Background Over the last decades, the neurosciences, behavioral sciences, and the social sciences have all seen a rapid development of innovative research methods. The field of bioethics, however, has trailed behind in methodological innovation. Despite the so-called “empirical turn” in bioethics, research methodology for project development, data collection and analysis, and dissemination has remained largely restricted to surveys, interviews, and research papers. We have previously argued for a “Design Bioethics” approach to empirical bioethics methodology, which develops purpose-built methods for investigation (...) of bioethical concerns. In this paper we compare a research tool created using a design bioethics approach to a “methods-as-usual” approach in empirical bioethics. Methods Our study compared dimensions of engagement with a digital game we created, called “Tracing Tomorrow,” to a standard vignette survey. The two tools investigated the same subject matter, digital phenotyping for mental health, in a sample of 301 UK adolescents. Results Participants who played the game reported a greater sense of presence, emotional engagement, cognitive absorption, and mental health ethics insight, compared to participants who completed the vignette survey. Perceived authenticity and curiosity/motivation to learn more was equivalent for both methods. Conclusion The results of this study highlights the importance of purpose-built methodology for empirical bioethics research. (shrink)

It is a commonplace that the modern world cannot be experienced as enchanted--that the very concept of enchantment belongs to past ages of superstition. Jane Bennett challenges that view. She seeks to rehabilitate enchantment, showing not only how it is still possible to experience genuine wonder, but how such experience is crucial to motivating ethical behavior. A creative blend of political theory, philosophy, and literary studies, this book is a powerful and innovative contribution to an emerging interdisciplinary conversation about (...) the deep connections between ethics, aesthetics, and politics. As Bennett describes it, enchantment is a sense of openness to the unusual, the captivating, and the disturbing in everyday life. She guides us through a wide and often surprising range of sources of enchantment, showing that we can still find enchantment in nature, for example, but also in such unexpected places as modern technology, advertising, and even bureaucracy. She then explains how everyday moments of enchantment can be cultivated to build an ethics of generosity, stimulating the emotional energy and honing the perceptual refinement necessary to follow moral codes. Throughout, Bennett draws on thinkers and writers as diverse as Kant, Schiller, Thoreau, Kafka, Marx, Weber, Adorno, and Deleuze. With its range and daring, The Enchantment of Modern Life is a provocative challenge to the centuries-old ''narrative of disenchantment,'' one that presents a new ''alter-tale'' that discloses our profound attachment to the human and nonhuman world. (shrink)

It may be possible, one day, to use gene therapy to treat diseases whose genetic defects have been discerned. Because many genes responsible for inherited eye disorders within the retina have been identified, diseases of the eye are prime candidates for this form of therapy. The eye also has the advantage of being highly accessible with altered immunological properties, important considerations for easy delivery of virus and avoidance of systemic immune responses. Currently, adenovirus, adeno‐associated virus and lentivirus have been used (...) to successfully transfer genetic material to retinal pigment epithelium and photoreceptor cells. By harnessing therapeutic genes to these viruses, researchers have been able to demonstrate rescue in rodent models of retinitis pigmentosa, providing evidence that this form of therapy can be effective in delaying photoreceptor cell death. Future challenges include confirming therapeutic effects in animal models with eyes more anatomically similar to those of humans and demonstrating long‐term rescue with minimal toxicity. BioEssays 23:662–668, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

: A distinctive nonconsequentialist argument for criminalisation and punishment claims that the citizens of a state that did not criminalise serious mala in se perpetrated in its jurisdiction would be complicit in their commission. However, one objection to such an argument is that such citizens cannot be complicit because they play no causal role in the commission of the offence. Against this objection, I argue that causal contribution is unnecessary, and that one way in which a secondary agent can become (...) complicit in a principal’s wrongdoing is if they allow that wrongdoing to be carried out in a domain over which they have authority, and with their permission. As a result of giving permission, the agent shares in the principal’s blameworthiness. (shrink)

