The Upaniṣads The Upaniṣads are ancient texts from India that were composed orally in Sanskrit between about 700 B.C.E. and 300 B.C.E. There are thirteen major Upaniṣads, many of which were likely composed by multiple authors and are comprised of a variety of styles. As part of a larger group of texts, known as the … Continue reading Upanisads →.

Evil in the Vedas and the Upanishads undergoes a theoretical transformation as this literature itself moves away from its consequentialist and naturalistic roots to a radical procedural approach to moral questions. The goods of life on the early account were largely natural: evil was a moral primitive that motivated a teleological approach to morality geared towards avoiding natural evil. The gods of nature (such as fire, and rain, intimately involved in metabolism) were propitiated to gain beneficent results, and to avoid (...) hunger and illness. To please the gods of nature involves eating, which is merely the imposition of natural evil on sacrificial victims so that one avoids the evils of disease and hunger oneself. The entire system is one of resentment: the goods of life are defined by way of the bads that they displace. Authors of the latter part of the Vedas, such as the Kaṭha Upaniṣad, show themselves to be concerned about the irreducibility of evil on the naturalistic account, but also more broadly with the irreducible phenomenon of moral luck that comes in tow with a teleological approach to ethics. Whether one is able to ward off evil and enjoy the goods of life is not under one’s control and is within the purview of the forces of nature. This motivates the transition to a procedural account of ethics---yoga---where evil is not a primitive but a side effect of the non-yogic life, characterized by a lack of self-governance. As Death teaches us, evil is not a moral primitive and can be reduced out of the moral equation by taking responsibility for a lack of autonomy, which transforms this external threat of a lack of autonomy into a self lack of autonomy, or self-governance. With this transformation we are delivered into the realm of preservation (Vishnu). (shrink)

In the Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, one of the principal Upaniṣads, we find a venerable and famous story where the god Prajāpati separately instructs three groups of people (gods, humans, and demons) simply by uttering the syllable “Da.” In this paper, our concern is not with ethics but theories of meaning and interpretation: How can all divergent interpretations of a single expression be correct, and, indeed, endorsed by the speaker? As an exercise in cross-cultural philosophical reflection, we consider some of the leading (...) modern theories of meaning—those of Grice, Quine, and Davidson—in order to see if the Upaniṣadic story receives a natural home in any of them. We conclude that the story is best understood through Grice’s theory of meaning rather than Quine’s or Davidson’s. (shrink)

This chapter explores the role of evil in the development of the Vedas and Upaniṣads. The Vedas and the Upaniṣads, or the Vedas are the repository of veda of the early Indo-European peoples of South Asia. Written and collected over a thousand-year period, from 1500 BCE to 500 BCE, the Vedas says many things about evil. However, the corpus presents a philosophical shift from naturalism to non-naturalism that also mirrors a shift from Consequentialism to Deontology. The problem with naturalism on (...) the Vedic reckoning is that it renders evil an ineliminable primitive that motivates a devotion to naturalistic forces to maximise good results. Vedic non-naturalism, rooted in the idea of self-development, treats evil as an inessential malady of self-governance. On the latter account, evil plays no essential role in self-understanding, and can be eliminated by self-governance. (shrink)

This paper critically reads and analyzes the first discourse of Āruṇi and Śvetaketu in the first half of the sixth chapter of the Chāndogya Upaniṣad. It argues that, except for a few interpolated lines in VI.2 and VI.3, the entire discourse constitutes one integrated whole with a specific indicatory knowledge at its core that indicates deeper truth underlying all realities, and its characterization and twofold elaboration with reference to macro- and microcosmos. In light of two cosmogonic accounts from the JaiminīyaBrāhmaṇa (...) and some other Vedic passages, this paper argues that Āruṇi’s cosmogony originally posited asat as the primordial entity, which has not yet acquired any phenomenal form. Incidentally it also demonstrates that in this discourse the term ādeśa cannot denote a ‘method of substitution’ as proposed by Thieme and taken over since then by several scholars. (shrink)

