and subject. Moreover, it enables us to understand why individualism – one of the hallmarks of modernity in the (...) West – became a universal ideal to be granted to every member of society; how acceptance of this notion could peak in the seventeenth century; and why it is now in decline, though not irreversibly so. Most importantly, the Cartesian concept of the self presents a way of saving modernity from the dangers that it now encounters. (shrink)

I understand the claim that there is a right to work as the claim that involuntary unemployment is an injustice that requires of justice enforcement institutions to stop it. I argue that in present conditions of high productivity it is more consistent with the liberal tradition to proclaim a right to develop one’s capabilities than a right to work. The steps of my argument are: (1) An important though not the only reason for considering unemployment unjust has been what I (...) call the Promethean idea of society. (2) The Promethean idea is implied by the liberal idea of rights. (3) There are two conceptions of the Promethean idea, the centralist and the autonomous one. (4) Only the latter is acceptable. (5) Involuntary unemployment is unjust even if the dole is decently high. (6) The injustice of unemployment can be stopped only by institutions that enable everyone to use their capabilities in realizing the Promethean idea. (7) One such institution is basic income. (8) As employment is not necessary for survival, we should replace the right to work with a right to develop one’s capabilities. (shrink)

Carver's interpretation of Marx's value theory (Terrell Carver, ?Marx's Commodity Fetishism?, Inquiry, Vol. 18 [1975]) is accepted, but his rejection of it criticized by explicating the reasons Marx gives for his theory after his faulty analysis of exchange-value at the very beginning of Capital. The central concept of abstract labour is shown to relate commodity exchange to other forms of distribution; by being compared to these the function of commodity exchange is recognized as the attachment of an amount of abstract (...) labour to a commodity, and exchange-value as that which determines that amount What it means to say value is thought to inhere in commodities is explicated. (shrink)

The paper's aim is to contribute to a better understanding of Weber's methodology by clarifying the difference of Weber's concept of Verstehen from Dilthey's concept of Verstehen, and by answering the question of how Weber's claim to objectivity of his Verstehende Soziologie is compatible with his claim that the specific method of his Verstehende Soziologie, the idealtypical construction, is empirically irrefutable. My thesis is that there are three classes of ideal types in Weber: concepts of 'historical individuals', concepts of 'objective (...) possibilities' and idealtypical classifying concepts. Common to them is the end to grasp the individual character of a social phenomenon. Their different functions in realizing this end justify to describe Weber's Verstehende Soziologie as a system, in which social phenomena are presented as if they were the result of conscious human decisions. (shrink)

Tugendhat’s remarks on religion and mysticism are explored in section 5 and 6 of this paper. To this end I outline, in section 1, the role that the criticism of religion has played from its beginnings in philosophy’s self-understanding and its focus on reasoning, which philosophers opposed to the non-reasoning justification of religion. In section 2, I consider philosophy’s relation to empirical statements and to the empirical sciences; in section 3, I discuss Tugendhat’s substitution of anthropology for metaphysics; and in (...) section 4, his moral theory. (shrink)

Eine philosophische Diskussion der Euthanasie muß unterscheiden: zwischen aktiver und passiver Euthanasie, zwischen Heiligkeit des Lebens und der Heiligkeit der Autonomie oder Selbstverfügung, zwischen Recht und Moralität, zwischenBarmherzigkeitund Gerechtigkeit für Patienten und Barmherzigkeit und Gerechtigkeit für deren Angehörige. Meggle beachtet keine dieser Unterscheidungen oder vericennt ihre Bedeutung, und er löst nicht einmal seinen Anspruch ein, aus der „Eigenperspektive des Euthanasanden" zu argumentieren.

Die englische Wikipedia erklärt ihn als »a collection of political philosophies and movements that uphold liberty as a core principle.« Doch diese Beschreibung trifft auch auf den Liberalismus zu. Den Libertarismus unterscheidet vom Liberalismus etwas, das ihn öffentlichkeitswirksam und in den USA zu einer politischen Partei machte.

I propose a conception of critical theory that is an alternative to that of the Frankfurt School and Habermas. It is based on the assumptions that critical theory is not unique but started off with the 5th century BC movement of the sophists that aimed at an understanding of society free from superstition and prejudice, can be better understood by considering the history of social thinking, does not look for knowledge for knowledge’s sake but for solving practical problems, distinguishes basic (...) social problems from dependent problems, looks for and defends a value to guide it both in its research and its solutions, prefers the value of capability development to that of happiness. (shrink)

Does the modern age have a specific attitude to the world, a way to make sense of the myriad stimuli that impinge on human organisms or, as I call it, a metaphysics? This book claims it has. It shows that what crucially changed Europe from the 16th century on was the spreading idea that things are best done for their own sake, for goals inherent in an activity, such as the goal of telling a good story or having a lively (...) chat, inheres in the telling or chatting itself. (shrink)

Gibt es Bedingungen gerechten Handelns, die die Politik zu beachten hat? Namhafte Philosophen aus dem deutschen Sprachraum begründen in diesem Buch, warum sich politisches Handeln am Maßstab der Gerechtigkeit orientieren muss, und zeigen am Beispiel aktueller politischer Probleme, welchen Beitrag die Philosophie zur Klärung der Prinzipien einer gerechten Politik zu leisten vermag.

A rational moral code must satisfy the condition of completeness. This same condition applies to a set of moral rights, where it takes the form of requiring that all the rights in that set be compossible: that their respective correlatively entailed duties be jointly fulfillable. Such joint fulfillability is guaranteed only by a set of fully differentiated individual domains. And if moral rights are to play any independent role in moral reasoning - any role logically independent of the values that (...) bring persons into conflict - those domains must be determined by rules which are not derived from those values. (shrink)

Wittgensteins "Philosophische Untersuchungen," von N. Malcolm.--Kritische Notiz zu einigen Begriffen in Wittgensteins Philosophie, von P. F. Strawson.--Wittgenstein über die Privatsprache, von N. Garver.--Der Zugang zu Wittgensteins Spätphilsophie, von S. Cavell.--Ausgewählte Bibliographie der Schriften über Ludwig Wittgenstein, zusammengestellt von Ulrich Steinvorth (p. 157-[171]).

I agree with Van Parijs that a theory of justice must meet the condition of indicating institutions that eliminate compulsory unemployment, but argue that his basic income is another form of unemployment compensation with all the disadvantages such compensations suffer from. In particular, it does not advance real freedom, but is liable to contribute to narrow political ends. I indicate an alternative and explicate, since Van Parijs disregards it, the right to work and its basis in the common property of (...) natural resources. Finally, I compare the two competing conceptions of a good life that underlie his recommendation of a basic income and my rejection of it. (shrink)