This paper contributes to the normative debate over capital punishment by looking at whether the role of executioner is one in which it is possible and proper to take pride. The answer to the latter question turns on the kind of justification the agent can give for what she does in carrying out the role. So our inquiry concerns whether the justifications available to an executioner could provide him with the kind of justification necessary for him to take pride in (...) what he does. If they cannot, I argue, this sheds some light on their adequacy as justifications. The main argument of the paper is that social control arguments for the death penalty fail to provide an adequate justification. I also give some consideration to retributive justifications. The argument is developed through close attention to the depiction of Albert Pierrepoint in the film, Pierrepoint: The Last Hangman. (shrink)

As a young gay man, David Bennett saw Christianity as an enemy to freedom for LGBTQI people, and his early experiences with prejudice and homophobia led him to become a gay activist. But when Jesus came into his life in a highly unexpected way, he was led down a path he never would have predicted or imagined. A War of Loves investigates what the Bible teaches about sexuality and demonstrates the profligate, unqualified grace of God for all people. David (...) describes the joy and intimacy he found in following Jesus Christ and how love has taken on a radically new and far richer meaning for him. (shrink)

Motivated by controversies surrounding the continued employment of poverty porn in humanitarian business, we initiated two 2 × 2 × 2 experiments to examine the extent to which humanitarian ads that utilize poverty porn images weaponize fundraising. Informed by negative state relief and Affect Intensity Theory, the two investigations explored the effects on study participants of the inclusion within ad appeals of images of starving children, ad spokespeople of disparate gender and ethnicity, and different types of message frame. A 2 (...) (protest emotive vs. informative message) × 2 (male vs. female announcer) × 2 (White British or Black African ethnicity) between-subjects eye track experiment ( n = 236) revealed that an informative message with a White female announcer attracted the most attention. Next, a survey ( n = 667) was completed, which recorded participants’ levels of affect intensity, advertising skepticism, and donation intention. The results suggested that a White British female announcer was more likely to engage potential donors than a male and/or non-White spokesperson. The implications of the findings are discussed in light of how poverty porn might work in practice. (shrink)

Empirical data can be an extremely powerful and influential tool in bioethical research. However, when researchers or policy makers look for answers to ethical questions by engaging with empirical research, there can be a tendency (conscious or unconscious) to shape, report, and use empirical research in a way that confirms their own preferred ethical conclusions. This skewing effect - what we call ‘normative bias’ - is often so subtle it falls short of clear misconduct and thus can be difficult to (...) call out. However, we argue that this subtle influence of bias has the potential to significantly influence debate and policy around highly sensitive ethical issues and must be guarded against. In this paper we share the lessons we have learned through a journey of self-reflection around the effect that normative bias can have when reporting on and referring to empirical data relating to ethical issues. We use a variety of papers from our area of the ethics of routine prenatal screening to illustrate these subtle but often powerfully distorting effects of bias. Our aim in doing so is not to criticise the work of others, as we recognise our own normative bias, but to improve awareness of this issue, remind the need for reflexivity to guard against our own biases, and introduce a new criterion - the idea of a ‘limitation prominence assessment’ - that can work as a practical way to evaluate the seriousness of the limitations of an empirical study and thus, the risks of the study being misread or misinterpreted through superficial reading. (shrink)

Annotation. Informed by recent developments in literary criticism and social theory, this book addresses the presumption that nature exists independent of culture and, in particular, of language.

