This book was originally published in 1981 and the theme of universals attracted a great deal of attention in the decade preceding publication.

ISBN 3110150077 (paperback) DEM 58.00 A collection of invited papers on the role of preferences and desires in practical reasoning: including rational decision making, the concept of welfare, and ethics. With a substantial introduction and a bibliographical survey. culture-specific and universal factors.

Spinoza’s stance against “bad” universals is well known but his own view on “good” universals is not obvious. In this paper we examine the ontological status of general terms in Spinoza against the background of his metaphysical ontology. We then move onto his view of universals in his discussions of the three kind of knowledge. I argue that Spinoza’s view may be best characterized as trope-conceptualism. Universals are, considered in things themselves, nothing but tropes, i.e., fully (...) particularized properties of individual objects. In particular, I claim that what Spinoza calls “attributes” in his grand scheme of ontology are tropes, of which we can have “adequate” ideas. Spinoza’s theory is a lot more delicate and sophisticated than is usually construed. (shrink)

Culture is the source of fostering the systems of philosophy, the philosophical ideologies/thoughts, and is the condition and material, the origin and condition for development of philosophy. A nation may have no its own system of philosophy, but cannot have no its own culture. Without its own culture, such nation cannot exist. Culture is the necessary conditions, requisites for existence of each nation in both aspects of the material and spiritual life. According to that meaning, culture is (...) also the requisites for the existence and development of the systems of philosophy. Different from the systems of scholarly philosophy in which the thinkers, scientists completely define and create the philosophies, the universals are commonly nameless, appear and exist in the different forms such as: folkverse, folk-speech, in the daily life, in architecture, etc... Cannot determine exactly the time of generating one certain universal, one specific philosophy. But can determine the author and the appearance time of one specific system of philosophy. Such philosophies, abundant and diverse universals have existed for a long time in the life of each national community, however they can exist only side by side, reflect the specific aspects, processes of the social life, but they cannot incorporate into a system of philosophy having an internal structure, a system of reasons/arguments. Their generalization level cannot be high and closely systematical like the systems of scholarly philosophy. The life reality of the nations shows the national cultures cannot be short of philosophies, universals because they are the orientations for their activities, communication and communication. The more and more a culture develops, the bigger and bigger quantity and depth of philosophies get. The farther and farther go towards the modernity, the bigger and bigger quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The more and more go backward the ancient past, the smaller and smaller quantity, depth and polyhedral diversity of the entire philosophies become. The most important is that when the system of philosophies increases in both quantity and depth, the other factors in the national culture also develop in both width and depth according to the development orientation of system of philosophies, since how far philosophies develop and expand,they will pave the way, create the direction, form the patterns for actions, communication and activities in order to create new cultural value, new cultural environment, new cultural products. Another aspect in the relationship between culture and philosophy that relates to the philosophies in the national culture is the role of the philosophies for the systems of scholarly philosophy. Only a few nations have the systems of scholarly philosophy. The systems of philosophy are normally at the high argumentative level in comparison with the philosophies in the national culture. The systems of philosophy are also an important component of the national culture. Can say, the doctrines of the scholarly philosophy is the high-leveled crystallization at the high argumentative level presenting the world outlook and the outlook on life of the nation in that era which were refracted through the concrete philosophists’ prism. The philosophies in the national culture are the direct materials for forming the structure for all factors of the systems of scholarly philosophy. On another side, the philosophies can take part more or less by their contents of knowledge, way of thinking, and deduction... into the systems of philosophy in the form of archetype. On the other hand, many philosophies indirectly take part in the doctrines of the scholarly philosophy through influencing the philosophist’s thought, consciousness during the study process, throughthe life experience, through adopting the experiences of the other people, in order to take part into the system of the scholarly philosophy since such system appeared, formed, developed and was expressed to become the systematical argumentation. The national culture is the living environment of the systems of scholarly philosophy, is the place supplying food, drinking water, oxygen and sunlight to those systems of scholarly philosophy. Like fruit trees in the garden being planted in the national culture gardens, the fatter, the richer with appropriate temperature, humidity, light they are, the more they develop with the more fruit. The systems of scholarly philosophy are the products firstly of the national culture that were piled up, distilled and sublimed through talent of the awareness, meditation, skill and spirit combined with the other virtues of the philosophists who have created the systems of scholarly philosophy that were also sprouted, fostered in the national culture. Can say there is no national culture that developed to a certain degree, cannot have the systems of scholarly philosophy. Culture is the spiritual foundation of society, at the same times is the spiritual foundation of philosophy. Culture in the broad sense of the word is the foundation of the existence of the humankind, at the same time is the decisive foundation for the birth, existence, development and perdition of the systems of philosophy.Culture despite the broad sense of the word or the narrow meaning is regularly the motive force of the social development in general in which there is the development of philosophy. A nation without a developed culture cannot have the abundant, diverse philosophies, even cannot have the systems of philosophy. A nation may be enslaved for thousands years, but it has not lost, eliminated its own culture, then that nation can exist as an independent nation. The nations can borrow the systems of philosophy, but cannot borrow the philosophies, moreover cannot borrow the culture in general. That is the relative independence of philosophy with culture and the role of culture for philosophy. (shrink)

