The Mīmāṃsā school of Indian philosophy has for its main purpose the interpretation of injunctions that are found in a set of sacred texts, the Vedas. In their works, Mīmāṃsā authors provide some of the most detailed and systematic examinations available anywhere of statements with a deontic force; however, their considerations have generally not been registered outside of Indological scholarship. In the present article we analyze the Mīmāṃsā theory of Vedic injunctions from a logical and philosophical point of view. (...) The theory at issue can be regarded as a system of reasoning based on certain fundamental principles, such as the distinction between strong and weak duties, and on a taxonomy of ritual actions. We start by reconstructing the conceptual framework of the theory and then move to a formalization of its core aspects. Our contribution represents a new perspective to study Mīmāṃsā and outlines its relevance, in general, for deontic reasoning. (shrink)

We present a unified vision of human knowledge, the external world and ourselves in the frame of an overall unity of Everything. Two main sources of knowledge are considered to this goal: an admittedly reductionist version of Modern Science and a few key elements of Oriental Philosophy. Our view is based on an analogy between the fundamental unity of Vedic ontology and the Grand Unification scheme of Particle Physics traced along the evolution of the Universe. Our key statement is (...) that these two sources of knowledge describe the same ontological story of separation, from an original One down to the multiplicity of the phenomenological world. We further substantiate this vision by drawing an analogy between the Residue of the Vedic sacrifice and the post-Big-Bang cosmological Matter-Antimatter Asymmetry. We also discuss a Big-Bang analogy between the postulated field of Inflationary Cosmology (the Inflaton) and the Vedic dissolution-decomposition of the cosmic progenitor Prajapati – whose body, according to Brahmanas texts, provides the material substrate of which the Universe is built. (shrink)

In _Sacrifice_, René Girard interrogates the Brahmanas of Vedic India, exploring coincidences with mimetic theory that are too numerous and striking to be accidental. Even that which appears to be dissimilar fails to contradict mimetic theory, but instead corresponds to the minimum of illusion without which sacrifice becomes impossible. The Bible reveals collective violence, similar to that which generates sacrifice everywhere, but instead of making victims guilty, the Bible and the Gospels reveal the persecutors of a single (...) victim. Instead of elaborating myths, they tell the truth absolutely contrary to the archaic sense. Once exposed, the single victim mechanism can no longer function as the model for would-be sacrificers. Recognizing that the Vedic tradition also converges on a revelation that discredits sacrifice, mimetic theory locates within sacrifice itself a paradoxical power of quiet reflection that leads, in the long run, to the eclipse of this institution which is violent but nevertheless fundamental to the development of human culture. Far from unduly privileging the Western tradition and awarding it a monopoly on the knowledge and repudiation of blood sacrifice, mimetic analysis recognizes comparable, but never truly identical, traits in the Vedic tradition. (shrink)

The present paper deals with the idea of understanding Vedic ethics as a code of righteous living, in the light of Mīmāṁsā philosophy. The paper also intends to reflect upon the possibility of such methods as a means of attaining liberation. In other words, the Vedas provide us with prescriptive codes of right and wrong actions. It commands us about duties and non-duties, through the performance of rituals, in order to lead a good life. We know that human endeavours (...) are primarily based on attaining the desired, and to prevent the unwanted ends. Hence, the entire effort of human actions lies in the fact that we want to attain the cessation of sufferings. This paves the way for studies in Soteriology, and the question arises that, could the Vedas be considered as a literature on Soteriology. The paper consists of a number of sections. The initial ones involve the linguistic analysis of the Vedic statements based on Sanskrit grammar and semantics. These are aimed at depicting the manner in which Vedic sentences act as prescriptive ethical codes. The latter ones deal with the questions raised by the opposing schools, namely Sāṁkhya-Yoga, against the idea of considering Vedas as a supreme sanction of means, leading beings to their salvation from empirical sufferings, and their plausible responses. Keywords: duties, ends, sacrifices, knowledge, liberation. (shrink)

In the present paper we model the Navya-Nyāya analysis of Vedic and secular injunctions and prohibitions by means of Giordani’s and Canavotto’s system ADL of dynamic deontic logic. Navya-Naiyāyikas analyze the meaning of injunctions and prohibitions by reducing them to plain indicative statements about certain properties whose presence or absence in the enjoined or prohibited action serves as a criterion for the truth or falsity of the “inducing” or “restraining knowledge”, a kind of qualificative cognition instilled in the recipient (...) of an injunction or prohibition. Thus, Navya-Naiyāyikas have found their own way to solve Jørgensen’s Puzzle concerning the very idea of a deontic logic as a tool to analyze arguments based on sentences which do not seem to be truth-apt. The teleological aspect of the Navya-Nyāya characterization of an enjoined or prohibited action can also give a clue to solutions of other puzzles and paradoxes which have beset the development of deontic logic in the West. A specific contrary-to-duty puzzle from the Indian tradition is related to the śyena, a malefic sacrifice meant for harming one’s enemy. The Vedic injunction to perform such a sacrifice runs counter to a religious practitioner’s duty not to harm a living being. In the present paper we examine the cogency of the very different solutions to this dilemma suggested by the Mīmāṃsaka Prabhākara on the one hand and the Navya-Naiyāyika Gaṅgeśa on the other hand. (shrink)