In these few pages I shall try to demonstrate the emptiness of the most cumbersome piece of unexamined intellectual baggage at present being hauled about by English philosophers. I here cite one example to be going on with, at the end of the paper I shall give a handful more, and it would be easy to multiply the number by ten from the writings of reputable philosophers. The outstanding philosophical achievement of the ha1f-century which has just drawn to a close (...) [i.e. the period 1900-1950] has been an appreciation of the peculiar status of a priori judgments and of logically necessary or formally true propositions. . . . Though many problems remain unsolved, the main outline is now clear: formally true statements assert nothing about the world; instead, their function is to state principles according to which empirical propositions are deduced from other empirical propositions . . . (R. B. Braithwaite, ‘Moral Principles and Inductive Policies’, Proceedings of the British Academy 1950). What is wrong with this passage and with the myth of which it is an expression is its assumption that we have clear notions of what it is for a proposition to be logically necessary and of what it is for a proposition to assert something about the world, these notions being such that it is plausible to say that it has recently been discovered that every proposition having the first of these properties lacks the second. This assumption is wrong: there is no body of published theory giving a clear account of such notions, and despite fairly diligent searching I have so far failed to find, among the many philosophers who accept the myth, one who is able when challenged to supplement the literature on this vital point. Let me make it clear at once that I am not going to defend synthetic a priori truths - I am going to attack a popular mishandling of the truth that all necessary truths are analytic, and through this attack to draw right-wing conclusions from left-wing premisses.. (shrink)

I am interested in what main differences there are between Homo sapiens and other known terrestrial species, or (for short) between man and beast. We have a sense that we differ vastly from all the rest in some respect that is mental rather than grossly physical, but we are not agreed on what respect it is. This is my topic today. I shall bring in some work done in recent years by ethologists and animal psychologists. It is relevant less because (...) it provides news about the beasts than because it spurs our thinking about what we already think or intuit about the beasts and how they differ from us. That is really my topic: although we don’t agree in what we say about what mainly differentiates us from the other animals, I think we have the same picture of the difference, the same sense of what it is; and I want to know whether that shared picture, or intuition, can be parlayed into an agreed description. One proper study of humankind is ourselves; that includes our thoughts, which include our thoughts about what makes us special. I shall go on talking as though the question were: What is the difference? But really it is: What difference do we already think is there? Or, anyway: What difference can be known to obtain between us and them, on the basis of what we already know about us and about them? I am interested in differences of kind rather than of degree. If the final story is merely that we are more intelligent than the beasts are, that means that our common picture of how we relate to them is false. Mortimer Adler, in his book The Difference of Man and the Difference it Makes argues for a fundamental intellectual difference of kind between humans and other animals. Having identified me in that book as an ally, on the strength of my book Rationality, he wrote to me about the matter. During the correspondence that followed, I wrote that while I agreed with his conclusion, I didn’t hold it with such passion as he did, perhaps because I was sure that the difference between kind and degree is itself a difference of degree.. (shrink)

Who should define what constitutes ethical and lawful medical practice? Judges? Doctors? Scientists? Or someone else entirely? This volume analyses how effectively criminal law operates as a forum for resolving ethical conflict in the delivery of health care. It addresses key questions such as: how does criminal law regulate controversial bioethical areas? What effect, positive or negative, does the use of criminal law have when regulating bioethical conflict? And can the law accommodate moral controversy? By exploring criminal law in theory (...) and in practice and examining the broad field of bioethics as opposed to the narrower terrain of medical ethics, it offers balanced arguments that will help readers form reasoned views on the ethical legitimacy of the invocation and use of criminal law to regulate medical and scientific practice and bioethical issues. (shrink)

This third of three articles outlining a different approach to science/religion dialogue generally and to engagement between theology and the neurosciences specifically, gives a brief account of the model in practice. It begins by introducing the question to be investigated—whether the experience of relational connection can affect health outcomes by directly moderating immune function. Then, employing the same threefold heuristic of encounter, exchange, and expression used previously, it discusses how the transversal model set out in these articles has been used (...) to investigate this question and to develop a theoretical physiological model for the proposed link between relationality and health. (shrink)

This book employs philosophical analysis in an endeavour to grasp more firmly some concepts used in moral theory. Analysis is defended here against attackers, especially Rorty. Moral non‐realism is presented as an underlying assumption of the book, and related to the desire for consistency and generality in moral theory. Hare's notion of two levels of morality is defended.