Any acceptable account of moral epistemology must accord with the following points. (1) Different people acquire seemingly very different moralities. (2) All normal people acquire a moral sense, whether or not they are given explicit moral instruction. Language resembles morality in these ways. There is considerable evidence from linguistics for linguistic universals. This suggests that (3) despite the first point, there are moral universals. If so, it might be possible to develop a moral epistemology that is analogous to (...) the theory of universal grammar in linguistics. In what follows, I will try to sketch what might be involved in such a moral epistemology. (shrink)

Intercultural philosophy is the name of a relatively young discipline that did not emerge in German-speaking universities until the 80s and 90s. Its goal is to establish dialogue and understanding between the diverse, often vastly heterogenous cultures to make a peaceful coexistence possible that became a necessity in the course of globalization. Cultures differ not only in respect of the religious, political and social, but also in the patterns of thinking and acting, i.e. in respect of logic, the conceptions (...) of time and space, causality or analogy etc. It cannot be assumed that there are universals of thought and action. Is it even possible to establish a dialogue under these conditions? Several theories need to be discussed: 1. In case that we assume with Gadamer that philosophy in content and form is a European project that evolved in the west, then true dialogue would only be possible under the same or similar cultural conditions, specifically under the assumption of a euro-centrism that must be imposed on all cultures if a dialogue should be possible. Habermas’ discourse theory too turns out to be a disguised euro-centrism that assumes equality of opportunity for all participants of discourse while relying on identical communicative, constative, representative and regulative speech acts that belong to western logic. 2. In case that we limit philosophy to questions of content that are for example already characteristic of children and not to questions of form that may be different in different cultures, then mutual understanding would not be entirely impossible, but difficult, since the contents would have to be translated into different verbal or averbal modes of explication, e.g. in the case of primitive cultures also into artistic, mimic, gestic modes of expression. In any case, intercultural philosophical understanding is a difficult project that has little to do with soapbox oratories of mutual understanding and the advent of uniform global peace. (shrink)

Modern epistomology has been dominated by an empiricist theory of knowledge that assumes a direct individualistic relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Truth is held to be universal, and non-individualistic social and cultural factors are considered sources of distortion of true knowledge. Since the late 1950s, this view has been challenged by a cognitive relativism asserting that what is true is socially conditioned. This volume examines the far-reaching implications of this development for the social sciences. Recently, (...) cognitive relativism has become a key issue of debate in anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. In anthropology this is illustrated by a growing awareness of the similarity of all systems of knowledge. In philosophy it is exemplified by the realization that traditional monolithic and absolutist concepts of truth have increasingly lost any power to make sense and to convince. In sociology it is visible in a renewal of interest in a general sociology of knowledge. Yet, in spite of this convergence of interests, practitioners of these three disciplines have on the whole shown no inclination to reach a consensus on the terms of reference that could facilitate an interdisciplinary approach. "Cognitive Relativism and Social Science "aims to do just this. It is a working assumption of this volume that, as far as the subject of cognitive relativism is concerned, anthropologists, philosophers, and sociologists should join forces rather than try to deal with the challenges of cognitive relativism within strictly imposed boundaries that normally separate academic disciplines. Only when they work together will it be possible to treat the problems posed by cognitive relativism in an adequate way. This volume provides the results of attempts to communicate on cognitve relativism across disciplinary boundaries. This is must reading in the philosophy of social science and in social research theory. (shrink)