Deeply rooted in the Vedic tradition, animal sacrifice is a controversial issue associated with a larger discourse of violence and non-violence in South Asia. Most existent studies on Vedic killing focus on the polemics of ritual violence in six schools of Indian philosophy. However, insufficient attention has been paid to killing in Dharmaśāstric literature, the killing that is an indispensable element of a Vedic householder’s life. To fill in the gap, this paper analyzes the animal (...) class='Hi'>sacrifice in the Manubhāṣya of Medhātithi, perhaps the most influential exegesis of the Mānavadharmaśāstra. As an important but understudied Dharmaśāstric exegesis, the Manubhāṣya provides insights on how dharmaśāstrins as protagonists of Vedic tradition understand ritual killing while dialoguing with other traditions in the complex religious landscape of the ninth century Kashmir. By investigating Medhātithi’s commentary on Mānavadharmaśāstra 5.22–56, this paper interrogates how Medhatithi interprets sacrificial killing, and how his interpretation assists to buttress the authority of the Vedic tradition represented by the root text. I argue that Medhātithi’s exegesis of killing serves as apologetics that re-establishes the Vedic sacrificial tradition, which is challenged by popular non-Vedic practices. This study intends to contribute to a better understanding of animal sacrifice situated at the intersection of Vedic, Purānic and Tantric strands, and the way in which Dharmaśāstric exegesis as apologetics engages in the negotiation of violence. (shrink)

According to the Hindu tradition, the origin of the various philosophical ideas that were developed in the philosophical systems lies in the Vedas, a body of texts that seem to have been composed around two thousand years Before the Common Era (BCE). While the Vedas contain a myriad of different themes, ranging from hymns for deities and rules of fire sacrifices to music and magic, there is no doubt that one finds in them an exemplary spirit of inquiry into “the (...) one being” (ekam sat) that underlies the diversity of empirical phenomena, and into the origin of all things. (“Was there being or non‐being at the beginning?”) One finds also predelineations of such concepts of ṛta (truth or moral order), karma and the afterlife, and the three qualities (or guṇas: sattva, rajas, and tamas) constituting nature (prakṛti). It is in the Upaniṣads (a group of texts composed after the Vedas and ranging from 1000 bce to the time of Gautama, the Buddha), that the thinking, while still retaining its poetic flavor, develops a more strictly philosophical character. While still concerned with many different themes belonging to cosmology (“How did the one being become many?”) and psychology (“What does the empirical person consist of?”), the Upaniṣads contain attempts to reinterpret, in symbolic terms, the elaborate Vedic sacrifices, and to defend, in many different ways, one central philosophical thesis – that is, the identity of Brahman (the highest and the greatest, the source of all things) and ātman (the self within each person). With this last identification, a giant step was taken by the authors of the Upaniṣads, a step that was decisive for the development of Indian philosophy. The Vedas had already decided, famously in the Nāsadiya Sukata, that at the beginning of things there must have been being and not non‐being (for something cannot come out of nothing); now this primeval being was said to be the same as the spirit within. The highest wisdom was intuitively realizing this identity of subject and object (tat tvarn asi). How to know it was the issue. Suggestions ranged from contemplative meditation to austere self‐mortification. The idea of yoga and a picture of the yogin make their appearance – possibly having a different origin – and blend with the central thesis of the Upaniṣads. If the reality underlying outer appearance is the universal spirit within, is then the world merely phenomenal appearance (like the magician's creation, māyā), or is the brahman‐ātman to be construed as the indwelling spirit of all things? These become the leading disputational questions amongst the commentators on the Upaniṣads, and amongst the various schools of the Vedānta philosophy. (shrink)

The primary aim of this article is to provide a case study of textual hermeneutics in the context of Vedic literature. It will be shown how some interpretative pitfalls, into which contemporary translators have fallen, can be avoided if we broaden the perspective beyond the semantics of words and apply a principle of plausibility. The case study concerns the analysis of Ṛgveda 10.28, with special reference to the wildlife episodes depicted in verses 10cd-11ab. A few modern translations in Western (...) languages of 10cd are here considered. Some of them show that a principle of plausibility has been actually taken into account by their authors while approaching the text, albeit the result does not seem always entirely satisfactory. Some other translations seem not to carefully consider the broader context, therefore failing to convincingly make sense of the original text. After an introduction on the general subject of the hymn as it emerges from verses 1-9, i.e., the Vedic sacrifice and the subsequent consumption of the sacrificial offerings, arguments and textual evidence are provided in order to show how the reading of 10cd acquires a cogent and very plausible meaning if regarded in light of verse 11ab. (shrink)

