It is a remarkable fact about the early history of the analytic tradition that its three most important protagonists all held, at least during significant intervals of their respective careers, that there are entities that cannot be named. This shared commitment on the part of Frege, Russell and the early Wittgenstein is the topic of this thesis. I first clarify the particular form this commitment takes in the work of these three authors. I also illustrate a distinctive cluster of philosophical (...) difficulties attending the view that there are unnameable entities, and explore the relationship between unnameability and inexpressibility. I then investigate what grounds there are for countenancing the unnameable, focussing in particular on the thesis that concepts cannot be named. I give a detailed hearing to four arguments for the unnameability of concepts discernible in, or suggested by, early analytic writings. The first and second arguments (chapters 3 and 4) are distinguishable in the locus classicus, Frege's 'On Concept and Object'. The first concerns the relationship between co-reference and intersubstitutability; the second concerns the unity of thought. The third argument (chapter 4) appeals to the alleged impossibility of expressing identities between objects and concepts, while the fourth (chapter 5) draws on considerations pertaining to diagonalization and Russell's paradox. I make the case that all four arguments fail to provide grounds for accepting the unnameable, contending that each argument can and should be resisted in defence of singular reference to concepts. In doing so I develop a novel defence of the view that absolutely any entity can be referred to with a singular term. (shrink)

By recovering the dependent, often enslaved, laborers who helped to make European medicines commercially available in the New England colonies, this article offers a new history of early American pharmaceutical knowledge and production. It does so by considering the life and labor of an unnamed, enslaved assistant who was said to make tinctures, elixirs, and other common remedies in a 1758 letter between two business partners, Silvester Gardiner, a successful surgeon and apothecary in Boston, Massachusetts, and William Jepson, his former (...) apprentice, in Hartford, Connecticut. Using strategies from slavery and critical archive studies, as well as from social history and the history of medicine, this article emphasizes the materiality and embodiment of pharmaceutical production and follows fragmentary evidence beyond the business archive to reverse the systemic erasure of enslaved and indentured laborers from the records of eighteenth-century manufacturers of medicines. The medicine trades of men like Gardiner and Jepson appear more reliant upon dependent laborers – named and unnamed – who not only performed rote tasks but brought their experience and judgment to their labors as well. Their contributions could be obviously medical (preparing remedies) or more ambiguous (stoking fires, shipping goods), but these actions together constituted early modern pharmacy, enabled the expansion of the transatlantic medicine trade, and laid the foundations for the more self-sufficient and industrialized pharmacy that developed in the nineteenth century. Centering the skill and knowledge among subordinated laborers in one facet of an emergent transatlantic care economy affirms the entanglement of slavery and science and underscores the necessity of asking new questions of old sources. (shrink)

This article critically examines the practice of unnamed sourcing in journalism. A literature review highlights arguments in favor of and against their use. The authors examine some common examples of anonymous sourcing using the lens of utilitarianism, the ethical model commonly used to justify the practice. We find that few uses of unnamed sourcing can be justified when weighed against diminished credibility and threats to fair, transparent reporting. The authors suggest specific guidelines for journalists that, if followed, would curb many (...) of the pedestrian uses of unnamed sourcing but still allow for the practice in specific circumstances. (shrink)

Current discussions of hermeneutical injustice, I argue, poorly characterise the cognitive state of victims by failing to account for the communicative success that victims have when they describe their experience to other similarly situated persons. I argue that victims, especially when they suffer moral wrongs that are yet unnamed, are able (1) to grasp certain salient aspects of the wrong they experience and (2) to cultivate the ability to identify instances of the wrong in virtue of moral emotions. By moral (...) emotions I mean emotions like indignation that reflect an agent’s ethical commitments and bear on her ethical assessments. Further, I argue that victims can impart their partial understanding of the wrong they suffer to others who are not similarly situated by eliciting moral emotions such as pity that are tied to broad notions of justice and fairness. (shrink)

According to Jacques Derrida, there is a différance – his infamous mis-spelling of the French différence – that ‘has no name in our language’ (‘Différance’, in Margins of Philosophy); its name is not différance, and it is not just nameless but ‘unnameable’. ‘The a of différance’, he also tells us, ‘remains silent, secret and discreet as a tomb’. My essay, which is haunted throughout by Derrida, seeks to address the following question: if the a of différance is like a tomb, (...) then who or what died? To Kzomil. (shrink)

Hans Herzberger as a philosopher and logician has shown deep interest both in the philosophy of Gottlob Frege, and in the topic of the inexpressible and the ineffable. In the fall of 1982, he taught at the University of Toronto, together with André Gombay, a course on Frege's metaphysics, philosophy of language, and foundations of arithmetic. Again, in the fall of 1986, he taught a seminar on the philosophy of language that dealt with 'the limits of discursive symbolism in several (...) domains of human experience.' The course description continues by saying: 'Special attention will be given to the paradoxes underlying various doctrines of the inexpressible and the tensions inherent in those paradoxes. Some doctrines of .. (shrink)

The Tao Te Ching begins enigmatically with the following lines:The Tao that can be told of is not the eternal Tao; The name that can be named is not the eternal name.