If making/allowing lacks basic moral significance, morality seems to be terribly demanding. It could be demanding in either of two ways: by answering too many practical questions, leaving too few to be resolved on non‐moral grounds, or by thwarting too many of our natural, non‐moral desires. The former is irrelevant to making/allowing but the ‘thwarting’ kind of demandingness is not, and attempts by Bentham, Mill, and Sidgwick to fend off the threat are failures. The ‘thwarting’ threat might be countered by (...) adopting a morality that requires or permits more attention to one's own interests than to others’, but when that is combined with the moral neutrality of making/allowing, the result is requirement or permission for behaviour that no decent person would agree to. (shrink)

We draw on three illustrative vignettes to examine how REBs manage participants’ agency in the context of qualitative research. We ask: Who owns a participant’s consent? Central to informed consent is the principle of Respect for Persons, which privileges the autonomy of individuals to make decisions about what happens (or not) to them. Yet, REBs sometimes require researchers to get permission from organizations to conduct research on their current and former members, even when the research is not about those organizations. (...) Our aim is to raise awareness about the inherent contradictions of this practice and to consider guidelines for determining the appropriateness of involving organizations that may be tangentially connected to the research objectives or potential participants. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Power of PersuasionG. Bennett HumphreyA long white coat, the title of doctor, a practiced professional persona and an appointment to the staff of a prestigious university medical center allows the physician to be a persuader of clinical decisions affecting patient management. When this power of persuasion is used to encourage patient compliance with a therapeutic regimen that might be curative for a fatal disease, there is justification (...) for trying to influence the patient to make choices resulting in a positive outcome. But when a physician is asking permission to enter the patient into a research protocol where the primary goal of the study is the hope of advancing knowledge, then much thought needs to be given to the potential abuse of this power of persuasion.In the 1960s, I found myself having to think about recruiting children into research protocols. I had just finished two years of residency in internal medicine and wanted to pursue a career in academic medicine. My primary interest was in laboratory research. To strengthen my training in research, I had competed for a position as clinical fellow in a western university. The fellowship program was designed to expose young physicians to both clinical and laboratory research. The first year was spent on one of the clinical research wards and the second year in a research laboratory. The program was open to residents from surgery, medicine and pediatrics but because there was a shortage of pediatricians in the program, I was required to work on the children’s leukemia ward for one year.The learning curve was steep during the first few months. Naturally, the faculty in pediatrics and the medical literature gave me a technical education in the use of protocols for therapeutic treatment of leukemia. For example, the first protocol used was designated as Phase III, and the goal was to try to cure the patient. A remission could be achieved in over 90 percent of children but the disease recurred. The median duration of these remissions in the mid–1960s was one year. A relapse was followed by progressive disease and death in a matter of weeks, but a new drug of unknown efficacy could be administered. This was a Phase II protocol, and while there was a chance of prolonging life for a month or so, the primary goal was the identification of drugs anti–leukemic activity.The pediatric leukemia ward experience for me as a fellow was unusual. There was more to learn than the treatment of leukemia. To my surprise, the children and their mothers gave me insight into the care of pediatric patients. Each month, the patients were admitted for five days of intravenous chemotherapy. The first day was traumatic with venipunctures, bone marrow aspirations and the establishment of an IV for the daily infusion of drugs. The remaining four days were for social rounds: listening to the children who liked to talk; talking with the ones who liked to listen; putting puzzles together with some toddlers; responding to a request to listen to the heart of a much loved teddy bear; exchanging jokes and riddles; stories about school, the family dog, or a favorite friend; enjoying the banter of the adolescents; and not invading the privacy of a few who didn’t like me, the ward or the therapy. These children were sharing their childhood with me and it took couple of months for me to recognize I was bonding with these little patients. I observed and listened to the mothers caring for their children and stood in awe of the resources that they brought to bear on having children with a fatal disease. A feeling of mutual respect and trust developed between these mothers and me. For an internist, these experiences were profound and very different from my experience treating adults.A professor, an internationally known researcher in the field of leukemia, was in charge of the ward. Formal rounds were conducted on Tuesday mornings when the result of the bone marrow aspirates and the toxicity of the chemotherapy were reviewed. The day–to–day responsibility for [End Page 101] treatment and informing the mothers on the remission status on Mondays was my responsibility... (shrink)