This essay is a comparison between two ancient theories of language—the 5th century BCE Indian etymologist Yāska and the 4th century BCE Chinese philosopher Xunzi 荀子. Specifically, it is a reading of the theory of “the rectification of names” in Xunzi through the lens of Yāska. Xunzi is known for his view that humanity’s innate tendencies need to be shaped through education and ritual. Similarly, ancient Indian authors like Yāska understand that a person is created, or made, through the performance (...) of Vedic sacrifice. Both thinkers’ constructivist theories of language and meaning proceed from these ritual assumptions. However, Yāska would query Xunzi’s inherent distrust of multiple meanings of words and their negative effects on a functional state. Guided instead by a theory of the transcendence of Vedic language, Yāska would argue that the more one can proliferate possible meanings the more powerful a word becomes. (shrink)

Scholars of the religious studies of India have long been intrigued by the seminal roles of rituals in diverse strands of the Hindu tradition. The most outstanding among them pertained to the institution of tīrthas, evident during this period, not only of the remarkable extension of the ritual format and its definitional scope but also an unprecedented proliferation in its numbers. A ritual outline very closely related to tīrtha-centric activities, featured at many prominent religious centres from the time of the (...) Purāṇas, was collective bathing in holy rivers or water bodies on certain occasions, which gained wide popularity and appeal. Given their status, it is important to explore the raison d ̍être of such water rituals and how the ritual of holy bath heightened. For this purpose, the paper is divided into three sections: the first section explores the sacrificial ritualism in relation to the Vedic Brahmanism and its symbolic transformation over disputation of the Vedic sacrifice. The second section delves into the understanding of the symbolic importance of water in the rituals of the Hindu religion and its association with the sacred sites or tīrthas. The last section elucidates the likely factors contributing to the growing attractiveness of holy water bath in Purāṇic Hinduism which reflects the changed character and format of the genre of religious texts that began to be composed from the Purāṇic period onwards. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Buddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious OthersTerry C. MuckBuddhist Inclusivism: Attitudes Towards Religious Others. By Kristin Beise Kiblinger. Hants, England: Ashgate, 2005. 145 pp.Kristen Beise Kiblinger, who teaches in the religion department at Thiel College, has written a provocative and imaginative book. It is provocative in that [End Page 168] she appears to be doing buddhology even though she resists calling it that. She says she doesn't want to (...) take the voice of a buddhologian. She does not describe what is as a phenomenologist might or what was as an historian of religion might, or what should be as a buddhologian might. She describes what might be, as a—well, as a participant-philosopher might. She writes as an outsider taking the voice of an insider.Kiblinger chooses as her topic the relationship of Buddhists to people of other religions. She begins by noting that Buddhists themselves have not explicitly addressed this topic in their religious philosophizing, at least not to the extent Christians have. But, she suggests, implicitly they behave as if they do have a favored response to this issue. Citing a wide variety of Buddhist sources across the Buddhist spectrum, she concludes that inclusivism is the most natural position for Buddhists to take vis-à-vis the other religions. She describes that position in some detail, all the while persisting in her refusal to be considered a spokesperson in the insider sense.Kiblinger draws her examples from the way two historical figures related to people of non-Buddhist ideologies and from historical contacts Buddhism as a movement had with other religions or sects. The first historical figure is Siddhartha Gautama himself. The Buddha, Kiblinger notes, was not shy about identifying what made any religion (not just his dhamma) useful—the noble eightfold path. This path is the core of Gautama's dhamma, but it also appears in other religions in other forms. The Buddha put forth the presence of this content as the measure of a religion's usefulness (see the Mahaparinibbana Sutta). And of course the parable of the raft relativizes all religious teachings, making them true only to the extent that they enable humans to "cross the stream" of temporal existence, a common tenet of the inclusivist position in all its forms.Asoka represents a second example of Buddhist inclusivism for Kiblinger. In the seventh and twelfth of his Rock Edicts, Asoka makes clear that all members of all religious traditions are welcome to practice in his kingdom, even though he thinks Buddhism is the best position. He makes clear that both exclusivism and intolerance of other religious ideas are not acceptable positions in his way of looking at the spiritual dimension of the world. Existentially, Asoka's life story is a model of a reformed "exclusivist" finally embracing the all-truth-no-matter-where-you-find-it-is-still-truth position.Not just these giant figures model inclusivism. Buddhism as a movement has consistently, Kiblinger argues, behaved toward other movements as inclusivists would. She uses as a first example the Buddhist attitude toward Vedic sacrifice, the religious practice most liable to be cast aside by the new teaching of Gautama. We see in this example, Kiblinger says, "the technique of significant reinterpretation and new application rather than subordination" (p. 41). She also notes that a technique she calls "reinterpretation by ethicization" that does not throw out Vedic teaching altogether but claims at its root a teaching that was originally Buddhist.Evidence for the inclusivist position can also be found in the way Mahayanists treated Theravadins, or Hinayanists as Kiblinger refers to them. Scholars of Buddhism [End Page 169] have for the most part recognized that the term "hinayana," perhaps best translated as "lesser vehicle," is a pejorative term given to Theravadins by the Mahayanists, the "great vehicle" folks. Kiblinger argues that even though Mahayanists consider their tradition superior (a common trait of all inclusivists, Buddhist or not), they do so with an openness to the value of the way Theravadins approach the problem of enlightenment. Their way may not be the best, but it is a way, and in some contexts it may be an effective way. Mahayanists are able... (shrink)