This essay is basically exegetical in nature, and its purpose is fourfold. First, I argue against the prevailing view that the dao 道 of the Daodejing 道德經 is metaphysically either a non-being or something transcending all senses by showing that it is a nonempty transforming unsummed totality.1 Dao is still metaphysical, but only as something that defies our ability to experience it as a totality or as any of its aspectual totalities.Second, I argue that in the Daodejing Laozi 老子 adopts (...) the condition of naming that a sign becomes a name only if it can be used to describe what it signifies.2 Because none of the aspectual totalities of dao can be described, the naming condition is contravened, and thus dao and its... (shrink)

The way we refer to third parties in talk is one means through which relationships between speaker, recipients and referents are made relevant. A range of referring expressions is available and any number of expressions might correctly refer to a referent. One guide to selection is the preference for achieving recognition and the default practice is, where possible, to use a name. This conversation analytic article describes a practice that does not fit the default pattern. In this practice, speakers select (...) a broad social category when a recognitional form could have been used. Despite the designed selection of a categorical form, the referent remains recognitional. For example, in one extract, a mother in conversation with her teenage daughter refers to a collective made up of her former husband and his girlfriend as ‘these people’. The daughter has no difficulty working out who ‘these people’ are and recognizes it as a reference to her father and stepmother. I show that this designedly categorical formulation often contributes to hostile action by distancing the referent from parties to the interaction – making the referent unnameable and not connected to the speaker and recipient. The role of demonstrative pronouns – this, that, these – are discussed in relation to constructing social distance between speakers, recipients and referents. (shrink)

In On Divine Names the Christian neoplatonist Dionysius the Areopagite develops a philosophical mode in which the form of the text follows from and advances his topic. This has not been recognized mostly because modern philosophical treatises have followed primarily the expository line of the text. However, Dionysius’ topic here, how properly to name God or as he would put it more broadly, how to praise God, requires a technique of a certain indirection. In short, the reader cannot be led (...) by argument alone to appropriate naming of the divine. Instead, the reader is led to a performative, almost liturgical philosophizing. This paper will consider in particular Dionysius’ opening chapters that serve to orient the reader to such a performative mode and to Dionysius’ modification of neoplatonic thinking on naming the divine. (shrink)

In this essay I present the postmodern phenomenological approach of Levinas, Derrida, and Marion to the problem of naming the unnameable God. For Levinas, God is never experienced directly but only as a third person whose infinity is testified to in the infinity of responsibility to the hungry. For Derrida, God remains the unnameable "wholly other" accessible only as the indeterminate term of pure reference in prayer. For Marion, God remains the object of "de-nomination" through praise. In all three, the (...) problem of naming the unnameable God is necessarily linked to how we relate to fellow human beings, to the hungry in Levinas, justice in Derrida, and charity in Marion. I also reflect on the merits and adequacy of phenomenology as such for speaking of divine transcendence. (shrink)

In this article, I compare WANG Bi’s 王弼 rendition of Dao 道 as the nameless, unfathomable root of language and the totality of beings, with Derrida’s analysis of the term khōra. Both cases include a text that presents itself as a commentary on another text, namely the Laozi 老子 for Wang Bi and Plato’s Timaeus for Derrida, whose matter is declared as elusive and ungraspable. I analyze the analogies between these two attempts to convey the unsayable, as well as the (...) philosophical differences in highlighting the “ipseity,” or the “otherness,” of what resides beyond the edge of discourse. On the basis of my analysis, I claim that decisive parallelisms can be found in the homology between text and theme, in the linguistic strategies and common metaphors, whereas the main difference lies in the metaphysical background. Whereas the Dao presumes a harmonious ability for self-ordering, khōra is centered on the concept of absolute otherness, whose unsayability is that of an entity that is constantly removing itself from any determination and which properly consists in dispossessing itself. (shrink)

Volume 29, Issue 7-8, November - December 2024.

Levinas establishes an intriguing connection between idolatry and ontology. This connection is aptly illustrated by the biblical character of Balaam, the ambiguous Mesopotamian prophet or sorcerer of Numbers 22-24, who is almost never mentioned in Levinas's work but who is present, albeit hidden, in the talmudic reading “Contempt for the Torah as Idolatry.“ A deconstruction of this talmudic reading uncovers Balaam's footprints. It also clarifies different meanings of idolatry—exposing its ontological violence, but also, perhaps, its necessity for ethics and law.

In focusing on the decade-long prelude to the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll have provided an excellent and accessible account of the situation in Ukraine on...

Olga Onuch and Henry Hale, The Zelensky Effect. London: Hurst and Co. 2023. Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll, Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Olga Onuch and Henry Hale. “ The Zelensky Effect ”. London: Hurst and Co, 2023. Dominique Arel and Jesse Driscoll. “ Ukraine’s Unnamed War. Before the Russian Invasion of 2022 ”. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2023.

Manifesto "is the projection of an ideal man. The portrayal of a moral ideal, as my ultimate literary goal, as an end in itself - to which any didactic, intellectual or philosophical values contained in a novel are only the means" (162). That she largely succeeded in her goal is attested to by the fact that her novels have enabled countless readers to reshape their lives. The story of Kira in We the Living, the image of Howard Roark in The (...) Fountainhead, the example of Dagny in Atlas Shrugged - all these have given readers the courage to free themselves from destructive circumstances or to make the right decisions in pivotal moments of their lives, and undergirded their conviction that only a life of moral integrity is a truly successful life. The story of the life and character of Howard Roark is, perhaps, the best known and most influential of Rand’s stories. (shrink)

Unnamed sources have claimed that Michael Novak is "credited with considerable input" into John Paul II's encyclical, Centesimus annus, such that the former's thought "is said to be reflected in" the document. However, while John Paul II affirms economic rights, Novak rejects them. In addition, the Pope critiques the gap between rich and poor and the consumerism that drives it; Novak finds them to be morally irrelevant. Following Catholic teaching before him, John Paul places restrictions on the accumulation of private (...) property for one's own use, while Novak identifies no such limits. Finally, while the Pope rejects the affirmation of any one system as a form of "ideology," Novak argues, "We are all capitalists now, even the Pope." Such dramatic differences suggest that the claim that Novak has influenced John Paul's thought is unfounded and that the former's position may even be one of dissent. (shrink)

As an unnamed friend pieces together—literally, from thousands of slips of papers and one troubling manuscript—the puzzle of Rotheimer's breakdown, what emerges is the story of a genius ceaselessly compelled to correct and refine his ...