Over the course of his career, Murray Edelman made one of the few sustained attempts by a theoretically inclined political scientist to explore the effects of the public's overwhelming ignorance of politics. In his early work, he focused on political elites? manipulation of an ignorant public through the deployment of symbolism. In his later work, however, he suggested that even elites are the puppets of their ideologies. His early work has been well received; his later work has gone largely unremarked. (...) The reason may have to do with the very thing that Edelman was, in his later work, addressing: the ideological biases of his politically elite audience. (shrink)

Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.

America’s increasing obesity problem requires federal, state, and local lawyers, policymakers, and public health practitioners to consider legal strategies to encourage healthy eating and physical activity. The complexity of the legal landscape as it affects obesity requires an analysis of coordination across multiple sectors and disciplines. Government jurisdictions can be viewed “vertically,” including the local, state, tribal, and federal levels, or “horizontally” as agencies or branches of government at the same vertical level. Inspired by the successful tobacco control movement, obesity (...) prevention advocates seek comprehensive strategies to “normalize” healthy behaviors by creating environmental and legal changes that ensure healthy choices are the default or easy choices. With many competing demands on diminishing municipal budgets, strategic coordination both vertically and horizontally is essential to foster the environmental and social changes needed to reverse the obesity epidemic. (shrink)

The Institute on Religion in an Age of Science has a long history of delivering conferences addressing topics of interest in the field of science and religion. The following papers from the 2013 summer conference on “The Scientific, Spiritual, and Moral Challenges in Solving the World Food Crisis” are, in keeping with the eclectic nature of these conferences, very different in content and approach. Such differences underline the challenges of synergistically combining scientific and religious insights to increase understanding of global (...) problems and their possible solutions. This in turn reflects deeper questions about the purpose and nature of the science/religion dialogue. These papers suggest various ways in which the two perspectives can be combined in the pursuit of building better understandings of food-related issues, as well as highlighting difficulties and limitations which need to be addressed if the fruits of such dialogue are to make a wider impact. As such they serve as useful pointers for how this type of science/religion interaction might be further developed and deployed. (shrink)

This article provides a novel inroad to the field of process philosophy and its application. It does this by elucidating the relationship between two modes of thought—static and process thinking—as a key to cocreating ecological civilization. Static and process modes of thought are conceptualized in terms of five “basic orientations”: abstract and context, closed and open, isolating and relational, passive and generative, one-dimensional and multidimensional. Inspired by the work of Alfred North Whitehead, Arran Gare, and Julie Nelson, these dynamic dualisms (...) are resolved by nesting static perspectives within process-relational contexts. This article argues that “hegemonic static thinking” is guiding decision-making at root of global crises. While also avoiding “dualistic process thinking,” “encompassing process thinking” that includes and transcends static thinking is posited as a mode of thought conducive to more ecological and community-oriented decision-making across multiple scales. This article establishes the philosophical consistency of this nested “static-process framework,” using it to show how process metaphysics underpins interlinking shifts in worldviews, politics, and economics for moving from industrial to ecological civilization. (shrink)

Launched in 1999, at a time of radical change for the publishing industry, Persephone Books has become a successful independent publisher of neglected female authors mainly from the 20th-century inter-war period. Publishing being an industry primarily shaped by the differential distribution of symbolic and economic capital, competing principles of cultural legitimacy within an increasingly commercial climate clarify the position of modern publishing at the intersection of culture and commerce. This article explores how Persephone Books’ understated assertion of publishing’s ‘middle ground’ (...) and commitment to the historically reviled ‘middlebrow’ genre have reconciled the perennial tension between culture and commerce to create a thriving yet unintentional publishing brand. (shrink)

Seumas Miller, The Moral Foundations of Social Institutions, 371 pp. ISBN: 978-0-521-76794-1 hardback; 978-0-521-74439-3 paperback. If one were loo...