In his edicts, the emperor Aśoka Maurya extols brāhmaṇas, usually alongside ascetics (śramaṇas), as deserving honor and generosity, though he never alludes to their connection with ritual, the central theme of early Brahmanical literature. On the other hand, in Rock Edicts I and IX, he disparages sacrifices, and ceremonies performed by women, advocating instead the practice of ethical virtues. Close attention to the wording of Rock Edict IX shows that Aśoka and the Brahmanical Gṛhyasūtras talk about domestic rites in very (...) similar terms, even describing them with the same adjective (uccāvaca). Both of them note the special role of women as a source of knowledge of such ceremonies, and differ only in how they evalute the value of such ceremonial: Aśoka disparages women’s rites, while some Gṛhyasūtras explicitly validate women as authorities in such matters. A comparison of these sources highlights the distinctive role of the term dhamma in Aśoka’s usage (in contrast to maṅgala (auspicious folk rites), and may provide some guidance for dating the Gṛhyasūtras. The fact that Aśoka does not explicitly connect such rites with the brāhmaṇas suggests that in his experience at least (i.e., in Magadha) Brahmins’ religious authority had nothing to do with domestic ritual. We may conclude that the Vedic canonization of Gṛhya ritual norms was not yet recognized outside of priestly circles, if it had developed yet at all. (shrink)

The Mīmā ṃ sā school of Indian philosophy elaborated complex ways of interpreting the prescriptive portions of the Vedic sacred texts. The present article is the result of the collaboration of a group of scholars of logic, computer science, European philosophy and Indian philosophy and aims at the individuation and analysis of the deontic system which is applied but never explicitly discussed in Mīmā ṃ sā texts. The article outlines the basic distinction between three sorts of principles —hermeneutic, linguistic (...) and deontic. It proposes a mathematical formalization of the deontic principles and uses it to discuss a well-known example of seemingly conflicting statements, namely the prescription to undertake the malefic Śyena sacrifice and the prohibition to perform any harm. (shrink)