White supremacy is the unnamed political system that has made the modern world what it is today. You will not find this term in introductory, or even advanced, texts in political theory. A standard undergraduate philosophy course will start off with plato and Aristotle, perhaps say something about Augustine, Aquinas, and Machiavelli, move on to Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and Marx, and then wind up with Rawls and Nozick. It will introduce you to notions of aristocracy, democracy, absolutism, liberalism, representative government, (...) socialism, welfare capitalism, andlibertarianism. But though it covers more than two thousand years of Western political thought and runs the ostensible gamut of political systems, there will be no mention of the basic political system that has shaped the world for the past several hundred years. And this omission is not accidental. Rather, it reflects the fact that standard textbooks and courses have for the most part been written and designed by whites, who take their racial privilege so much for granted that they do not even see it as political, as a form of domination. Ironically, the most important political system of recent global history-the system of domination by which white people have historically ruled over and, in certain important ways, continue to rule over nonwhite people-is not seen as a political system at all. It is just taken for granted; it is the background against which other systems, which we are to see as political are highlighted. This book is an attempt to redirect your vision, to make you see what, in a sense, has been there all along. (shrink)

The subtractive : preface by Francois Wahl -- Philosophy itself -- The (re)turn of philosophy itself -- Definition of philosophy -- What is a philosophical institution? -- Philosophy and poetry -- The philosophical recourse to the poem -- Mallarm's method : subtraction and isolation -- Rimbaud's method : interruption -- Philosophy and mathematics -- Conference on subtraction -- Truth : forcing and unnameable -- Philosophy and politics -- Philosophy and love -- What is love? -- Philosophy and psychoanalysis -- Subject (...) and infinite -- Antiphilosophy : Lacan and Plato -- Writing of the generic -- Writing of the generic : Samuel beckett. (shrink)

This paper identifies and elucidates a hitherto unnamed epistemic vice: epistemic insouciance. Epistemic insouciance consists in a casual lack of concern about whether one’s beliefs have any basis in reality or are adequately supported by the best available evidence. The primary intellectual product of epistemic insouciance is bullshit in Frankfurt’s sense. This paper clarifies the notion of epistemic insouciance and argues that epistemic insouciance is both an epistemic posture and an epistemic vice. Epistemic postures are attitudes towards epistemic objects such (...) as knowledge, evidence, or inquiry. Epistemic vices are defined as character traits, attitudes, or thinking styles that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping or sharing of knowledge. Epistemic insouciance is not just a posture but an affective posture. Such postures are distinguished from epistemic stances, which are policies that one can adopt or reject. Epistemic malevolence is an example of an epistemically vicious epistemic stance that issues in active attempts to undermine the knowledge possessed by a specified group of individuals. An example of epistemic malevolence in action is the so-called ‘tobacco strategy.’ I argue that epistemic malevolence undermines knowledge by instilling doubts about respectable sources of evidence. (shrink)