The concept of person arises in the conjunction of Greek Philosophy carried out by Saint Augustine. Both men and women are persons because they carry the image of God in their soul. On bearing the mind God's mark in its memory, it will wish for happiness. On bearing God's mark in its intelligence, it will wish for Truth and on bearing God's mark in its will it will wish for the Good since the desire for happiness is a wish (...) or remembrance of God, the desire for Truth is a wish of God because He is the Truth, and the desire of Good and Beauty is a wish of God because He is the highest Good and the supreme Beauty. Human being's strongest motivations: happiness, truth, good and beauty, they all just come from being a person, from being the brightest bearer of the Trinitarian image which, on leaving its mark on him, at the same time marks the direction of his deepest desire. The anchorage of those metaphysical desires of man is in God and they can be thought of as anthropological universals. (shrink)

In his recent book Peirce and the Threat of Nominalism, Paul Forster presented how Peirce understood the nominalist scruple to individualise concepts for collections at the cost of denying properties of true continua. In that process Peirce showed some vibrant problems, as for example, the classic one of universals. Nonetheless that work is still incomplete; as long as that should be adequately related with what Peirce called his ‘scholastic realism’. Continuity is started by the theory of multitude and frees (...) his analysis from any constraints of the nominalist theories of reality as integrated by incognizable things-in-themselves. His theory of multitude, instead, can be derived with mathematics: By drawing in the work of the ways of abstraction in diagrammatic reasoning made by Sun Jo Shin and in continuum theories by Cathy Legg I will show the device of diagrammatic reasoning as a plausible pragmatic tool to represent those continua and make sense of his scholastic realism. The analysis of continuity is a perfect example of how the method of diagrammatic reasoning helps unblock the road of philosophical inquiry and also helps to clarify other problems as, for example, the applicability of Mathematics. General concepts define continua, and, while the properties of true continua are not reducible to properties of the individuals they comprise, they are still intelligible and necessary to ground any science of inquiry. (shrink)

Assuming the position that takes properties to be tropes rather than universals and takes ordinary objects as bundles of tropes, the essay first argues that the Law of the Identity of Indiscernibles survives the challenge raised by Black's "two-sphere universe". It is because the Law of Indiscernibles becomes a trivialconsequence of the assumed trope ontology. The essay then considers four construals of the thesis of Uniqueness differing in strength. The construals are developed in terms of both the possibility that (...) tropes of an object may be transferred to another object and the possibility that objects may survive cross-worldproperty changes. Finally, the essay argues that a trilemma arises from three intuitively innocent claims: (1) that same world objects do not share tropes, (2) that cross world objects may share some (but not all) tropes, and (3) that objects may survive cross-world property changes. And, unfortunately, Indiscernibles plays a role in giving rise to one horn of the trilemma. The essay suggests "ultraessentialism" as a possible way out of the trilemma. (shrink)

Realism and conventionalism generally establish the parameters of debate over universals. Do abstract terms in language refer to abstract things in the world? The realist answers yes, leaving us with an inflated ontology; the conventionalist answers no, leaving us with subjective categories. I want to defend nominalism — in its original medieval sense, as one possibility that aims to preserve objectivity while positing nothing more than concrete individuals in the world. First, I will present paradigmatic statements of realism and (...) conventionalism as developed by Russell and Strawson. Then, I will present the nominalist alternative as developed by William of Ockham. (shrink)