The Mīmāṃsā mission of disambiguating Vedic texts led the thinkers of the tradition to confront several instances of apparently conflicting Vedic commands. Consider the two cases: ‘give alms daily’ vs ‘do not give alms during ritual X’, and ‘never harm another’ vs ‘sacrifice an animal during ritual Y’. Each command in these two cases is derived from the Vedas and Mīmāṃsā authors thus attempted to resolve such cases of deontic conflict by putting forth hermeneutic solutions, without taking (...) recourse to any other epistemic source. In this paper, I present several instances of conflicting Vedic commands and indicate three distinct types of deontic conflicts as well as their corresponding solutions as identified by Mīmāṃsā thinkers. This study is based on discussions put forth in four important Mīmāṃsā texts: the Pūrvamīmāṃsāsūtra, the Śābarabhāṣya, Kumārila’s Ṭupṭīkā and Āpadeva’s Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa. I explain the foundational difference between prescriptions and prohibitions for Mīmāṃsā thinkers, and thereby also discuss several technical conceptions such as paryudāsa, vikalpa, prāpti and bādha among others. In doing so, I attempt to highlight certain fundamental tenets of the vast and intricate hermeneutic framework developed within the Mīmāṃsā tradition. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE IN HINDU RELIGIOUS TRADITIONS Francis X. Clooney, SJ. Boston College Outline I.Violence, Sacrifice and Ritual 1. Some basic attitudes toward the killing of animals 2.Resolving the problem of sacrificial violence by internalization 3.Substitutions 4.Renunciation and nonviolence: an elite pathway 5.Violence andnonviolenceinrelation to vegetarianism: Hans Schmidt's theses?. Traditional Hindu Theorizations of Violence in Mimamsa Ritual Theory and Vedanta Theology 1. The ritual analysis (at Mimamsa Sutra (...) 1.1.2) of the Shyena rite which is performed in order to harm enemies 2.The Vedanta analysis (at Uttara Mimamsa Sutra 3.1.25) of ritual violence in relation to the prohibition of violence??. Violence in the Life of the State HOFrancis X. Clooney, S.J. 1. The royal power to punish (danda) 2.The synthesis of the ideals of brahmin and king a..The distribution and management of violence in the Laws ofManu (1st century CE) b. Policy toward warfare in the Arthashastra of Kautilya 3.The collapse of the brahmanical synthesis—and the emergence of a (seemingly) more nonviolent Hinduism 4.A comment on Gandhi (1 869-1948) and the contemporary emergence of post-Gandhian Hindu perspectives IV.Alternate Views from Outside the Sanskritic Tradition 1. Tamil Wisdom on Violence and Nonviolence: a.Tirukkural (c. 2nd century CE) b.Cilappatikaram (5th century CE) 2.Blood and Goddesses 3.From a Village Perspective a. Some Trouble with Cows b.Mahasweta Devi and the Literary Exposure of Violence V.The Question of a Christian Perspective on the Hindu Treatment of Violence and Religion: Are Victims Necessary? Some Presuppositions: • The following reflections, complex as they are, are governed by a reluctance to simplify Hindu teaching. I seek to avoid the view that the Hindu traditions had only one view of violence and nonviolence. • I use the term "Hindu" loosely and as a shorthand, without claiming that there is a single Hindu tradition, or a single creed shared by all Hindus, or a single attitude toward violence. But neither do I claim that there are simply many traditions without any common elements which justify the appellation "Hindu." • I am reluctant to idealize the Hindu traditions as if nonviolence must necessarily be taken as the epitome ofHindu thought. India's traditions are complex, and require complex treatment. • A serious artificiality of this paper is that I treat Hinduism without simultaneously lookinginto Buddhist andJain materials, though both were traditions with important and enduring commitments to nonviolence. Particularly with respect to the renunciant, marginal components of traditions, one ought not to make overly neat or decisive distinctions Violence and Nonviolence in Hindu Religious Traditions 1 1 1 between the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain theories and practices related to violence and nonviolence. • I attempt to give preference to indigenous discussions ofissues related to violence and nonviolence; the context and mode of thinking are important, notjust the conclusions drawn. I therefore avoid simply mining Hindu texts for an answer to a contemporary question, "What is the Hindu attitude toward violence and nonviolence?" • In most ofwhat follows we must distinguish contexts where "violence" indicates "physical action which causes pain to some living being," from contexts where "violence" indicates "an intention, rooted in anger or malice, to hurt someone." I use the word "violence" for both in order to highlight the complex issues of distinction involved. In considering the Sanskrit formulations, one likewise has to distinguish himsa as "causing pain" from himsa as "intending to harm." • It is often difficult to date ancient texts, and even when one narrows down a date—within 200-300 years—its significance still depends on other, often equally broadly stated dates. Nevertheless, I do offer dates throughout, as summarized here: •ancient Vedic sacrificial practices, from before 1200 BCE •Vedic ritual analyses and reformulations of sacrifices as ritualized acts, in the Brahmanas, from after 1000 BCE •the Upanishadic exploration of the deeper meanings of ritual and interiorized alternatives to ritual, from after 900 BCE •the Buddha, c. 500 BCE •key texts in the theorization of royal power, The Laws of Manu (beginning of Common Era) and Arthashastra (c. 150 CE) •the Tamil wisdom text Tirukkural (100 CE) •Goddess texts as evidenced in Sanskrit formulations, from after 500 CE... (shrink)

Lucian Blaga (1895-1961), the famous Romanian philosopher who started as a poet and took his PhD in Philosophy and Biology in Vienna is our contemporary, illustrating the spiritual changes at the borders between modernism and postmodernism; he is meant to be studied from the perspective of the postmodernist philosophy of religion. Lucian Blaga was a writer, playwright, journalist, professor and librarian who had a vaste writing; as a philosopher he is a unique author of philosophical system, in the Romanian philosophy (...) where his “deconstructionism” is the fact that Blaga “deconstructs” Rigveda by the analysis of the word brahman, specifying that because of the mentality about the sacrificer as a being and God at the same time, the vedic believer “takes courage” towards the deities, loses humility, gaining in return “boldness towards gods”. (shrink)