There are numerous studies on the esoteric sects in Islam. Though in these studies they have been discussed from different respects, none of them draws attention to the place and importance of the theory of shadows (aẓilla) in the esoteric sects. In this article, after the identification of the meaning of the theory of shadows, it has been argued that the concept of shadows has a central role in understanding the esoteric system of thought. In this context, it has been (...) tried to reveal the central effect of the theory of shadows on the basic ideas of esoteric sects. -/- SUMMARY There are numerous studies on the esoteric sects in Islam. Though in these studies they have been discussed from different respects, none of them draws attention to the place and importance of the theory of shadows (aẓilla) in the esoteric sects. In this article, after the identification of the meaning of the theory of shadows, it has been argued that the concept of shadows has a central role in understanding the esoteric system of thought. In this context, it has been tried to reveal the central effect of the theory of shadows on the basic ideas of esoteric sects. The theory of shadows can be defined as the reflection of the shadows or non-material beings, which appear in the divine world, in this world in a material form. The origins of this view go back to the Plato’s theory of ideas that he formulated as ideas and forms and to his allegory of cave that he used to explain this theory. This theory which was formulated and developed by the pre-Islamic various religious and philosophical traditions took an Islamic form through the bāṭinī/esoteric schools. The theory of shadows was first developed by the extremist groups of shiʿa. Though the early classical works referred the theory of shadow to the extremist shiʿas, they do not give any detail thereof. Nevertheless, it is possible to find in some views of theirs and in the esoteric sects such as Ismailites, Nusayrites, Druzes and Yazidites some clues about the character of this theory. In addition, the later works like Kitāb al-Haft wa al- ʾAẓilla directly articulating the theory of shadows were composed. Although the theory of shadows was not mentioned sufficiently in the works produced within the bāṭinī/esoteric circles, it is witnessed that their understandings of religion were based, to a large extent, upon the theory of shadows. The most basic feature of this unnamed understanding is the claim that every being in the divine world has been reflected in this world in a material form. Since the essence of God generally was kept out from the manifestation (tajallī), reflection was not started with his essence. However, the first beings emanating from Almighty Creator brought the divine world into being and that world was reflected to this world in a material form. With this perception, a Gnostic understanding was developed that the material has no reality and the ultimate reality should be sought in the non-material. According to this, the material beings consisting of only reflection of reality are not possible to have an ultimate reality. The only truth is the meaning, inner (bātin) or shadow which reflects to the world in a material form. Naturally what a bāṭinī should do is to seek the non-material ultimate truth hidden behind the material form. The theory of shadows in this point argued compulsorily the distinction of ẓāhir-bātin (outer-inner). Accordingly, ẓāhir consists of a shell or reflection in which hides the truth. The duty one should do is to go beyond the outer meaning of religious text and to get the inner truth hidden behind the outer meaning. The theory of shadows made a dualist view point obligatory, because every being has an inner aspect which includes the truth and an outer respect in which the ultimate truth is reflected in a material form. God has the inner attributes through which the truth appears spiritually and material attributes to which they are reflected. Universe has a dualist character, a spiritual universe consisting of non-material realities and material universe consisting of its reflections. Human beings have a dualist character, a soul belonging to the divine world and a body belonging to this world. Religious texts which were sent for the salvation of mankind also have two aspects, the inner (bāṭin) belonging to the divine world and the outer (ẓāhir) belonging to this world. Since the Bāṭiniyya considered the divine world to be composed of sevenfold and each fold to be a divine being, they sought, as a result of the theory of shadow, to find in the material world the counterparts or reflections of these beings. Even if their names show differences, the bāṭinī/esoteric groups regarded in certain times some figures as the reflections of the divine world in the material world. Divine beings called al-ʿAql al-Kullī (the Universal Intellect), al-Nafs al-Kullī (the Universal Soul), al-Kalima, Sābiq and Tālī were reflected in the world as the material forms like the Prophet Muhammad, Ali, Salman al-Farisī, Miqdāt b. al-Aswad, Ammār b. Yāsir. This understanding resulted in the divinization of some figures in the world, because it was held that through the manifestation these figures differ from the ordinary people, thus having some divine features. These figures gaining a bipolar identity were outwardly human beings, while inwardly regarded as the forms of divine beings reflected in the world. In this point, what the other people should do is to comprehend, with reference to the figures and their forms, the divine truth reflecting them. This approach brought about a religious understanding in which an individual salvation was not possible and some figures were perceived as charismatic leaders. As a result, the religious understanding developed by the Bāṭiniyya schools is under the ultimate influence of the theory of shadows. With reference to this theory, they developed a new understanding of Islam called Esotericism. At the core of this perception lies the theory of shadows and dualism as its inseparable part. In this sense, Esotericism represents a religious understanding developed in this direction and having a wholeness and deepness. In order to understand this religious understanding correctly, the theory of shadows must be taken into consideration and the esoteric texts be read in this direction. This kind of way of reading, in which the outer is seen as the unique reality, fails to realize the duality behind it, will not enable us to comprehend the inner wholeness of Esotericism and cause to see it as a mass of contradictions. (shrink)

The main argument in Parmenides’ didactic poem begins with these remarks by the unnamed goddess who delivers the revelation (B2 in Diels-KranzDie Fragmente der Vorsokratiker):Come now and I shall tell you, and you listen to the account and carry it forth, which routes of inquiry (ơδοί…διζησιος, B2.2) alone are for knowing: the one (μέν, B2.3), that (…) is and that it is not possible (for …) not to be ὅπως ἔστιν τε ϰαὶ ὼς οὐϰ ἔστι μὴ είναι, B2.3) is the (...) course of Persuasion, for it attends truth; the other ἠδ; B2.5 that (…) is not and that it is right (for …) not to be (ὡς οὐϰ ἔστιυ τε ϰαὶ ὡς χρεών ἐστι μὴ εἶναι, B2.5) that one I mark for you as being a byway from which no tidings ever come (παναπευθέα ἔμμεν άταρπόυ, B2.6) For you could neither come to know (Υυοίμς, aorist, B2.7) the thing itself which is not (τό Υε μὴ έόυ), for it cannot be consummated (οὐ Υὰρ ἀνυστόυ), nor could you point it out (φράσαις, aorist, B2.8). (shrink)

Epistemologies have power. They have the power not only to transform worlds, but to create them. And the worlds that they create can be better or worse. For many people, the worlds they create are predictably and reliably deadly. Epistemologies can turn sacred land into ‘resources’ to be bought, sold, exploited, and exhausted. They can turn people into ‘labor’ in much the same way. They can not only disappear acts of violence but render them unnamable and unrecognizable within their conceptual (...) architectures. Settler systems of epistemic and conceptual resources and the relations among them are constructed to preclude certain forms of knowledge. This is not an accident; it is a central goal of colonial violence. Colonization and land dispossession would not be possible without the violent disruption of Indigenous knowledge systems and ongoing organized attempts to disrupt their survival. Violently disrupting the relationships of people to land is as much an epistemic project as it is a material one, and these two projects are inherently linked. The task of theorizing epistemic oppression is not only about epistemic oppression. Epistemic oppression is a story that gives language to a phenomenon in order to get past it, to carry on with the maintaining and reviving the forms of Indigenous and diasporic knowledge that colonialism has worked tirelessly to corrupt and silence. (shrink)