The Upanisads, the basic philosophical texts of Hinduism, represent the height of Vedic philosophy. Many of the older Upanisads can be dated in the eighth and seventh centuries BCE. This newly reissued scholarly work by S. Radhakrishnan, first published in 1953 and long out of print, contains in full the classical Upanisads, those commented on or mentioned by the eighth-century Indian philosopher Shankara. The Sanskrit text, transliterated into Roman script, is followed, verse-by-verse, with an English translation. The volume also includes (...) a commentary on the argument, notes on the vocabulary, and a very detailed introduction by Dr. Radhakrishnan. (shrink)

The authors of the "Saṃnyāsa Upaniṣads", manuals of ascetic lifestyle and practice, recommend that wanderers renounce behavioral standards of their formerly Brahmin householder life, including ritual purity and familial duties. Patrick Olivelle argues that these ascetics are thereafter considered impure and corpse- or ghoul-like, clearly lacking in dharma. However, these Upanisads counsel pursuing mental purity and moral behavior, and modeling oneself after the perfection of the Absolute. This essay investigates ascetic notions of purity and identity, and virtues such as non-violence (...) and kindness cultivated in forest isolation. Is ascetic dharma universal in intent, and is it conceptually opposed to householder dharma? What type of ethics is admired by the authors, what type deprecated? Olivelle's position is reevaluated, as is Jeffrey Kripal's notion that monistic mysticism does not support ethics adequately. (shrink)

In The Varieties of Religious Experience, William James suggests that the human experience of a fundamental and existential uneasiness can be found at the core of most religious traditions, and that these traditions constiute essentially a proposed solution to this uneasiness. The present investigation focuses upon the notion of uneasiness, particularly fear, and its solution in the early Hindu tradition. Through a close examination of textual expressions of both desire and fear from the R̥gveda, the Śatapatha Brāhmaṇa, and the Br̥hadāraṇyaka (...) Upaniṣad, it is proposed that “liberation” in the early Upaniṣadic period, or at least the precursor to the traditional notion of liberation, actually meant freedom from fear, rather than freedom from karma or saṁs̥ra. The Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad suggests that the origin of duality is desire, and duality necessarily results in fear. By relinquishing the sorts of desires so frequently expressed in the earlier vedic literature, together with an understanding of the essentially non-dual relationship between the ātman and brahman, a state of complete freedom from fear (abhaya) may be achieved. (shrink)

Professional ethics, in general, deals with justified moral values that govern the work of professionals. Profession is an expertise who is committed to promote a distinctive public good, such as learning or education. Professionals are committed to special duties to make services available, maintain confidentiality, secure informed consent for services, and be loyal to clients, employers, and others with whom one has fiduciary relationship. Professional ethics deals with theoretical issues which seek to understand how the justified moral values governing professionals (...) are linked to wider values. It also deals with practical issues as to how to apply duties in particular contexts. Professional values include principles of obligation and rights, virtues, personal moral ideals as manifested in the great lives. Given such a Western idea of professional ethics, it is indeed fascinating to trace professional ethics in the Upaniṣads. The Upaniṣadic sages since time immemorial have shown the path to peace and progress for all humanity, not only by laying down theoretical ideals or speculation, but by actually applying truths in their practical life. They have demonstrated the practical application of the ethical ideals or moral values in the personal and professional life and proved that self-realization alone can not only save man from misery but promote to the state of highest bliss. The standards laid down by them have been followed practically by people even today. Gītoponiṣad states that whatever action is performed by the great is imitated by the common people; whatever standard is set by him is followed by them. The Kaṭha Upaniṣad prescribes professional values to the extent that not he who has not ceased from evil conduct can obtain Him by knowledge. Good conduct as a value is thus emphasized here. In Taittirīya Upaniṣad, for instance, the teacher prescribes certain values in the form of commandments: speak the truth and practice virtue. Thus, it is evident that the Upaniṣadic teacher is not only concerned about the intellectual progress of the student but also its personal and professional life as well. The paper is a humble attempt to explore the roots of professional ethics in the Upaniṣadic ethics. (shrink)