Those who anticipated the demise of religion and the advent of a peaceful, secularized global village have seen the last two decades confound their predictions. René Girard’s mimetic theory is a key to understanding the new challenges posed by our world of resurgent violence and pluralistic cultures and traditions. Girard sought to explain how the Judeo-Christian narrative exposes a founding murder at the origin of human civilization and demystifies the bloody sacrifices of archaic religions. Meanwhile, his book Sacrifice, a (...) reading of conflict and sacrificial resolution in the Vedic Brahmanas, suggests that mimetic theory’s insights also resonate with several non-Western religious and spiritual traditions. This volume collects engagements with Girard by scholars of Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Buddhism and situates them within contemporary theology, philosophy, and religious studies. (shrink)

The Chinese parallel to the Pali-Kutadantasutta marks one of the major turning points in Old Indian history of ideas: the transition from magic to ethics. In this sermon, the Buddha rejects the Vedic animal sacrifice and re-interprets it according to Buddhist ethics. He preaches sacrifices in a new sense of the word: the sacrifice of giving alms to Buddhist monks, or, even better, of building monasteries, of converting to Buddhism as a Buddhist layman, of obeying the five (...) Buddhist rules for laymen, or - finally and most meritorious - becoming a Buddhist monk. In Beginnings of Buddhist Ethics, Konrad Meisig translates the Buddhist Chinese text for the first time and contrasts it in synopsis with the Pali. The text is given in the original characters along with the Pinyin transcription. The text-critical introduction deals with the variae lectiones both of the Chinese and the Pali; the final analysis focuses on the literary stratification and criticism of forms, thus reconstructing the archetypical nucleus of the Kutadantasutta."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

RESUMENEl artículo analiza las concepciones del espacio y del tiempo en el periodo védico tardío, utilizando como fuentes primarias el antiguo corpus de textos sánscritos conocido como upaniṣad. Para ello se estudian las diversas cosmogonías y las diferentes formas de legitimación de una gradual transformación del sacrificio público (dominante en la época védica temprana, caracterizada por las colecciones de himnos y una literatura de comentarios de carácter litúrgico) a la experiencia privada de la meditación y la especulación filosófica (característica de (...) tradiciones ascéticas).PALABRAS CLAVECOSMOGONÍA, UPANIṣAD, ESPACIO, TIEMPOABSTRACTIn this article we analyse the conceptions of space and time in the later Vedic period, using as primary sources the old corpus of Sanskrit texts known as Upaniṣad. For this purpose we study the various cosmogonies and different forms of legitimation of a gradual transformation of the public sacrifice (dominant in early Vedic times, characterized by collections of hymns and a literature of comments of a liturgical nature) to the private meditation experience and philosophical speculation (characteristic of ascetic traditions).KEYWORDSCOSMOGONY, UPANIṣAD, SPACE, TIME. (shrink)

Eco–spiritualism is not a new idea; in fact, it has a long history in the Vedic tradition. ‘Vasudhaiva Kuṭumbakam’ in the mantra of Mahā–Upaniṣad of the Sāmaveda tradition presents us with a thought–provoking message, namely, that every being or entity on this earth is one family [अयं बन्धुरयं नेति गणना लघुचेतसाम् ।उदारचरितानां तु वसुधैव कुटुम्बकम् ॥७१॥]. In the Vedic civilization the realm of ethical thinking was extensive. The Vedic science of ecology addresses eco–spiritualism from the perspective of (...) the cosmological and the ontological unity of nature. However, the ethics of natural laws, such as ṛta, satya and dharma, plays a very vital role in the human being’s environmental actions. Firstly, this paper intends to trace and identify the ecological divinity of the Vedas. Secondly, the paper shall endeavour to apply and evaluate ancient scriptures and their understanding of the environment in terms of its intrinsic value and its relation to human beings. We conclude with the discussion on the problems of eco–spiritualism in the contemporary world. (shrink)

Vedic Voices: Intimate Narratives of a Living Andhra Tradition. By David M. Knipe. New York: Oxford University Press, 2015. Pp. xxii + 340, illus. $35.

The Papers In This Volume, Presented At A Seminar Organised By The Gurukula Kangri Viswavidyalaya, Offer A Kaleidoscopic View Of Myriad Aspects Of Himalayan Eco-System Like Causes Of Its Degradation, Impact Of Hydroelectric To Deforestation And Role Of Wild Life. The Deliberations Also Highlight The Relevance Of Vedic Philosophy In Conserving The Fragile Himalayan Eco-System.

Papers presented at a national seminar on Vedic texts and the knowledge systems of India, held at Kalady during 9-11 December 2009.

The articles by Henk Bodewitz collected in this volume, published between 1969 and 2013, deal with Vedic cosmology and ethics on basis of a systematic philological study of early Vedic texts, from the Ṛgveda to various Brāhmaṇas, Āraṇyakas and Upaniṣads.