Some of the short pieces attributed in various Arabic manuscripts to Alexander of Aphrodisias in fact derive from Proclus's Elements of Theology. Twenty such pieces were published in 1973 by G. Endress, who traced the unnamed translator to the circle of Kindi. Another such piece is here identified, published, and assigned to the same translator. Its beginning and end seem to have been revised by a later transmitter. Section II of the article adduces a parallel case where the original Arabic (...) version still exists. Section III surveys a number of related pieces that would also appear to have been changed in transmission. Section IV argues that most if not all were once united in a single collection of Proclus and Alexander. Section V argues that since certain changes of detail were evidently made during or soon after translation, the general arrangement of the Kindi-circle Alexander, as of the Kindi-circle Liber de Causis and the Kindi-circle, is also likely to be peculiar to the Arabic tradition. The text from which Proclus Arabus was first translated need not have differed substantially from the transmitted Greek. (shrink)

The “lost” Yaḥyā ibn ʿAdī treatises recently discovered in the Tehran codex Marwī 19 include a record of a philosophical debate instigated by the Ḥamdānid prince Sayf-al-Dawla. More precisely, Marwī 19 contains Yaḥyā’s adjudication of a dispute between an unnamed Opponent and Yaḥyā’s younger relative Ibrāhīm ibn ʿAdī (who also served as al-Fārābī’s assistant), along with Ibrāhīm's response to Yaḥyā’s adjudication, and Yaḥyā’s final word. At issue was a problem of Aristotelian exegesis: should “body” be understood as falling under the (...) category of substance or under the category of quantity? The unnamed Opponent argues that body is a species of substance; Ibrāhīm argues that technically speaking, body is a species of quantity, and hence an accident; and Yaḥyā judges that body is a species of substance, though for very different reasons than the Opponent gives. For the first time, the Arabic text of this exchange is edited and translated into English. Also provided is an Introduction that sets the debate in historical context, and discusses in particular the possible influence of John Philoponus. The debate is interesting and important not only because of the philosophical ramifications of the issues under discussion, but because it constitutes evidence of dialectical practice among Arabic-speaking philosophers from the middle of the 10th century. (shrink)

In Phaedo 115c-e Socrates scornfully rebukes Crito for enquiring how Socrates should be buried for Crito had not been persuaded by the previous arguments that burying Socrates’ body is not equal to burying Socrates. A parallel account is found in Aelian and Diogenes Laertius where Apollodorus is rebuked for attempting to persuade Socrates that he should be bothered how his remains would be clothed when laid out. Several scholars have suggested this should not be considered a copy of Plato but (...) an early proto-type written by one of his contemporaries with particular regard to Euclides of Megara. While this thesis has been criticized, further evidence will be examined in this article where the character of Apollodorus cites an unnamed Megarian examining this same argument but with conclusions different from those in Plato. Here the Megarian concludes that though the body may be separate from the soul we still show care and grief for the remains. The argument is both cogent and non-metaphysical in approach but characterized from a Socratic perspective. In the conclusions, I will attempt to reopen the case for a Euclidean origin of the Crito vignette in Phaedo 115c-e. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Coleridge’s Intellectual Intuition, the Vision of God, and the Walled Garden of “Kubla Khan”Douglas HedleyIn his seminal work of 1917 Das Heilige Rudolph Otto quotes a number of passages as instances of the “Numinose.” Alongside those quotations from more conventional mystics, Plotinus, and Augustine, Otto refers to Coleridge’s “savage place” in Kubla Khan. 1 It is also pertinent that, when trying to define Romanticism, C. S. Lewis appeals to (...) the longing for the “unnameable something” fired by “morning cobwebs in late summer” or the “opening lines of Kubla Khan.” 2 Perhaps it is a mere coincidence that two of the most penetrating and influential scholars of religion in the twentieth century should appeal to Coleridge and his poem “Kubla Khan.” I wish to suggest reasons why the link between the imagery of “Kubla Khan” and a mystical experience of transcendence is not merely fortuitous. Indeed the connection between Coleridge’s mature writing and the imagery of the poem shows that we have good reason for seeing him as consciously writing, both as a poet and as a philosopher, within a visionary mystical tradition. I propose that it is no accident that Coleridge’s most visionary poem draws upon the central Christian image of paradise: the walled garden.This is an attempt not to interpret “Kubla Khan” but rather to suggest Coleridge’s place in the history of ideas as a Christian poet and philosopher. He is best described as an essentially speculative and mystical philosopher-theologian. 3 [End Page 115] By “speculative” I mean a theology inspired by those Church Fathers who emphasize the “vision” of God as an intellectual contemplation (speculari) of the transcendent Absolute, the prius of all being. The scholastics, the medieval German mystics, the Cambridge Platonists, and some of the German Idealists have all been influenced by such a speculative impulse. 4 Hegel uses the term “speculative” for his Dialectic. 5A philosophical or “speculative” approach to theology has invoked hostility from Tertullian onwards. Coleridge’s philosophy of religion often excited the fear of the new pantheistic German theology. John Henry Newman castigated Coleridge’s speculation as more heathen than Christian. Yet the speculative movement in theology spawned both a radical and a conservative wing, and we have to judge Coleridge’s thought in the light of the more conservative branch of nineteenth-century Idealism. D. F. Strauss jettisoned the transcendent “yonder” of traditional theology in favor of his philosophical or “scientific” approach to Christianity. Coleridge, however, could not adhere to theology of immanence; he wished to present a theology of an adamantly transcendent character.The walled garden is an eminently appropriate image of transcendence and was used as such by the fifteenth-century Christian Platonist Nicholas of Cusa, who is one of the links between Patristic theology and German Idealism. I shall draw upon his book The Vision of God as a paradigm of the sort of speculative mysticism which informs Coleridge’s metaphysics and much of his poetry. 6 Reflection upon an exotic poetic image may help us to clarify one of Coleridge’s philosophical tenets; the walled garden can be seen to symbolize that transcendent numinous reality, which the soul inchoately and barely consciously seeks and strives for.Coleridge’s “Mysticism” and the Imagery of “Kubla Khan”Richard Holmes claims that the “Kubla Khan” provides evidence of a transition in Coleridge’s interests and presents this switch from “classical and religious mythology” to the “drama of self-knowledge... the growth of consciousness and civilisation” as a key to Coleridge’s poetry. Holmes writes: [End Page 116][H]is instinct that the modern Epic subject must now centre on “the mind of man,” through “travels, voyages and histories,” shows a shift of poetic focus characteristic of the new Romantic age. The Epic could no longer draw on classical or religious mythology for the framework of its action. It must become contemporary with the world of scientific, anthropological, and psychological exploration: it must centre in some way on the drama of self-knowledge, on the growth of consciousness and civilisation. 7Coleridge would not have seen a conflict between the drama of self-consciousness and classical and religious mythology. In “Kubla... (shrink)