Among 108 Upaniṣads, the central theme of the true knowledge of Self is consistent. The wholesome philosophy of Upaniṣad is focused towards the enlightenment or proliferation of mind through the knowledge of Self as the source which is both Constitutive as well as Regulative source. According to Upaniṣadic view, only when we understand and realize the true nature of self, we can understand the concept of reality. In this article, I would concentrate on the idea of Self and Reality from (...) the perspective of Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, which portrays that the manifestation of the universe is done out of self, which is identical with the ultimate reality Brahman, through consciousness. Moreover, with the reference to Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad, I would make an attempt to highlight the nature of Self, methodologies to understand the Self, the ground of this empirical reality with diversity, and the ungendered Self. (shrink)

77 ff. ; RS Deshmukh, Religion in Vedic Literature, p. 331. Jacobi seems to take the extreme view that the conception of immortality of the Soul was unknown ...

In this paper, I offer a close comparative reading of a creation myth from chapter 1 of the Bṛhadāraṇyaka-Upaniṣad, which opens with the startling statement “ātmaivedam agra āsīt”, “in the beginning there was the self (ātman)”. I read this classical text with Śaṅkara, its foremost commentator, in dialogue with an ensemble of Indologists (Wilhelm Halbfass, Greg Bailey and Frederick Smith) and theorists (Walter Benjamin, Ramchandra Gandhi and Hélène Cixous), and vis-à-vis, the creation myth narrated in chapter 1 of the Book (...) of Genesis. My aim is to decipher the intrinsic relation between identity, difference and diversity underlying the Upaniṣadic myth, and the ambivalent relationship (fear and desire) between self and other depicted here. The Upaniṣad presents a narrative of “the self first”, and implied is the aspiration to retrieve and rediscover this first self, the ātman, which precedes and encompasses everything else. I challenge this narrative drawing on Mukund Lath’s paper (J World Philos 4:6–23, 2003/2018). According to Lath, being is becoming, and change is a precondition of identity-formation. Identity, he argues, does not only accommodate but also invites change and plurality. Identity for Lath is a matter of creation, not restoration. It is pregnant with the future, not obsessed with premordiality. Lath’s unique case study for his counter-Upaniṣadic discussion of identity and self is classical Indian music, rāga music. (shrink)

The Saṁhitā Upaniṣad [SU] is a little-known Vedic text that presents ‘typical’ Upaniṣadic teachings on the truth of identity alongside seemingly out-of-place descriptions of rites used to protect oneself against enemies and even against death. The difference between these contents is striking, but what it has to tell us about the SU’s main concerns is vulnerable to historical and text critical methods that rely on structure, style, and linguistic archaism to divide texts into discrete strata. What if the modern text (...) critical practice of individually identifying and classifying textual contents obscures the use and meaning of the word saṁhitā in the SU? Is it possible that the SU’s diverse contents are intrinsically related? This article explores these questions through a close examination of a sequence of passages illustrating the contrast that has led previous scholars to see the SU as miscellaneous in character and lacking internal coherence. Through this examination, I identify a wider context for saṁhitā in the specific relationship the SU depicts between the person and speech. I argue that the SU’s treatment of saṁhitā draws upon an understanding of recitation in the perspective of one’s vulnerability and the dynamics involved in developments of personhood. These findings allow the SU to emerge as an intriguing and coherent text that merits closer examination and establishes a promising approach for the study of the R̥gvedic Āraṇyakas. (shrink)