In this paper I elaborate a notion of nurses’ professional self as one who is attracted towards intrinsic value. My previous work in 2003 has shown how nurses, who see intrinsic value in their work, experience self‐affirmation when they believe that they have made a difference to that which they see to have value. The aim of this work is to reveal a further aspect of nurses’ professional self. I argue that nurses’ desire towards that which they see to have (...) intrinsic value, is a necessary and self‐transcending aspect of a nurses’ professional self. I argue further that nurses’ desire towards intrinsic value inevitably involves their vulnerability. Nurses who see intrinsic value are shown to be vulnerable to self‐sacrifice in their inclination to work for the good of their patients, at the expense of themselves. Yet an ability to transcend their self in this way remains a necessary aspect of a nurse's professional self, which requires nurture and support through nurse education. (shrink)

This paper compares two ancient traditions of knowledge: The Indo-European vedic texts and the Edda poems of the Scandinavian and Germanic people. There appear to be close similarities between these two traditions in terms of four major concepts: A basic unified state lying at the foundation of the vast variety in the universe; the process of creation from within this unified field; the development of higher states of individual consciousness; and the development of higher stages in the collective consciousness (...) of society. Today this knowledge has practical implications for improving performance and quality of life, as shown by scientific research. (shrink)

Vedic Studies: Language, Texts, Culture, and Philosophy. Proceedings of the 15th World Sanskrit Conference, vol. 1. Edited by Hans Henrich Hock. New Delhi: RaShtRiya SanSkRit SanSthan, 2014. Pp. viii + 244.

The Vedic -ya-presents: Passives and Intransitivity in Old Indo-Aryan. By Leonid Kulikov. Leiden Studies in Indo-European, vol. 19. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2012. Pp. xxix + 994.

Vedic Vision Of Consciousness And Reality Is An Attempt At A Systematic Presentation Of The Visions Of Vedic Seers Concerning Consciousness In Relationship To Reality. The Relevance Of This Attempt Has Got Enhanced Today Due To Latest Discoveries In Quantum Physics Tending To Accord Some Sort Of Substantiality To Consciousness. This Is The Position Vedic Seers Held Long Ago As Is Evident From The Vedanta. The Vedanta, However Has Ignored The Vedic Samhitas On Metaphusical Issues Including (...) Consciousness. The Present Work Has Come In Fulfillment Of This Lacuna In The Tradition Of Vedic Thought. It Has Been Shown Here Strictly On The Basis Of Textual Evidence How The Vedic Seers Were Involved In The Search For Consciousness In Its Purest Form Coinciding With Reality. The Coincidence Of The Modern Science In Its Latest Developments With The Vedic Viewpoint In This Regard, Suggests The Necessity Of A Paradigmatic Shift In The Human Thinking At This Juncture From Matter To Consciousness As The Most Fundamental Reality. These Issues Have Been Discussed Here From Various Viewpoints Including Scientific, Philosophical, Psychological, Theological And Epistemological. (shrink)

Intellectual sacrifice -- Intellectual expulsion -- Historical forms of mystification -- The path of demystification -- Conclusion -- A brief letter from René Girard -- Other mimetic paradoxes -- Interlude: corrections and paradoxes -- Girard's ontological argument for the existence of God -- Mimetic theory's post-Kantian legacy -- Mimetic theory and hermeneutic Communism -- The self in crisis -- Hermeneutic mimetic theory.

In This Book The Author Have Tried To Present A Historical Study Of Vedic Interpretation Confines Ourselves To The Study Of These Various Parts Of The Vedic Literature As Some Interpretation Of The Vedic Samhita. The Author Observed The Vedic Myth, Rituals And Philosophy As Interpreted By Madhvacarya The Founder Of Dvaita School Of Vedanta.

Vanessa Carbonell argues that sacrifices of self, unlike most other sacrifices, cannot be analyzed entirely in terms of wellbeing. For this reason, Carbonell considers sacrifices of self as posing a problem for the wellbeing theory of sacrifice and for discussions about the demandingness of morality. In this paper I take issue with Carbonell’s claim that sacrifices of self cannot be captured as prudential harms. First, I explain why Carbonell considers sacrifices of self particularly problematic. In order to determine whether (...) some state of affairs is harmful for someone, it is necessary to assume a particular account of welfare. In this paper, I assume the self-fulfillment account of welfare. I introduce this theory and show that it can account for the harm of sacrifices of self. (shrink)

Suppose that people in the affluent countries can easily save the lives of the starving needy in poor countries. Then, three points seem to follow. First, it is wrong for these people not to make the easy rescue . Second, it is wrong to stop making the easy rescue even if they have made many rescues already . Third, if we accept the first two points, the demands of morality are super-extreme. That is, people have to keep making trivial sacrifices (...) until there is no more trivial sacrifices to make . Here, predictably, our commonsense will resist the third point. However, I argue in this paper that, since the first two points are harder to refute, we have to accept the third point anyway. (shrink)