In a new book titled Wild Things: Queer Theory After Nature, I develop a new critical vocabulary to access different, transdisciplinary ways of thinking about race, sexuality, alternative political imaginaries and queer futurity and extinction. Wildness in no way signals the untamed frontier, or the absence of modernity, the barbarian, the animalistic or the opposite of civilization. Rather, in a post-colonial and even de-colonizing vein, it has emerged in the last few years as a marker of a desire to return (...) queerness to the disorder of an unsorted field of desires and drives; to the disorienting and disquieting signifying functions it once named and held in place; and to a set of activist and even pedagogical strategies that depend upon chance, randomness, surprise, entropy and that seek to counter the organizing and bureaucratic logics of the state with potential sites of ungovernability and abjection. Wildness signifies in my project in a number of different ways, but here I use the framework of “abjection” to explain some of the appeal of wildness and a few of the ways in which it expresses relations between the unnamable, the excessive, horror and death. Later on, I will turn to a set of performances and art projects that are deliberately auto destructive and that collectively imagine the end of the human. (shrink)

Cormac McCarthy’s The Road demonstrates the centrality of individualism to the unsustainability that defines consumer culture in the Anthropocene. His representation of cannibalism not only reflects the main problems of consumer culture but also sheds light on individualism as its driving force. While the cannibalistic world of The Road presents a struggle of individuals for autonomy, the novel’s unnamed boy protagonist shows that empathy can be a viable solution for that struggle. The novel suggests that making consumer culture sustainable means (...) recognizing the violence of individualism and the significance of empathetic consciousness simultaneously. To exit the highway that leads to unsustainability means taking the road of empathy, for only this will potentially lead to sustainability in the Anthropocene. (shrink)

This essay engages the issue of misogyny through the narrative of the concubine of Judges 19. By utilizing a literary feminist re-reading of this text, the gender violence of both the ancient Near East and today, as well as the intersection between the two, is revealed. By journeying with this unnamed woman who was abused and murdered, the reader is invited to mourn the violence perpetrated against her in the name of patriarchy and in doing so to remember the women (...) of today – named and unnamed, dead and alive – who have suffered at the hands of a similar misogyny. (shrink)

How can we quiet the mind? How can we prevent it from endlessly worrying away at philosophical questions that serve only to keep us awake at night, with no hope of ever being resolved? Simply ignoring them is not an option, since they lurk around the corner of every decision; nor will argument suffice, argument being merely a continuation of philosophy. What we need, again, is not a theory but a method, one in which each claim is systematically juxtaposed against (...) its opposite, together with evidence just compelling enough to allow the two of them to cancel each other out. It is this method that Beckett’s Trilogy—Molloy, Malone Dies, The Unnamable—crucially offers its readers. A latter-day work of ancient skepticism, it begins from the same premise, aims at the same telos, and employs the same devices along the way. What it provides, in the end, is not insight and not inspiration but the opportunity to detach ourselves from our desire for certainty and to achieve, for the first time, an enduring peace of mind. (shrink)

mim•ic•ry (n.pl.mim•ic•ries) 1. (a) the art, practice, or art of mimicking; (b) an instance of mimicking. 2. Biology: The resemblance of one organism to another, or to an object in its surroundings for concealment and protection from predators. In evolutionary biology, mimicry is a similarity of one species to another, which protects one or both. This similarity can be in appearance, behaviour, sound, scent or location. Mimics are typically found in the same areas as their models. The pervasive condition of (...) African architectural education and practice is one of mimicry, in which students and architects are (sub-consciously) driven to copy ‘solutions’ posed by practitioners outside the continent, most typically European or American, whose understanding and experience of Africa is often limited in nature. Wired, switched-on and connected, current and future young African architects are able, at the click of a finger, to peruse the ‘appearance, behaviour and [even] scent and sound’ of buildings and architectural projects that they may never experience ‘in the flesh’, but whose form, material and programmes are multiplying across the continent in ways and places that their original ‘makers’ could not possibly have imagined. Maboneng is now ‘the Manhattan of Africa’; Kigali its Singapore. Unlike biological mimics, in this context a ‘cut-and-paste’ approach neither protects nor conceals: it simply exposes. As far back as 1997, the Dutch architect and theorist, Rem Koolhaas, argued that it had become increasingly important for architects to operate on a level independent of architecture in order to understand, at the most basic level, the phenomena affecting the development of architecture and the city. In this article, rather than treat ‘cut-and-paste’ as pastiche, a quick-fix intervention that solves the ‘problem’ of original thinking, a new proposition for An Architectural Brief, for An (as yet) Unnamed African Architectural Student, in An (as yet) Unnamed African Location is proposed which fuses art, culture and digital technology to demand a radical, post-Afro urban example. (shrink)