A correct understanding of experience is crucial for understanding the difference between human and non-human animals. Richard Sorabji interprets Aristotle to be affirming that experience in non-human animals is the same thing as a rudimentary universal, and that the individual who possesses experience achieves his goal by the application of low level univer-sals. I argue that this is neither a correct understanding of Aristotle’s statements in the Posterior Analytics, Metaphysics, and Nicomachean Ethics, nor is it true to the facts. Sorabji (...) is misled, first, by the fact that experience can be regarded as a rudimentary universal in humans, and secondly by the fact that people of experience often possess universals that pertain to their actions. As to the latter, I show that people of experience do not succeed in virtue of possessing universals. As to the former, I point out that regarding experience as a rudimentary universal presupposes that the being that possesses them goes on to acquire true universals, something Sorabji fails to show. The presence of a modicum of experience in some non-human animals, thus, does not show that these beings share with us the capacity for knowledge of universals. (shrink)

El objetivo de la educación es la formación universal del ser humano. ¿Qué significa la formación universal del ser humano? Significa su máxima realización. Esta máxima realización hace posible la reproducción de los valores universales por medio de la educación garantizando la continuidad de la especie humana. Esta tarea de la educación se ve truncado en el hombre moderno por el paradigma fragmentario de formación unilateral. Esta formación unilateral es la causa de la fragmentación espiritual del individuo que se refleja (...) en la crisis existencial y de valores. El predominio de los antivalores en la sociedad conduce a la involución espiritual del individuo y, en consecuencia, a la destrucción de la sociedad. Ante este problema global, surge la necesidad de replantear el objetivode la educación sobre nuevas bases ontológicas que comprende la naturaleza y esencia del hombre, y los principios universales. (shrink)

The various forms of human knowledge can be regarded as an integral, historically developing system. Universal cultural categories are a system-building factor. They form the core of the cultural and historical code by which a type of society is reproduced. The differences in the meaning of universals in traditional and technogenic cultures determine the difference in the organization of knowledge forms. The modern system of knowledge is developing under two general conditions: the search for a new worldview, as well (...) as the intensification of cross-cultural dialogue. The transition to the technological mastery of complex, historically evolving systems forms new images of nature from the scientific perspective, as well as new strategies of activity. These new images of nature accord not only with the values of the European culture, but correlate with the worldviews of different Eastern cultures which had previously been rejected as unscientific. (shrink)

Are there deep differences between these cultures in their ways of thinking? How can they be described? There is no neutral language for doing so. One can doubt all claims to deep essence as being metaphysical illusions and figments. However, the differences are certainly experienced. They can be characterized negatively. This is where Chinese and Western viewpoints meet. Whereas Jullien finds the cultural Other enabling him to think otherwise and effectively to keep the recursive self-negating aspect of discourse active and (...) alive in his own discourse, I attempt to do this by reference to the apophatic current underlying Western philosophical reflection in all its most radically critical and especially self-critical manifestations. Especially from consideration of Eastern approaches to universality, the apophatic wisdom that can be gathered here can serve to put us on guard against any universality that can be thought. Universality is not what it is thought to be by the universals that we can think. The naïve faith in thought and education as per se emancipatory is belied by history. The universal remains an ideal rather than a manifest fact in the course of history. It cannot be approached except always by way of the negative. (shrink)

Buddhist logicians have rejected the reality of universals on the one hand, and, on the other hand, given a substitute in the form of the doctrine of Apoha. The doctrine of apoha first appears in Dinnaga’s Pramanasamuccaya, according to which words and concepts are negative by their very nature. They proceed on thebasis of negation. They express their own meaning only by repudiating their opposite meaning. The Buddhist logicians talk of two types of knowledge, viz., pratyaksa, which is non- (...) relational and anumana, which is relational. They accept nirvikalpaka pratyaksa as a pure pratyaksa, and savikalpaka pratyaksa has been merged with anumana by them. According to them, cognition is either a direct awareness of an object, which is independent of any mentalconstructionor it is an awareness of an object which is a mentalconstruction. Further, according to the Buddhist logicians inferences are of two kinds, viz., svarthanumana and pararthanumana. But they do not accept pararthanumana as a source of knowledge. Now, since perception is devoid of kalpana, perceptual knowledge is essentially non-linguistic and does not involve any general concept or universal. Thus,Apoha has no role to play in perceptual knowledge. On the other hand, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana are based on kalpana, thus according to the Buddhist logicians knowledge of universal is essential for both, savikalpaka pratyaksa and anumana. (shrink)