It is often claimed that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. This claim is made because it is thought that it is the level of sacrifice involved that prevents these acts from being morally required. In this paper, I will argue against this claim. I will start by making a distinction between two ways of understanding the claim that all acts of supererogation involve sacrifice. I will then examine some purported counterexamples to the view that supererogation always (...) involves sacrifice and examine their limitations. Next, I will examine how this view might be defended, building on comments by Dale Dorsey and Henry Sidgwick. I will then argue that the view and the argument in favor of it should be rejected. I will finish by showing how an alternative explanation for the limits of moral obligation avoids the problems facing The Sacrifice View. (shrink)

Sacrifice is shown to be (1) a bestowal which brings pain to the donor; (2) making something holy; (3) the shedding of innocent blood. Six different meanings to 'giving' are analyzed: protection, Bribery, Commerce, Reward, Gift, Sacrifice. This last is existentially intelligible, Not morally intelligible. Gifts celebrate the worth of the recipient, Sacrifices the worth of both donor and recipient. The shedding of blood is explained as necessary to 'give of oneself', And hence it is the highest level (...) of bestowal, And thus is virtuous. (shrink)

In ancient China, the preparation of food and the offering up of food as a religious sacrifice were intimately connected with models of sagehood and ideas of self-cultivation and morality. Drawing on received and newly excavated written sources, Roel Sterckx's book explores how this vibrant culture influenced the ways in which the early Chinese explained the workings of the human senses, and the role of sensory experience in communicating with the spirit world. The book, which begins with a survey (...) of dietary culture from the Zhou to the Han and offers some intriguing insights into the ritual preparation of food--some butchers and cooks were highly regarded and would rise to positions of influence as a result of their culinary skills--and the sacrificial ceremony itself. As a major contribution to the study of early China and to the development of philosophical thought, the book will be essential reading for students of the period, and for anyone interested in ritual and religion in the ancient world"--Provided by publisher. (shrink)

Early Vedic possesses a chameleon-like verb form called the injunctive, whose uses partly overlap with, and alternate with, those of the subjunctive, optative and imperative moods, and with the past and present tenses. Being morphologically tenseless and moodless, the injunctive has attracted interest from a comparative Indo-European perspective because it appears to be an archaic layer of the finite verb morphology. Its place and function in the verb system, however, remains disputed. In Kiparsky 1968 I argued that it is (...) tenseless and moodless not only morphologically but also functionally, and that injunctive forms acquire modal and temporal interpretations only contextually. The injunctive’s only intrinsic grammatical features are aspect, voice and person/number. This paper provides new evidence for that view (section 1), and goes on to argue that such underspecified forms in paradigms support morpheme-based theories of morphology over realizational theories such as Paradigm Function Morphology (section 2), and that the rise and loss of the injunctive is connected to other changes in the pre- and post-Vedic aspect, tense, and mood system (section 3). (shrink)

Heidegger’s treatment of self-sacrifice has suffered neglect. In this paper, it is critically analysed and found wanting, and it is argued that for a proper understanding its historical location must be taken into account. The way he treats self-sacrifice presents a particular instance of many recurrent features in his thinking. Some of these can be better understood by reference to the kinship with certain forms of religious thought. In particular, the absence of a moral dimension has a counterpart (...) in certain familiar forms of religiosity. (shrink)

Max Horkheimer and Theodor W. Adorno famously argued that ‘myth is already enlightenment, and enlightenment reverts to mythology.’ Although much scholarship has analyzed and built upon Horkheimer and Adorno’s insight, it has often conflated myth with another concept: epic. By closely reading Horkheimer and Adorno’s Dialectic of Enlightenment, this article disentangles the two concepts and elucidates key features of myth. Sacrifice, it argues, stood at the centre of myth, connecting and organizing its other dimensions. Next, the article reconstructs the (...) lineage of Horkheimer and Adorno’s account of myth and sacrifice in the fields of anthropology, ethnology, and sociology. Specifically, Horkheimer and Adorno drew on analyses of sacrificial rites in these disciplines to argue that sacrifices constituted a transaction between worshipers and gods and, therefore, established control, disempowerment, and fraud. Finally, the article takes up Horkheimer and Adorno’s task of tracing the conduits between myth and enlightenment by identifying parallel features of sacrifice and modern wage labor. To conclude, the article indicates the significance of mythical sacrifice by connecting its analysis of wage labour to contemporary theorizing about the ‘theological dimensions of capitalism.’ Together, these arguments show the centrality of Dialectic to theories of myth as conceptual tools and critical resources. (shrink)

From Thomas Hobbes to Jeremy Bentham, 'British Moralists' have questioned whether being virtuous makes you happy. Roger Crisp elucidaties their views on happiness and virtue, self-interest and sacrifice, and well-being and morality, and highlights key themes such as psychological egoism, evaluative hedonism, and moral reason in their thought.