Various scholars have argued that the rise of modern information technology over the past century has coincided with a steady decline of traditional methods of learning and interpretation, and has contributed to the general sense of “worldlessness” or anomie. In the words of Paul Ricoeur, “we are overwhelmed by a flood of words, by polemics, by the assault of the virtual, which today create a kind of opaque zone.” Philology, the ancient discipline that grew in the past two centuries to (...) encompass literary study, linguistics, and intellectual history, was originally conceived as a return to the past with the aim of retrieving the knowledge of bygone times. While the recent revival of interest in philology recognizes its importance to the humanities, it remains unnamed as such. The aim of my exploration of the history and practices of philology is to suggest how it can reinstate the presence of the past. With its attentiveness to language—undertaken in the silent spaces of private study, archive, and library—philology not only confirms the presence of the dead but also enacts a more fundamental return to “world.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Feminine Role Designations in the Comedies of PlautusZ. M. PackmanThere is a considerable degree of inconsistency in the role designations applied to female characters in the list of personae published with each of the Plautine comedies in the standard modern editions. My purpose here is to compare these role designations as they appear in modern editions with the designations attested by the scene headings of the manuscripts, identifying and (...) where possible accounting for discrepancies, and to propose, on the one hand, a general reading of the system of female role designations as assigned in the manuscripts, and, on the other, a critique of modifications introduced by modern editors. Editions chiefly referred to are the Oxford Classical Texts and the Teubner and Budé series. 1 For role designations in manuscripts I have depended on the text and apparatus of Friedrich Leo (1895–96) as well as the apparatus of the Budé texts.To begin with the role of matrona: of all characters so designated in the OCT, only one—the nameless wife of the local Menaechmus in Menaechmi—is so called also in both the Teubner and the Budé editions. In other cases, those designated matrona in the OCT are called uxor in the Teubner and the Budé (Alcumena in Amphitryo and Phanostrata in Cistellaria), or, in those same editions, mulier (Eunomia in Aulularia, Cleostrata and Myrrhina in Casina, and Dorippa in Mercator). In one case (Artemona of Asinaria) the OCT’s matrona is also matrona in the Budé, but uxor in the Teubner. Philippa in Epidicus, Philocomasium in Miles Gloriosus, and Palaestra and Ampelisca in Rudens are each called mulier in the Personae of the OCT, Budé, and Teubner—but Telestis in Epidicus, called mulier in the OCT, is identified as virgo in the Budé and Teubner editions. In the one play where the OCT uses the word uxor as a role designation (for the young sisters in Stichus), the same characters are designated sorores in the Teubner, and uxor (singly) and sorores (together) in the Budé. [End Page 245]Where the OCT applies the designation virgo (Phaedria in Aulularia, Planesium in Curculio, and Lucris in Persa), or the designation meretrix (Philaenium in Asinaria; the Bacchises in Bacchides, with the addition of the word sorores; Selenium and Gymnasium in Cistellaria; Erotium in Menaechmi; Pasicompsa in Mercator; Acroteleutium in Miles Gloriosus; Philematium and Delphium in Mostellaria; Lemniselenis in Persa, and Phronesium in Truculentus), the Teubner and the Budé do the same—but in the case of the Poenulus the Personae of the OCT, inconsistently, describes as puellae characters called meretrices in the Teubner and the Budé (Adelphasium and Anterastilis).Like meretrix, the role designation ancilla is relatively stable, and persons so designated in the Personae of the OCT are so called also in the Teubner and the Budé (Bromia in Amphitryo, Pardalisca in Casina, Halisca in Cistellaria, Milphidippa in Miles Gloriosus, Scapha in Mostellaria, Sophoclodisca in Persa, Crocotium and Stephanium in Stichus, and Astaphium in Truculentus, as well as one unnamed character in Menaechmi). In two cases the designation anus stands in all three of the editions under consideration (Staphyla of Aulularia and Leaena of Curculio), and this degree of consistency is observable in other relatively uncommon female roles, like lena (Cleareta in Asinaria, Melaenis and Syra in Cistellaria), fidicina (Acropolistes in Epidicus), and nutrix (Giddenis in Poenulus). Just once the OCT becomes expansive about a character designated ancilla in the Teubner and the Budé: Syra of Truculentus is here called tonstrix (ancilla Phronesii). One character called simply anus in the OCT (Syra in Mercator) is called anus ancilla in the Teubner and the Budé. In the case of Ptolemocratia of Rudens, called sacerdos in the Teubner and the Budé, it is once again the OCT, with sacerdos Veneris, which becomes expansive.By comparison with those assigned to female characters, the role designations of male characters in the Personae of standard editions of Plautus’ comedies are relatively stable. There is absolute consistency among the editions here under consideration with respect to role designations in such occasional types as parasitus, cocus, leno, and miles, and also with the even rarer designations like mercator, danista, and medicus. Some thirty characters are... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Recuperation of the Theory-Death of the Avant-GardeRobert Radin (bio)Paul Mann. The Theory-Death of the Avant-Garde. Bloomington: Indiana UP, 1991.It is difficult to respond to an essay that so thoroughly lays bare (and thereby challenges) what it is we do when we respond to another writer’s writing. I find it hard to begin, caught somewhere in that terminal state between speech and silence, that moment Beckett captures at the (...) end of the The Unnamable: “I can’t go on, I’ll go on.” Should I follow every word I write with “[sic],” at once quote myself and distance myself from what I have just written, indicate that I am aware of what it is I’m doing even as I’m doing it? I’ll go on.The fact that Paul Mann’s The Theory-Death of the Avant-Garde has received relatively little critical response since its publication in 1991 may in fact be a measure of its success. Nevertheless, this lack of response seems worthy of attention, given that Mann devotes so much of his essay to making the point that art’s (and theory’s) raison d’être is to generate further discourse, to keep the discursive economy going, however resistant to dominant culture that art or theory may appear to be.After repeatedly, painstakingly pointing out the status of his own essay in the discursive economy he describes—the discourse of the avant-garde—Mann anticipates the likely response to his work:It is not difficult to imagine whatever little response this essay is liable to. For the most part dismissals of what will be taken as its nihilism, its cynicism, its defeatism, its adherence to this or that dubious theory, its outmoded obsession with recuperation. But the essay was not written for those who reject an insistence on recuperation only in order to conceal from themselves the extent of their own recuperation.[141]And further on in the same passage: “it [the essay] was also written precisely so that it could be dismissed” [141]. Mann, to varying degrees, has correctly diagnosed the critical reception of his work thus far. When the essay is dismissed in reviews it is because it is seen as both passé and nihilistic. Even in one of the favorable reviews of Mann’s essay the question of nihilism arises. It is this “specter of nihilism” that I want to take up here—after first reviewing some of the more salient features of Mann’s argument—as I think it is a response most readers will have to struggle through (as Mann correctly points out), and it might tell us something about the larger discursive economy of which The Theory-Death of the Avant-Garde is now a part. That Mann’s position is seen as outmoded is less of an issue for me. It may be that his essay was already “old” by the time it was published, [End Page 41] his position already dismissable under the aegis of other names: Baudrillard, Barthes, Derrida. But that his essay is no longer new, that his position has exhausted its discursive currency, only further makes his point: in the discourse of the avant-garde, and in the discursive economy generally, the new supersedes all other values. More important, Mann’s position in particular must exhaust itself quickly if the discursive economy is to continue to thrive.In The Pleasure of the Text Roland Barthes delineates what he calls the “versus myth”:Art seems compromised, historically, socially. Whence the effort on the part of the artist himself to destroy it.... Unfortunately, this destruction is always inadequate; either it occurs outside the art, but thereby becomes impertinent, or else it consents to remain within the practice of the art, but quickly exposes itself to recuperation (the avant-garde is that restive language which is going to be recuperated). The awkwardness of this alternative is the consequence of the fact that destruction of discourse is not a dialectic term but a semantic term: it docilely takes its place within the great semiological “versus” myth (white versus black); whence the destruction of art is doomed to only paradoxical formulae... (shrink)