The female characters in the Br̥hadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad have generally been interpreted by scholars in two opposing fashions: as fictional characters whose historicity can be dismissed or as representative of actual women in ancient India. Both of these interpretations, however, overlook the literary elements of this text and the role that these female characters play within the larger philosophical debate. This paper is an analysis of the various women who appear in the Br̥hadāraṇyaka and their role in this text. Close attention (...) is paid to their characterizations, their relationship to the doctrine discussed, and their functions in the larger narrative structure. The paper concludes with a discussion about the relationship of narrative to history and fundamental problems with the “woman question” based on this text. (shrink)

본고는 우파니샤드 중 가장 초기 우파니샤드 중의 하나인 『브리하다란야카 우파니샤드』에 대한 샹카라의 주석서인 『브리하다란야카 우파니샤드 주석서』(Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad Bhāṣya, 약칭 BUBh)를 연구한 것이다. BUBh는 비록 그의 『브라흐마 수트라 주석서』(Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya)에 비해 연구가 덜 이루어졌으나, 그 사료적 중요성과 베단타 전통 내의 중요성으로 보아 독립 대상으로서 연구할 가치가 높다. BUBh를 철학적, 신학적으로 접근한 두 선행 연구들과 달리 이 연구는 교육법에 초점을 두고, 이 교육법은 텍스트를 통독할 때 드러나게 된다고 주장한다. 독자는 의식하든 의식하지 않든 발췌독, 정독, 통독을 교차적으로 하게 되지만, 특히 BUBh는 발췌독, (...) 정독과 함께 텍스트 전체를 통독해야 이 텍스트가 초급에서 고급으로 발전하는 단계를 고려한 교과서의 기능을 하고 있음을 알 수 있다. 그래서 본고는 BUBh를 앞에서부터 뒤로 순서대로 읽어야 이 텍스트를 더 바르게 이해할 수 있고, 더불어 교사 샹카라의 구체적 모습을 알고 느낄 수 있다고 주장한다. (shrink)

Throughout its history, the renowned Kaṭha Upaniṣad has often been described as being both incoherent and contradictory. The aim of this paper is to show to what purpose the text was created. To this end, it discusses the connection of the three paths to salvation depicted in the text, viz. the Agnicayana (a powerful Vedic fire-ritual), the Upaniṣadic method of self-knowledge, and yoga. The first part retraces how in the Upaniṣads, the Agnicayana was transformed into a non-material or mental ritual (...) and linked with self-knowledge. The second part analyses how the various salvation goals (heaven, the World of Brahman, liberation from rebirth) could be related to each other. First, the authors redefined the Agnicayana’s salvation goal, heaven, to make it identical with liberation. Secondly, they introduced self-knowledge and yoga as alternative and equally powerful means to the same end. In practice, however, the new and world-negating methods were implied to be superior to the costly ritual from which they had drawn their authority. Thus, the authors of the Upaniṣad were more concerned with showing continuity between different religious approaches than upholding consistency of content. (shrink)

Many modern scholars working on the early Upaniṣads translate ādeśa as substitute, substitution, or the method or rule of substitution. The choice of this translation, which often affects the larger analysis of the text, started only in 1960s, with the late Paul Thieme who understood ‘substitute/substitution’ as the meaning of ādeśa in the Pāṇinian tradition and introduced that meaning to Upaniṣadic analysis. After carefully analysing all relevant passages in their contexts—not just the individual sentences in which the term occurs, this (...) paper rejects Thieme’s idea. It shows that the term never violates its etymological meaning of indication, and argues that ādeśa by itself does not mean substitute or replacement even in the Pāṇinian tradition. This paper further shows that ādeśa, usually used in the plural, was once the formal term referring to the class/genre of Vedic teachings now known as Upaniṣads. As it analyses different passages from the early Upaniṣads, this paper touches on the origin and composition of some of the Upaniṣads, for example arguing that the original Upaniṣadic teaching of the archaic Brāhmaṇa of the Vājasaneyas begins eleven sections before the formal beginning of the Bṛhad Āraṇyaka Upaniṣad. (shrink)

[The Soul Chariot Allegory in Plato and the Kaṭha Upaniṣad].