Purpose: finding out the features of logical methods for obtaining conclusions on humanitarian subjects. The task of this scientific research is to analyze the logical paradigmatic aspects of humanitarian knowledge, such as the differences in the formation of sets, logical forms and conclusions, and so on. Methods: a set of logical methods such as analysis, synthesis, abstraction and generalization, informal logic of understanding, etc. Scientific novelty: the logic of humanitarian knowledge is formed on the basis of the logic of historical (...) knowledge, the specificity of which is manifested in the special meaning of individual sets that receive direct and indirect meaning, form the corresponding logical connections in obtaining conclusions. When obtaining conclusions on humanitarian subjects, the formation of an exemplary individual is a plurality. Its ideal qualities are transferred to an unnamed set. Thus, the integrity of the humanitarian subject is created. In the transition from parts to the whole there is a “logical jump”, which is also the difference in the procedure for obtaining a conclusion. Widely used rational understanding by identifying the value of the whole. Understanding can be strong or weak. The difference in the logic of humanitarian knowledge is primarily due to the peculiarity of the work of human thinking, which uses specific tools in formatting various scientific disciplines and organizing the cognitive process. Among the many new approaches and methods of the humanities developed in phenomenology, existentialism, philosophy of life, structuralism, postmodernism, etc., hermeneutics should be noted. It is hermeneutics that occupies a special place in humanitarian knowledge due to its ontology and logic. Conclusions: the logic of humanitarian knowledge is formed on the basis of historical consciousness, relies on ontology and has signs of the logic of practical thinking. In its formation, it is advisable to use the theory of practical judgments and conclusions, taking into account subjective values of life experience, obtaining the logical values of truth and falsehood. The terms of deductive and non-deductive forms are based on judgments about values. The logic of humanitarian knowledge to a large extent is hermeneutical logic, which, in turn, is the logic of rational understanding. (shrink)

This article attends to an unnamed and often missing element of the cosmopolitanism discourse: care ethics. Developed out of feminist theory in the 1980s, care ethics privileges the relational, contextual, and affective aspects of morality. It is my suggestion that contemporary discussions of cosmopolitanism would benefit from integrating the moral commitments of care ethics. First, a definition of care ethics is offered followed by a delineation of themes of care in the cosmopolitan theorizing of an historical figure, Jane Addams, and (...) a contemporary theorist, Kwame Anthony Appiah. Ultimately, the contention here is that cosmopolitan societies envisioned by Addams and Appiah cannot be exclusively founded on systems of justice (i.e., rights, principles, laws) but needs caring to provide the social cohesion necessary for organic international justice, as well as lasting peace. (shrink)